132 N.Y.S. 908 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1911
Concurrence Opinion
For the reasons pointed out by the learned court at Special Term, and particularly because requirement for notice can properly be read into the law, I think.section 856 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not in contravention of either the Federal or State Constitutions. I do not think, however, that the questions propounded to Mr. Barnes with respect to his acquiring the J. B. Lyon stock and which he refused to answer were
It could not aid the committee in framing its report to the Legislature or in the recommendation of legislation to know in what manner Mr. Barnes acquired his stock in the J. B. Lyon Company. If there was any dereliction on his part in owning stock in that corporation, which personally I fail to appreciate, the fact that he owned a large amount was sufficient for the purposes of the committee. Whether he obtained it by purchase or gift, at a high price or at a low price, or with whom he talked about purchasing,.is wholly immaterial so far as the jurisdiction of the committee is concerned. Being the owner of a- comparatively large amount he is conclusively presumed to be interested in the prosperity and welfare of the corporation. If the Lyon Company was favored by the officials and boards of the city and county of Albany and any inference is to be drawn that such favoritism was because of Mr. Barnes’ ownership of stock therein, the committee already has knowl
I recognize that there is a very wide difference between the right to compel the production of corporate books and those of an individual. Assuming, however, that because the books are those of the Journal Company, a corporation owing its life to the State itself there exists a greater right to inspect than if they belonged to an individual, still there must be some, reasonable cause shown why the production of the books even of a corporation is necessary before the court shall resort to the extreme remedy of imprisonment for refusal to produce them. The matters set forth in the moving affidavit respecting which the. production of the books is claimed to be necessary to the investigating committee are the printing of the Session Laws done by the Journal Company amounting to $14,504.50, during a period of twelve years, paid for by the State after audit
The fact that the Argus Company gave to the Journal Company fifteen per cent of the amount of its contract price for the printing which it obtained by its lowest bid the committee already has knowledge of. The books of the Journal Company cannot add to the culpability of that act if it was culpable, or throw any light on the transaction. So, too, the committee already has proof before it, as the moving papers show, that the Journal Company entered into contracts with city officials for the doing of printing and the furnishing of materials without such contracts being obtained by competitive bidding, and by splitting up the same so no one would amount to more than the prohibited sum óf $250. The books of the Journal Company cannot make these transactions any worse' or any better. If there was any evasion or violation of the law that fact is ■ now before the committee. It is not claimed that ‘the books would show that these contracts were in fact let by competitive bidding; the fact that they were not and that the law was violated is asserted to have been already proven before the comm
For these reasons I think the witness was justified in refusing to answer .the questions and in declining to produce the books of the Journal Company, and, therefore, concur in a reversal of the order and denial of the motion.
Lead Opinion
The only authority upon the subject holds that section 856 of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates no notice to the alleged offender. We do not feel at liberty to overrule those cases. (Matter of McAdam, 7 N. Y. Supp. 454, General Term, First Department, 1889; Matter of Grout, 105 App. Div. 98, Second Department, 1905.) The question, therefore, is whether this section, so construed, violates the appellant’s constitutional rights. In the case of criminal contempts it is provided by section 751 of the Judiciary Law (Consol. Laws, chap. 30; Laws of 1909, chap. 35) that if committed in the presence of the court the offense may be punished summarily; otherwise the alleged offender must have notice and time to prepare his defense. In the so-called civil contempts (Judiciary Law, §§ 755, 757) a person cannot be punished for contempt until after he is brought before the court by warrant or an order tó show cause and given, an opportunity to be heard. The McAdam case, above cited, holds that although no notice is required the section is valid. The Grout case holds that the section is unconstitutional in that the defendant has had no opportunity to be heard. Adopting the construction placed upon the section by the above authorities, that no notice is contemplated, we are constrained to follow the Grout case, as the latest decision of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, that the statute is unconstitutional, and that the order should be reversed and the motion for commitment denied.
All concurred, except Houghton, J., concurring in result in memorandum, and Betts, J., dissenting in brief memorandum, and voting for affirmance, on opinion of Justice Joseph A. Kellogg in the court below.
Dissenting Opinion
A committee appointed by a concurrent resolution of the Legislature is investigating conditions prevailing in Albany with a view of suggesting remedial legislation that will improve conditions alleged to there exist. A witness, one William Barnes Jr., subpoenaed to testify and produce certain books of the Journal Company, of which he is president, has refused to answer questions claimed to be pertinent, and also refused to produce said books. The matter is important because the judiciary is asked to hinder and prevent the legislative inquiry. The lower court, on sufficient precedent, has, it seems to me, applied to the facts disclosed here, properly held that the questions should be answered and the books produced. This court is about to reverse on the authority of a decision of the Appellate Division of the Second Department, which decision was rendered on facts not at ail analogous to the facts existing here. I dissent from that opinion and vote for affirmance of the order appealed from on the opinion of Justice Joseph A. Kellogg in the court below.
Order reversed and motion denied.