I. INTRODUCTION
In this matter, the Court finds itself in a difficult position; it has been asked to rule *85on discovery in an action overseen by a different United States district court, the Southern District of Ohio, related to the voting rights of Ohio citizens; an issue with little to no connection to Washington, D.C. Pending before the Court are five motions to quash or enforce subpoenas issued by the Southern District of Ohio seeking documents and testimony from recipients in Washington, D.C. The Plaintiffs in the underlying action-five organizations and several individuals who are Democratic voters living in Ohio-have asked this Court to transfer two of the subpoena disputes back to the Southern District of Ohio, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. One of the subpoena recipients, E. Mark Braden, has also asked this Court to transfer the disputes in which he is involved. Several of the subpoena recipients, however, resist transfer. Despite their protestations, as explained below, the Court concludes that transfer is appropriate under Federal Rule 45, given the nature of the disputes and the posture and complexity of the underlying action.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the underlying action, Plaintiffs are challenging Ohio's 2011 congressional redistricting process-which resulted in the state's sixteen current United States congressional districts-as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. See Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") ¶¶ 1-2, APRI, S.D. Ohio ECF No. 37.
The parties are now in discovery and, as explained in greater detail below, the Southern District of Ohio Judge overseeing the proceedings, Judge Timothy S. Black, has set an expedited discovery and trial schedule. Acting swiftly, so as to complete discovery before the December 19, 2018 deadline, Plaintiffs have subpoenaed several national Republican organizations and individuals associated with those organizations, seeking documents and testimony that Plaintiffs believe will flesh out the alleged conspiracy between national and Ohio Republicans to unconstitutionally redraw Ohio's congressional districts.
Certain recipients of Plaintiffs' subpoenas have resisted disclosing responsive documents that Plaintiffs believe are not protected by any privilege, and have conducted document searches that Plaintiffs believe are insufficient to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A. Mark Braden
Mr. Braden, according to Plaintiffs, was one of the national Republican operatives involved in the scheme to unconstitutionally gerrymander Ohio's congressional districts. Pls.' Mem. Law Opp'n E. Mark Braden's Mot. Quash Subpoenas ("Braden Quash Opp'n I") at 4, In re Subpoena Served on E. Mark Braden ("Braden Subpoena I") , No. 18-mc-0095, ECF No. 4. Mr. Braden is a Washington, D.C.-based attorney who was retained by the Ohio Attorney General's office as special counsel to advise the Ohio legislature during the 2011 redistricting cycle. Mem. Supp. Mot. Quash ("Braden Quash Mem. I") at 1, Braden Subpoena I , ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiffs contend that while Mr. Braden may have provided legal advice to the Ohio legislature, he also "played a key role in developing Ohio Republicans' redistricting strategy and guiding the map drawing process." Braden Quash Opp'n I at 5.
Plaintiffs have served three subpoenas on Mr. Braden, seeking documents and testimony relating to the 2011 Ohio redistricting and other redistricting litigation in which Mr. Braden has been involved. See Braden Quash Mem. I Ex. A & Ex. B, ECF Nos. 1-2 & 1-3; Mem. Supp. Mot. Quash ("Braden Quash Mem. II") Ex. 1, In re Subpoena Served on E. Mark Braden ("Braden Subpoena II") , No. 18-mc-0151, ECF No. 1-2. In response, Mr. Braden filed motions in this Court to quash the subpoenas, arguing that the subpoenas seek privileged or irrelevant material and impose an undue burden on him. See generally Braden Quash Mem. I; Braden Quash Mem. II. Mr. Braden subsequently filed motions to transfer both of his subpoena disputes to the Southern District of Ohio. See generally Ohio Att'y General & Non-Party Witness E. Mark Braden's *87Mot. to Transfer ("Braden Transfer Mot. I"), Braden Subpoena I , ECF No. 13; Ohio Att'y General & Non-Party Witness E. Mark Braden's Mot. to Transfer ("Braden Transfer Mot. II"), Braden Subpoena II , ECF No. 4.
