282 F. 726 | D. Mass. | 1922
The somewhat complicated facts are stated in the certificate of the learned referee. Those essential to the discussion of the points in controversy are as follows:
The confectionery company had borrowed from the Charles River Trust Company the full amount which it could legally loan to one person. See Gen. Laws Mass. c. 172, § 40; chapter 167, § 5. The president of the trust company was a director of the confectionery company. It was arranged between him and Simes, president of the confectionery company, that the trust company would loan .approximately .$40,000 more by discounting notes made by employees of the bankrupt secured by shares of its capital stock as collateral, which at that time was worth more than par. Accordingly three such notes were lnsde to the trust company and were discounted by it. The proceeds of the notes were credited to the bankrupt, and the interest on the loans was paid by it. The notes were purely accommodation paper; the makers had no interest in the transaction beyond lending their names to the
As part of the original transaction, the bankrupt made three notes of like amounts, payable to the accommodation makers, whose credit, nominally, at least, it was using. These notes were properly signed and countersigned and given into the hands of the president of the bankrupt. It is not contended that any further delivery of them was made. They have been referred to as the “covering notes.”
While the accommodation notes were outstanding in the trust company’s hands in the fall of 1920, the bankrupt gave its own demand notes for like amounts to the trust company at the latter’s request as additional collateral on the accommodation notes, and without any further consideration. The payments of principal were noted by the trust company on the accommodation notes; no entries concerning such payments appear on the direct notes of the bankrupt to the trust company last referred to.
Simes was one of the accommodation makers. He received $2,400 cash from the bankrupt, which was to be applied on the indebtedness to the trust company; but he retained the money himself.
The principal questions are: (1) Whether the trust company (through Mr. Richardson) may prove on the notes made direct to it by the bankrupt, it being urged against the proof that these notes were ultra vires, without consideration, and not made in accordance with the bankrupt’s by-laws; and (2) whether the trust company may prove against the bankrupt on the original loan for which the accommodation notes were given. The entire proof was, as to the claims under discussion, disállowed by the learned referee.
“It is true that at this stage of the transaction there was.no direct promise by the bankrupt to repay to the trust company the sums advanced to the bankrupt on the individuals’ notes.” Claimant’s brief.
It is contended for the trust company that there was an implied obligation on the part of the bankrupt to repay the money loaned on the accommodation notes, because it was the person to be benefited. But where transactions are fully covered by express contracts, as these were, there is no occasion and no room for a contract implied by law. . That the loans on the accommodation notes were made at the request of the bankrupt and for its advantage did not create an obligation on it to pay them to the lender, especially as the purpose of the transaction was to avoid creating such a liability, and there is no evidence of any intention to do so. I agree with the learned referee that no provable claim by the trust company against the bankrupt arose out of those transactions
We have therefore a transaction in which the bankrupt gave to the trust company its own notes as collateral for the notes of third parties, who made them at its request and for its benefit, and its notes were held and relied upon by the trust company, with the knowledge and approval of all but one of the bankrupt’s directors, and without objection by any director. Under such circumstances the bankrupt cannot escape liability on the notes, because no formal vote authorizing or ratifying them was ever passed as required by its by-laws. Beacon Trust Co. v. Souther, 183 Mass. 413, 418, 67 N. E. 345. The claimant may prove on the direct notes.
Ordered accordingly.
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