IN THE MATTER OF B.O.A.
No. 264PA18
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
Filed 16 August 2019
On discretionary review pursuant to
Hicks & Wrenn, PLLC, by C. Gill Frazier, II, and N. Kyle Hicks for petitioner Granville County Department of Social Services, and Bell, Davis & Pitt, P.A., by Derek M. Bast, Guardian ad Litem Program attorney for the minor child, appellants.
Edward Eldred Attorney at Law, PLLC, by Edward Eldred, for respondent-appellee mother.
Elizabeth Kennedy-Gurnee and Jamie Hamlett for North Carolina Association of Social Services Attorneys, amicus curiae.
The issue before the Court in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court had erred by determining that the parental rights of respondent-mother Lauren B. in her daughter, B.O.A.,1 were subject to termination
pursuant to
Bev was born to respondent-mother and Harry A.2 on 4 April 2015. On 9 August 2015, the Butner Department of Public Safety was called to the family home after respondent-mother sought emergency assistance to deal with assaultive conduct in which the father was engaging against her. As a result of this altercation, both parties were placed under arrest. In view of the fact that Bev was
On 20 August 2015, a social worker met with respondent-mother for the purpose of developing an Out of Home Service Agreement, or case plan.3 In the
resulting case plan, respondent-mother agreed, among other things, to obtain a mental health assessment; complete domestic violence counseling and avoid situations involving domestic violence; complete a parenting class and utilize the skills learned in the class during visits with the child; remain drug-free; submit to random drug screenings; participate in weekly substance abuse group therapy meetings; continue to attend medication management sessions; refrain from engaging in criminal activity; and maintain stable income for at least three months. After a hearing held on 17 and 18 December 2015, Judge J. Henry Banks entered an order on 12 January 2016, in which he found, among other things, that the home maintained by Bev‘s parents constituted an “injurious environment“; that respondent-mother was “in therapy for domestic violence, addiction, ADHD/ADD and rape“; and that respondent-mother was being prescribed medication, and concluded that Bev was a neglected juvenile as defined in
Over the course of the ensuing year, periodic review proceedings were conducted, each of which resulted in the entry of orders requiring DSS to attempt to reunify Bev with respondent-mother. After a review hearing held on 15 December 2016, Judge Carolyn J. Thompson entered an order on 11 January 2017 discontinuing reunification efforts and changing Bev‘s permanent plan from reunification to adoption. On 24 January 2017, DSS filed a petition seeking to have respondent-mother‘s parental rights in Bev terminated on the grounds that respondent-mother had neglected Bev and had “willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to removal of the juvenile.”
The termination petition came on for hearing before the trial court on 13 July 2017 and 17 August 2017. On 8 September 2017, the trial court entered an order in which it found as fact, among other things, that:
9. [Respondent-mother] signed a[ case plan] with [DSS] on August 20, 2015, but she has not met the terms of that Agreement.
10. [Respondent-mother] completed a domestic violence class . . . but has not demonstrated the skills she was to learn in that. In the last six months, [respondent-mother] has called the police on her live-in boyfriend and father of her new born child.
11. [Respondent-mother] has not remained free of controlled substances, and has continued to test positive for controlled substances (even during her recent pregnancy).
12. [Respondent-mother] admitted that she does not take her medications as prescribed and takes her prescriptions, “when she feels like it[.]”
13. [Respondent-mother] has tested positive for extremely high levels of amphetamines .... . . . .
29. [Respondent-mother] was to engage in therapy as part of her [case plan] and there is no credible evidence of therapy.
30. [T]here is no credible evidence that [respondent-mother] is able to protect her child.
31. [Respondent-mother] was to complete a neuro-psychological examination as part of her [case plan], but [she] never rescheduled her examination appointment after having the examination explained to her by the social worker and the psychologist.
32. [Respondent-mother] declined a visit with the juvenile on December 27, 2016 after [DSS] changed the plan to adoption and ceased reunification efforts.
33. [Respondent-mother] continues to make excuses and cannot demonstrate what she has learned during her parenting classes and continues to shift her focus away from the juvenile during multiple visitations.
