*1 COURT THE SUPREME IN 532 In re Brownlee BROWNLEE SCOTTWEBSTER in the matter of: No. 159 (Filed January 1981) 6 may appeal Appeal Error 7—who § 1. and privy is not party to the record or who is not not a to an action One who is judgment appeal lower court. of a to from
entitled requirement 7; juvenile that Appeal court Error Infants § § 2. order — 21— super- by county appeal county right pay for treatment —no —exercise jurisdiction by appellate visory court by County right appeal entered from orders not have the Wake did county pay directing juvenile delinquency proceeding for in a district court Austin, (1) juvenile’s Texas since Schools in treatment at the Brown (2) county juvenile proceeding, party G.S. 7A-667did was not a to the However, juvenile proceeding. county appeal empower in a to take an by pursuant to Supreme the district court the ordered entered Court will review IV, 12(1) supervisory powers the N.C. Constitution. Art. § its under county pay delinquent out-of-state that 3. Infants § 20— —order by authority trial court treatment —no require authority 7A-649(6)to under G.S. not have the The district court did facility delinquent County pay at a treatment of a for the state. another dissenting. Justice Carlton dissenting opinion. joins in the
Justice Exum Bason, J., County appeal from orders WAKE PURPORTED August September 1980 in WAKE 22 entered 1980 16 District Court. pursuant proceeding instituted and heard
This was Code, Articles 41-54 of Juvenile provisions of the North Carolina begun proceeding was Chapter the General Statutes. 7A of years juvenile (Scott) 14 old. He was when the October 1978 and, subsequently, alterna- adjudged delinquent, numerous pursued in an effort to tives were
Scott. unsuccessful, having proved the court
All of these alternatives Following hearing August 1980. a further on 6 conducted order, hearing entry an an the court conducted additional and the history complete is best hearing September A of the case on 12 1980. presented quoting which were entered from the orders hearing. following court each August 1980 order are as follows: portions
Pertinent FALL TERM 1980 hearing 6,1980, *2 August upon This cause came on for on by Williams, for Review J. Motion Steven Chief Court Counselor, following per- Tenth Judicial District. The Brownlee; present hearing: Cop- sons were for said Scott Rain, per Brownlee; Williams, mother of Scott Steven J. Counselor; Kay Mayberry, Chief Court and Martha County Department Wake The of Social Services. res- pondent Johnson, represented by child was Sandra L. Attorney Cooke, at Law. John C. Attor- Assistant ney, appeared County. on behalf of Wake hearing August 6,1980,
At the on Mr. Cooke voiced county’s hearing interest said that the Motion for requested Review that the court consider entity pay financial resources to for needed respondent treatment and educational services of the Austin, child at Brown School in Texas. Mr. Cooke objected testimony further the Chief Court Counse- regarding opinions lor treat- of others as Scott’s ment and educational needs and as to information re- regarding possible placements ceived from others hearing August 18,1980, Scott. The was continued until upon persons the court’s own motion so that those whose opinions were to be testified to Mr. Williams could present hearing at the and available for examination county attorney, county and so that the would have opportunity prepare present and evidence. County’s requesting Motion that the court rule county party juvenile proceeding that said is not a to this 11, August was filed on hearing Said on 1980. motion came 18,1980. August appeared on Mr. on Cooke be- county. respondent represented by half of the ruling Sandra L. Johnson. The court deferred its on said proceeded county’s hearing motion and objection. with the over the 18, 1980, . August having . . on been continued from August 6, 1980.
* * * evidence, considering including After the factual witnesses, testimony reports documents written and COURT IN THE SUPREME re
In Brownlee needs, concerning the court the child’s condition forth and enters its conclusions finds the facts set below judgment as follows: of law thereon FACT
FINDINGS OF judicial as fact all 1. The court takes notice of finds rectírds matters set in official court related forth respondent child. 25, adjudicated delinquent on October
2. Scott was Disposition two allow 1978. was continued for weeks to plan, temporary development time for of treatment placement House. at Wake *3 by incorporated report reference the
3.... Said order resulting per- psychological a evaluation of Scott from Robinson, 18, Marguerite on formed M.A. October 1978, implementation and for of the recommenda- called psychological tions therein. evaluation contained Said average intelligence found Scott to be a child of above deep-seated problems keep with emotional which him using intelligence potential from his to its and result in poor Hospital inner controls. Evaluation at Dorothea Dix recommended, temporary placement was with at Wake report pointed House to continue. evaluation probable long-term therapeutic Scott’s need inter- vention. during at Dix Hospital
4. Scot evaluated was Dorothea upon November of 1978 referral from Trentman Mental was Health Scott denied admission to Dorothea Center. Hospital upon diagnosis of‘Impulse Dix Personality.’ based Ridden dependent upon
Scott was found to be his impulses, of and environment for control his program offering and with external structure controls management, probably throughout behavior his adoles- cence, was recommended. 14, Duncraig Manor
5. Scott admitted on March was 1979, May 1979, discharged in from which he was as a problems. result of behavioral 25, 1979, adjudicated delinquent Scott on
6. was June placed probation. twelve on months TERM FALL re Brownlee In 19, adjudicated delinquent November on was 7. Scott custody the North 1979, committed to and was Resources, Division of Department Human Carolina Services, The court recommended on said date. Youth given placement of Scott considerations be that Department operated special programs several requested the Div- and further Human Resources court, immediately advise the of Youth Services ision following screening program was available of what regarding avail- plan or information No treatment Scott. from the programs received this court has been able of Youth Services. Division by the Div- placed at Samarcand Manor Scott was
8. Services, he was considered for where ision of Youth program XX but was not admitted to the Title admission Shortly arrived at Samar- program. after Scott to said Cornwall, cand, psychiatrist consult- Dr. Thomas a child him to ing him and found at Samarcand [examined anxious, feeling depressed, was that his situation hopeless]. Hospital] Dix State was admitted to
9. Scott [Dorothea 21,1980, discharged January on for evaluation 27, 1980, findings February upon is a child that he on ‘long standing problems’ in of a personality need begin to learn to trust where he can safe environment being placed on him. Scott people and to tolerate limits *4 suffering ‘Impulse diagnosed from an Ridden was Personality as Personality questionable Borderline inappro- hospital Organization’ as an and was seen long term treatment at Dorothea priate candidate psy- from the intensive would not benefit Dix because he pharmacological treatment avail- chotherapeutic and programs through hospital’s for adolescents. able to of the Chief Court Counselor Efforts the office 10. state-supported placement residen- for Scott locate have unsuccessful. tial treatment facilities been his serious in need of treatment 11. Scott remains specialized educational serv- problems and emotional has received and is his needs. He not appropriate to ices receiving appropriate educational services there. not COURT IN THE SUPREME Brownlee
In re Treatment appropriate his education needs are not available to him at Manor. Samarcand opinion directly
12. It is the of Dr. Cornwall who was involved in Hospital, Scott’s evaluation at Dorothea Dix and of Dr. Lenore Behar of the Division of Mental Health facility Services that appropri- no residential treatment currently ate Scott’s needs State exists of North Carolina, program and no such is known to the court.
