3 Wyo. 121 | Wyo. | 1884
This is an accusation against Melville C. Brown, an attorney and counselor at law of this court, prosecuted by direction of the court under the act of December 9, 1869. Comp. Laws, 16. The accusation avers inter alia that the respondent, in the presence of divers witnesses, in the city of Cheyenne, in this territory, uttered of and concerning this court, and its decision of a certain cause, the following language: “It is a son of a bitch of a court, — one bribed and the other I don’t know what.” It is further alleged that said words were so spoken with intent to scandalize, traduce, and bring into contempt and disgrace the court. There is also a further allegation charging the utterance of similar words at Laramie City; but as to these words we do not find the accusátion sustained. The respondent answered under oath. In his answer he admits the use of the language at Cheyonne, except that he claims he used the expression “son of- a gun" instead of “son of a bitch.” Mr. Corlett and Mr. Riner both swear positively that thelatter expression was the one used, and they are contradicted by the respondent alone. The court finds, therefore, that the words laid in the accusation were the words used.
Were the words used in relation to this court and a cause by it decided with intent to charge the court with bribery in the decision of that cause? If the above question be decided in the affirmative, do all the facts show, on the part of respondent, such a violation of his duties as an officer of this court as would demand a suspension or- severance of the official relation? The evidence shows that, on the-day the words were uttered, this court had decided a case in which Edw.ard Ivin-son was appellant, and Charles Hutton and Judge Carey and brother were appel-lees. The decision was by a majority of the court, the members of that majority being Judges Blair and Parks. The then Chief Justice Sener dissented. The respondent was solicitor for the appellant in that cause, and the decision was adverse to his client. Immediately after the decision the respondent and several others walked from the court-room towards the hotel, stopping on the way at the Sun office. While in the Sun office some one remarked to respondent, “Brown, you got beaten, ” or words to that effect; to which respondent replied: “Yes; that’s a son of a bitch, of a court, — one bribed and the other I don’t know what.”
The respondent Was himself sworn as a witness on his own behalf at the trial, and in his evidencemade the following answers :
“Question. To recurto the conversation in the Sun office, you say the name of no court was mentioned? Answer. No, sir; it was not. Q. What court did you refer to as the son of a gun of a court? A. I don’t know that I referred to any; it was one of those- remarks we lawyers sometimes make. It really has but little or no meaning. Q. Some one asked you if you were beaten? A. Yes, sir. Q. In your reply, ‘Yes,’ where did you mean you were*123 beaten? A. Well, if I meant anything, or if my conversation referred to any matter, it probably referred to the case decided there in court. Q. You would say that your conversation referred to something? A. Well, it referred to just this, if your honor please: it was a remark made in anger, and what it meant, or what one would mean by it, it would be pretty hard to say. Q. In your answer you certainly referred to the Ivinson case? A. I certainly had the Ivinson case in mind.”
Mr. Corlett, in his evidence, after stating what had occurred in the Sun office, and that he and the respondent were after-wards, on the same day, in his (Corlett’s) office, states the following as having occurred at the latter place:
“I broached the subject to him about his remark. He said to me finally that he didn’t mean to say that I had done anything, or had anything to do in respect to this case, that was improper; or that Judge Carey had, either. Question. What cause had that reference to? Answer. What we call the Ivinson and Hutton case. Q. * * * Now, yon might state whether, in that conversation, the respondent did not state that he meant not to be understood that the court was bribed. A. T don’t rememberof his saying that. Q. You might state whether the respondent did not wish to be understood as charging any judge with bribery. A. No, sir. The statement was that he did not mean to say that he had any evidence that Judge Blair [one of the judges of this court] had been bribed, but that his position in the supreme court was different from what it was in the district court. That may have been it, or that he did not have any evidence.”
As to what drew out respondent’s remark above stated, Mr. Corlett testified :
“I don’t know, but for some reason or other I presumed he had reference to Judge Blair; and I asked him what reason he had for thinking Judge Blair had been bribed, or if he had any evidence of it. ”
Of the above testimony, and the conversation mentioned in it, the respondent, in his testimony, says:
“I think if it occurred at all, and probably it did as he states it, it occurred in the afternoon of that day, or substantially as he states it. If I was to repeat the conversation I would not vary it very much.”
