IN RE: MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF COUNTY TREASURER (CORTEZZ, LLC, Petitioner-Appellee, v. JAYLNN & JAVARIS FOUNDATION, INC., Respondent-Appellant).
No. 1-24-0859
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
September 2, 2025
2025 IL App (1st) 240859-U
JUSTICE MCBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Howse and Ellis concurred in the judgment.
SECOND DIVISION. NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
21COTD255
Honorable Araceli De La Cruz, Judge Presiding
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Denial of petition to vacate tax deed affirmed where former property owner did not present clear and convincing evidence that tax deed buyer‘s affidavit and lawyer‘s statements amounted to fraud upon the court about efforts to give notice.
¶ 2 The circuit court granted a tax deed to Cortezz, LLC (“Cortezz“) for commercial/residential mixed use property belonging to Jaylnn & Javaris Foundation, Inc. (“J & J“). Five months later, J & J filed a section 2-1401 petition to vacate the order, contending it had been unaware of the proceedings and that the tax deed was procured by fraud at the prove up hearing when Cortezz “basically exaggerated” its attempts to give J & J notice.
¶ 3 J & J is a non-profit, 501(c)(3) organization that secures affordable housing for low-income individuals and families. Javaris L. Gardner is J & J‘s president. In 2016, J & J was given a two-story building that was identified by two sequential street numbers. The portion of the building that became subject to delinquent tax deed proceedings is commonly known as 354 E. 115th Street, Chicago, IL 60628 (“354“) and is referenced by permanent index number or “PIN” 25-22-123-006-0000. The adjoining property is 352 E. 115th Street (“352“) and is cataloged under PIN 25-22-123-005-0000. The donee, Gregory Edinburg, executed a quit claim deed that had been prepared by Gardner‘s attorney, Harry A. Schroeder. The quit claim deed directed J & J‘s tax bills to Schroeder‘s office at 1619 Western Avenue, Chicago Heights, IL 60411. No one, however, paid 354‘s 2017 general taxes totaling $1,743, and Schroeder died shortly thereafter, in 2018.
¶ 4 Appellee Cortezz and at least five other corporations managed by Greg R. Bingham are in the business of buying delinquent real estate taxes in Illinois, Colorado, Florida, and New Jersey, and managing or remodeling property. Bingham, through his corporation, Intaxx, LLC, purchased 354‘s delinquent taxes at auction on May 7, 2019.
¶ 5 An ex parte prove up hearing was held via videoconference on October 28, 2021, during which, in lieu of having Bingham testify, attorney Douglas S. Miller submitted Bingham‘s affidavit and summarized its contents for the court. According to Miller, Bingham swore (1) he
¶ 6 As the prove up continued, Miller said that the required notices had been served, including a take notice pursuant to section 22-5 of the Property Tax Code (
¶ 7 Miller also said that a title company searched public records and “we served all interested parties.” The record discloses that Intaxx had difficulty making personal contact with anyone and resorted mostly to certified mail. Miller specified that Intaxx attempted and did not succeed with personal service on J & J “at their corporate offices” on March 19 and 23, 2021. Miller was referring to J & J‘s registered agent at the time, which was New Link Access Corporation, 1229 N. North Branch St., Suite 101, Chicago, IL 60642. Intaxx could not personally serve lienholder The Closers Firm, Inc. (“The Closers“) on the first floor of the subject property, on an unspecified
¶ 8 At the conclusion of the prove up, the judge said that when he received all the documents, he would take the matter under advisement, and if there was strict compliance with the Property Tax Code (
¶ 10 The circuit court received Cortezz‘s written response to the amended 2-1401 petition, both
