In Re Barfknecht
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Clark
Decision on Trustee’s Objections to Debtors’ Plan Confirmation
LEIF M. CLARK, Bankruptcy Judge.CAME ON for hearing on September 20, 2007 the confirmation of the two foregoing chapter 13 plans. At issue is whether Social Security benefits (including supplemental security income benefits for a disabled person) must be included when calculating a below-median income debtor’s projected disposable income for purposes of section 1325(b) of Title 11. If it does not, the next question is whether the benefits should be included anyway, on grounds that not including it constitutes bad faith under section 1325(a)(3) of Title 11. The issues arose in these cases because the chapter 13 trustee objected to confirmation on both of these grounds. The court concludes that such income is not a component of projected disposable income, and that, at least on these facts, retaining all or part of these benefits while paying less than 100% of general unsecured creditors’ claims does not constitute bad faith in proposing the plan. In all events, it is not per se bad faith.
Background Facts
The facts in these two matters are not in dispute. The Debtors
1
in each case earn
The Barfkneehts list on their Schedule I a total of $1,759.00 in Social Security benefits received between Mr. Barfknecht and their son. In their initial Schedule J, they listed as an expense $800.00 (attributable to the Social Security benefits) with a notation that the benefits are “not considered income.” In the Barfkneehts’ Amended Schedule J, this figure is reduced to $180.00 (meaning that the Barfkneehts decided to provide a larger portion of their benefits to fund their chapter 13 plan). 4
In the other case before the court, Ms. DeMattio did not list any of her benefits on her initial Schedule I. In her Amended Schedule I, however, Ms. DeMattio did list the $945.00 she receives in Social Security benefits each month, all of which she then “backed out” on Amended Schedule J with the notation that the benefits are “Not Considered Income” (meaning that Ms. DeMattio offers to fund her plan using her monthly wages only, and not any of her Social Security benefits). In each case, the proposed plan offers to use the amount
Positions of the Parties
The trustee argues that the Debtors are withholding funds that should be treated as “projected disposable income.” Thus, says the trustee, these plans cannot be confirmed.
See
The trustee acknowledges that courts trying to arrive at an approach to calculating projected disposable income are not in agreement.
5
Nevertheless, the trustee ar
The Debtors counter that, notwithstanding the forms, and notwithstanding the deluge of recent case law interpretations, the plain language of the statute cannot be ignored. Even assuming that “projected disposable income” is a forward-looking figure, the Debtors emphasize that the phrase nonetheless incorporates a defined term in the Code, and that defined term explicitly excludes Social Security benefits.
In re Kibbe,
361 B.R. 302 (1st Cir. BAP 2007);
In re Pale,
357 B.R. 549 (Bankr. N.D.Cal.2006);
In re Rotunda,
349 B.R. 324 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.2006). Accordingly, say the Debtors, even if the court were inclined to agree with
Hardacre
and its suggestion to look forward when applying the “ability to pay” test per
The trustee has argued in the alternative to this statutory reading argument that the Debtors’ refusal to use the benefits to pay creditors who will not be receiving 100% of satisfaction constitutes bad faith, a separate ground for denying confirmation.
See
The Debtors respond to this assertion by noting that good faith in proposing a plan is demonstrated, not by a single factor, but by considering the totality of circumstances. The Debtors assert that they have been honest and forthcoming with the court, and that the trustee does not propose any theory of bad faith other than the Debtors’ retention of benefits. In short, the Debtors ask how it could be bad faith to retain benefits which the Bankruptcy Code itself does not consider income. How can it be bad faith to do exactly what the statute expressly permits?
ANALYSIS
To reiterate, the two issues before this court are: (1) whether benefits received under the Social Security Act must be included in the calculation of projected disposable income for the purposes of the ability to pay test of
Under
[CJurrent monthly income received by the debtor (other than . . . disability payments for a dependent child made in accordance with nonbankruptcy law to the extent reasonably necessary to be expended for such child) less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended—
(A)(i) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor, or for a domestic support objection, that first becomes payable after the date the petition is filed.... ”
(A) means the average monthly income from all sources that the debtor receives . . . without regard to whether such income is taxable income . . . and (B) includes any amount paid by any entity other than the debtor . . . on a regular basis for the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor’s dependents (and in a joint case the debtor’s spouse if not otherwise a dependent), but excludes benefits received under the Social Security Act....
However, for any number of reasons, Congress’ retention of the adjective “projected” in
Are Social Security Benefits Included in the Calculation of Projected Disposable Income?
