In re John J. BERNARD.
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
Dec. 13, 1979.
408 A.2d 1279
Finally, as the trial Justice noted, there are only four culpable states of mind set out in the Code, and the culpable mental state defined in the statute should be equated to one of these four. It most closely approximates the definition of “recklessness.” The Comment to
This section [Subsection B] is graded on the basis of dangers created solely in order to collect on insurance or in reckless disregard to the dangers posed to other persons on their property. (Emphasis added)
Had the drafters used the term “reckless disregard” in the arson section, rather than tracking the language of the definition of reckless, there would have been an automatic change in the statute with the 1977 amendment to the definition of reckless. This would have simplified matters. Under the circumstances, however, this Court will treat the crime of arson under
We find no merit to the claim that the instructions given were confusing, misleading, and prejudicial. On the contrary, though the legal issues involved are rather complex, the instructions were accurate and very thorough.
The entry is:
Appeal denied.
Judgment affirmed.
DELAHANTY, GODFREY and NICHOLS, JJ., did not sit.
DUFRESNE, A. R. J., sat by assignment.
Thomas E. Delahanty, II, Dist. Atty., Herbert Bunker, Jr., Deputy Dist. Atty., Michael D. Seitzinger (orally), Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheryl Simcock, Law Student, Augusta, for plaintiff.
Thomas S. Carey, Fred E. Hanscom Law Offices, Rumford, Albert J. Beliveau, Jr., Rumford (orally), for defendant.
NICHOLS, Justice.
When a trial judge sees a breach of decorum as contempt of court requiring summa
Such a case is this.
In 1977 in Superior Court in Oxford County John J. Bernard, Chief of Police in Mexico, Maine, was adjudged guilty of criminal contempt following a brief trial before the presiding justice who, just a few hours before, had observed the improper conduct of the police officer. Chief Bernard has appealed from that judgment.
In no way do we condone the deportment of Chief Bernard in the presence of the court that day. We do, however, sustain his appeal because of error in the procedure by which he was there found guilty of criminal contempt.
The pertinent facts are summarized in the presiding justice‘s statement, which he termed his “certification for the record.”
Chief Bernard and Officer Gallant, of the Mexico Police Department, had appeared in court that day to testify in the jury-waived trial of one Pomerleau, charged with (a) hindering apprehension of another person for the commission of a crime and (b) assault upon Officer Gallant. After both parties had rested, and before he announced his findings, the presiding justice declared he was “concerned and disturbed” by the apparent use of unreasonable force by the police in arresting Pomerleau on these two charges. At that point, and while the presiding justice was still speaking, Chief Bernard arose from his chair and “stomped out,” closing the courtroom door behind him with some force. As the Chief was making his exit, the presiding justice said, “You don‘t have to leave now, Mr. Bernard.”
The presiding justice proceeded to find Pomerleau guilty of the charge of assault and not guilty of the charge of hindering apprehension, and continued his remarks
Ten minutes later Chief Bernard, through the deputy district attorney, requested permission to speak with the presiding justice in chambers. Anticipating that an apology would be forthcoming, the presiding justice gave permission, and he asked all in his chambers except the deputy district attorney to leave. There was no official reporter present in chambers.
Chief Bernard stood in the doorway. The presiding justice indicated that, due to his “shock and surprise” at what next transpired, he was unable to recall the precise words used as the Chief strode in, but the Chief‘s manner was described as “belligerent and contemptuous.” His remarks during “no more than two minutes in which the Chief did all the talking,” were characterized as an accusation that the presiding justice was prejudiced and would not support the police. He made a reference to someone higher up, but the presiding justice was not sure in what context. The Chief said he hoped that criminals had “as much disrespect for the court as they had for the police.”
The presiding justice interrupted Chief Bernard and told him to get out. Even then, the presiding justice stated, rather than leaving the chambers quietly, the Chief “continued to berate and accuse and show his contempt for the court as he was walking for the doorway, and stood in the doorway between the hall leading to the chambers and continued to indicate his contempt for this court by the words and language that he used.”1
After Chief Bernard had departed, the presiding justice went to lunch and reflected upon his course of action. Upon returning to the courthouse, he undertook the contempt proceedings which are the subject of this appeal. The record does not disclose what notice Chief Bernard was given, but obviously it was enough for him to appear with counsel. The Chief testified in his own behalf, asserting that when he went to see the presiding justice it was his goal “to open lines of communication between the judiciary and law enforcement personnel” and to achieve a better understanding of the disposition of court matters.
