The Cape May County Ethics Committee has submitted a two count presentment to this Court with respect to the alleged unethical conduct of respondent, Martin L. .Blatt, an attorney at law of this State. The charges set forth in the respective counts are unrelated and we will consider them separately.
FIRST COUNT
In the summer of 1971 a United States Grand Jury undertook an investigation of alleged municipal corruption in the
At the time of the investigation and for some years past, one Patrick J. Doran was and had been engineer for Atlantic County. Doran was later indicted, tried and convicted of extortion in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. 1 The conviction rested upon evidence of corrupt and collusive arrangements between Doran and certain engineers and contractors for the payment of kickbacks. There was abundant proof that numerous such payments had in fact been made by firms and corporations engaged to do work for Atlantic County. Prominent among those making such payments was the engineering firm of Kammerer, Symes & Associates.
In October 1971 a meeting took place at the Cherry Hill offices of the Kammerer firm. It was attended by Doran, by respondent, acting as Doran’s attorney, and by Kammerer and Symes. The Kammerer office had for a number of years been rendering substantial engineering services to Atlantic County as well as to other counties and various municipalities in the southern part of the state. According to the testimony of both Blatt and Doran, the latter told the former that he had done work for the Kammerer firm, for which he had been paid, during the period that he was also acting as engineer for Atlantic County. At the same time, the engineering office had been performing services for the county for which they had received compensation. Doran told respondent he was fearful that his having received payments from the engineering firm under such circumstances might suggest a conflict of interest which could prove personally harmful or
At the October meeting Blatt asked leave to review the books, cancelled checks, receipted invoices and other documents relating to the work that his client had done for the firm. These were made available and Blatt studied them. He was apparently satisfied except as to one detail. While respondent denied the charge, there is seemingly conclusive evidence that he removed from the file an invoice dated August 1, 1968, which had been submitted by Doran to the engineering firm, in the amount of $9,000. The invoice had been previously paid. Blatt is said to have stated that he wished to add the word “surveying,” so that the statement, as so revised, would read, “To Bill your account for' Surveying work performed — $9,000.” Following these instructions, Doran some time thereafter submitted a new invoice identical to the original one, except that the word “surveying” was included. The revised invoice was sent to the Hammerer firm. Hammerer receipted it as of August 2, 1968 and directed his secretary or bookkeeper to stamp it with the various notations that had appeared upon the original document.
At the meeting, after this incident, there followed a discussion of the federal investigation that all those present knew was taking place. Blatt, according to both Hammerer and Symes, suggested to them that in the event they were questioned by federal authorities — an eventuality which then seemed likely — they should be uncooperative and say as little as possible. In the federal trial in which Doran was later convicted of extortion, Hammerer, after receiving a grant of immunity, testified under oath as to this conversation in these words:
He [Blatt] indicated not to say anything or to offer any information. He indicated if we were, our records were subpoenaed, that the Federal Attorneys would use certain tactics to attempt to get us to answer tlieir questions, and that we should keep our mouths shut.
The Ethics Committee concluded that a statement, substantially as set forth above, was in fact made by respondent. A careful study of the record before the Ethics Committee, including the testimony of Hammerer at the federal trial, convinces us that this conclusion, despite defendant’s denial, was inescapable.
We therefore conclude that Blatt did substitute a new and altered invoice for the original and that he did urge Hammerer and Symes, obviously potential witnesses in connection with the ongoing investigation, to cooperate as little as possible with the Federal authorities. It is our opinion that each of these acts constituted a violation of the ethical standards governing the conduct of attorneys.
We are mindful that at the October meeting Blatt was acting for his client, Doran, and that it is the duty of an attorney to represent his client with zeal and vigor. But there are boundaries beyond which an attorney may not go and respondent’s conduct transgressed these limits.