34. [Respondent-mother] exhibits delusional tendencies, as evidenced by her statement to the court that she “could pass the Bar today.”
35. [Respondent-mother] has remained hostile and combative to [DSS] and has not completed her [case plan].
36. [Respondent-mother] has not demonstrated an ability to put her child first.
37. [Respondent-mother] revoked her consent for [DSS] to have access to her mental health records.
38. [Respondent-mother] continues to make inconsisten[t statements] regarding her medical diagnosis.
39. [Respondent-mother] has willfully left the minor child in an out of home placement for more than twelve months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile, pursuant to
N.C.G.S. §7B-1111(a)(2) .
After determining that respondent-mother‘s parental rights in Bev were subject to termination pursuant to
In seeking relief from the trial court‘s termination order before the Court of Appeals, respondent-mother argued that the trial court had erred by terminating her parental rights in Bev pursuant to
of concerns relating to domestic violence and the bruising of Bev‘s arm and that the trial court‘s findings of fact did not establish that she had failed to address these concerns. Id.
In reversing the trial court‘s termination order, the Court of Appeals began by determining that a number of the trial court‘s findings of fact lacked sufficient evidentiary support and failed to support its ultimate conclusion that respondent-mother had failed to correct the domestic violence-related problems that had led to Bev‘s removal from respondent-mother‘s home. Id. at 334-36. For example, the Court of Appeals held with respect to Finding of Fact No. 10 that respondent-mother‘s decision to call the police based upon the abusive conduct of her live-in boyfriend did not reflect a failure to learn how to address domestic violence-related problems given the absence of any evidence tending to show “that the incident involved violence, force, or any actions constituting domestic violence under [
had difficulty focusing upon the juvenile during her visits with Bev given that “Bev was not removed from the home due to [r]espondent‘s lack of focus with the child, but rather for domestic violence between the parents and an unexplained bruise.” Id. at 336. Finally, after acknowledging that the case plan to which respondent-mother had agreed with DSS attempted to address issues “pertaining to substance abuse, medication management, mental health/psychological issues, and parenting skills,” the Court of Appeals noted that, since these concerns were not enunciated “in either the nonsecure custody order or neglect petition [so as] to put [r]espondent on notice of these conditions,” such concerns could not be considered as having contributed to Bev‘s removal from respondent-mother‘s home for purposes of
order. On 5 December 2018, this Court granted DSS‘s request for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals’ decision in this case.
In seeking to persuade us to reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision, DSS and the Guardian ad Litem argue that the Court of Appeals had erroneously construed
failed to make reasonable progress in correcting the conditions that led to Bev‘s removal from the family home for purposes of
Respondent-mother, on the other hand, asserts that the Court of Appeals properly interpreted the “clear and unambiguous” language of
were those relating to domestic violence and the presence of a bruise on Bev‘s arm. Moreover, even if other conditions, such as substance abuse, are generally related to the existence of domestic abuse, respondent-mother argues that the record is devoid of any evidence tending to show that such conditions played any part in Bev‘s removal from respondent-mother‘s home in this case. As a result, respondent-mother asserts that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the trial court‘s findings failed to support its conclusion that she had failed to make sufficient progress toward correcting the conditions that led to Bev‘s removal from the family home.
Finally, while acknowledging that a trial judge is authorized by
progress pursuant to
According to well-established law, this Court reviews trial court orders in cases in which a party seeks to have a parent‘s parental rights in a child terminated by determining whether the trial court‘s findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether those findings support the trial court‘s conclusions of law. In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404, 293 S.E.2d 127, 133 (1982). A trial court‘s finding of fact that is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is deemed conclusive even if the record contains evidence that would support a contrary finding. Id. at 403-04, 293 S.E.2d at 132.
A termination of parental rights proceeding consists of an adjudication stage that is followed by a dispositional stage. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984). At the adjudication stage, the trial court must “take evidence, find the facts, and . . . adjudicate the existence or nonexistence of any of the circumstances set forth in [
those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.”
