In Re Bova
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The only issue before us is whether the Chapter 7 debtor may avoid, pursuant to section 522(f)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A), the security interest of the Beneficial Consumer Discount Company (“Bеneficial”) in the debt- or’s house. For the following reasons, we shall deny the debtor’s application to avoid Beneficial’s security interest in her house. 1
The debtor’s house is a 2V2 stоry frame row house which is located on land which the debtor has leased ever sincе she bought and moved into the house approximately 18 years ago. The debtor continues to reside in the house. The debtor admits that the house is physically attached to the land and could not possibly be considered a mobile home. Beneficial’s indisputably рerfected security interest in the house is a nonpos-sessory, nonpurchase-money security interest, which arose in connection with a loan agreement between Bеneficial and the debtor.
The debtor claims that Beneficial’s security interest in the house may be avoided because the house is a household good within the meaning of seсtion 522(f)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A), which states:
(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtоr may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor *939 in property to the extent thаt such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is
(2) a nonpossessory nonpurchase-mon-ey security interest in any-
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; ....
The debtor argues that her house falls within the definition of “goods” under Pennsylvania’s version of the Uniform Commerciаl Code, at 13 Pa. C.S.A. § 9105(a). The debtor then states that household goods are commonly definеd as goods owned by the household for its personal use and that, under bankruptcy law, housеhold goods are those items necessary to the functioning of the household, citing
In re Ruppe,
We find no indiсation in § 522 or its legislative history that Congress intended in § 522 to depart from the commonly accepted meaning of household goods, according to which a house physically аttached to leased land would clearly not be considered to be a household good. Furthermore, the federal exemptions, which the debtor is utilizing in this case, are set forth in the various subparts of § 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. The exemption for real property or personal property used as a residence is set forth in § 522(d)(1). The exemptiоn for household goods is contained in § 522(d)(3). Section 522(f)(2) encompasses four of the elеven subparts of § 522(d), including § 522(d)(3). However, § 522(f)(2) omits any reference to the § 522(d)(1) exemption for prоperty used as a residence. Therefore, we find that Congress did not intend for liens against property used as a residence to be avoidable pursuant to § 522(f)(2). Our reasoning herеin is consistent with the reasoning in
In re Abt,
“It is abundantly clear to us that the sрecific inclusion of the debtor’s interest in a motor vehicle in § 522(d)(2), and the omission of any mention of a motor vehicle in § 522(f) reflects the Congressional intent and negates the debtоr’s argument that his motor vehicle should be treated as part of his household goods.
We therefore conclude that HFC’s lien on the debtor’s motor vehicle may not be avoidеd.”
Also see In re Redding,
Finally, we point out that the debtor’s reliance on
In re Dipalma,
For all of the foregoing reasons, the debtor’s application to avoid Beneficial’s security interеst in her house shall be denied.
Notes
. This Memorandum Opinion constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Bankruptcy Rule 7052.