¶ 11 Bingham testified that he earned an economics degree in 1991, had been in the business of buying delinquent real estate taxes for over 25 years and also remodeled and managed property. He employed himself as a manager and three other people in bookkeeping and administrative roles at Start Rehab Real Estate in Northlake, Illinois. He did not employ in-house counsel, but for two to three years, Miller had been sharing the office space. After purchasing 354‘s delinquent taxes, Bingham used the treasurer‘s last billing address to give notice and also investigated addresses that were publicly available through Chicago Title and cyberdriveillinois.com, which is the Secretary of State‘s website. Bingham did “[n]othing beyond what [was] required by the statutes.” Later, when Gardner told Bingham that 354 was tax exempt, Bingham gave “our standard response” which was that Gardner needed to “straighten this out downtown” and Bingham did not investigate into the exemption status given that “everything was done according to the guidelines of the statute.” Bingham had driven past 354 many times because of where it was located and he visited the location “probably twice.” He saw plywood across the front of the ground floor, although the “second floor had windows,” and that the building had no mailbox, “identifiers,” “controlling signs,” or “management signs” out front, which were indications that 354 was “basically derelict and/or vacant.” He did not know that 354 and 352 were “connected” and denied knocking at 352 when he was evaluating 354 for potential purchase. When shown the single quit claim deed which conveyed 352 and 354 to J & J, Bingham denied seeing it before and said that he relied on the title company to determine who had title. He did not personally know whether any attempts were made
¶ 12 Bingham was shown J & J‘s certificate of good standing as an Illinois corporation, which had been accessed on February 12, 2021, through cyberdriveillinois.com. The website indicated that the address of J & J‘s registered agent was New Link Access Corporation, at 1229 North Branch Street, Suite 101, Chicago, IL 60642 and Bingham testified that on March 19 and 23, 2021, J & J was served at this address by certified mail. Similarly, the “county records” for J & J indicated that its address was 1619 Western Avenue (attorney Schroeder‘s office), which was where the section 22-5 take notice had been sent by certified mail.
¶ 13 Gardner was the other hearing witness. Gardner testified that 352 and 354 were spanned by “one solid [stone] building with four *** entrances” at the front. Around back, there was a single fence enclosing the building‘s two porches and garage. There was a mail slot in 352‘s front door where “[t]hey could just slide the mail right in the door.” In 2021, he was residing at 352 and frequently receiving mail there, but he did not receive mail notifying him that 354 had been sold
¶ 14 Gardner also said that he updated the mailing address for the tax bill, but he could not recall when. He acknowledged receiving about 12 pages in April 2022, which included a tax deed and motion for order of possession, and that he and his attorney went to the hearing. Gardner thought that the judge gave a continuance instead of possession and told the parties to use the time to negotiate. He acknowledged that the mailing address on the documents was 354‘s. There were sheriff‘s affidavits indicating service was attempted at New Link Access, at 1229 N. North Branch Street, but Gardner denied that the organization was J & J‘s registered agent at the time. He said there was an e-mail in 2019 between New Link Access and J & J indicating that they were no longer doing business, although he did not have “anything [to that effect] from the Secretary of State.” He acknowledged that service was attempted at 354 in March 2021 upon The Closing Firm and unknown occupants. The circuit court then noted that the affidavits indicated the documents were not served.
¶ 15 Gardner also testified that J & J‘s website in 2019, 2020, and 2021 included e-mail and
¶ 16 J & J then argued that the hearing established that Bingham was a sophisticated tax purchaser and that his company did the minimum to comply with the take notice requirements during the pandemic. Gardner‘s contact information was “readily accessible” on the Internet, Gardner lived at 352, and Woolfolk was working daily at 354, so they could have “easily been contacted or notified of these proceedings,” but that did not happen because “they didn‘t want it to be done.” If notice had been provided, there would have been no need for a prove up or the situation could have been “readily resolved” by Gardner‘s testimony at the prove up. If Bingham had been willing to subsequently negotiate, the parties could have resolved the matter. When none of this happened, a 2-1401 petition became necessary, and it should be granted.