13. psychiatric The educational and needs of Scott custody Brownlee while of the committed Division of Youth Services have not been met.
14. The Director the Division of Youth Services did [option] exercise his under G.S. 7A-665 to seek an disposition alternative for a committed to the care of the Division and found not to be suitable for its program.
* * * 16. The committing court now finds that its order Scott custody of the Division of Youth Services is not in his best interest and further finds that said commitment inappropriate in that the court’s increased awareness severity of Scott’s emotional disturbance and the problems, extent of together his behavioral with the findings court’s that his treatment educational needs unmet; have been change and continue constitute a requires in circumstances which that the court vacate prior and revoke its order of commitment. go order,
17. Scott has nowhere to as of the date this and is not in his best interest to vacate his commitment training today. school effective Upon 18. of Dr. recommendation Cornwall and as a counselor, result of efforts his court Scott had been accepted for Austin, admission to the Brown School in Texas. The Brown School is a residential treatment facil- ity appropriate which offers both for his se- vere problems emotional and behavioral specialized educational services. The costs associated *5 placement at. the Brown School are in excess of $40,000 year. per FALL TERM 1980 appropriate
19. No other than treatment alternatives the Brown School are known to the court at this time. mother, Rain, Copper employed
20. Scott’s is as a bar- weekly salary per tender. Her net is week. She $105.00 approxi- has two other children who reside with her for mately days year. per She has no health insurance or pay other assets from which she can for the cost of care at any facility. the Brown School or other residential Ms. through support Rain’s effort to secure from Scott’s father Support proceedings Interstate Child Enforcement have been unsuccessful to date. Department
21. The of Human Resources is not now purchase private able to care for Scott in a residential facility for the reason that no funds have been appropriated purpose purchasing private for the resi- emotionally dential care for disturbed children.
* * * hopeful 23. The court that the North Carolina Resources, Department County of Human Area Program County Mental Health and the Wake Board of develop appropriate Education will an treatment and plan implemented educational for Scott which can be immediately identify will and make available and/or necessary purchase funds or such treatment and education at the Brown School or in some appropriate program. other plans forthcoming, 24. If such funds are not this and/or will
court have no resource other than Wake necessary purchase which it can look for funds treatment Scott needs. LAW
CONCLUSIONS OF review, Upon A. the court concludes that its order committing custody respondent child to the Division of Youth Services is not in said child’s best inter- change est. The current needs of the and the require circumstances since said order was entered prior the court vacate and revoke its order of commit- pursuant ment to N.C. (a). G.S. 7A-664 § *6 538 IN THE SUPREME COURT
In re Brownlee care for of and is in need treatment B. Scott Brownlee specialized educa- problems and of his severe emotional receiving at this services services. He is not said tional time. pay of the care to the cost
C. Scott’s mother is unable treatment needs. and Scott court, have proceeding, does not
D. This in this Resources, authority Department of Human order County Program the Health or Wake Wake Area Mental County particular treat- Board of Education to juvenile is com- funding while the ment or of treatment custody the Division Youth Services. mitted to the plan appropriate educational E. If an treatment and Department developed Scott is not and funded Resources, County Wake Area Mental of Human and/or Education, County Wake Board of Health and/or only securing necessary alternative for the funds court’s charge provide the Scott will be to treatment needs county pursuant to G.S. said cost of treatment § (3). 7A-647 Brownlee to This of Scott
A. court’s commitment hereby custody va- of Youth Services is Division 12, 1980, pursu- September cated and revoked effective ant to N.C. G.S. 7A-664. § Disposition matter shall be continued until
B. in this 12,1980. September Department Re- of Human
C. The North Carolina sources, County Program Area Mental Health hereby County re- of Education are the Wake Board necessary to quested attempt to make available funds placement Brown Scott Brownlee in the secure facility or appropriate School or some other treatment implementation develop arrange for immediate program by appropriate and educational an 12,1980, September to inform the court of results of said efforts on or before date. FALL TERM appropri- hereby if an notified that
D. Wake secure plan funds to or and educational ate treatment any program are not forthcom- placement 12,1980, September ing or before other sources on from any county for turn to will on that date this court may be able wish information and assistance and/or *7 regarding placement in an of Scott offer Brown facility expensive than the which is less treatment School. county participate requests that the
E. The court 12, hearing September 1980. dispositional on County in the cause a motion August filed 11 1980 Wake On County party is not a asking that Wake the court to rule County not a Thereafter, was ruled that the proceeding. the court order, requested the but, party in the above necessary as stated hearing County dispositional scheduled participate in the County did that the September record indicates 1980. The hearing. participate in that are as September 1980 order portions the 16
Pertinent follows: 12,1980, hearing September on for on
This cause came having until said date disposition continued been 22, August 1980. Order entered evidence, including the considering the factual
After witnesses, reports testimony written documents and needs concerning respondent condition child’s to meet those programs and resources available and the needs, forth below that the facts set the court finds from pro- provide following disposition for the would best tection, treatment, and correction rehabilitation child. FACT