B. Edward Gillespie and John Morgan
Plaintiffs also believe that Edward Gillespie and John Morgan were among the national Republican operatives involved in the gerrymandering scheme. Movants' Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel Compliance ("Gillespie Compel Mot.") at 1-3, In re Subpoenas Served on Edward Gillespie & John Morgan ("Gillespie & Morgan Subpoenas") , No. 18-mc-0105, ECF No. 1-1. Mr. Gillespie was the Honorary Chairman of the Republican State Leadership Committee ("RSLC") from 2010 through early 2011, and then the Chairman of RSLC's Board of Directors during the Ohio congressional redistricting at issue in the underlying action. Decl. of Edward Gillespie ("Gillespie Decl.") ¶ 4, Edward Gillespie's & John Morgan's Brief Opp'n Gillespie Compel Mot. ("Gillespie Compel Opp'n") Ex. A, Gillespie & Morgan Subpoenas , ECF No. 4-1. "The RSLC is a political organization designed to elect Republicans to state level offices." Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiffs claim that the RSLC, among other national Republican organizations, attempted "to control the redistricting process in Ohio by guiding state Republican officials in creating a map to maximize the Republican share of Ohio's congressional delegation," and that as Chairman Mr. Gillespie was a "central architect" of these efforts. Gillespie Compel Mot. at 2.
Mr. Morgan is a "professional demographer"-an expert in population composition and distribution-who "regularly provide[s] services to states and localities responsible for drawing electoral maps." Decl. of John Morgan ("Morgan Decl.") ¶ 3, Gillespie Compel Opp'n Ex. C, ECF No. 4-3. He provided technical and map drawing redistricting services to the Ohio legislature in connection with the 2011 redistricting. Id. ¶ 7. In supplying his services, he visited Ohio twice in 2011 to administer "in-person, on sight training and guidance to the [Ohio] map drawers." Morgan Decl. ¶ 8; SAC ¶ 49. He claims that outside of these visits, his "work supporting Ohio's redistricting efforts was extremely limited." Id. ¶ 9.
Plaintiffs have served subpoenas on Mr. Gillespie and Mr. Morgan, seeking documents from 2010 through 2012 that they believe will show the unconstitutional intent of national and state Republicans to secure a partisan advantage through the Ohio redistricting process. Gillespie Compel Mot. at 11; Gillespie Compel Mot. Ex. G & Ex. H, ECF No. 1-4. Mr. Gillespie asserts that, despite a thorough search, he is not in possession of any documents responsive to Plaintiffs' subpoena. See Gillespie Compel Opp'n at 5, ECF No. 4; Gillespie Decl. ¶¶ 14-15. Mr. Morgan asserts that he has identified and produced to Plaintiffs all responsive, non-privileged documents in his possession. Gillespie Compel Opp'n at 7; Morgan Decl. ¶ 15. Both individuals have resisted searching for and producing documents created prior to 2011, because they claim that those documents are unrelated to the 2011 Ohio redistricting and thus not relevant to Plaintiffs' action. Gillespie Compel Opp'n at 1-2. Mr. Gillespie lodges the same argument with respect to certain RSLC fundraising-related documents. Id.
Plaintiffs claim that the document searches undertaken by Mr. Gillespie and Mr. Morgan were insufficient, and that their relevance objections are invalid. Gillespie Compel Mot. at 11-12. Plaintiffs accordingly filed a motion with this Court to compel Mr. Gillespie and Mr. Morgan to conduct additional searches over a broader *88scope of documents. See generally id. Recently, Plaintiffs also filed a motion to transfer this subpoena dispute to the Southern District of Ohio. See generally Movants' Mot. Transfer Mot. Compel Compliance ("Gillespie Transfer Mot."), Gillespie & Morgan Subpoenas , ECF No. 7. Mr. Gillespie and Mr. Morgan oppose this motion. See generally Opp'n Pls.' Mot. Transfer ("Gillespie Transfer Opp'n"), Gillespie & Morgan Subpoenas , ECF No. 8.
