In re B.R.
Rendered on July 8, 2021
On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and George M. Schumann, for appellant.
On brief: Robert J. McClaren, for appellee Franklin County Children Services.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch
MENTEL, J.
{1} Mother, B.R., appeals from the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, granting the motion for permanent custody of her child, B.R., filed by Franklin County Children Services (“FCCS“). For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{2} On March 22, 2018, FCCS filed a complaint under
{3} After a hearing held on June 12, 2018, at which the matter was uncontested, the magistrate adjudicated B.R. an abused child under
{4} FCCS filed a motion for permanent custody on December 5, 2018, in which the agency stated that it was required to file the motion under
{5} The trial court held a hearing on the motion for permanent custody on January 13, 2020. Mother B.R. was not present but was represented by an attorney who stated that she did not contest the motion. Id. at 10. However, he did request a continuance on her behalf, based on Mother B.R.‘s belief that her cousin wanted to seek custody of B.R. (Jan. 13, 2020 Tr. at 6.) FCCS objected to the “last second” request, noting that Mother B.R. had “never mentioned this person before.” (Tr. at 7.) The trial court overruled the request and proceeded to hear testimony on the motion. Id.
{6} FCCS first called P.C. as a witness as if on cross-examination. (Tr. at 13.) She testified that B.R. first came to live with her on January 30, 2017 and stayed there until July 7, 2017. (Tr. at 14-15.) P.C. stated that it was a “lie” that she had abused B.R. and that the child had been “kidnapped” and “taken out of the home without permission” when removed. (Tr. at 15.) P.C. asserted that she had complied with all aspects of the case plan created by FCCS. (Tr. at 15-18.) She had not seen B.R. since “October or November of 2017.” (Tr. at 18.) When asked if she was seeking custody of B.R., P.C. replied that the child “never should have been taken out of my home.” (Tr. at 19.)
{7} FCCS also called Brittney Gilmore, an FCCS caseworker and licensed social worker, to testify. (Tr. at 28-29.) Ms. Gilmore was the primary caseworker for the case involving B.R. (Tr. at 29.) She testified that B.R.‘s case was opened because of “physical abuse” in P.C.‘s care as well as the “conditions of [P.C.]‘s home.” (Tr. at 30.) According to Ms. Gilmore, B.R. was removed from Mother B.R.‘s home for “obtaining a burn” before P.C. gained legal custody of B.R. (Tr. at 30-31.)
{8} Ms. Gilmore‘s attempts to establish paternity of B.R. were unsuccessful. Testing of an individual, R.W., “determined that he was not the father.” (Tr. at 31.) After Mother B.R. reported that J.R., her father was possibly B.R.‘s father, Ms. Gilmore made several unsuccessful attempts to engage with him but could not ever get him to take a paternity test or even talk to her about the case. (Tr. at 32.)
{9} Ms. Gilmore principally worked with Mother B.R. on reunification. (Tr. at 33.) Under the case plan, Mother B.R. was required to attend and participate in parenting classes and the parenting mentor program; demonstrate the ability to “appropriately interact” with B.R.; sign releases for service providers; “be available for all scheduled home visits“; maintain “consistent contact” with FCCS; “complete a psychological assessment and follow through with all recommendations“; comply and follow all court orders; avoid any other criminal charges; not allow any contact between B.R. and R.W.; secure “stable and independent housing that is free of all safety hazards“; and obtain “a stable and legal source of income.” (Tr. at 33-34.)
{10} Ms. Gilmore testified that Mother B.R. completed parenting classes and she had observed her interacting “appropriately” with B.R. (Tr. at 35.) Mother B.R. had also made herself available for scheduled home visits and had completed a psychological
{11} Mother B.R. could not be referred to a parent mentor because obtaining stable, independent housing and achieving “enough progress on the case plan” to be “close to reunification” was a prerequisite to referral. (Tr. at 35.) According to Ms. Gilmore, Mother B.R. did not work and had not had employment during the duration of the case. (Tr. at 37-38.) Ms. Gilmore testified that during her observations of Mother B.R.‘s interactions with B.R., the child hugged her and called her mother. Their level of interaction was not one of Ms. Gilmore‘s areas of concern. (Tr. at 43-44.)