The ultimate issue before us in this case revolves around the manner in which the reference to “those conditions that led to the removal of the juvenile” contained in
Morehead Mem‘l Hosp., 318 N.C. 76, 81, 347 S.E.2d 824, 828 (1986)), with the legislative intent to be determined “first from the plain language of the statute, then from the legislative history, ‘the spirit of the act and what the act seeks to accomplish.‘” Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 664, 548 S.E.2d 513, 517 (2001) (quoting Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 349 N.C. 290, 297, 507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1998)). “When the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute.” Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs. & Div. of Med. Assistance, N. Carolina Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006).
In overturning the trial court‘s determination that respondent-mother‘s parental rights in Bev were subject to termination pursuant to
language appears to us to be subject to a number of potentially possible interpretations in addition to that adopted by the Court of Appeals. For example, the relevant statutory language can easily be read to encompass all of the conditions that led to the child‘s removal from the parental home, including both those inherent in the events immediately surrounding the child‘s removal from the home and any additional underlying factors that contributed to the difficulties that resulted in the child‘s removal. A careful examination of the relevant statutory language in the context of other related statutory provisions suggests that a more expansive reading of the reference to “those conditions that led to the removal of the juvenile” contained in
According to
to order a parent to take any step reasonably required to alleviate any condition that directly or indirectly contributed to causing the juvenile‘s removal from the parental home. In addition,
In addition to its reliance upon what it believed to be the plain meaning of the relevant statutory language, the Court of Appeals justified its decision to overturn the trial court‘s termination order on certain notice-related considerations. In essence, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court was not entitled to consider certain of the “conditions” addressed in respondent-mother‘s court-approved case
plan because “DSS failed to allege any of these conditions in either the nonsecure custody order or neglect petition to put [r]espondent on notice of these conditions.” B.O.A., 818 S.E.2d at 336. Although a trial court would clearly err by terminating a parent‘s parental rights in a child for failure to make reasonable progress pursuant to
[t]hat the parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to removal of the juvenile.
In view of the fact that nothing in the relevant statutory provisions limits the “conditions for removal” to those specified in any initial abuse, neglect, or dependency petition or any subsequent amendment to that petition and the fact that DSS adequately alleged that it was seeking to terminate respondent-mother‘s parental rights in Bev pursuant to
notice-related concerns expressed by the Court of Appeals justify overturning the trial court‘s termination order.
The broader reading of the relevant statutory language that we believe to be appropriate is also consistent with the manner in which those provisions have been applied by our state‘s appellate courts in the past. As an initial matter, we note that
In addition, the Court of Appeals has treated parental compliance with a broadly drafted case plan as pertinent to the inquiry required by
toward her case plan goals, the amount of progress she has made is not reasonable under the circumstances and in fact, she has not completed any of her case plan goals,” id. at 380-81, 628 S.E.2d at 455, and concluded that the mother‘s parental rights in the child were subject to termination on the grounds of both neglect,
A careful review of relevant decisions by both the Court of Appeals and this Court, see D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 845, 788 S.E.2d at 168 (holding that a trial court could correctly determine that a parent whose children had been removed from the family home because of domestic violence and a failure to provide adequate housing and meet the children‘s minimal needs were subject to termination pursuant to
governmental intervention into the family‘s life, as long as the objectives sought to be achieved by the case plan provision in question address issues that contributed to causing the problematic circumstances that led to the juvenile‘s removal from the parental home. The adoption of a contrary approach would amount to turning a blind eye to the practical reality that a child‘s removal from the parental home is rarely the result of a single, specific incident and is, instead, typically caused by the confluence of multiple factors, some of which are immediately apparent and some of which only become apparent in light of further investigation. A restrictive construction of the relevant provisions of
We do not, of course, wish to be understood as holding that a trial judge‘s authority to adopt a case plan pursuant to
satisfy all elements of the case plan goals.” In re J.S.L., 177 N.C. App. 151, 163, 628 S.E.2d 387, 394 (2006). On the other hand, a trial court has ample authority to determine that a parent‘s “extremely limited progress” in correcting the conditions leading to removal adequately supports a determination that a parent‘s parental rights in a particular child are subject to termination pursuant to
