IN RE BRIANN A.T. et al.
No. 2015-170-Appeal. (98-1873-3) No. 2016-233-Appeal.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
October 18, 2016
147 A.3d 866
For Petitioner: Karen A. Clark, Department of Children Youth and Families, Lynne Marran Radiches, Court Appointed Special Advocate
For Respondent: Jesse W. Duarte, Esq.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Goldberg, for the Court.
This case came before the Supreme Court on October 4, 2016, on appeal by the respondent, Marvin T.1 (respondent), from
Facts and Travel
The plight of Briann and Bri‘Nayshia first came to the attention of the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) on August 23, 2012, when DCYF was called to the home of Briann and Bri‘Nayshia‘s mother in response to an incident that led to the mother‘s arrest. DCYF removed Briann and Bri‘Nayshia from the home, placed them on a forty-eight-hour hold, and filed ex parte neglect petitions in the Family Court seeking to remove the children from the care of the mother and respondent-father. During this time, the whereabouts of respondent were unknown.
A decree was entered by the Family Court on January 17, 2013, finding Briann and Bri‘Nayshia to be neglected and committing them to the care, custody, and control of DCYF. On October 27, 2014, DCYF filed petitions in the Family Court seeking to terminate the parental rights of respondent with respect to both Briann and Bri‘Nayshia.3 With respect to respondent, DCYF alleged the following grounds for termination: that the children had been placed in DCYF‘s custody or care for at least twelve months; that respondent was “offered or received services to correct the situation which led to the [children] being placed“; and that there was not “a substantial probability that the [children would] be able to return safely to [respondent‘s] care within a reasonable period of time considering the [children‘s] age[s] and [their] need for a permanent home.”
Trial proceedings were held in Family Court on March 16-18 and April 1, 2015. The Family Court justice heard testimony from several witnesses, including Jen Shymanik (Shymanik), a social worker from DCYF, who was assigned to respondent‘s case on February 1, 2013. At that time, Shymanik contacted respondent and thus began what can only be characterized as difficult and unsuccessful case planning for
The record discloses that eight case plans had been developed, four for each child. Those case plans included the attainable goals of: obtaining employment, obtaining appropriate housing, gaining financial stability, attending to the girls’ mental-health and developmental needs, and working on parenting through visitation, empathy, and bonding. Shymanik also referred respondent to a psychologist for a parent-child evaluation; however, respondent refused to attend. It was only after Shymanik stressed the importance of the evaluation that in July 2013, respondent agreed to cooperate. The evaluation centered on respondent‘s lack of parenting skills and his own mental-health issues. Although the evaluation included a referral for respondent to attend the Families Together program at the Providence Children‘s Museum, respondent was ineligible based on his failure to consistently attend his biweekly visits with Briann and Bri‘Nayshia. Visitation was problematic throughout case planning efforts. The respondent canceled many scheduled visits with his daughters, asserting that he was ill, he had to work, or that the weather was inclement.
Shymanik estimated that, during her involvement with respondent, he was offered visitation twice a month but that he attended only one visit per month. Shymanik testified that during these visits the girls were “[r]eally affectionate with one another” but there “seemed to be very little bond between [respondent] and the girls. * * * [T]hey weren‘t very responsive to him.” Shymanik credited respondent for asking questions about Briann and Bri‘Nayshia‘s day and stressing the importance of education, but she noted that, in some ways, respondent “showed very limited capacity to parent.” For instance, after Shymanik informed respondent that a nephrologist had diagnosed Briann with hypertension and recommended that she not consume high-fat, sugary, or fried foods, respondent brought fried chicken and french fries for her to eat. Although Shymanik provided respondent with feedback and suggestions for improvement, respondent “consistently ignored” her and on several occasions “became sort of argumentative.”
Shymanik testified that, on one occasion, respondent became confrontational when he arrived for a visit and was informed that Briann would be approximately half an hour late because she was attending a friend‘s birthday party. Shymanik recalled, “[respondent] * * * had a verbal argument with the clinician and just walked out of the visit.” Thereafter, respondent “refused” to participate in the Families Together program, but visitations continued. Shymanik observed an increase in Bri‘Nayshia‘s behavioral issues; and, when she brought the problem to respondent‘s attention, he “blame[d] [Shymanik] and the foster parents for the way the children behaved.” When Shymanik explained to respondent that he should be more protective of the children because of their developmental and mental-health needs, he replied that the children “didn‘t have any service needs at all” and that their behavior arose from lenient parenting by the foster parents. Shymanik informed respondent that his daughters had been diagnosed with communication, behavioral, and medical needs and that Briann and Bri‘Nayshia had been referred to early-intervention services and enhanced outpatient services. These services were delayed, however, because respondent flatly refused to sign the necessary release forms; requiring DCYF to seek the Family Court‘s permission for Briann and Bri‘Nayshia to receive these overdue services.