It is urged in respondent’s behalf and also suggested by the Ethics Committee that neither of these criticized acts in any way inhibited the administration of justice. Fortunately this is true, but it does not excuse the derelictions. The falsification of records, especially when there is a strong likelihood that they may later be examined in the course of an investigation or judicial proceeding, is on its face improper conduct. Its only purpose is to mislead. And Blatt’s admonition to Hammerer and Symes, neither of whom was his client, not to cooperate with the federal authorities, can only be understood as an attempt to deny evidence to law enforcement officials. We find Blatt’s actions constituted “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,” in violation of DR 1-102(5).
SECOND COUNT
In February, 1970, respondent was approached by David E. Feinstein and George F. Roberts in connection with the
On their face the documents suggest impropriety if not outright illegality. Why should two contracts, prepared simultaneously, obviously designed to permit the interposition of a straw man, contain a $25,000 disparity as to purchase price? 2
Some time after title closed the facts were discovered by the sellers. They instituted suit agaist all parties involved and respondent contributed to the financial settlement that followed. The Ethics Committee exonerated respondent as to this phase of the Second Count. We cannot agree. On the contrary we think respondent’s conduct to have been highly unprofessional.
As to tlie transaction, I wouldn’t ask any questions. I would do what these fellows, who are twice my age, advise me, requested me to prepare.
No satisfactory explanation was ever given, either hy respondent or by any other witness, as to why the contractual arrangements described above took the form they did. Respondent’s duty, upon being requested to draft the aforementioned agreements, was to learn all the details of the proposed transaction. Only then, upon being satisfied that he had indeed learned all the facts, and that his client’s proposed course of conduct was proper, would he have been at liberty to pursue the matter further. Respondent’s conduct fell far short of that required of a member of the bar of this State.
We take this occasion to call attention to a further problem which the facts of this case suggest. Here respondent was retained by and acted for real estate brokers who hoped to benefit from the proposed transaction. He represented neither of the principals — seller or purchaser. Yet he drew contracts fixing the rights and obligations of the parties to a transaction of considerable importance to each.
In representing the broker, in a typical vendor-purchaser transaction, to whom does an attorney owe responsibility or allegiance? The interest of the broker is to make sure that
Upon another phase of this transaction the Ethics Committee found respondent to have violated DR 5-105, which broadly forbids an attorney from representing conflicting interests, except under carefully confined circumstances, which admittedly did not exist here. 2
Mr. Blatt advised Council on certain points of the various laws.
Blatt rendered such advice knowing the agreement providing for the transfer of license was his own work product.
Respondent’s insensitivity to the ethical requirement that conflicts of interest be avoided is the more distressing because this is not the first time that such a violation on his part has been brought to our attention. See In re Blatt, 42 N. J. 522 (1964).
The totality of respondent’s conduct, exposed by the record and condensed above, cannot of course be allowed to go un-censured. The measure of discipline is always difficult to decide. We conclude that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for two years and until the further order of this Court. Judgment to that effect will be entered.
Opposed — None.
It is ORDERED that MARTIN L. BLATT of Atlantic City be suspended from the practice of law for two years and until further order of the Court, effective August 15, 1974; and it is further
ORDERED that the said MARTIN L. BLATT, be and hereby is restrained and enjoined from practicing law during the period of his suspension.
Notes
His sentence was thereafter affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. United States v. Doran, 480
F.
2d 919 (1973). The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari.
After these contracts had been delivered to Mr. Roberts, they were revised, apparently in his office. The names of the straw men were inserted in each contract, and other provisions were included. The contracts were then signed by the various parties. Except for these additions the executed agreements were substantially the same as those prepared by respondent.
The Cape May County Ethics Committee measured Blatt’s conduct by the provisions of DR 5—105 which became effective on September 13, 1971. Blatt’s acts, however, occurred in the early part of 1970. Therefore Canon 6, the predecessor of DR 5-105 was applicable. Canon 6, similar in its provisions to DR 5-105, provided:
6. Adverse Influeneces and Conflicting Interests
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.