The presiding justice was unmoved by the protestation of Chief Bernard‘s counsel that he did not know on what “format” the justice was going to present this case until the hearing was underway; he declined to hear counsel‘s argument upon the proper application of
The presiding justice found Chief Bernard guilty of contempt of court. From the judgment of conviction he seasonably appealed to this Court.
We sustain the appeal.
In the case before us, as in most where a trial judge is confronted with a breach of decorum, he had to decide almost immediately whether the misconduct he observed amounted to contempt of court.2
In analyzing the issue which controls this appeal we start with the standard, which more than forty years ago we termed “the great, underlying principle,” that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Norton v. Inhabitants of Fayette, 134 Me. 468, 470, 188 A. 281, 282 (1936).
That standard comports with the rights to which a defendant in a criminal proceeding is entitled under the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions.4
In the law of contempt of court, however, even a right so fundamental as the right to an impartial tribunal must occasionally yield to the need to punish summarily a person who in the presence of the trial judge willfully obstructs the course of criminal proceedings.5 It yields because the misbehavior not only brings the court into disrepute but also interferes with the orderly conduct of the court‘s business. Charles Cushman Co. v. Mackesy, 135 Me. 490, 494, 200 A. 505, 508 (1938).
Only in such exigent circumstances is summary vindication of the court‘s dignity and authority necessary. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925).
In a summary contempt proceeding it is true that we have the anomalous situation of the function of judge, jury and prosecutor combined in a single individual. Nevertheless, that power cannot be denied the trial judge in an appropriate case without inviting or causing such obstruction to the orderly and impartial administration of justice as would endanger the rights and safety of the entire community. Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 309, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888).
Because of its penal nature as well as because of its summary character, a proceeding of this type is to be strictly guarded by the courts. Even if the judge regards the misconduct as contumacious, unless the misconduct actually obstructed the administration of justice in his court, he must accord the contemnor a plenary proceeding instead of punishing him summarily.6
The mere fact that the trial judge personally observed the conduct which he regards as contumacious should not of itself be a justification for summary punishment.
We adhere to the standard reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319, 95 S.Ct. 1802, 1808, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975), that only “the least possible power adequate to the end proposed” should be employed in contempt proceedings. This standard requires notice and hearing absent an overriding need for immediate punishment to prevent the contumacious conduct from disrupting the orderly progress of the trial. Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 165, 86 S.Ct. 352, 15 L.Ed.2d 240 (1965).
Absent any willful obstruction of judicial proceedings, we conclude that it was error to proceed summarily under
In sum, the Defendant was denied due process of law.
The entry, therefore, is:
Appeal sustained.
Judgment vacated.
Remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein.
DELAHANTY, J., did not sit.
ARCHIBALD, Justice, with whom GODFREY, Justice, joins, concurring.
I concur in the result announced in Mr. Justice Nichols’ opinion.
As I view this case, Bernard‘s summary conviction of criminal contempt under
Why do I feel the certificate is deficient?
The presiding justice did describe the conduct of Bernard while in the courtroom. However, the balance of the factual summary dictated into the record makes it quite apparent to me that if nothing else had occurred beyond the courtroom episode, the contempt proceeding would not have ensued. Therefore, the interchange in chambers between Bernard and the justice necessarily constitutes the conduct which must underlie the charge of criminal contempt.
The factual certification of the justice is devoid of any specific description of what Bernard either did or said while confronting the justice in chambers. We only know that in the subjective opinion of the justice, Bernard‘s manner then was “belligerent and contemptuous.”2 The justice‘s description of his condition as one of “shock and surprise” cannot be said to be descriptive of Bernard‘s conduct since it only reflects the state of mind of the justice. What Bernard specifically may have said or done to cause “shock and surprise” is not to be found anywhere in the statement. I also note that the statement does not suggest that there was any serious disruption of any particular judicial proceeding resulting from the confrontation in chambers between Bernard and the justice.
I read Rule 42(a) as mandating a factual description of what a particular justice “saw or heard.” Mere conclusory statements cannot comply with the language of the rule which requires the order of contempt to “recite the facts.”
In summary, I would sustain the appeal, limiting the rationale for that result to an insufficient certificate.