127 N.Y.S. 542 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1910
Lead Opinion
The district attorney of the county of New York has presented to this court a petition stating that by the direction of the Governor of this State he presented .the facts stated in the petition to this court, asking for such action as the court should deem proper. Annexed to this petition is a report by the district attorney to the Governor, dated September 17, 1910, with a recommendation by the Governor that the matter should be presented to this court for such consideration and disposition as it may think the facts justified. There are also annexed to the petition certain communications to the Governor from residents of Boston, Mass., New Haven, Conn., and the police authorities of those cities; affidavits of police officers of the city of New York and others, and the statement of the respondent in relation to his actions. Hpon the presentation of this petition and these papers to the court the respondent interposed an answer, and upon this petition with the accompanying papers and depositions it is now to be determined whether the facts alleged are such as to justify the court in requiring formal charges to be presented looking to the • removal of the respondent as a city magistrate. Before proceeding to discuss the facts as they appear, it would be well to clearly state the question that is presented to us.
This application is made under the provisions of section 17 of article 6 of the Constitution, which provides that judges or justices of inferior courts not of record, and their clerks, may be removed for cause, after due notice and an opportunity of being heard, by such courts as are or may be prescribed by law, and section 1401a of the charter of the city of New York (Laws of 1901, chap. 466), which provides that a city magistrate or police clerk may be removed for cause, after due notice and an opportunity of being heard, by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court within the division for which such city magistrate or police clerk was appointed. (See,
These cases present the principles that should b.e applied in considering a charge against a judicial officer in a proceeding of. this character. We must not forget that this is an impeachment of an officer, the result of which is to remove him from office. The “ causé ” which justifies the impeachment of a judicial officer would be that the officer in the exercise of the power conferred upon him - has been influenced- by improper motives. The -first requisite for a judicial officer is that his judicial acts should be the result of an honest attempt to administer the power conferred upon him unin
Bearing these principles in mind we will consider the facts as disclosed by the papers submitted to us. It may not be improper,, however, to premise this statement of the facts by calling attention to the fact that the respondent has been for many- years a magistrate in the city of Mew York, during which time he has borne the highest character for integrity and efficiency in the discharge of his duties. This court can take judicial notice of that fact, because the review of cases that have come before the magistrates enables the court to judge of the manner in which they' pérform their duties. As to the respondent there has never before been a question that has been called to our attention as- to the fidelity and intelligence with which he has performed his duties, and there is
The facts disclosed are, that three persons, known as Harris Rothstein, Jacob Goldberg and Joseph Goldberg, were accused of having committed a burglary in the city of Boston in the State of Massachusetts and had. stolen $15,000 worth cf jewelry on the 28th of February, 1910. These same persons were also charged with having committed a burglary in the city of Hew Haven in the State of Connecticut, and a burglary in the State of Pennsylvania. On the 26th of March, 1910, these three persons were arrested in the city of Hew York, the specific charge being that they had. committed- a burglary in the city of' Boston and had there stolen from one Ulian about $15,000 worth of jewelry.. A police officer from Massachusetts aided the police of the city of Hew York in locating these prisoners, upon each of whom was found certain articles of jewelry which were identified by Ulian as property stolen from his safe. Other jewelry was also found upon these prisoners which was subsequently identified by one Meyer of Philadelphia, Penn., and by one Sarasohn of Hew-Haven, Conn., as property that had been stolen from them in those cities. There was other evidence of identification which was sufficient to connect these prisoners with these burglaries. On Saturday morning, March 26, 1910, the prisoners were arraigned in a Police Court before the respondent, and were then remanded back to police-headquarters for forty-eight hours’ without bail. On Monday- morning, March 28, 1910, the prisoners were again brought before the respondent, when they were represented by Moses A. Sachs as counsel, who requested that
There is considerable dispute among these affiants as to. what took place before the magistrate, on March 28, 1910. It is conceded, however, that the magistrate- was informed that these men had been identified as the thieves who had committed' the burglary in Massachusetts and that jewelry taken at that burglary was found upon the persons of-all three of the-prisoners, • It also' appeared that on
So far as the record shows the prisoners were charged With .having committed a burglary of property of.the value of -$14,000 or $15,000 in the State of Massachusetts. There is evidence that .the magistrate was also informed1 that the prisoners had been charged with burglaries in other States, the total amount'of which would aggregate. $35,000, but no written deposition or charge was submitted to the magistrate from which it appeared that the amount, of property stolen by the prisoners exceeded the $14,000 or $15,000 stated as being, the value of the property taken in Massachusetts.
The question presented' here is whether .these facts, if established in tlie absence of airy charge of improper motive, or that the magistrate did hot in good faith believe that bail to the extent of $15,000 for the three prisoners would be sufficient to insure their attendance on their examination, and did not in good faith believe that the sureties upon .the bonds were responsible for the amount of bail fixed, rvould justify the court in removing the respondent from his official position. '
I am inclined to think that the magistrate had no power to accept bail for these prisoners. The proceedings in the case of an arrest of a' f ugitive from, justice from another State or Territory is regulated by chapter 1 of title 4 of part 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the provisions of that chapter regulate the powers of a magistrate in case of such an arrest. By section 828 of said Code it is provided that a mágistrate may issue, a warrant as a preliminary proceeding to the issuing of a requisition by the Governor of another State or Territory upon the Governor of this State for tlié apprehension of a person charged with treason* felony or other crime, who shall flee .from justice and be found within this State. Section 829 provides that the proceedings for the arrest .and commitment of. the person
The proceedings on.the accejitance of. the, bail also seem to have been irregular. The sureties weré subjected to no examination as to their sufficiency, but. a simple affidavit was accepted without investigation, without notice to'the-police or the district attorney so that the sufficiency of. the bail could be investigated.' There was simply the statement of the attorney for the prisoners that the bail was sufficient .and an affidavit that certain real property which the. sureties claimed that they owned was of a value sufficient to qualify the sureties over and above the mortgages to which the property was subject. 'It had been stated to the magistrate that these prisoners-were confirmed criminals and had been before arrested and convicted for similar burglaries.1 The examination was fixed for the thirtieth day of March, and the application to discharge them was made on the evening of the. twenty-ninth of March. One of the prisoners was not in fact discharged until the morning of the thirtieth, just before the examination was to take place-. ■ The -insistence, of the defendants in . procuring their discharge the evening before the examination was to tike place, after they had been in custody for several days, was of itself a circumstance which should have attracted the attention of the magistrate and justified him in withholding a discharge until after their examination.
