delivered the Opinion of the Court.
1 Bаss appealed from the Presiding Disciplinary Judge's denial of her motion filed pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b)(8) for relief from his earlier order revoking her probation and suspending her license to practice law. After a half dozen unsuccessful attempts to nоtify Bass of his show cause order, by mail and email, over a period of some four months, the PDJ found Bass in default of the Attorney Regulation Counsel's allegations of violation.
12 Because the Attorney Regulation Counsel's motion alleging probation violations and seeking a show cause order was filed with the Presiding Disciplinary Judge before the issuance of an order of successful completion of probation, as required by C.R.C.P. 251.7 for termination, the PDJ was empowered by the rule to lift the stay and activate Bass's suspension. The order deny ing Bass's motion pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b) is therefore affirmed.
I.
T8 On January 21, 2009, the Presiding Disciplinary Judge entered an order approving the stipulation of Betty Bass and the Attorney Regulation Counsel for a suspension of her law license for one year and one day, to be stayed subject to the successful completion of a two-year period of probation. On February 11, 2011, the Office of Attorney Regulatiоn filed a request with the Presiding Disciplinary Judge for an order to show cause why Bass's probation should not be revoked and the stay lifted, alleging that she had violated the conditions of her probation by, among other things, failing to submit to practice monitоring and failing to pay over $26,000 in costs included in the stipulation. Although a show cause order issued, the questions of violation and revocation remained unresolved for months while attempts were made to notify Bass by mail, and e-mail, at a number of different addresses, including the address at which she was registered with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, as required of all registered attorneys by C.R.C.P. 227. When she had not responded to the show cause order or requested a hearing by August 31, 2011, the PDJ found her in default of regulation counsel's allegations of violation; and the court then revoked her probation, lifted the stay, and imposed the year and a day suspension to which she had stipulated more than two years earlier.
T4 Almost six months later, Bass filed a motion for rеlief pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b), asserting that the court's order of revocation and suspension was void both because she was not properly served and because regulation counsel had not filed his motion for show cause within the time required by C.R.C.P. 251.7. The cоurt denied the motion without further comment, and Bass filed a notice of appeal with this court.
IL.
1 5 The disciplinary and disability jurisdiction of the Colorado Supreme Court in all matters relating to the practice of law in the jurisdiction is implemented by C.R.C.P. 251. Rule 251.6 provides for attorney discipline in the form of disbarment, suspension, public censure, and private admonition, and Rule 251.7 expressly provides for and governs the imposition of probation as an order of attorney discipline for eligible attоrneys. The ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sane-tions, which we have consistently recognized as "the guiding authority for selecting the appropriate sanction to impose for lawyer misconduct," see In re Roose,
T 6 In this jurisdiction, when probation is imposed, it shall be imposed for a specified period of time not to exceеd three years, and it shall be imposed in conjunction with an order of suspension from the practice of law, which suspension may then be stayed in whole or in part. See C.R.C.P. 251.7(a)(8). That specified period of probation may be
17 In addition, the rule specifically provides for the termination of probation. See C.RC.P. 251.7(F) (entitled "Terminatiоn"). In this regard, the rule mandates that between 28 and 14 days (formerly 80 and 15 days) prior to "the expiration of the period of probation," the attorney shall file an affidavit with regulation counsel stating that the attorney has complied with all terms of prоbation, and the attorney also shall file with the PDJ notice and a copy of that affidavit, as well as application for an order showing successful completion of "the period of probation." Id. Upon receipt of this notice and absent objection from regulation counsel, the rule directs the PDJ to issue an order showing that the period of probation was successfully completed. Id. The order of successful completion is, once issued, to become effective upon "the expiration of the period of probation." Id.
8 The rule also specifically addresses the revocation of probation. See C.R.C.P. 251.7(e) (entitled "Violations"). This subsection of the rule provides that if, "during the period thе attorney is on probation" (emphasis added), regulation counsel receives information that any condition may have been violated, he may file a motion with the PDJ specifying the alleged violation and seeking an order requiring the attоrney to show cause why the stay should not be lifted and the sanction activated for violation of the condition. Id. The rule then provides the process to which the probationer is entitled, including a revocation hearing, at which regulation counsel has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the violation, and a report by the PDJ setting forth his findings of fact and decision. Id.
III.
19 Bass does not challenge the proposition that revocation of probаtion as an order of attorney discipline is governed by the provisions of C.R.C.P. 251.7 or that the rule should be interpreted according to the same principles governing statutory interpretation. See Leaffer v. Zarlengo,
10 Subsection (e) of the rule authorizes the filing of a motion with the PDJ "{if, during the period the attorney is on probation, the Regulation Counsel receives information that any condition may have been violated." C.R.C.P. 251.7(e). Even if this provision could reasonably be understood to mandate actual filing, rather than simply learning of a violation, during the applicable period, the language of the rule clearly de-seribes the applicable period as "the period the attorney is on probation," as distinguished from "the period originally specified," to which a motion for extension is limited. See C.R.GC.P. 251.7(@)(8). Unlike the criminal statute our prior сonstructions of which are offered by Bass in support of her interpretation, see, e.g., People v. Gore,
$11 As with the period of suspension, which was stayed in conjunction with the imposition of probation, see C.R.C.P. 251.29(b) (entitled "Reinstatement After Suspension"), the expirаtion of a specific period of probation imposed upon an attorney does not alone entitle that attorney to reinstate ment to the unconditional practice of law. On the face of the rule, the "specifiс period of probation" imposed upon the attorney merely establishes a period between 28 and 14 days before the expiration of which the probationer not only may but in fact must apply for reinstatement to the unconditionаl practice of law. CRCP. 251.7(f). According to the express requirements of the rule, the probationer "shall" do so by filing an affidavit with regulation counsel verifying that she has complied with all the terms of probation, and by filing with the Presiding Disciplinary Judge a coрy of that affidavit and an application for an order of successful completion of probation. Id. Also by the express terms of the rule, the PDJ is only directed to issue an order showing that the period of probation was successfully completed if the probationer files an affidavit and regulation counsel does not object. Id.
{12 While the rule does not expressly state that the probationer remains "on probation" until an order of successful completion has issued, thаt is not only a probable, but in fact the necessary, implication of the requirement. If a determination of successful completion of probation were not a prerequisite to the probationer's return to the unconditional practice of law, it could have no meaning whatsoever. - And although the rule does not specify the consequence of the probationer's failure to comply with subsection (£) by filing an affidavit and application for an order of sucсessful completion, it is at least clear that in the absence of filing such an affidavit and application at all, the issuance of an order certifying completion is nowhere authorized by the rule.
113 Unless a statute is susceptible of morе than one reasonable interpretation or conflicts with other statutes, it is considered unambiguous and must be applied as written, without construction. Holcomb v. Jan-Pro Cleaning Sys. of S. Colo.,
IV.
{14 Because the Attorney Regulation Counsel's motion alleging probation violations and seeking a show cause order was filed with the Presiding Disciplinary Judge before the issuance of an order of successful completion of probation, as required by C.R.C.P. 251.7 for termination, the PDJ was empowered by the rule to lift the stay and activate Bass's suspension. The order denying Bass's motion pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b) is therefore affirmed.