C. Republication National Committee, National Republican Congressional Committee, and Adam Kincaid
Finally, Plaintiffs believe that the Republican National Committee ("RNC"), the National Republican Congressional Committee ("NRCC"), and Adam Kincaid were "central participants" in the alleged scheme. RNC Compel Mot. at 5-7. The RNC is a national Republican party committee under
The NRCC is another national Republican party committee under
In addition to Plaintiffs' subpoenas served on Mr. Gillespie and Mr. Morgan, Plaintiffs served subpoenas on the RNC, the NRCC, and Mr. Kincaid (together with Mr. Gillespie and Mr. Morgan, "Respondents"), seeking documents that they believe will further demonstrate national and state Republicans' unconstitutional intent to gerrymander Ohio's congressional districts. RNC Compel Mot. at 3;
Plaintiffs claim that (1) the RNC, the NRCC, and Mr. Kincaid have failed to establish that the subpoenas infringe their First Amendment privileges; (2) any First Amendment privileges held by these Respondents are outweighed by Plaintiffs' "significant interest" in the information sought by the subpoenas, considering the information's relevance to Plaintiffs' claims; and (3) the information sought is in large part not covered by the attorney-client or work product privileges. RNC Compel Mot. at 3-4. Plaintiffs filed a motion with this Court to compel the RNC, the NRCC, and Mr. Kincaid to comply *89more fully with the subpoenas. See generally
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, a subpoena to produce materials, permit inspection of materials, or submit to a deposition "must issue from the court where the action is pending. " Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(2) (emphasis added). However, if the subpoena's recipient does not comply to the serving party's satisfaction, the "serving party may move the court for the district where compliance is required for an order compelling production or inspection."
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court first considers Mr. Braden's motions to transfer his subpoena disputes with Plaintiffs to the Southern District of Ohio. The Court then considers Plaintiffs' motions to transfer their subpoena disputes with Mr. Gillespie, Mr. Morgan, the RNC, the NRCC, and Mr. Kincaid to the Southern District of Ohio. Because Mr. Braden has consented to the transfer of his subpoena disputes, the Court grants his motions to transfer under Federal Rule 45(f). While Respondents do not consent to the transfer of their subpoena disputes, the Court concludes that the disputes raise "exceptional circumstances" warranting transfer, also under Federal Rule 45(f). Accordingly, the Court Grants Plaintiffs' motions to transfer those disputes.
A. The Court Transfers Mr. Braden's Motions to Quash Plaintiffs' Subpoenas
The Court first considers Mr. Braden's motions to transfer his subpoena disputes with Plaintiffs to the Southern District of Ohio. As noted, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, the court where subpoena compliance is required may transfer a subpoena dispute to the court that issued the subpoena "if the person subject to the subpoena consents." Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(f). The subpoenas served on Mr. Braden were issued from the Southern District of Ohio and require compliance in Washington, D.C., over which this Court has jurisdiction. Moreover, Mr. Braden has consented to the transfer of his motions to quash the subpoenas; in fact, he seeks the transfer. See Braden Transfer Mot. I Ex. 1, Braden Subpoena I , ECF No. 13-1; Braden Transfer Mot. II Ex. 1, Braden Subpoena II , ECF No. 4-1. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Federal Rule 45's requirements are met, and it grants Mr. Braden's motions to transfer.
B. The Court Transfers Plaintiffs' Motions to Compel Compliance with the Subpoenas Served on Mr. Gillespie, Mr. Morgan, the RNC, the NRCC, and Mr. Kincaid
The Court next considers Plaintiffs' contested motions to transfer their subpoena *90disputes with Mr. Gillespie, Mr. Morgan, the RNC, the NRCC, and Mr. Kincaid to the Southern District of Ohio. As noted, because Respondents do not consent to the transfers, the Court may transfer the motions only under "exceptional circumstances." Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(f). While the term "exceptional circumstances" is not defined in Rule 45(f), the Rule's Advisory Committee Note states that, while the "prime concern" when considering transfer "should be avoiding burdens on local nonparties subject to subpoenas," in "some circumstances ... transfer may be warranted in order to avoid disrupting the issuing court's management of the underlying litigation[.]"
"Thus, courts weighing transfer under Rule 45(f) must carefully balance the 'interest of the nonparty in obtaining local resolution of [a subpoena-related] motion' against the interest 'in ensuring the efficient, fair and orderly progress of ongoing litigation before the issuing court.' " In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig. ,
Courts in this jurisdiction have identified several factors that support a finding of exceptional circumstances, including the "complexity [of the underlying matter], [its] procedural posture, [the] duration of pendency [of the underlying case], and the nature of the issues pending before, or already resolved by, the issuing court in the underlying litigation." In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig. ,
*911. The Southern District of Ohio is Best-Positioned to Address the Subpoena Disputes
Plaintiffs and Respondents vigorously dispute whether, and to what extent, the underlying litigation in the Southern District of Ohio would be disrupted by this Court's decision to address the merits of their subpoena disputes, rather than transferring those disputes to the issuing court. Plaintiffs contend that the Southern District of Ohio is uniquely positioned to ensure consistent decisions across the subpoena disputes, within the narrow discovery deadlines imposed by that court. See Gillespie Transfer Mot. at 6. Unsurprisingly, Respondents counter that this case is not "exceptional," and that this Court is in fact better-positioned to address the disputes. See Gillespie Transfer Opp'n at 7-8; RNC Transfer Opp'n at 5. While the question is perhaps closer in this case than in certain of the cases cited by Plaintiffs, the Court concludes that transfer is appropriate to avoid disrupting the underlying litigation.