FINDINGS OF judicial and finds as fact all takes notice of 1. The court relating to the in official court records matters set forth respondent child. hereby judicial incor- notice of
2. The court takes set forth its order porates reference all matters 22, 1980, August in this matter. IN THE SUPREME COURT Copies 22,1980, August
3. of this court’s order of were following persons: served on the Cooke, County Attorney: Mr. John C. Assistant Wake
* * * Johnson, County Mr. Manager; Carl Wake Aycock, Chairman, Mr. County M. Edmund Wake Commissioners. regrets County
4. The court partici- that Wake did not pate hearing September 12,1980, requested on as August 22, Order entered on 1980. proposal A requesting funding
5. implement ap- an propriate plan County for Scott in Wake Department submitted to the North Carolina of Human following entry Resources August of this court’s order of 22, agreed 1980. Schools *8 funding necessary for component the educational of the plan. Funding proposal by for said was denied the De- partment 11, September Human Resources on 1980. appreciates The court Kirkpatrick, the efforts of Mr. Ms. Lambe and regrets others involved in these efforts and Department the decision of the of Human Resources. proposed A placement 6. plan pres- and treatment was Behar, Ph.D., ented Lenore Depart- on behalf of the ment of Human Department proposed Resources. The placement program a new residential for children ages between the developed 10 and 17 to be on the campus Hospital. of John Umstead Dr. Behar testified that Department she did not know inwho of Human placement Resources proposed pro- decided that in the gram Hospital at appropriate John Umstead would be Scott, that she was not involved in that decision and superiors that she was September instructed her on 11, 1980, develop plan placement for Scott’s in that program. proposed program
7. The Hospital at John Umstead is yet buildings not in existence. Renovations to have not TERM 1980 FALL completed been and not all of the staff been Dr. has hired. did not when the Behar testified that she know rest of the screening procedures staff will be hired. The for admis- yet program place sion and it are is not ages possible for the court to determine the or conditions living children with whom be of other interacting. Scott would and Department proposed 8. The Human Resources’ plan for an written Scott’s treatment includes accurate description strengths specifies of Scott’s needs and and long goals. appropriate ever, term short treatment How- court is not able find from the evidence before plan, implemented, it that whenever could be placement appropriate an would be or would constitute plan. an is There no evidence psychiatrist court before the from a familiar with Scott’s relating program condition and needs to details of the proposed program be offered to Scott at John Hospital opinion there Umstead psychiatric expert is no from such placement program in the would appropriate and in Scott’s best interest. discharged 9. Scott was from Samarcand Manor on 3, custody September has 1980. Scott been 19, Department of Human Resources since November Hospital at Dix 1980. He evaluated Dorothea in Jan- uary February of 1980. appreciates appearance
10. The court Dr. Behar’s at hearing develop plan suggested the by and her efforts to Department Human Resources. again 11. The court finds that Scott Brownlee in need *9 problems. of treatment for his serious emotional again facility appro- court further finds that no treatment currently priate to Scott’s needs exists in the State of North Carolina. reality system
12. The ‘Brown is Schools’ of resi- psychiatric programs dential treatment Texas. Said variety program includes a residential treatment [of] specialized programs, facilities and each of which offers according specialized patient. services of the needs IN THE SUPREME COURT programs All of the Brown Schools are accredited Hospitals. Joint Commission on Accreditation of appro- 13. The court finds that the Brown Schools offer Scott, priate treatment for which treatment is imme- diately him accepted available to in that he has been hearing admission and that the court was informed at the 12, September 1980, on that he can be admitted to the program’s Short-Term Adolescent Center as soon as nec- essary paper completed. work is appropriate placement
14. The court finds that no plan treatment other than that available at the Brown Schools is known to the court.
15. The court finds that costs associated with treatment at the Brown Schools are consistent with costs at other treatment facilities and are less than those associated psychiatric in some residential treat- programs. Specifically, ment the cost of treatment in the Service, 601, Adolescent Admission Ward Dorothea Dix Hospital approximately $65,000 per patient per year. specifically incorporates
16. The court herein its find- ing August 22,1980, in the Order of that Scott’s mother is pay unable to for the cost of the treatment he needs. Her approximately net per income is week. She $105. has two other children days approximately who reside with her year. per She has no health insurance or other pay income or assets with which to for the treatment Scott needs. Her support efforts to secure for Scott from through his father Interstate Proceedings Enforcement have been unsuccessful. 17. Scott is in need of supervision care and which his
parent cannot placement. and is in need of Place- ment of Scott in the Brown Schools will be facilitated placing custody him in the Depart- ment of Social Services in that his mother is not able to make arrangements necessary financial for ad- mission.
18. Admission to require the Brown Schools does not commitment patient the child will remain a there any particular period Charges of time. are made for *10 TERM 1980 FALL
In re Brownlee charged daily actually and are on a services rendered discharge. admission and basis between daily charges, 19. In addition to other costs associated include costs of with treatment at the Brown Schools clothing. transportation, medical and dental care and hopeful appropriate 20. The court remains that an placement program will devel- and treatment for Scott be oped in in North and funded Wake or elsewhere ready to modification of Carolina and remains consider program this Order if it can be shown that such a does program will in exist and that transfer to that be Scott’s best interest.