One of the first decisions to address the conundrum of calculating “projected disposable income” in light of the amended definition of “disposable income” made by BAPCPA was
In re Hardacre,
338 B.R. 718 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2006). In
Hardacre,
Judge Russell Nelms ruled that the “plain” language of amended
The trustee relies on this language to infer that
Hardacre
means that courts are free (perhaps even required) to ignore all pre-petition figures and look only to Schedules I and J when calculating the Debtors’
projected
disposable income. In fact, pre-BAPCPA, courts
usually
calculated a debtor’s projected disposable income by subtracting the projected reasonable expenses listed on Schedule J from the debtor’s estimated projected monthly income reflected on Schedule I, then multiplying that figure by the length of the plan.
See, e.g., In re Kibbe,
361 B.R. at 307;
In re Killough,
900 F.2d 61, 64 (5th Cir.1990). Of course, those pre-BAPCPA decisions did not have to struggle with a definition of “disposable income” that incorporated a new defined term, “current monthly income,” as is now the case under BAPCPA. And, of course, those courts were not saddled with a definition of
current
monthly income hitched rather oxy-moronically to
historical
pre-petition income numbers.
8
The trustee, however, appears to have read more into the
Har-dacre
decision than the language of the decision itself will support. Though concluding that projected disposable income must refer to forward-looking data, the
Hardacre
court nonetheless made two
This does not mean thatsection 101(10A) ’s definition of current monthly income is irrelevant to the calculation of projected disposable income.Section 101(10A) continues to apply inasmuch as it describes the sources of revenue that constitute income, as well as those that do not.
Id.
at 723 (emphasis added). This dramatically undercuts the trustee’s argument here. Even
Hardacre
would agree that, insofar as what does and what does not constitute “income” for purposes of computing “projected disposable income,” a court must be bound by the clear directive in
Notwithstanding this rather clear statement from Hardacre, the trustee still insists that the court should ignore the definitions of CMI and disposable income when calculating the Debtors’ projected disposable income. Absent case law support, however, there is simply no other basis upon which the trustee’s argument can find support. Certainly a plain reading of the statute demands that benefits received under the Social Security Act do not count as income for any purposes. The trustee would have to insist that the addition of the adjective “projected” unhinges the remaining two words from their Code-mandated definitions. To do that, the trustee would have to demonstrate that the phrase “projected disposable income” is otherwise rendered meaningless and cannot be reconciled with the remainder of the statute. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 579-80, 114 S.Ct. 1778, 1783, 128 L.Ed.2d 586 (1994). Yet, the Hardacre court itself had little difficulty according a sensible reading to the phrase “projected disposable income” without having to ignore the Code-mandated definitions of “current monthly income” and “disposable income.” See In re Hardacre, 338 B.R. at 722. On that point at least, this court agrees with Judge Nelms — it is unnecessary to read “current monthly income” (and its limitations on what counts as income) out of the statute in order to arrive at a sensible reading of the phrase “projected disposable income.” 9
It is more logical to assume, as did
Hardacre,
that the definition of “disposable income” must be the starting point for arriving at a debtor’s
projected
disposable income. Congress, after all, is deemed to intend the language used in a particular section.
See In re Hardacre,
338 B.R. at 723 (quoting
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
511 U.S. 531, 537, 114 S.Ct. 1757, 128 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993)). While it is this rule of statutory construction which enabled the court in
Hardacre
to read
projected
disposable income as a forward-looking figure, this same rule of statutory
Having resolved this question of the source of projected disposable income, the facts of these cases are otherwise unremarkable. Unlike
In re Hardacre,
there is no dispute as to the accuracy and reasonableness of the Debtors’ monthly expenses — save the technical issue of “backing out” all or portions of the Debtors’ Social Security benefits from Schedule J.
10
Furthermore, the Debtors in these matters are below-median income households, which precludes a discussion of section 707(b)(2).
See
The chapter 13 trustee also objects to the Debtors’ plans on the ground that, in his view, they are not proposed in good faith.
See
In making the case that failure to devote Social Security benefits toward the plan constitutes bad faith, the trustee points to a few bankruptcy decisions that have held that, notwithstanding the express exclusion of Social Security benefits from disposable income — see discussion
supra
— it demonstrates bad faith for a debtor to accumulate savings over the life of the plan while paying unsecured creditors less than 100%, even though those savings result from the debtor’s retention of Social Security benefits.
