108 F. 529 | D. Mass. | 1901
In this case the personal property of the bankrupt was duly attached on mesne process in this commonwealth more than four months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. Thereafter, and within four months before such tiling, judgment was entered against the bankrupt, execution was taken out, and a levy was made. The petitioner contended that the judgment, execution, and levy were avoided'by section 67f of tlie bankrupt act; and the question here presented concerns the effect of that subsection upon a Massachusetts attachment made more than four months before the filing, when the execution and levy were within such four months. The material part of the subsection reads as follows:
“All levies, judgments, attachments, or other liens, obtained through legal proceedings against a person who is insolvent, at any time within four months*530 prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against him, shall be deemed null and void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the property affected by the levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien shall be deemed wholly discharged and released from the same.”
In Re De Lue (D. C.) 91 Fed. 510, it was said tliat the provisions of section 67fwere limited to involuntary bankruptcy. The remark was hastily made, both counsel in that case having agreed in argument upon that construction of the section. It was clearly erroneous, and has long been treated in this district as overruled. Section 67f avoids certain liens, if created within four months. This is its object. It does not avoid judgments or levies, except so far as these create a lien. In re Kavanaugh (D. C.) 99 Fed. 928; In re Lesser, 5 Am. Bankr. R. 320, 324.
‘‘It is sometimes called an inchoate lien, or a contingent lien, but it is not a right in. or a right to hold, a particular article of property. It is not like the lien obtained by the attachment of personal property in an action at law by virtue of which a sheriff obtains either actual or constructive possession of the property attached, and in such a case the lien is not obtained by the judgment, but by the attachment, and we are not now prepared to say that if the judgment is rendered within four months after the petition in bankruptcy is tiled that the lien by attachment is vacated.”
It was urged in argument that the act of the bankrupt hi failing to dissolve the attachment and permitting the sale of the property attached would be the suffering of a creditor to obtain a preference, under section 3a (3) of the bankrupt act, although the attachment was made more than four months before the petition in bankruptcy was filed. Manufacturing Co. v. Stoever, 38 C. C. A. 200, 97 Fed. 330. It was further argued that, if the creditor thus obtained a preference, that preference would be voidable, under section (50b. It is not easy to reconcile all the language' concerning preferences and liens in the bankrupt, act, but the argument thus drawn from sections 3 and (>0 does not appear to me strong enough to meet the language and plain implication of section <i7f. In Manufacturing Co. v. Htoever, above cited, it was said by the circuit court of appeals for this circuit:
‘•In order to prevent any misapprehension, we will add that the question whether or not the attaching creditor acquired a valid lien as against these proceedings hi bankruptcy is not in issue on this appeal.”
The decision rendered by the referee, expressly following In re Lesser, 3 Nat. Bankr. N. 331, 108 Fed. 201, is reversed, and the injunction issued by Mm is dissolved. Of course, the judgment cannot be enforced against, the bankrupt personally.
. Casé certified to supreme court, and opinion withdrawn.