A careful review of the record satisfies us that the necessary nexus between the components of the court-approved case plan with which respondent-mother failed to comply and the “conditions which led to [Bev‘s] removal” from the parental home exists in this case. Admittedly, the triggering event that led to Bev‘s placement in DSS custody was an act of domestic violence and the discovery of an unexplained
bruise located on Bev‘s arm. However, a careful examination of the record clearly reflects that a much broader list of concerns contributed to causing the events that directly and immediately contributed to Bev‘s adjudication as a neglected juvenile and her removal from the parental home. In the initial adjudication order, Judge Banks found that respondent-mother was “currently in therapy for domestic violence, addiction, ADHD/ADD and rape and is prescribed medication” and that the entry of a dispositional order should be continued until DSS had had an opportunity “to further modify its recommendations after a CFT meeting with” the parents. Similarly, Judge Finch found in the subsequent dispositional order that “there continue[ ] to be concerns with substance abuse, domestic violence and visitations.” A report submitted by DSS that was accepted into the record at the adjudication hearing indicates, among other things,
mother was receiving treatment for anxiety and depressed mood, that respondent-mother had been diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, that respondent-mother was not complying with the requirements of her Suboxone regimen, and that respondent-mother became angry and acted out with regularity during her dealings with DSS personnel and others. Finally, respondent-mother voluntarily agreed upon a case plan with DSS and never contended prior to the termination hearing that its components did not address issues that contributed to causing the conditions that led to Bev‘s removal from her home.
The various reports and orders contained in the record reflect an early recognition of the fact that a complex series of interrelated factors contributed to causing the conditions that led to Bev‘s removal from respondent-mother‘s home. There is widespread recognition that post-traumatic stress disorder can result from domestic violence. Similarly, common sense indicates that certain mental disorders and unaddressed substance abuse problems can make an individual more susceptible to domestic violence. Thus, the history shown in these reports and orders reveals the existence of a sufficient nexus between the conditions that led to Bev‘s removal from respondent-mother‘s home and the provisions of the court-ordered case plan relating to respondent-mother‘s mental health issues, substance abuse treatment, and medication management problems. As a result, we are fully satisfied that the trial court had an adequate basis for finding the required relationship between the components of respondent-mother‘s case plan and the “conditions that led to [Bev‘s]
removal” from respondent-mother‘s home for purposes of
The trial court‘s termination order contained multiple findings of fact detailing respondent-mother‘s failure to comply with numerous components of her court-ordered case plan. Although respondent-mother challenged a number of the trial court‘s findings of fact as lacking in sufficient evidentiary support, the record provides ample justification for the trial court‘s determination that respondent-mother had entered into a judicially approved case plan with DSS and “ha[d] not met the terms of that [a]greement.” Among other things, the trial court found “ample evidence that [respondent-mother had] abuse[d] her Adderall prescription” and had “admitted that she does not take her medications as prescribed and takes her prescriptions, ‘when she feels like it.‘” In addition, the trial court made findings of fact concerning respondent-mother‘s failure to pass random drug tests or failure to submit to drug tests and to refrain from using illegal substances. In addition, the trial court found that respondent-mother had failed to complete the required neuro-psychological examination or to participate in required therapy sessions. Similarly, the trial court found that respondent-mother was unable to “demonstrate what she has learned during her parenting classes and continue[d] to shift her focus away from the juvenile during multiple visitations.” A careful review of these unchallenged findings of fact satisfies us that respondent-mother failed to comply with all but the most minimal requirements of her court-ordered case plan and that the limited progress that she
did make cannot be fairly described as reasonable. As a result, we conclude that the trial court‘s unchallenged findings of fact amply demonstrate that respondent-mother‘s parental rights were subject to termination for failing to make reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that resulted in Bev‘s removal from the family
Thus, we hold that the trial court‘s unchallenged findings of fact, including those regarding respondent‘s failure to comply with the provisions of her court-ordered case plan, adequately supported the trial court‘s conclusion that respondent-mother willfully left Bev in DSS custody for a period of twelve months without making reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that led to Bev‘s removal from respondent-mother‘s home and that the Court of Appeals erred by reaching a contrary result. As a result, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision in this case.
REVERSED.