21. The court finds that it is in Scott’s best interest that immediately he in that be admitted to the Brown Schools waiting appropriate placement he has been and treat- many that no other alternative is ment for months and delay placement appropriate available. Further damag- will commencement of treatment ing to him. The court further finds that there is no assur- ance placement that this and the treatment it offers this seriously disturbed child will remain available if he is not admitted at once. OF LAW
CONCLUSIONS supervision his which is in of care and A. Scott need placement. is in need of cannot mother psychiatric, psychological and B. Scott is in need of problems. Place- of his serious emotional other treatment in Scott’s best interest. Schools is ment the Brown pay the cost of the care is unable to C. Scott’s mother treatment he needs. treatment, great need of immediate D. Scott’s availability at the Brown treatment immediate of such delay receiving appropriate long Schools and the already subjected been to which Scott has Schools. compel placement at the Brown immediate IN THE SUPREME COURT *11 E. authority This court has the to order the treatment charge County Scott pursu- needs and to the cost to Wake (3). ant to G.S. 7A-647
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: hereby placed custody 1. Scott Brownlee is in the County Department pursuant Wake of Social Services (2) placement G.S. 7A-647 order to facilitate at the Brown Schools. hereby
2. Scott Brownlee is ordered to the Brown pursuant Schools for residential to G.S. 7A- (6). 649 arrangements necessary
3. All for Scott’s immediate admission to the Brown Schools shall be made County Department Chief Court Counselor and the Wake of Social Services.
4. The cost of Scott’s care at Brown Schools shall be paid County pursuant (3). to G.S. 7A-647 county hereby cooperate ordered with the Chief Department Court Counselor and the of Social Services making necessary arrangements for Scott’s imme- diate admission to the Brown Schools. County Department
5. The Wake of Social Services is hereby responsibility identifying relieved of for alterna- placements tive for Scott until such time this court’s placement order .for at the Brown Schools is vacated or modified. placement
6. This order and Scott’s at the Brown implemented Schools immediately shall be pursuant notwithstanding G.S. appeal by any 7A-668 interested party. 7. The court will consider modification of this Order upon any party motion of interested at such it time as can alleged placement treatment and Scott program Brownlee at a than other those offered actually the Brown Schools is available and that transfer program to such would be in his best interest. August
On 28 County gave 1980 Wake and served notice of 1980 545 FALL TERM appeal August to the 22 County 1980 petitioned order. The also mandamus; Appeals prohibition peti- Court of for writs of prejudice. tion was without denied September County gave
On 17 1980 Wake and served notice of appeal September day, On 1980 order. the same again petitioned or, Appeals the Court of for a writ of mandamus alternative, supersedeas; a writ of it also asked for an order temporarily staying Sep- the orders of On 23 the district court. stay Appeals granted temporary tember 1980 the Court but on September stay petition 1980 dissolved denied the supersedeas. mandamus and *12 September County
On applied 29 1980 Wake this court for a to temporary stay the Judge pending of orders entered Bason preparation filing petition of a for a writ of certiorari. On 30 September court, feeling expedited 1980 this that an this decision of public interest, case inis to elected invoke Rule 2 the Rules of Appellate (1) stay Procedure and application ordered: that the for a denied; order (2) petition be bypass that the be treated as a to motion Appeals granted; Court of (3) and that motion that the filing times appeal accelerated; for the record on and the briefs be (4) specially hearing that this matter be set for at the December 1980 session of this court.1 Cooke, County John Attorney, petitioner- C. Assistant for
appellant, County. Wake Johnson, by Johnson, respondent- Johnson & L. Sandra for appellee, Scott Webster Brownlee. BRITT, Justice. present brings principal ques- case before this court two (1) County
tions for our consideration: whether is entitled to appeal by Judge Bason; from (2) the orders entered whether empowered county district court was to direct care arrangements 1This court took note of the fact that for Scott’s admission made; Brown had that he be admitted at a.m. on Wednes Schools been was to 9:00 day, Austin, 1980; transportation arrangements 1 had October Texas been 1980; County September for the of 30 and that the Wake Board of made afternoon September passed appropriating Commissioners on 23 1980 had resolution $16,000 County Department to cover the sum to the Wake Social Services care, expenses at cost of months initial travel to and incidental estimated three Brown Schools. COURT 546 IN THE SUPREME re In Brownlee Austin, respondent at the Brown Schools Texas. These issues separate Accordingly, are and distinct. it is tous independently examine each one of the other.
WAKE COUNTY’S RIGHT TO APPEAL
[1]
G.S. 1-271
§
codifies the common law
rule that
“[a]ny party
may
aggrieved
appeal
prescribed
chapter.”
the cases
this
(Emphasis added.)
Salisbury Zoning
See Duke Power Co. v.
Board
730,
607,
denied,
Adjustment,
App.
20 N.C.
202 S.E.2d
cert.
of
N.C.
235, 204
(1974).
party
S.E.2d
One who is not a
to an action or
privy
appeal
who is not
to the record
entitled to
from the
judgment
Blake,
(1838).
of a lower court. Siler v.
