In Re Brenna E.
This case is before the court on appeal from a judgment of the Williams County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenilе Division, granting permanent custody of Brenna E., born October 12, 1992, and Jessup E., born August 30, 1993, to appellee, the Williams County Department of Human Services (‘WCDHS”). Appellant, the natural mother of Brenna and Jessup, appeals that judgment and sets forth the following assignments of error:
“The trial court erred to [sic] concluding that reasonable efforts had been taken by the Department of Human Services to reunite the family or to avoid the
“The trial court erred in finding that the children could, not be returned to their mother within a reasonable time when efforts at treatment for mental health conditions had not been tried, duе to the neglect of the Department of Human Services to disclose information in their possession.”
We find that this court must disregard appellant’s assignments of error and must reverse this case on the basis that the juvenilе court lacked the authority to consider the children services agency’s motion for permanent custody.
On August 6, 1996, WCDHS filed a complaint in dependency and neglect, seeking temporary custody of Brenna and Jessup. In an entry journalized August 27, 1996, the court found Brenna and Jessup dependent children and, pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(2), awarded temporary custody of the children to WCDHS. On January 6, 1997, WCDHS filed a motion requesting permanent custody of Brenna and Jеssup.
At the time of the filing of the motion for temporary custody, R.C. 2151.413 read:
“(A) A public children services agency оr private child placing agency that, pursuant to an order of disposition under division (A)(2) of section 2151.353 of thе Revised Code or under any version of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code that existed prior to the effeсtive date of this amendment, is granted temporary custody of a child who is not abandoned or orphanеd * * * may file a motion in the court that made the disposition of the child requesting permanent custody of the child if a period of at least six months has elapsed since the order of temporary custody was issued * * *.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, undеr the former statute, a children services agency was required to have temporary custody of a child for at least six months immediately preceding the filing of a motion for permanent custody. See
In re Hayes
(1997),
Nevertheless, R.C. 2151.413(A), as effective September 18,1996, eliminated the six months of continuous temporary custody as a prerequisite to the filing of a motion for permanent custody under R .C. 2151.413(A). Consequently, if the amendment is applicable to a pending case, WCDHS was required to have temporary custody of Brenna and Jessup only immediately preceding the motion
Generally, a statute is presumеd to be prospective unless it is expressly made retrospective by the legislature. R.C. 1.48;
Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.
(1988),
“(A) The * * * amendment * * * of a statute does not * * *:
“(1) Affect the prior operation of the statute or any prior action taken thereunder;
“(2) Affect any * * * right, * * * obligation, or liability previously acquired, accrued, aсcorded, or incurred thereunder,
a í¡í ^ #
“(4) Affect any * * * proceeding, or remedy in respect of any such * * * obligаtion, liability, * * * and the * * * proceeding, or remedy may be instituted, continued, or enforced, * * * as if the statute had not been repealed or amended.”
Thus, R.C. 1.58 acts as a savings clause to all statutes that amend prior legislation and, absent express provision in the amending act, make the law as it existed before the amendment applicable to all pending cases.
Woodward v. Eberly
(1958),
In the present case, amended R.C. 2151.413 does not specifically express an intent that it be applied retrospectively. Therefore, it may not be applied to causes of action which accrued prior to its effective date.
Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.