In support of their argument, Plaintiffs rely heavily on In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig. , in which the underlying action, which had been actively litigated for years in the Middle District of Florida, was an MDL consolidating more than fifty lawsuits challenging a highly complex price fixing scheme.
First, the posture of discovery in the underlying action weighs in favor of transfer. The Southern District of Ohio "has issued comprehensive case management orders that have defined the scope of permissible discovery, and has set [a] detailed pretrial schedule[ ] for discovery [and] dispositive motions." In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig. ,
Respondents attempt to frame the matter's impending discovery deadline as weighing against transfer, because they claim that transfer will require time-consuming new briefing. Gillespie Transfer Opp'n at 10.
Second, Plaintiffs' motions to compel would require this Court to evaluate the relevance of the documents sought; an evaluation that the Southern District of Ohio is far more capable of making within the short discovery window. Respondents claim that they and Plaintiffs are "not asking the Court to make relevance determinations that may or may not prove central to the underlying litigation," RNC Transfer Opp'n at 6, and that the "gravamen of this case is not relevancy," Gillespie Transfer Opp'n at 13. However, the subpoena dispute briefing suggests otherwise.
Mr. Gillespie and Mr. Morgan assert two primary arguments in opposing Plaintiffs' motion to compel, one of which will require the court addressing the subpoena dispute to evaluate the relevance of the documents sought. See generally Gillespie Compel Opp'n. First, Mr. Gillespie and Mr. Morgan argue that their searches were reasonably designed to identify documents responsive to Plaintiffs' subpoenas. Id. at 10. Second, they argue that both (1) documents created prior to 2011; and (2) fundraising-related documents are not relevant to Plaintiffs' complaint, or if relevant "are wildly disproportionate to Plaintiffs' needs." Id. at 17-18.
Similarly, Plaintiffs' subpoena dispute with the RNC, the NRCC, and Mr. Kincaid concerns those Respondents' First Amendment, attorney-client, and work product privilege claims, see RNC Compel Mot. at 3, which again will require the court addressing the dispute to evaluate the relevance of the documents sought. In evaluating those Respondents' First Amendment privilege claim, the court addressing Plaintiffs' motion must "balance the burdens imposed on [the RNC, the NRCC, and Mr. Kincaid] against the significance of the ... interest in disclosure and consider the degree to which [Plaintiffs have] tailored the disclosure requirement to serve [their] interests." AFL-CIO v. FEC ,
*94No. 57.
Accordingly, while Respondents attempt to downplay the necessity of making relevance determinations in ruling on their subpoena disputes, the disputes belie that framing. Transfer is necessary to allow the court that is most familiar with Plaintiffs' core arguments-the Southern District of Ohio-to evaluate the importance of the documents sought in the subpoenas at issue to those core arguments. See Lipman , 284 F.Supp.3d at 13 (holding that "[t]he centrality of the relevance assessment weighs in favor of transfer because determining whether information is relevant requires nuanced legal analysis based on a full understanding of the [u]nderlying [a]ction" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ); In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig. ,
*95Third, as suggested in the 2013 Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 45(f), this Court has consulted with Judge Black, who does not disagree with the Court's assessment that the complexity and posture of the underlying case and the interests of judicial efficiency would be best served by transferring the subpoena disputes to the Southern District of Ohio. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(f) advisory committee's note to 2013 amendment ("Judges in compliance districts may find it helpful to consult with the judge in the issuing court presiding over the underlying case while addressing subpoena-related motions."). In light of these considerations, the Court concludes that transferring the subpoena dispute to the Southern District of Ohio promotes Rule 45(f)'s interests in avoiding disruption of the underlying litigation.