the court with information and assistance it wish *13 regarding placement ... or be able appro to offer of Scott in an priate facility expensive which is less than the Brown Notwithstanding School.” this notice of the intention of the district court, county participate dispositional the elected not to in the hearing. dispute, record, upon present There is no the that the county pendency given had notice of the of the action and was the opportunity heard, dispositional hearing to be both at the as well as hearing. at the earlier hearing August 1980, county argued
At the of 18 the that it ought party proceeding not to abe “it because has never filed petition legal a motion relationship or and because there is no county’s between it and the child.” the While factual basis of the argument correct, however, argue, point. is to so is to miss the The county responsibility had no to file a motion in the cause. Nor was county privy legal relationship the to a between itself and the child. pertinent legal relationship The respondent was that between custody the Division of Youth Services to whom Scott’s had been FALL TERM 1980 extent motor vehicle. The use of a unauthorized committed present from its county’s case arises interest actual of such, liability As expenditure of its tax revenues. potential for the action. legitimate in the commencement no interest had Instead, disposition a is to the effect final its interest confined upon its resources. cause will have financial county party, not had the if the had a it would have Even been question. provides as right appeal from the G.S. 7A-667 orders follows: juvenile; juve- appeal may by the
An be taken custodian; county parent, guardian, or or State nile’s following: agency. appeal The is limited to the State’s Any delinquency (1) than or final order in cases other cases;
undisciplined following delinquency (2) or undisci- orders
plined cases: finding to be An a State statute a. order unconstitutional; Any prose- terminates order which
b. petition upholding the of a
cution jeopardy, hold- defense double ing not stated that a cause of action statute, by granting a or under a suppress. motion is set out above does the statute which It is manifest empower county juvenile proceeding. While appeal take an in a County Department of Social Services true it is that Wake necessary custody to make all of given and directed Scott Schools, portion of arrangements the Brown that upon for his transfer to employed which to Judge as a basis cannot be Bason’s order It is clear that right applicable statute. appeal under the found terminology “county agency” been intended could not have agency very entity in the first create the which would include the place. *14 right appeal County to not have We that Wake did hold Nevertheless, challenged is authorized this court orders.
from
supervision
give general
necessary
“any
to
it
writs
to issue
remedial
548
IN THE SUPREME COURT
proceedings
and control over the
of the other courts” of
state.
Constitution,
IV,
exceptional
(1).
12
N.C.
Article
Section
Under
power
this
circumstances this court will exercise
under
section
pres
questions which are not
the constitution in order to consider
Stanley,
according
procedure;
N.C.
ented
to our rules of
State v.
288
19, 215
(1975);
will not hesitate to exercise
S.E.2d 589
and this court
authority
necessary
general supervisory
promote
its
when
justice.
expeditious administration of
Brice v. Robertson House
Co.,
74,
Moving, Wrecking
Salvage
N.C.
S.E.2d 439
249
105
Terrace,
Co.,
595,
Inc.,
(1958);
Indemnity
Park
v. Phoenix
243 N.C.
(1956).
We consider the case to be of such that the expeditious justice requires administration of us to invoke our supervisory authority. novelty presented, coupled of the issues Carolina, potential liability with the of the counties of North serves emphasize judiciary securing proper prompt role of the County resolution of this matter. While it is true that Wake was not party Bason, proceeding Judge before have a does formal significant interest in the outcome of in that its funds the matter already expended pursuant have been to a court order and that its potentially subject expenditures pursuant funds are to further words, county the directive of the district court. In other has a cognizable interest in the determination of whether the action of the Therefore, lower court was authorized law. we elect to treat the papers calling which upon have ben filed in this court as a motion supervisory powers the court to exercise its to enable it to review the by Judge allowed, orders entered Bason. The motion is and we will proceed now to examine the cause on its merits.
THE VALIDITY OF THE ORDERS [3] A careful study pertinent statutes leads us to conclude Judge authority require Bason did not have the pay Austin, for Scott’s treatment at the Brown Schools in Texas.
Judge September Bason’s order of 16 states that he sending pur- Scott to “the Brown Schools for residential treatment 7A-649(6).” “dispositional suant to G.S. G.S. 7A-649 lists ten alter- judge natives” dealing that a district court has available to him in delinquent juveniles. 7A-649(6) provides judge may G.S. that a “[ojrder community-based program to a of academic or professional vocational education or to a residential or non-residen- program. Participation programs tial treatment in the shall not Obviously Judge exceed months”. Bason concluded that the *15 FALL TERM 1980 549 professional “a . . . Brown Schools residential program”. provides judges disposi- district court with certain
G.S. 7A-647 dealing delinquent, abused, undisciplined, with tional alternatives neglected, dependent juveniles. 7A-647(3)provides or G.S. as follows: case, any may juvenile judge
In the order that the be physician, psychiatrist, psychologist examined or may judge qualified expert other as be needed for the juvenile. judge If the determine the needs of the finds the medical, juvenile surgical, psychiatric, to be need of treatment, psychological parent other shall allow or he arrange the responsible persons for care. If or other parent the necessary arrange- declines or is unable to make ments, treatment, judge may the order needed care, may surgery judge parent or and the order the pay pursuant G.S. If the cost of such care 7A-650. care,
judge parent pay finds the is unable to the cost of may county (Emphasis judge charge .... the cost added.) Code, 7A, 41-54, present G.S. Articles
Since our
Juvenile
Assembly
enacted
the 1979 General
and became effective on 1
815)
January
(1979 N.C. Sess. Laws c.
the courts have
1980
had
opportunity
provisions. It
little
to construe its
is fundamental
that
Housing
interpretation of statutes.
legislative intent controls
Farabee,
242,
City
v.
284 N.C.
200
Greensboro
Authority
of
Garrett,
163,
(1973);
S.E.2d 12
Person v.
280 N.C.
matter
must be construed
Shaw v.