¶ 17 Cortezz countered that it had complied with the property tax statute by sending notices including to notice to the registered agent at the time; “Judge Paul was a very knowledgeable judge” and saw nothing fraudulent; and despite Gardner‘s testimony that he did not receive notice, the law did not require receipt. Cortezz contended that J & J had introduced a lot of information that was irrelevant to the issue of procuring the tax deed. Also, J & J indicated it was a 501(c)(3) corporation but did not allege or provide evidence that the property was exempt from taxation, and, in the unlikely event that the court vacated the tax deed on this basis, then it should also order the county to refund Cortezz. See
¶ 18 After reviewing all of the parties’ materials, the circuit court concluded that the information presented did not amount to clear and convincing evidence that there was “‘wrongful intent—an act calculated to deceive’ [at the prove up]” in order to obtain the tax deed.
¶ 19 After the redemption period has expired without a redemption by the property owner, a tax purchaser may seek a tax deed. The tax deed petitioner must exercise due diligence to locate and notify parties interested in the property and must prove its strict compliance with statutory notice requirements. In re County Treasurer and ex Officio County Collector of Cook County, 2022 IL App (1st) 211511, ¶ 38 (Capital Equity Land Trust); In re Application of the County Treasurer and ex Officio County Collector of Cook County, 2011 IL App (1st) 101966, ¶ 44 (Glohry) (“The Code requires a tax purchaser to serve notice upon all individuals holding an interest in the property if their identities can be discovered through diligent inquiry.“);
¶ 21 A diligent inquiry is the kind of search or investigation that a diligent person who is intent upon ascertaining a fact would usually and ordinary make. Id. “‘[W]hat steps are reasonable in response to new information depends upon what the new information reveals.‘” In re Application of County Collector for Judgment, Sale Against Lands, Lots Returned Delinquent for Nonpayment of General Taxes and/or Special Assessments, 225 Ill. 2d 208, 231 (2007) (quoting Jones, 547 U.S. at 234).
“Typically, diligent inquiry to obtain the names and addresses of interested parties consists of the following acts, although not all are always required and others occasionally may be necessary: (1) ordering an opinion of title from a title company; (2) searching relevant documents in the recorder‘s office for names and addresses of parties or their attorneys or agents ***; (3) searching relevant court cases such as probate or housing court cases; (4) consulting telephone directories; (5) searching relevant directories and websites on the Internet; (6) inspecting the premises; and (7) interviewing occupants and neighbors. In each case, the scope of the diligent inquiry will be determined by the facts.” In re County Treasurer, 2019 IL App (2d) 180909-U, ¶ 19 (quoting Jeffrey S. Blumenthal, A Guide to Tax Deed and Indemnity Fund Proceedings, Real Estate Taxation, § 11.6(n) (Ill. Inst. for Cont. Legal Educ. 2012)).
¶ 22 Tax deeds issued under section 22-40 of the Property Tax Code are virtually incontestable except by appeal from the order directing the county clerk to issue the tax deed, or by petition for relief from the order under sections 2-1203 or 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
¶ 23 “[R]elief from such order may be had under Sections 2-1203 or 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the same manner and to the same extent as may be had under those sections with respect to final orders and judgments in other proceedings.”
¶ 24 A section 2-1401 petitioner alleging that a tax deed was obtained by fraud bears the burden of proof. Smith v. D. R. G., Inc., 63 Ill. 2d 31, 36-37 (1976). Fraud in this context means a wrongful intent, an act calculated to deceive. Application of County Treasurer and ex Officio Collector of Cook County, 67 Ill. App. 3d 122 (1978) (Murray). Fraud in tax deed proceedings has also been defined as “[t]the failure to inform the court of any facts that might change the court‘s ruling.” In re County Treasurer and ex Officio County Collector of Cook County, 2013 IL App (1st) 220070, ¶ 50. A section 2-1401 petition is not intended to relieve a party from the consequences of his or her own mistake or negligence. Lofendo v. Ozog, 118 Ill. App. 3d 237, 241 (1983).
¶ 25 On appeal, J & J contends the standard of review is de novo because J & J “did not object to the evidence entered and [was] able to enter evidence during the evidentiary hearing” and because J & J is disputing the admission of Bingham‘s affidavit into evidence. Cortezz contends the standard is abuse of discretion.
