75 Conn. App. 466 | Conn. App. Ct. | 2003
Opinion
The respondent mother
The following facts and procedural history underlie the respondent’s appeal. The child was bom on April 13,1990. At the time of the child’s birth, the respondent was a twenty-one year old single mother who had just left active duty with the United States Marine Corps. She lived with her great aunt and relied heavily on relatives to help her raise the child during the first five years of her daughter’s life.
On January 18, 2000, when the child was nine years old, the respondent attacked the child with a large hunt
The respondent was charged with attempt to commit minder, assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child. The respondent claimed that her actions were the result of a drug induced psychosis. She was acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect.
The petitioner, the commissioner of the department of children and families, secured an order of temporary custody and, on January 21, 2000, filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents. The petition subsequently was amended to include several grounds for termination that inadvertently had been left unchecked on the standard petition form. The amended petition alleged that it was in the child’s best interest to terminate the respondent’s parental rights because “[t]he child has been denied, by reason of an act or acts of commission or omission ... by the [respondent], the care, guidance or control necessary for her physical, educational, moral or emotional well being,” and because [t]here is no ongoing parent/child relationship with respect to the [respondent] that ordinarily develops as a result of the [respondent] having met on a continuing, day to day basis, the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or re-establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child.”
I
“Our standard of review on appeal from a termination of parental rights is whether the challenged findings are clearly erroneous. . . . The determinations reached by the trial court that the evidence is clear and convincing will be disturbed only if [any challenged] finding is not supported by the evidence and [is], in light of the evidence in the whole record, clearly erroneous. . . .
“On appeal, our function is to deteimine whether the trial court’s conclusion was legally correct and factually supported. . . . We do not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached . . . nor do we retry the case or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. . . . Rather, on review by this court every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the trial court’s ruling. . . .
“A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition. ... In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights [under General Statutes § 17a-112 (j)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (D) provides that the court may grant a petition to terminate parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that “there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child
“This part of the statute requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis. First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child’s best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop. ... In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance. . . . The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent. . . . Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn. App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001). Where the child’s feelings toward the parent are ambivalent, there must be a finding that “no positive emotional aspects of the relationship survive.” In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, 470, 586 A.2d 597 (1991).
Regardless of the quality and nature of the respondent’s relationship with her daughter prior to the assault, it is the character of that relationship at the time of the filing of the termination petition that is relevant to the court’s inquiry. See In re Shane P., 58 Conn. App. 234, 241, 753 A.2d 409 (2000). The court heard sufficient evidence to find that the relationship between the respondent and her child had been irrevocably damaged by the trauma that the child suffered as a result of the assault. The testimony presented at the termination hearing supports a finding that whatever the respondent’s degree of culpability for the attack, the trauma that the child suffered was no less real to her and no less destructive to whatever parent-child relationship may have existed at one time.
The child was evaluated by a child and adolescence psychiatrist who stated that the child is uncertain about how to feel about her mother and that she cannot feel safe in her presence. The psychiatrist noted the child’s lack of affect when discussing her mother. When referring to her mother, the child adopted a blank expression and monotonous tone; her affect would flatten and she would withdraw. During the course of three interviews, she never shared any positive memories of experiences
The psychiatrist also stated his professional opinion that the trauma of the assault is irreversible, that the child would never feel safe and that she would always be anxious about what might happen next if she were to live with her mother. He stated that the respondent’s rehabilitation would have no impact on how the child perceives her. If reexposed to her mother, the trauma would be reactivated. The psychiatrist testified that in the case of posttraumatic stress disorders, the symptoms correlate to the nature of the trauma. A trauma of the severity as that involved in this case would likely lead to lasting consequences.
Since the assault, the child also has been seeing a therapist who was an expert in the areas of childhood, adolescent and developmental psychology. At the time that she began counseling, the child was experiencing “night terrors.” During the counseling sessions, she stated that many of her memories of her mother included irrational rages, bizarre behavior and physical abuse. She related instances of physical abuse preceding the latest assault, including an incident in which the respondent hit her with a hanger. During her sessions, the child also recounted episodes in which her mother would tell her that she hated her.
On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the court’s finding that there was no ongoing parent-child relationship was not clearly erroneous.
II
The respondent also claims that the evidence was not clear and convincing that the physical injury to the child was not accidental and that the court improperly found that she did an act of commission or omission within the meaning of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (c). We decline to review those claims.
Because the statutory grounds necessary to grant a petition for termination of parental rights are expressed in the disjunctive, the court need find only one ground to grant the petition. Thus, we may affirm the court’s decision if we find that it properly concluded that any one of the statutory circumstances existed. See In re Alexander C., 67 Conn. App. 417, 427, 787 A.2d 608 (2001), aff'd, 262 Conn. 308, 813 A.2d 87 (2003). Having concluded that the court properly found that there was clear and convincing evidence that no parent-child rela
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The respondent mother was unable to identify the child’s father with any degree of certainty. The court identified the likely father, and notice by publication was provided to him at his last known area of residence. The court terminated the putative father’s parental rights on August 28, 2001, and he is not a party to this appeal. We therefore refer in this opinion to the respondent mother as the respondent.
The psychiatrist also met with the respondent. He concluded that her responses indicated a lack of capacity to parent effectively and to set appropriate limits for the child. Specifically, he saw in her responses indications of a coequal relationship with the child, characterized by bargaining and compromise, rather than an appropriate parent-child relationship. That conclusion is consistent with the testimony of a child therapist who described the child as “parentified,” a situation that results when a child is induced to take on parental responsibilities.