Baxley,
740,
harmonized,
(1967),
270 N.C.
(1) juvenile sys- To divert offenders from the through tem herein so that the intake services authorized juveniles may may remain in their own homes and through community-based ap- treated services when this IN THE SUPREME COURT
In Brownlee re safety; public protection proach is consistent hearing provide procedures (2) To protect equity that assure fairness cases *16 parents; rights juveniles and of and constitutional juvenile develop disposition in each case that (3) a To facts, the needs and limita- consideration of the reflects child, strengths weaknesses of the the tions of the family, safety. (Emphasis public protection and the of added.) express words of the statute which While it manifest that the article”, inappro- speak “this it would be in terms of
is set out above objectives public policy which priate oblivious to for us to be adoption Code Gen- prompted the new Juvenile attempted Assembly legislature in to articulate eral and which legislation. adoption introductory Prior to the provisions of the sitting Code, judges courts who were of the district the Juvenile flexibility making provi- suitable little matters had committing youthful to a Other than sion for county offenders. regional when such was needed for the home or detention child, community interest of the see protection or in the best of the only empowered judges (1978), of the state were G.S. 110-24 § duration of which place juveniles probation, the conditions and on appropriate order entered the cause. See out in the were to be set (1978). G.S. 110-22 § flexibility juvenile jus- greater in the seeking In introduce think, Assembly, state, system we was echo- the General
tice ing Study System Commission of the Penal the sentiments of the Bent, Twig report, As the Is In its Bar Association. North Carolina observed the Commission society young people
Certainly within our there are may discipline rigid be neces- confinement and whom sary society’s protection. protection and for both their dealing young- system The State must delinquent whatever reason. It sters who become opportunities to young people maximum must afford become adults well problems and to overcome their equipped society. present Our places in to take their goal. system this does not achieve * * * TERM 1980 FALL re In Brownlee continuity We must begins establish a of care that when through beyond child is arrested and continues his steps incarceration until all reasonable have been taken to assure his rehabilitation. System Study
North Carolina Commission, Bar Association Penal Twig As the (1972); compare Advisory Is Bent 23 National Commit- Goals, tee on Criminal Justice Standards and Juvenile Justice and Delinquency (1976). Prevention 611-12 “community-based program”
While the term art, is a term of 7A-517(8) (Cum. see G.S. Supp. 1979), usage by we feel § that its Asembly General responses reflects its prob- concern that juveniles coming lems of the before the courts be fashioned in a flexible manner so as to address the best interests of the child in ways probation other than training commitment schools. subsidiary concept The same introductory at work in provisions permeates of the Juvenile Code subsequent all provisions: of its relationship family important and friends is an component in the *17 program youthful offender, rehabilitative for a and institutionali- ought zation of a child except to be extraordinary ordered in an Otherwise, situation. stabilizing the and motivational attributes of surroundings familiar process. is lost to the Indeed, Assembly provided General has in concrete terms expression an of its regard by concern in stating this in G.S. § 7A-646 that purpose dispositions juvenile of in actions is to
design appropriate plan an juve- to meet the needs of the nile objectives and to achieve the of the State in exercis- ing jurisdiction. possible, If approach the initial should working juvenile involve family and his in their appropriate own home so community that the resources may care, supervision, involved in and treatment according juvenile. Thus, to the needs of judge arrange appropriate should community-level servi- provided ces juvenile to be family and his in order strengthen the home situation. choosing among statutorily In permissible dispositions delinquent juvenile, judge for a shall select the least disposition duration, in restrictive both terms of kind and appropriate offense, that is to the seriousness of the IN THE SUPREME COURT degree culpability of indicated circumstances of particular age prior case and the record of the juvenile. juvenile training A should not be committed to any helped through or school community-level other institution he can be if (Emphasis added.) resources. earlier, provides specific As we observed G.S. ten 7A-649 § empowered what it alternatives from which the court is to select appropriate disposition delinquent feels to be the most for a child. variety scope The wide alternatives which are embodied dispositional in us to the statute’s formulation alternatives leads legislature’s it was the district conclude intention that the fashioning in courts exercise sound discretion response an particular delinquency. to each instance of The tenth provided clearly which is the statute alternative is the most severe: commitment of the to the Division of Youth Servi- provisions in with the ces accordance of G.S. 7A-652. This alterna- § change tive is the most severe in that it makes in no the former committing juveniles training practice of to state schools when it probation inappropriate was concluded that conditional on the Clearly, ought only employed facts of the case. that alternative to be open when there is no reasonable alternative to the court in its disposition of the matter. provided
A close examination of the nine other alternatives that all G.S. 7A-649 indicates of them are subsumed within the § concept community-level services. It will be recalled that we community-based program earlier observed that is a term of art being in defined the statute itself as a residential or non-residential program community which serves a Only 7A-649(6) any way which he lives. G.S. in terms defined § then, scope program of this term of art. Even its is limited to a *18 Every pro- academic or vocational education. alternative other by statute, including 7A-649(6) provision vided the the of G.S. § professional which authorizes commitment of a child to a residen- program, employed tial or non-residential in such can be upon a manner an of the court order that the concern in Juvenile Code that the of an child be addressed needs individual programs meaningful, community-level terms of which keep efforts in which would serve to the child familiar surround- ings. by apparent programs It is that would be aided the fact such program to a that child’s in such a would be aided rehabilitation family degree by among keeping considerable his the child FALL TERM 1980 553 friends, least, very having reasonably or at the within them close proximity being provided to the location where the care is to the question. child in
G.S. forth in 7A-646 sets clear terms the mandate of § Assembly providing dispositional General for various alterna- delinquent juveniles. provides tives for The statute that approach working ... the initial should involve juvenile family and his in their own home so appropriate community may resources be involved in the care, supervision according and treatment to the needs of juvenile. Thus, judge arrange appro- should priate community-level provided resources to be to the juvenile family strengthen and his in order to the home situation.
[*] [**] training A school or should not be committed through any helped com- other if he can be institution munity-level resources. objectives juvenile justice
While it is true that one of the clear
system
problems
response
of a child within its
is to fashion a
purview
particular
is in
which
needs of the child and
addresses the
court,
by
re
see In
the child’s best interests as determined
Vinson,
640,
compare
(1979);
v.
298 N.C.
S.E.2d 591
State
260
Burnett,
735,
(1920),
N.C.
102 S.E.
that determination
711
concerning
Indeed, making
cannot be in a vacuum.
its decision
exercising
juvenile jurisdic
disposition
juvenile,
of a
a court
its
Burns,
weigh
of the state. See In re
tion must also
the best interests
517,
nom.,
(1969),
McKeiver v.
275 N.C.
S.E.2d 879
sub.
aff'd.
(1971).