See, e.g., In re Upton,
363 B.R. 528, 536-37 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio) (citing
In re LaSota,
351 B.R. 56 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.2006)). In
Upton,
the bankruptcy court based its finding of bad faith on the notion that Congress in BAPCPA left
We return, then, to the “totality of the circumstances” as traditionally applied in this circuit. In re Chaffin II, 836 F.2d at 216 (reversing the bankruptcy court’s denial of confirmation and the district court’s affirmation “[bjecause the bankruptcy court in effect found that [a few] factors per se constituted bad faith”). The trustee here has not directed the court to any peculiar circumstances in either of these cases demonstrating a lack of good faith. The trustee points only to the issue of the Debtors’ retention of some or all of their Social Security benefits. Even’ before BAPCPA, such an argument would have failed in the Fifth Circuit. See id. The trustee has not demonstrated — or even argued — that the Debtors do not propose these plans with an intent not to effectuate them. Nor has the Trustee demonstrated or argued that the Debtors have proposed these plans for any purpose not permitted by the Bankruptcy Code. 14 After considering the totality of the circumstances with respect to the Debtors, there is no basis for concluding that either of these plans were not proposed in good faith. Accepting the trustee’s reading of good faith in these two matters would amount to adopting a per se rule. That is not permitted in this circuit. See Chaffin II, 836 F.2d at 216.
If anything, the enactment of BAPCPA calls into doubt whether a debt- or’s retention of Social Security benefits may
ever
be a factor to consider under the good faith standard. Several courts have held that, when the Bankruptcy Code specifically addresses a particular issue, the good faith standard should not be expanded to alter the statutory treatment of that issue.
See, e.g., Matter of Smith,
848 F.2d 813, 820-21 (7th Cir.1988) (“Since Congress has now dealt with the issue quite specifically in the ability-to-pay provision, there is no longer any reason for the amount of a debtor’s payments to be considered as even part of the good faith standard.”);
In re Alexander,
344 B.R. at 752 (agreeing with another court that “the debtor’s disposable income must be determined under
Conclusion
If a certain category of revenue is explicitly excluded from a debtor’s “current monthly income” or “disposable income,” then the same revenue is not suddenly included as “projected disposable income” simply because that phrase is not independently defined in the Bankruptcy Code. While the term “projected disposable income” may be a forward-looking figure, and the recent amendments to the Code have made the term “disposable income” a backward-looking figure, this difference does not make the two terms necessarily irreconcilable’ — at least not with respect to the issue presented in this case. The plain language of the Code provides that Social Security benefits are to be excluded from the calculation of disposable income. As Hardacre teaches, the underlying definition of current monthly income is relevant to the calculation of projected disposable income inasmuch as the definition describes which sources of revenue are income and which are not. See In re Har-dacre, 338 B.R. at 723. Thus, for the purposes of determining whether a debtor has proposed a plan paying all of her projected disposable income, Social Security benefits are not to be considered.
In determining whether it may be bad faith to exclude all or part of a debtor’s Social Security benefits, a court must consider all facts and circumstances. The Fifth Circuit has long held that such a determination may not be made based upon a single factor. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the good faith analysis may even include a discussion of a debtor’s retention of Social Security benefits. However, even assuming arguendo that such a factor could be part of the good faith analysis, the trustee has failed to demonstrate any other circumstances portraying these plans as being proposed in bad faith. The trustee argues only that, because the Debtors are retaining some or all of their Social Security benefits while paying less than 100% of unsecured creditors’ claims, their plans are per se proposed in bad faith. Unfortunately for the trustee, the Fifth Circuit proscribes such a conclusion.
The court overrules the trustee’s confirmation objections.
Notes
. In one matter, debtors Joel and Maiy Barf-knecht filed their voluntary chapter 13 petition on July 17, 2007. In the other matter, Julia DeMattio filed her voluntary petition on June 4, 2007. For ease of reference, this court will use the debtors’ names when refer encing them individually or simply as “the Debtors” when referencing them collectively.
. Official Form 22C (or B22C) is a form which tracks the recent 2005 amendments. The title of the form is “Chapter 13 Statement of Current Monthly Income and Calculation of Commitment Period and Disposable Income.” In addition to calculating current monthly income (“CMI”) according to
. This practice, to which the trustee refers as “backing out” the Social Security benefits, has become a common practice among debtors’ counsel in the Western District of Texas. The problem seems to be that Social Security benefits are not included, by definition, in the Form B22C‘s CMI calculation. While Form B22C specifically excludes Social Security benefits, Schedule I specifically includes Social Security benefits under its own category. To remove doubt that a debtor does not have excess disposable income with which to pay unsecured creditors under a chapter 13 plan, many debtors (as did the Debtors in these cases) list Social Security benefits as a line-item expense or deduction on Schedule J, thus netting no actual disposable income from the Social Security benefits.