We think the evidence shows conclusively that the language spoken by the respondent at the Sun office was spoken of this court, and concerning its decision in the Ivinson-Hutton case, and, being so used, the only meaning which can reasonably be given the words is one which charges the court with bribery in the decision of that cause. By his words, spoken publicly, therespondent, with vile epithets, charged the court with the commission of the highest crime which a court can possibly commit, and yet it is not claimed that there was even the slightest ground for that charge.
The claim is that the words were spoken in anger. The plain duty of respondent was then to right the wrong as fár as possible, and when confronted here with the groundless charge made by him to retract it with as much alacrity as it was uttered. He owed it to himself as well as to the court to be entirely frank, candid, and truthful in the matter. But there is no retraction in the respondent’s answer, nor is there anything showing the slightest regret upon his part on account of his offense. Indeed, the answer closes with this self-sufficient language:
“That if at any time he has criticised the action of courts unkindly it was the result of disappointment in the failure of justice, and the inability of courts to administer the law with that uniformity and precision that he believed requisita in so high and.noble a profession, and not from any disposition or intention to hinder or prevent the due administration of justice.”
Respondent testifies that he retracted the charge of bribery in a private conversation with Mr. Corlett, which, respondent says, took place before noon of the day of the utterance, and within a few minutes after the utterance. Mr. Corlett’s recollection is not in accord with.that oE respondent upon this point, and in this the former is strongly corroborated by the conversation which took place several hours afterwards in his office, — a conversation in which respondent reiterated in effect the charge of bribery, though admitting he had no evidence of it. It is at least singular that this conversation should have taken place as it did if the retraction had been made as claimed. It will be seen that the testimony of respondent, to state it mildly, was quite evasive. We have also had the task of trying to reconcile that testimony with his sworn answer. For example, that answer contains the following:
*125 “But respondent denies that he used said language, or spoke said words of or concerning said cause of Ivinson against Hutton, or any other case that had been decided by said supreme court.”
This denial we failed to reconcile with portions of respondent’s testimony.
Our statute provides that this court “may revoke or suspend the license of any attorney or counselor at law to practice therein: * * * Fifths for the willful violation of any of the duties of attorney or counselor.” The statute does not define the duties of an attorney or counselor. We have also a general statute adopting the “common law of England, as modified by judicial decisions,” and expressly providing that that common law “shall be considered as of full force until repealed by legislative au tliori'ty. ” Comp. Laws, p. 193, § 1.
The duties of an attorney in this territory are, therefore, the same as under the common law, his- first duty being to the court of which he is an officer. “The obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the bar, is not merely to be obedient to the constitutionandlaws, but to'maintain at all times the respect due courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct towards the judges personally for their judicial acts.” Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335. at page 355.
The fountain of the power of the courts to remove attorneys, as exercised at common law, is the statute of 4 Hen. IV. c. 18,-which is as follows:
“And if ány such attorney be hereafter found notoriously in any default of record or otherwise, he shall forswear the court and never after be received to make any suit in any court of the king. They that be good and virtuous and of good fame shall be received and sworn at the discretion of the justices, and, if they are notoriously in default, at discretion may be removed upon evidence either of record or not of record. ”
It seems to us that the power to remove under our statute, and the causes sufficient for removal, are as broad and comprehensive as at common law. Further, so far as questions now arising in this case are concerned, there is nothing in our statute, either expressly or by implication repealing the common law.
The court finds that the accusation, so far as it relates to the conversation in Cheyenne, is in all things sustained, and that the subsequent conduct of the respondent in relation to the matters involved, including his answer and testimony here in thi3 action, has in no way lessened or atoned for his offense. The court further finds that the default of the respondent, the willful violation of his duty to the court as an attorney and counsel- or, has been such, when viewed from the standpoint either of the common law or of our statute, as to demand a suspension of his official relation to this court. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, supra; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; People v. Green, 7 Colo. 237, 244, 3 Pac. Rep. 65, 374; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 569. It is therefore considered by the court that the license of respondent as an attorney and counselor at law to practice in this court be, and the same is hereby, suspended until the further order of this court. It is further considered by the court that the respondent pay the costs of this proceeding, taxed at .¶83.