Pennsylvania,
What is or is not
the best
In psychologist or psychiatrist, physician, examined judge may for the qualified expert be needed as other judge finds the juvenile. If the determine the needs of medical, surgical, psychiatric, in need of to be treatment, par- allow the he shall psychological, or other arrange If the persons for care. responsible or other ent necessary arrange- is unable to make parent declines or treatment, ments, may sur- judge order the needed care, may parent pay judge gery, order the or and the parent judge If finds that the such care.... the cost of care, judge may charge the pay is unable to the cost of county. cost to the seem, therefore, dispositional enu- alternatives that the
It would this in tandem with are to be read merated G.S. 7A-649 § authority, possible grant it is provision. If it were not for this instances, would, provided in some to the courts the alternatives authority However, invoking empty and unworkable. county, charge the courts must be sensitive the cost of care to the also only The courts must proper placement of the child. utilization of interest of the state what is in the best consider components. of its inferior its resources and those Code, emphasis Throughout is a consistent the Juvenile there community treating not understand upon level. We do a child at the be to emphasis fashion. To do so would this to be taken in a literal all areas in our state result. It is manifest that not foster an absurd that wealth privy the resources which to the same wealth and are geographic com- available within the confines of would make munity. of the child add that the best interests While we hasten to home, by keeping in his own the individual will often be served another, it subject guidance outpatient of one kind or services necessarily be so. need not judges today ought taken to mean that decision not to be
Our neighborhood may hometown or his not remove a child from county. interpretation the statute That would not be reasonable legislative community Instead, that the term intent. we feel and the TERM 1980 FALL *20 In re Brownlee manner, connoting an interrela-
ought
interpreted in a broad
to be
area,
general
but who
among persons
same
tionship
who live in the
laws,
Heart
rights,
interests. See Sacred
same
and
also share the
618,
We commend Bason for his juveniles him. record in the before the welfare of who come present patience Honor exercised deal- case reveals the that His many ing tireless efforts period months and his with Scott over a youth. help delinquent Such secure effective for a and disturbed salutary example to the patience expenditure is a of effort However, judiciary we are unable to conclude that of this state. authority Assembly which he intended to vest him with the General sought it, Hopefully, this case and others like to exercise in this case. dealing develop prompt an effective means of will our state to disposition. nature and children of Scott’s stated, judgment Court is of the District For the reasons Reversed. dissenting.
Justice Carlton respectfully majority opinion. interpret- I dissent from the In ing Legislature, places the statutes enacted our form above substance, erroneously dispositional provisions construes the of our juvenile code, produces seriously a result which curtails the ability emotionally of court officials to deal with disturbed children. disagree majority’s
I repeated emphasis with the on and inter- pretation provisions of G.S. 7A-649 two reasons.
First, Judge it is obvious from the record that Bason intended authority to commit the 7A-647(3), child under the of G.S. not G.S. 7A-649(6) majority. developed fully as assumed As more below, clearly Judge the former authorizes Bason’s action. While the being final order did recite that Scott was sent to the Brown School pursuant 7A-649(6), expressly to G.S. it also stated that Wake Coun- IN THE SUPREME COURT
ty’s responsibility pursuant for the care was to G.S. Moreover, 7A-647(3). findings various and conclusions the trial judge compel proceeding the conclusion that he was under the authority 7A-647(3). example, of G.S. For conclusion of law E. in provided, authority the final order “This has the court to order the charge County pur- treatment Scott needs and to that cost to Wake 7A-6b7(3)” suant to G.S. (emphases added). majority For the ignore simply all judge of this and proceeding conclude that the solely is, 7A-649(6) my opinion, placing under G.S. form above substance.
Secondly, assuming arguendo Judge proceed- that Bason was ing authority strongly 7A-646(6), disagree under the I of G.S. that presently programs this statute is limited to within the State of provides judge may “[ojrder North Carolina. The statute a that juvenile community-based program to a of academic or vocational professional education or to a residential or non-residential treat- program.” 7A-649(6) (Cum. Supp. 1979) ment added). (emphasis G.S. “community-based” clearly The limitation is intended to — only apply programs to the academic or vocational education programs normally many available in communities. The remainder referring of professional programs pointedly the sentence to is separated by the words “or to” and there is not even a hint that such programs community must be located within the child’s home or Indeed, programs relatively the state. such are in available few community communities in North and no in Carolina the state has program prescribed finding available the for Scott. This was the of binding appeal. the trial court and is on this Court on 7A-647(3), quoted majority opinion, clearly G.S. in the allows judge psychiatric, psychological appro- the trial to order or other priate care for a child when he finds child needs such care and to charge county. provides, the costs to the This is what the statute plainly simply. absolutely nothing There is in the statute limit- ing placement the trial court to in-state for treatment of a disturbed child. majority mightily language
The has strained to find some juvenile support my our opinion, code to In its result. it has failed to quoting, disjointedly, do so. After phasizing various sections of the code em- goal serving the laudable of troubled children sur- roundings appro- most similar to their own communities when priate programs available, that, majority are then concludes FALL TERM Assembly that “we find it inconceivable the General intended authority vest with the a the court order child committed to an facility charge county.” out-of-state cost ... authority majority conclusion, cites no for such a for there is none. majority reasoning I find the both strained and inconsis- example: tent. For flexibility
(1) speaks provided by It lack of the former dispositional interprets pres- code alternatives and ent code to a more “flexible manner” for courts fashion responses problems juveniles, yet very that flexi- denies bility in the matter us. before
(2) acknowledges juveniles It the clear intent of the code that training only be committed to school when no al- other “reasonable available, yet only ternative” it denies Scott Brownlee the “reason- able alternative” the trial court find for could him after weeks of pleading agencies they help local state were unable provide.