.A debtor is always allowed to voluntarily commit money or property to fund a plan, even if the debtor is under no legal duty to do so. Thus, for example, a debtor might decide to fund part of a plan with the proceeds from the sale of an exempt asset. We note what the debtors have elected to do here only in the interest of completeness. What is at issue in this case, however, has to do with what the law requires them to do, regardless what they may choose to do.
. The trustee offers, in his brief, “Hanks Seven Schools of Thought” (a case law update presented by Judge Keith Lundin at the National Association of Chapter 13 Trustee‘s Convention in July 2007). According to these schools of thought, projected disposable income has been calculated the following ways:
(1) Schedule I minus Schedule J, see In re Riggs,
359 B.R. 649 (Bankr.E.D.Ky.2007);
In re Hardacre,
338 B.R. 718 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. 2006);
In re Dew,
344 B.R. 655 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.2006);
In re lass,
340 B.R. 411 (Bankr.D.Utah 2006);
In re Nowlin,
366 B.R. 670 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2007);
(2) Schedule I minus Schedule J, except for
. We ought to be able to proceed this far safely and without controversy just attending to the plain meaning of the statute.
. Perhaps it is because “projected disposable income” is undefined anywhere in the Bankruptcy Code, while the definition of “disposable income” as amended uses historical fig ures as of the date of petition, computed mechanically by Form B22C. Whatever the reason, the fact of the matter is that there are an increasing number of published opinions on the matter since 2005, few of which agree on the proper figures to use in calculating the projected disposable income. See supra note 4 (listing the several published opinions with differing views as to how projected disposable income should be calculated).
. It may be that the drafters, in their zeal to assure that debtors not simply “make up” income numbers for their chapter 13 plans, decided to make sure that income was tied to what the debtors were actually making prior to filing. What the drafters failed to anticipate was the relatively common scenario in which it is a loss of job, or a reduction in income that finally thrusts a debtor into chapter 13. Debtors frequently improve their situation after filing (for reasons about which this court has far too little data to speculate), such that the historical income numbers actually underpredict a debtor’s future ability to perform. Prior to BAPCPA, courts and trustees commonly tested debtors’ projections of income, especially when they were overly optimistic. The statute‘s language unfortunately takes away some of that discretion and generates what is, no doubt, for the drafters an unexpected (and perhaps even unintended) consequence.
. Though, at this point at least, the court declines to endorse Hardacre’s entire treatment of the phrase. There are other difficulties with that court‘s approach that deserve revisiting at a later date, when an actual dispute over its application is presented to the court. The facts of this case do not present such an opportunity.
.In view of the court’s ruling that income does not include social security benefits, neither need Schedule J reflect a “balancing” entry to offset the “income” reflected on Schedule I. Both schedules should be amended.
.Lest there be any confusion, the court reiterates that neither of these cases presents the circumstance presented to the court in Harda-cre — the above-median debtor attempting to “double dip” in calculating her expenses on Form B22C, rendering the figures on that form unreliable. To the contrary, the figures listed on the Debtors’ forms in these matters are reliable and undisputed, and this court can discern no reason — as did the court in Hardacre — for ignoring such figures.
.In fact, the Debtors’ respective plans offer to pay some money toward the claims of general unsecured creditors even though they have no projected disposable income. The Debtors do this by offering to do what they are not required to do by the statute — committing some portion of Social Security bene fits or other monies toward their plans. The fact that the Debtors can do this, or choose to do this, does not mean that they are obligated to do this by fiat of the addition of the word “projected” to the phrase “disposable income.” A debtor may have several independent reasons for volunteering more than is actually required by the Code. See, e.g., In re Rotunda, 349 B.R. at 332 (citing In re Schanuth, 342 B.R. 601, 606 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 2006)) (“While the [Schanuth ] court indicated that it could not compel the debtors to include the Social Security benefits in calculating disposable income, they certainly could voluntarily devote a portion of that income to the plan in order to overcome the feasibility problem.”).
. The court in In re Upton actually did not conclude that the plan was proposed in bad faith. Instead, the court deferred its conclusion to allow the debtor to demonstrate why its retention of benefits should not be considered bad faith. See id. at 537.
. Indeed, in view of the definition of “current monthly income” in