{12} Ms. Gilmore also described B.R.‘s placement history. After leaving P.C.‘s home, she was placed with a non-relative for only a “few months” but was removed because J.R., who had sexually abused Mother B.R., was “living in the home” and possibly physically abusing B.R. (Tr. at 44.) Ms. Gilmore moved B.R. to a foster home for 30 days, and then placed in her in another foster home where she stayed for several months. (Tr. at 45.) However, B.R. had to leave that foster home after reports that B.R. was being abused there as well. Id. Sometime in 2018, Ms. Gilmore testified, B.R. was moved to her current foster home. (Tr. at 46-47.)
{13} Based on her bimonthly visits to the foster home, Ms. Gilmore testified that B.R.‘s interaction with her current foster mother was “very positive. She appears to be very comfortable with the foster mom,” as well as her three biological children. (Tr. at 47-48.) B.R.‘s biological sister was placed in the home as well, and B.R. had a “sister bond” with her. (Tr. at 48.) The foster mother was interested in adopting B.R. (Tr. at 49.) Ms. Gilmore recommended granting the motion for permanent custody so that B.R. could be adopted. (Tr. at 50.) When asked about B.R.‘s best interests, Ms. Gilmore stated that “issues regarding safety” and Mother B.R.‘s non-completion of “portions of the case plan” were concerns, but B.R. was “doing well” in her current foster care environment. (Tr. at 50-51.)
{14} FCCS also called M.H., B.R.‘s current foster mother, as a witness. (Tr. at 62.) She testified that when B.R. first came into her care in June 2018, she was not potty trained
{15} Nancy Cody, the court-appointed guardian ad litem for B.R., also testified. Ms. Cody had performed “regular home visits” at all of B.R.‘s placements since being removed from P.C.‘s home. (Tr. at 69.) Ms. Cody attended her HeadStart enrollment, reviewed her medical and FCCS records, and attended supervised visits. Id.
{16} Ms. Cody spoke with B.R., who was five at the time, about her wishes. (Tr. at 71.) She showed B.R. a picture of a house and asked her: “if this were your home, who would you like to have live with you?” (Tr. at 71.) B.R. told Ms. Cody “that she was happy with her brothers and sisters in the home,” referring to M.H.‘s children, and that “she wanted mommy to be with her.” Id. When Ms. Cody asked who mommy was, B.R. pointed to M.H. Id.
{17} Ms. Cody‘s recommendation was that B.R. “remain with [M.H.] hopefully with an opportunity for adoption.” Id. Ms. Cody‘s “main concern” was “how many times [B.R.] had to be moved” but noted “how much better her current placement has gone in the two years that she‘s been there.” (Tr. at 71-72.) She described B.R. as “flourishing” in M.H.‘s home: “She‘s getting the speech therapy and educational support that she needs.” (Tr. at 72.) Although Ms. Cody believed that B.R. had “some delays in terms of her academic performance,” she felt that B.R. was “getting better” where she was. Id. In addition, Ms. Cody opined that “it would be harmful for her to be moved again,” and “very harmful if she [were] moved to a different school.” Id. Ms. Cody stated that B.R.‘s best interests “would be served by her achieving permanency” in M.H.‘s home, where she was “happy,” she was “learning,” “her three older siblings [were] like role models to her,” and she had the possibility of living with her biological sister. (Tr. at 77-78.)
{18} Ms. Cody also described Mother B.R. as “a very nice person, [a] very sweet person” but “extremely immature.” (Tr. at 77.) When observing Mother B.R.‘s interactions with B.R., Ms. Cody said that Mother B.R. “didn‘t change her or feed her; it was just -- just playing with her.” Id. Ms. Cody expressed concern about reunification because Mother B.R. had “never held a job” or a permanent residence and was pregnant again at the time of trial. Id.