(3) holding purposes In that one of the clear justice system interests, majority is to serve the child’s best dispositional holds “determination cannot made in *22 states, majority exercising juvenile juris- vacuum.” The “a court its state,” weigh yet diction must also majority the best interests of the the any point step proceedings to fails to in these at which the acting judge trial court was in a “vacuum” or at the to failed which Indeed, majority “best consider the interests the state.” the could only in make such statements the abstract because the record be- gave County every fore us discloses that trial court con- opportunity present ceivable to an alternative solution and invited fully county participate proceedings. in the The assistant county attorney, stage proceedings, at one of the walked out of the any resulted, If courtroom. it “vacuum” was the fault of Wake County, not that of the trial court or the child.
(4) majority appro- The states that is conceivable that an “[i]t priate disposition... require would that other resources than those by governmental provided employed units be the court. No Assembly in doubt exists our minds that the General envisioned emerging.” majority a such situation The here denies such a resource to Scott Brownlee. THE SUPREME IN COURT
(5) majority “in The holds that G.S. must be read 7A-649 A-647, yet language apply with G.S. it fails to tandem” the clear 7A-647(3) before us. G.S. matter judge majority juvenile a
(6) that when The holds invokes charge county, judge authority to a the cost of care must be placement proper for the both to the child consider the sensitive “in the utilization of its resources and best interests state yet any it components,” fails to note those of its inferior failure of County’s If court to consider the utilization Wake resources. trial implication approximate in is that the annual cost excess of the $40,000 excessive, the Brown School is how does
for treatment at finding majority quoted rationalize such a conclusion with the average opinion that annual cost of treatment an in the $65,000? Hospital Raleigh at Dix is adolescent Dorothea that,“Our majority today ought (7) The decision be states not to judges may neigh- that from his taken to mean remove a child county. and hometown or That would not be a reasonable borhood legislative intent,” yet interpretation of the and the statute denies only explanation of this Its for such a is such removal child. result majority legislative intent finds “inconceivable” a to vest authority placement county court with at the trial out-of-state expense. effect, majority, permits code has held that the “community-based” only of a child facilities and that
treatment “community” Legislature encompass is the entire intended legislative intent state. That this could not have been is clear Throughout from the code itself. the code are references treat- community, child within his own and full utilization of ment of the “community-level required resources” is before can Additionally, training “community- to a state committed school. program” program providing as nonresiden- based defined “[a] community juvenile in the where tial or residential to a (Cum. 1979) 7A-517(8) Supp. (emphasis family his lives.” G.S. § Legislature “Community” obviously added). our intended geographic state. a much smaller area than the entire And it mean *23 Legislature, although it intended that is obvious that also community first, utilized not within the be did resources child’s judges to be limited to resources available intend district court community fashioning when within the child’s Likewise, in disposition each is nowhere manifested for child. there dispositional juvenile code an that the available alterna- intent FALL TERM 1980 tives be limited to facilities within the state. today juvenile judges
This Court announces that must exercise determining “sound appropriate dispositions discretion” in juve- for delinquents, yet nile Judge it cites no in instance which Bason abused his discretion. program Is because the costs this are too excessive or the distance to majority Texas too far? Is it because the program feels the inappropriate of treatment for this child? Trial given guidelines exercising courts are no for their discretion. One only opinion can conclude from the majority that the feels that Judge Bason placing abused his discretion program in Scott beyond However, the borders of North Carolina. major- would the ity any result have been program different had the same at the same cost been available within our state but several hundred miles county? realize, course, from Scott’s home I appellate that an always questions court cannot answer which are not asked and However, must deal with the record major- before it. I fear that the ity today opinion confusing will judges they be to our trial as attempt dispositions juveniles to decide whether their are based on “sound discretion.”
I wish to make it I that clear that do not advocate judges given authority country to send children all over the they Obviously, for treatment wherever and whenever wish. there public expended is a limit to the amount of funds which can be obvious, purposes. Equally majority acknowledges, such as the develop programs that North Carolina must effective for such Legislature problem. In children. meantime, must address this serious however, pro- Scott Brownlee should be denied a gram present juvenile which is in his best interests and which the allows, (Cum. 1979). plainly 7A-647(3) Supp. I code G.S. do not § engage judicial legislating. think this Court should today The result of the decision of this Court is to take Scott program Brownlee from a found to be his best interest and to bring him back to Wake to face an uncertain future. Per- haps majority, will not matter. Like the I that have no idea whether any may progress young has made It this Scott whatsoever. be that program anywhere mind is so disturbed that no man’s the world graduation prevent delinquent could his from to hardened me, however, ought give up It seems to criminal. we not to on him in the middle of treatment and return him to a which situation hope. The odds that he will offers little soon be an adult criminal *24 IN THE SUPREME COURT greater result, add, surely might be if he is I will returned. Such expensive public present than will be far more the the costs his stake, program. simply why With at I so much cannot understand majority of this Court into chooses read words our code which there. are not stated that argument, member of this Court During one oral give juvenile Legislature intended our not conceive that could he children, county expense, authority, to such at
judges send agree Texas, England. I that not even faraway or places Hawaii as consciously Legislature considered our of our the first member away. so Such a emotionally would be sent far children disturbed however, decision not result part, should on our conclusion Rigid view has today. to such a by majority adherence reached legislative process. usurp majority Court of this led a Moreover, it difficult judges will find far more our delinquent programs for and innovative to utilize novel future children. contemplated situation
Assuming Legislature never us, this Court do about what should presented record before course, is, statute construe the that we should The it? answer attempt what the meaning to divine according plain and not to its this it considered situation. Legislature intended had would have proper it court because was the trial should affirm action of We city in Legislature convenes in this less present The code. under the wishes, can, the statutes to more if amend weeks and than three clearly intent, may be. legislative whatever that reflect the surely money during would an public spent the interim may the harm this decision compared to investment when unwise young people other Brownlee and to thousands to Scott cause future. I to affirm. vote joins in this dissent.
Justice EXUM