With regard to future planning for Briann and Bri‘Nayshia, respondent was informed that he needed to ensure that the children would not be exposed to unsafe living conditions. Although respondent admitted his residence “wasn‘t an appropriate place” for Briann and Bri‘Nayshia, he made no effort to obtain suitable housing. Shymanik testified that, while respondent met certain goals in the case plans such as obtaining employment, his mental-health issues, especially his “combative approach” to disciplining, were continuous concerns. In addition to being concerned about his mental-health, Shymanik testified to her repeated concerns that respondent‘s future planning for Briann and Bri‘Nayshia included his stated intention to “hand the children over to his sister for her to parent them.”
In June 2014, Shymanik and her supervisor met with respondent to discuss the remaining services that were prerequisites to reunification with Briann and Bri‘Nayshia. The services included parenting services and consecutive attendance at Briann and Bri‘Nayshia‘s medical appointments. Shymanik explained to respondent that, if the services were not completed, DCYF would file a petition to terminate his parental rights. The respondent replied, “do what you have to do.”
Meanwhile, Briann and Bri‘Nayshia‘s foster families were “very attentive” to their needs. Shymanik reported that Briann was “very connected” to her foster mother and called her “mommy.” Likewise, Bri‘Nayshia referred to her foster parents as “mommy” and “daddy.” Bri‘Nayshia “hugs them, kisses them, [and] lays her head on their shoulder.” Both foster families expressed a desire to adopt the children.
At the conclusion of Shymanik‘s testimony, three additional witnesses with personal knowledge of respondent‘s character testified about their numerous concerns regarding respondent‘s ability to parent. For example, Kimberly Rodrigues (Rodrigues), a former family clinician at Families Together, testified that, in her opinion, reunification “was a risk” for these children. Rodrigues recounted the visitation at which respondent became angry when he was informed that Briann would be approximately half an hour late because she was attending a friend‘s birthday party. Rodrigues testified that respondent blamed Shymanik for Briann‘s tardiness and stated: “I come from a street background, [and] this makes me want to take matters into my own hands. It wouldn‘t turn out good for some people. When I‘m provoked, I can be the nastiest person on this earth, and [Shymanik] crossed the line.”
On April 24, 2015, the Family Court justice issued a written decision granting the petition to terminate respondent‘s parental rights in accordance with
Standard of Review
“On appeal, ‘[t]his Court reviews termination of parental rights rulings by examining the record to establish whether the [Family Court] justice‘s findings are supported by legal and competent evidence.‘” In re Amiah P., 54 A.3d 446, 451 (R.I. 2012) (quoting In re Victoria L., 950 A.2d 1168, 1174 (R.I. 2008)). “These findings are entitled to great weight, and this Court will not disturb them unless they ‘are clearly wrong or the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence.‘” Id. (quoting In re Victoria L., 950 A.2d at 1174).
“Natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the ‘care, custody, and management’ of their children.” In re Amiah P., 54 A.3d at 451 (quoting In re Destiny D., 922 A.2d 168, 172 (R.I. 2007)). “Before terminating a parent‘s rights to his or her child, the trial justice must find that the parent is unfit.” Id. (citing In re Pricillion R., 971 A.2d 599, 604 (R.I. 2009)). “In these cases, the right to due process requires that the state support its allegations by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. (citing In re Jazlyn P., 31 A.3d 1273, 1279 (R.I. 2011)). “However, once the trial justice determines parental unfitness, ‘the best interests of the child outweigh all other considerations.‘” Id. (quoting In re Jazlyn P., 31 A.3d at 1279).
Analysis
Before this Court, respondent argues that the Family Court justice erred in terminating his parental rights, specifically claiming that the state failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was an unfit parent. In addition, respondent avers that the state failed to establish that it made reasonable efforts to strengthen the parental bond and offer services aimed at reunification, pursuant to
When confronted with assertions such as these, our review of the Family Court‘s decision is threefold. “We turn first to the court‘s finding of parental unfitness; thereafter, we examine its finding as to the reasonable reunification efforts on the part of DCYF. Finally, our review turns to the Family Court‘s determination concerning the children‘s best interests.” In re Brooklyn M., 933 A.2d 1113, 1122 (R.I. 2007).