{19} FCCS called no more witnesses but submitted as an exhibit a judgment entry from Mother B.R.‘s criminal case in which she had entered a plea of guilty to one count of child endangerment, in violation of
{20} The trial court granted the motion for permanent custody, terminated P.C.‘s legal custody of B.R., and divested Mother B.R. of her parental rights. (Jan. 23, 2020 Decision and Jgmt. Entry at 19-20.)
{21} Mother B.R. filed a timely appeal and asserts the following assignment of error:
The juvenile court‘s judgment finding that permanent court commitment of the minor child to Franklin County Children Services is in the minor child‘s best interests under
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) ,R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) , andR.C. 2151.414(D)(1) is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
II. Standard of Review
{22} “A trial court‘s determination in a permanent custody case will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re K.L., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-218, 2013-Ohio-3499, ¶ 13, citing In re Andy-Jones, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1167, 2004-Ohio-3312. Under the manifest weight of the evidence standard, the court of appeals “will not overturn a permanent custody order when it is supported by competent, credible evidence.” (Citations omitted.) In re C.W., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-309, 2020-Ohio-1248, ¶ 51. The reviewing court “must make every reasonable presumption in favor of the judgment and the trial court‘s findings of facts.” In re K.M., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-64, 2015-Ohio-4682, ¶ 13.
III. Analysis
{23}
{24} Here, the trial court concluded that “clear and convincing evidence” satisfied two of the
{25} The second factor was
{26} Rather, Mother B.R. contests the second part of the trial court‘s
- The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child‘s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child‘s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; - The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, * * *;
- The child‘s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency;
- Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.
{27} Mother B.R. “contends that there is evidence in the record showing that she loves her daughter” and that she “maintained visitation,” during which she appropriately interacted with B.R. and “was a mother-figure” to her. (Appellant‘s Brief at 18-19.) She also claims that that B.R. “knows” that Mother B.R. “is her biological mother.” Id. Although she cites no portion of the record to support these assertions, we acknowledge that Ms. Gilbert testified that Mother B.R. acted appropriately during visitations, that B.R. hugged her and called her mom, and that Ms. Gilbert did not consider their interaction an “area of concern.” (Tr. at 43-44.) On the other hand, the guardian ad litem observed that Mother B.R. “didn‘t change her or feed her; it was just -- just playing with her.” (Tr. at 77.) We also acknowledge that when considering the “interaction and interrelationship of the child” with others under
{28} The second best interest factor is “[t]he wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child‘s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child.”
{29} The trial court also emphasized “the custodial history of the child” under
{30} The trial court also addressed “[t]he child‘s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency.”
[D]esperately in need of a legally secure permanent placement. The evidence is clear that neither of her parents or relatives have given [an] indication that they can provide this for her now or in the future. Although [P.C.] has indicated a desire to provide her a secure permanent placement the evidence does not support her request. Further, by her own volition she did not foster any type of continuing relationship with [B.R.] after she was moved. Under such circumstances an attempted permanent placement with [P.C.] would place [B.R.] at risk for additional removals. Therefore, the Court finds that a legally secure permanent placement cannot be accomplished without a grant of the agency‘s motion and allowing [B.R.] [to be] placed for adoption.
(Jan. 23, 2020 Decision and Jgmt. Entry at 18.)
{31} Mother B.R. argues that “this is not a case where a mother is homeless and thus entirely unable to have her child with her,” or one in which the mother “has no means of any kind of ensuring that her child‘s needs are met.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 19.) This may be, but Mother B.R. cites no evidence in the record that demonstrates she has any means
{32}
{33} Finally, the trial court appropriately considered the guardian ad litem‘s recommendation that it grant the motion to be a “relevant factor” under
{34} Mother B.R.‘s only other arguments describe her partial compliance with the case plan but do not otherwise demonstrate or even address the trial court‘s analysis of the evidence in relation to the best interest factors under
{35} Mother B.R. has not demonstrated that the manifest weight of the evidence did not support the trial court‘s application of the best interest factors under
Judgment affirmed.
SADLER and BEATTY BLUNT, JJ., concur.