¶ 26 Whether to grant a section 2-1401 petition is within the sound discretion of the circuit court, which we find to be the governing standard of review, and we will not disturb the decision unless
¶ 27 On appeal, J & J returns to some of its 2-1401 arguments and adds others. J & J newly contends it was error for Judge Paul to consider Bingham‘s affidavit because it was misdated and because the notary, attorney Miller, shared office with Bingham, which meant that the notary had “financial and beneficial interest[s]” in the subject matter of the sworn statement. J & J also argues for the first time on appeal that Miller made statements during the prove up that violated the portion of the Illinois Notary Public Act that provides: “No notary public shall be authorized to explain, certify, or verify the contents of any document; however, this prohibition shall not prohibit an attorney, who is also a notary public, from performing notarial acts for any document prepared by that attorney.”
¶ 28 Since none of these arguments were presented in the amended section 2-1401 petition,
¶ 29 Next, J & J mischaracterizes Miller‘s statements as hearsay testimony, when the attorney was speaking as an officer of the court rather than a witness, and was describing the contents of his client‘s affidavit. As quoted above, while Judge Paul and Miller were discussing Bingham‘s affidavit, the judge questioned the attorney about the type of property at issue and its occupancy status, asking, “So is [it Bingham‘s] opinion as to the time of this affidavit, the property is unimproved, vacant, and abandoned and/or occupied, or to be determined later?.” Miller answered
¶ 30 J & J‘s next argument concerns the fact that the affidavit does not specify “in what capacity Bingham was signing the affidavit” and that attorney Miller did not inform the court that Bingham was the president of the petitioning corporation and that Miller was the notary. The latter argument about Miller was forfeited because it does not appear in J & J‘s amended 2-1401 petition. Vantage Hospitality, 2016 IL App (4th) 160271, ¶ 49; Cavalry Portfolio, 2012 IL App (1st) 111690, ¶ 19. Furthermore, J & J fails to cite any authority that required Bingham or Miller to affirmatively state their relationship to the petitioner and J & J does not explain why the absence of these details is indicative of fraud upon the court.
¶ 31 J & J argues that the affidavit is contrary to section 6-104(h) of the Illinois Public Notary Act, which provides: “No notary public shall be authorized to prepare any legal instrument, or fill in the blanks of an instrument, other than a notary certificate; however, this prohibition shall not prohibit an attorney, who is also a notary public, from performing notarial acts for any document
¶ 32 Continuing with its arguments about Bingham‘s affidavit, J & J contends that he made false representations in his statement and deliberately withheld information about his “diligent inquiry and effort” to find and give notice to Gardner as an interested party.
¶ 33 J & J relies on a case in which a tax purchaser withheld from the court the names and addresses that appeared on a quitclaim deed for the property. Murray, 67 Ill. App. 3d 122. One person was the lawyer to whom the quitclaim deed had been mailed after it was filed and the other person was the property owner who had been receiving tax bills in the mail for 13 years. Id. The tax purchaser kept this and other information from the court, which the court found to be concealment and sufficient evidence of wrongful intent to warrant vacating the tax deed. Id. at 131. Had the court known these facts at the time, it would not have granted the tax deed. Id. In affirming the decision, the appellate court said, “Where the deed contains information to ascertain [the owner‘s current address], and the purchaser fails to [act upon it], there is sufficient evidence of bad faith to warrant concluding that the deed was procured by fraud.” Id. at 132. What makes this case distinguishable here is that there is no indication this tax purchaser withheld any information from the court. The case does not support J & J‘s fraud argument. J & J also cites cases in which the tax purchaser out and out lied to the court. In Schott v. Short, 131 Ill. App. 2d 854, 860 (1971), the tax purchaser falsely testified that he personally served a person whom he had never actually seen, and in Giordano v. Trzaska, 2014 IL App (2d) 130778-U, ¶ 22, the tax purchaser made a number of false statements in his affidavit. The falsehoods included that he