Parental Fitness
Our careful evaluation of the finding of unfitness made by the Family Court justice, in the face of this evidence, is not one with which we struggle. Pursuant to
The Family Court justice premised her finding of unfitness on respondent‘s refusal to cooperate with DCYF, his sporadic visits, and the unanimous consensus among DCYF service providers that he is “agitated,” “angry,” and “threaten[s] physical harm when he [does] not ‘get his way,‘” such that reunification with his children presents a risk to their well-being. The Family Court justice determined that this behavior and conduct “overwhelmingly” established that respondent was unfit to parent Briann and Bri‘Nayshia. A thorough review of the record before us supports these findings—particularly the testimony of Shymanik. Although Shymanik testified to respondent‘s occasional successes, such as obtaining employment, the majority of her testimony highlighted respondent‘s noncompliance with case planning, his defiant refusal to sign medical releases, violent outbursts, frequent anger, and poor interactions with Briann and Bri‘Nayshia. Shymanik‘s testimony concerning respondent‘s mental-health issues and his refusal to accept the mental-health services offered to him demonstrates his unfitness. See In re Ryan S., 728 A.2d 454, 457 (R.I. 1999) (mother‘s mental-health problems and her unwillingness to cooperate with recommended services rendered her unfit to parent her son). Shymanik‘s testimony was accompanied by significant corroborating evidence establishing that respondent is unfit. See In re Charles L., 6 A.3d 1089, 1093 (R.I. 2010) (affirming the trial justice‘s determination of unfitness where parent demonstrated “periods of noncompliance” with treatment plan, “marked by violent outbursts, sudden mood changes, and unpredictable actions and demands“).
The respondent‘s own statements also belie the notion that he was willing to parent Briann and Bri‘Nayshia; perhaps none more than his admission that he would “hand the children over to his sister for her to parent them.” This declaration aptly illustrates respondent‘s unwillingness to parent these children and explains their lack of responsiveness to him. We are therefore satisfied that the Family Court justice‘s findings with respect to this issue were not clearly erroneous and were supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Reasonable Efforts
In order for the Family Court to terminate a parent‘s rights under
Our review of the record reveals that there is adequate evidentiary support for the Family Court justice‘s careful and detailed conclusions. The respondent, however, categorizes these findings as “vague[] articulat[ions]” and suggests that the record reveals that any conduct unbecoming to a parent that he may have displayed is directly attributable to DCYF‘s failure to provide him with individualized treatment. To this argument we echo our sentiments in In re Natalya C., 946 A.2d 198 (R.I. 2008), in that “we do not fault the agency when the treatment received does not resolve the underlying problem or when a parent‘s recalcitrance to treatment precludes reunification.” Id. at 203 (citing In re Raymond C., 864 A.2d at 633). During two precious years of his daughters’ childhood, respondent failed to obtain safe and adequate housing or otherwise plan for their future. His sporadic efforts, refusal to cooperate with DCYF, and failure to nurture a loving relationship with his children lead us to conclude that respondent is simply unequipped to parent them.
We have long recognized that, in carrying out its responsibilities for child welfare, DCYF need not be burdened with “holding the hand of a recalcitrant parent.” In re Joseph S., 788 A.2d at 478 (quoting In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d at 204). We therefore conclude that the Family Court justice did not err when she found by clear and convincing evidence that DCYF made reasonable efforts to correct the situation that led to the removal of Briann and Bri‘Nayshia from respondent‘s care.
The Best Interests of the Children
Once DCYF has “demonstrated parental unfitness and has shown that it made reasonable efforts at reunification, the Family Court then shifts its analysis to consider the best interests of the child or children involved in the proceeding.” In re Brooklyn M., 933 A.2d at 1126 (citing In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574, 580 (R.I. 1987)). The best interests of the child or children “outweigh all other considerations.” Id.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the respondent‘s appeal is denied and dismissed. The decree of the Family Court terminating the parental rights of the respondent is affirmed. The papers of this case are remanded to the Family Court.
GOLDBERG, J.
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND
Notes
“(a) The court shall * * * terminate any and all legal rights of the parent to the child * * * if the court finds as a fact by clear and convincing evidence that:
* * *
“(3) The child has been placed in the legal custody or care of the department for children, youth, and families for at least twelve (12) months, and the parents were offered or received services to correct the situation which led to the child being placed; provided, that there is not a substantial probability that the child will be able to return safely to the parents’ care within a reasonable period of time considering the child‘s age and the need for a permanent home[.]”