2. Transfer Will Not Unduly Burden Respondents
Mr. Gillespie and Mr. Morgan assert a variety of burden arguments, mostly of the logistical variety, none of which persuade the Court that transfer would impose an undue burden on them. First, Mr. Gillespie and Mr. Morgan argue that "transfer would require new briefing under Sixth Circuit law, which would be expensive and cause further delay." Gillespie Transfer Opp'n at 15. However, as noted above, "transferring a motion to the jurisdiction where the underlying litigation is pending requires few, if any, modifications of the written submissions, [and] does not rise to the level of unfair prejudice." Google, Inc. ,
*96The RNC, the NRCC, and Mr. Kincaid put forth a more nuanced burden argument, but they too fail to persuade the Court that they would be unduly burdened by a transfer. First, they argue that the D.C. Circuit has developed a more fulsome body of First Amendment case law than the Sixth Circuit, and that this Court and this Circuit are "familiar with cases concerning political party structure and associations and the inner-workings of those associations." RNC Transfer Opp'n at 15-16. They claim that they would "suffer prejudice" if deprived of access to this base of knowledge. Id. However, courts in this Circuit follow the principle that a "transferee federal court is competent to decide federal issues correctly," In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983,
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that (1) the subpoena disputes involving Mr. Braden should be transferred to the Southern District of Ohio because Mr. Braden consents to that transfer; and (2) the subpoena disputes involving Mr. Gillespie, Mr. Morgan, the RNC, the NRCC, and Mr. Kincaid should be transferred to the Southern District of Ohio because there are "exceptional circumstances" warranting transfer. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(f). Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Mr. Braden's Motions to Transfer (Braden Subpoena I , ECF No. 13; Braden Subpoena II , ECF No. 4) and Plaintiffs' Motions to Transfer (Gillespie & Morgan Subpoenas , ECF No. 7; RNC, NRCC, & Kincaid Subpoenas , ECF No. 2) are GRANTED . Accordingly, it is FURTHER ORDERED that the miscellaneous proceedings addressed by this Memorandum Opinion shall be TRANSFERRED to the Southern District of Ohio. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
For additional background detail, see the Southern District of Ohio's recent opinion denying the defendants' motion to dismiss the underlying action. Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. ("APRI") v. Smith , No. 18-0357,
All record citations to the underlying action are designated as "S.D. Ohio ECF No...."
Plaintiffs' amended complaint names as defendants Ryan Smith, Speaker of the Ohio House of Representatives, Larry Obhof, President of the Ohio Senate, and Jon Husted, Ohio's Secretary of State, in their official capacities. See generally SAC. None of the parties involved in the subpoena disputes before this Court are defendants in the underlying action.
Plaintiffs initially filed the underlying action in May 2018, and subsequently amended their complaint twice. The most recent iteration was filed in July 2018. See generally SAC.
The Court refers to motions to quash subpoenas, motions to compel compliance with subpoenas, and other subpoena-related motions as "subpoena disputes."
As explained in further detail below, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 governs the issuance of subpoenas in civil disputes, and the process by which subpoena issuers may force compliance with their subpoenas and subpoena recipients may quash them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45.
Mr. Gillespie and Mr. Morgan also claim that transfer is inappropriate because the Southern District of Ohio lacks personal jurisdiction over Mr. Gillespie, and thus would be required to further transfer the subpoena dispute to another court with personal jurisdiction over Mr. Gillespie to enforce any order granting Plaintiffs' motion to compel. Gillespie Transfer Opp'n at 10. However, the 2013 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 45 contemplates that "retransfer may be important to enforce [such an] order." Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(f) advisory committee's note to 2013 amendment. Enforcing a discovery order is typically far less complex than crafting a discovery order. See Wultz ,
As Respondents note, RNC Transfer Opp'n at 10, federal law requires that a trial in the underlying action must be conducted by a three-judge panel.
Respondents note that the Southern District of Ohio has not yet ruled on any discovery disputes, Gillespie Transfer Opp'n at 9, or on any privileges, including the "First Amendment privilege, attorney-client privilege, or the attorney work-product doctrine," RNC Transfer Opp'n at 11. However, Plaintiffs seek documents from the RNC related to the services that Mr. Braden provided to the Ohio legislature. RNC Compel Mot. Ex. A, Request for Production Nos. 3, 9, 13. To the extent that both the RNC and Mr. Braden claim attorney-client privilege over these documents, see RNC Compel Opp'n at 35;
Mr. Gillespie and Mr. Morgan cite several non-binding, out-of-Circuit, unreported cases in which courts declined to transfer subpoena disputes to their issuing courts. See, e.g., Snow v. Knurr , No. 18-mc-09015,