¶ 34 There is no suggestion of any omission or falsehood to Judge Paul. Nevertheless, J & J relies on these cases to support its argument that Bingham deliberately withheld information about his diligence in locating the owner and interested persons and made false representations about those details in his affidavit. J & J argues that instead of relying on the title insurer‘s research, Bingham should have personally scrutinized the 2016 quitclaim and conducted his own Internet research. J & J contends that the quitclaim disclosed that 352 and 354 had been deeded together, and thus 352 would have been a lead to locating Gardner; and also disclosed the name of the deed recipient‘s attorney which would have been a lead to pursue with the bar association. J & J also contends that it was easily found on the Internet. In other words, J & J is arguing that it was not reasonable for Bingham to rely on the names and addresses that were reported by the professional title searcher; the “Agent Information” that Gardner provided to the Secretary of State and then failed to update for two if not three years; or the proof of certified mail delivery upon which postal workers wrote “COVID 19” instead of obtaining recipient signatures during the pandemic. The fact that additional information might have been found is not the standard of reasonableness. The tax purchaser was required to make diligent inquiry and effort to find the owner and all parties interested in the real estate. D.S. Associates, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 171-72. The record of Cortezz‘s reliance on the title insurer, the corporation database maintained by the Secretary of State, and the
¶ 35 Then there is J & J‘s contention that the order on appeal “makes no mention of the fact[s]” that 1) Miller did not tell Judge Paul that 352 and 354 comprised a single building, 2) Miller did not tell Judge Paul that J & J was a not-for-profit corporation, 3) Gardner testified truthfully at the 2-1401 evidentiary hearing that 352 and 354 each had a mailbox/mail slot and Bingham testified falsely at the hearing that there were no mailboxes, 4) Gardner testified that he learned of the proceedings in April 2022 when court documents were delivered without postage to 354‘s mailbox, and 5) Gardner‘s affidavit indicated he spoke with Bingham once at the property, but Bingham‘s “incredible” testimony was that he did not know who Gardner was until their introduction during the post-judgment “walk through.” Only the third point, regarding Bingham‘s testimony about the lack of a mailbox at 354 would seem to be salient as to whether there was deception about the ability to make contact with the owner and interested parties. However, J & J is asking us to second guess the circuit court‘s determination of Bingham‘s credibility, which we are incapable of doing from the cold record. Murray, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 132 (“The trial court here heard and saw the witnesses and determined their credibility.“). Even if we could, our determination that there was in fact a mailbox at 354 would be an insufficient basis upon which to find that the denial of the 2-1401 petition was an abuse of discretion.
¶ 37 J & J next contends that Intaxx‘s notice of the prove up was deficient because it did not state J & J‘s name and address and therefore “failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 105(a)-(d) and Cook County Rule 2.1” concerning notices. J & J points out that the order on appeal “does not mention” this detail. We find this is a new argument on appeal rather than one that should have been addressed in the order on appeal. In the “Relevant Facts” section of its amended petition, J & J stated, “24. The notice of hearing filed by Petitioner concerning the October 28, 2021, prove-up failed to contain any of Respondent‘s information and the Respondent was not aware of the date of prove-up and was not present at the prove-up. (See, Exhibit 5).” In its “Argument” section, J & J did not elaborate on this fact or cite either of the two rules it now cites on appeal. This new argument was forfeited. Vantage Hospitality Group, 2016 IL App (4th) 160271, ¶ 49; Cavalry Portfolio Services, 2012 IL App (1st) 111690, ¶ 19.
¶ 38 Finally, the circuit court wrote in part, “And while this court did not find Mr. Bingham to be the most forthright or even credible witness during the evidentiary hearing for the Amended 2-1401 Petition to Vacate, it does not find that fraud was made upon Judge Paul.” J & J argues that the court should have identified its specific concerns about Bingham and then found that the tax deed had been procured by fraud. J & J cites no authority that required the circuit court to elaborate on why it deemed Bingham to be an unsatisfactory witness. More importantly, Judge De La Cruz‘s negative impression of Bingham at the 2-1401 hearing does not mean that J & J met its burden of
¶ 39 For all these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶ 40 Affirmed.