{¶ 3} Upon reaching the front of the store, L.Y. made a gesture and a statement to the other two boys and fled the store without paying for the games. The employee attempted to pursue L.Y., but A.B. and B.M. physically blocked the employee to ensure L.Y.'s escape. When A.B. and B.M. attempted to flee along with L.Y., the employee attempted to restrain A.B. and a struggle immediately ensued. The struggle continued until the exhausted employee could no longer hold A.B., during which time the two had wrestled on the floor knocking over CD's and racks. When A.B. arose from the scuffle, the manager confronted him. A.B. threw the manager aside, smashed the computer monitor off the countertop and toppled a rack of tee shirts. At this time, B.M. had reentered the store, picked up a stool, and brandished it at the other employees. Meanwhile, someone had prudently called the police.
{¶ 4} A.B. and B.M. next fled to the Record Exchange's back room, and exited the back door and into the parking lot. The police came upon the two as they were fleeing, and caught up with A.B. as he ran across a field. Eventually, the police followed B.M. to a hiding spot in a nearby apartment building. The police took the two to the Record Exchange, where an employee and a customer made a positive identification. The police contacted L.Y. at his home and he admitted that he stole the video games, that the three had gone to the store with no money, and that he had made a statement to the other two while he was fleeing the store. Later, at trial, all the employees and the customer positively identified all three boys from the incident.
{¶ 5} B.M. was charged with complicity to robbery, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 6} B.M. alleges that the evidence produced at trial could not have persuaded a reasonable finder of fact that he was guilty of complicity. Thus, B.M. charges that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence and should be reversed. We disagree.
{¶ 7} Reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for the exceptional case where the evidence demonstrates that the "trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed." State v. Otten (1986),
{¶ 8} B.M. was convicted of complicity to robbery, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 9} At trial, the magistrate heard testimony from nine witnesses. The State produced seven witnesses, including eyewitnesses, a police officer and a friend of the three boys. B.M. produced one witness, codefendant L.Y., and testified himself. Upon acknowledging that such extensive testimony will inevitably produce some inconsistent or conflicting assertions, we recognize the sound principle that the trier of fact is best positioned to weigh the credibility of the individual witness and reach a conclusion based on the totality of the evidence. SeeState v. DeHass (1967),
{¶ 10} In presenting its case for complicity to robbery, the State presented a coherent version of the incident, culminating in the sound inference that A.B. and B.M., through physical force, aided and abetted L.Y. in his theft of the games. Simply put, the three boys, without any money whatsoever, entered the store and asked to see the games, whereupon L.Y. fled with the games and signaled the other two to block the pursuit. What started as physical obstruction became an all out struggle, until eventually; the two boys were able to flee out the back. B.M. suggests that they did nothing to provoke the encounter, but rather were attacked by store personnel. This allegation is simply not credible, and is rebuked by the State's witnesses. B.M. also contends that he had no prior knowledge that L.Y. intended to steal the games. This contention is suspect in light of the fact that none of the boys had any money, yet B.M. lurked at the counter without browsing himself while the others asked the employee to remove the games from the locked cabinet, under the premise that they would purchase them. However, this issue is immaterial, in that the State was not seeking to prove a prior agreement, but merely complicity in the robbery. There is little doubt that B.M.'s actions, as described by the State's witnesses, aided and abetted L.Y. in his theft of the games. Furthermore, the testimony of B.M.'s witnesses, codefendants in his case, could be seen as self serving and lacking in credibility.
{¶ 11} We conclude that the mere fact that the finder of fact chose to disbelieve B.M.'s theory of the encounter, and instead chose to believe the State's version, is insufficient to find that the finder of fact lost its way or created a manifest miscarriage of justice. See Gilliam, supra at *4; Otten,
Judgment affirmed.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
Exceptions.
Whitmore, P.J. Carr, J. Concur.