Upon these papers, therefore, it cannot be said that the magis
. Entertaining these views,. I think these proceedings should be dismissed. •
McLaughlin, Laughlin,. Cl-abke and Scott,-jj., concurred.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring):
I would' like it better if further evidence were taken to make some points more clear and to remove doubts on others.; but the burden is not on the magistrate, and I concur in the dismissal of the proceeding on the ground that the evidence submitted is insufficient to require his removal. .'
I feel' keenly, however, the reflection and criticism on the administration of the extradition laws by the judiciary .of our State, justly merited by the record now before the Court and which lias resulted in' a miscarriage of justice, particularly concerning the rights of three sister States and generally the entire nation as well, for it pertains to the performance of the duty, of surrendering fugitives from justice which-is imposed by the Federal Constitution and by the extradition laws enacted by Congress and by the Legislature of our State (XT. S, Const, aft. § 2; XT. S. R. S. § 5278; Code Grim. Broc. §§ 831, 827), for which amends cannot be' made' but only a confession of error and an expression of regret. ■ I, therefore, deem it proper to add a few observations by way of-caution and admonition to magistrates, and of warning against the assumption on their part of jurisdiction to admit to bail in extradition cases, for their jurisdiction is not general but- is limited- and confined to the- authority clearly conferred by statute, and they should not attempt, to exercise jurisdiction unless they Can point to a legislative enactment conferring it upon them. Wé are not informed how the magistrate came to assume jurisdiction to admit to bail in extradition cases; but if it appeared that he leriowingT/y acted .without jurisdiction. I would vote for removal. Mistakes of fact and errors of law may be overlooked, but it is not so easy to excuse the uuwaiv ranted assumption of jurisdiction by a magistrate with limited powers.
- The petition was presented pursuant to the direction of Governor
It appears that the magistrate was deceived by the attorney for the accused, in whom he had confidence. It also appears that this attorney misrepresented the facts to the sureties, and that, without any evidence as to the value of their property, he filled in valuations in the affidavits of justification far in excess of the actual values, and then, without reading the undertaking or affidavits of justification to them, permitted them to acknowledge the undertak•ing and to make the affidavits of justification 'before the magistrate in his presence. On these facts, he should be presented for disbarment or discipline by the district 'attorney or by the Association of the Bar. ■
The magistrate,- in view of the nature and the number of the charges against the accused and of the warning which lie received" from the detectives of the Hew York police force with respect to the means possessed by the accused and to the probable effect of reducing bail, not only should not have reduced the- bail, but even if he had.jurisdiction to admit to bail, I think it would have been an abuse of discretion ■ to give the accused their freedom the night before the morning to "which the hearing was adjourned; for had the crimes been committed here, they were not bailable as matter of right (Code Grim. Proc. § 553), and on the statement of the detective, there was reason to believe that by admitting them to bail they would escape unless very high bail were" exacted. The most charitable view that can be taken of the -conduct of the magistrate in reducing and accepting the bail is that he resented the suggestion of the detective with respect to a matter which he supposed rested in his judicial discretion. The representations made by. the detective were ■ perfectly proper, however, and should have been given due consideration.
The moving papers contain no' suggestion that the magistrate acted without jurisdiction, and we are not informed whether he complied with the provisions of section 832 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which made it his mandatory duty, On the accused being brought before him, to notify the district attorney at once. Had such notice been given, however, it is probable that the accused would not have been admitted to bail, or at.least not on insufficient bail and with sureties who could not-justify and who did not know the contents of their undertakings; . Doubtless the magistrate assumed that since he had, by virtue of the provision of sections 828' to 831 of the' . Code of Criminal. Procedure, inclusive, jurisdiction..to issue warrants for the arrest of fugitives from justice'-as a preliminary proceeding, to requisition papers, and to proceed with the examination for the purpose of ascertaining whether they were charged in any State or Territory with extraditable offenses', he. might' proceed as . if the crimes were charged as having been committed here and take bail pending such examinations. If it be customary 'in such cases for magistrates - to admit to bail the practice should not be. continued, for it is quite clear, 1 think, that théy are wholly without authority to admit to bail in ■ extradition cases. The authority to admit to bail in such cases is, by the express provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, confined to justices of the Supreme Court and to county judges. ' (Code. Crim.- Proc.. §§ 831, 827.) I have . carefully examined the provisions of the Consolidation Act and of the Greater New1 York charter, and ! fail therein to find any statu- . tory provision vesting in the city magistrates authority to exercise the powers conferred on justices of the Supreme Court and county judges by sections 831 and 827 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with respect to admitti’ng.to bail in snob cases. There being no county judge in the county- of New York, probably judges of the Court of
Proceeding dismissed." Settle order on notice. .'