In the Matter of the Application of PIONEER MILL COMPANY, LIMITED, to register title and confirm its title to land situate at Lahaina, Island and County of Maui, State of Hawaiʻi, and KAHOMA LAND LLC, Substituted Applicant as to Lots 1, 2 and 3A
SCWC-19-0000704
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
SEPTEMBER 2, 2025
** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST‘S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **
Dkt. 133 OP
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP-19-0000704; LD. CT. APP. NO. 439 amended; LD. CT. CASE NO. 09-0300)
RECKTENWALD, C.J., MCKENNA, EDDINS, AND DEVENS, JJ., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE KAWASHIMA, IN PLACE OF GINOZA, J., RECUSED
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MCKENNA, J.
I. Introduction
This appeal concerns a land court application filed in 1919, not prosecuted for decades at a time, then summarily decided 100 years later.
The adverse possession claim as to Lot 3A is the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
A 1919 report by the Examiner concluded that Pioneer Mill held paper title to Lots 1 and 2 but did not have good paper title to Lot 3. The Examiner said Pioneer Mill may have acquired Lot 3, which includes Lot 3A, by adverse possession, indicating adverse possession was not clear.
Charles Kanaʻina (“Kanaʻina“)2 was identified as the last owner holding title to Lot 3A. His heirs at his 1877 death included Princess Ruth Keʻelikōlani and Princess Bernice Pauahi
The 1919 land court application was not prosecuted for decades at a time. There was a trial in 1967, but this court nullified Judge Samuel P. King‘s decision in 1972, and the matter was remanded for a new trial. No trial took place after 1972, with long periods of dormancy. The land court application was decided in 2019 and 2020, when the land court filed three documents. The first awarded fee simple title to Lots 1 and 2 to Pioneer Mill‘s successor based on paper title. The second and third awarded a 78.704% interest in Lot 3A based on adverse possession, the remaining 21.296% representing interests of Kanaʻina descendants who appeared in the case and contested the claim. These three documents are:
- Amended Decree No. 2016 of May 27, 2020 (awarding Lots 1 and 2 to Kahoma based on paper title)(“Decree 2016“);
- September 24, 2019 “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law regarding Orders Filed on February 13, 2018 and May 2, 2018” (finding Kahoma has a 78.704% interest in Lot 3A based on adverse possession)(“September 24, 2019 FOF/COL“); and
Amended Decree No. 2017 of May 27, 2020 (awarding Kahoma 78.704% of Lot 3-A) (“Decree 2017“)
On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA“) affirmed.
Petitioners on certiorari allege several errors.
We discern no genuine issues of material fact regarding paper title to Lots 1 and 2, and we therefore affirm the ICA and land court regarding Decree 2016.
With respect to Lot 3A, however, we address two dispositive errors raised on certiorari.
First, contrary to the ICA, we hold that petitioners on certiorari, as cotenants of Kanaʻina heirs, had standing to also defend their cotenants’ title against the adverse possession claim.
Second, we hold that, in any event, the adverse possession claim as to Lot 3A should have been dismissed based on laches. Laches requires two essential elements: (1) an unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing or advancing the claim, and (2) resulting prejudice due to the delay.
We hold that the 100-year delay in deciding the Lot 3A adverse possession claim was blatantly unreasonable. Also, Kanaʻina descendants were prejudiced because witnesses, including Kanaʻina descendants themselves, as well as their knowledge of facts concerning the alleged adverse possession of Lot 3A before
Hence, we vacate the ICA‘s July 17, 2024, judgment on appeal to the extent it affirmed the land court‘s decisions as to Lot 3A. In other words, we vacate the land court‘s September 24, 2019, FOF/COL as well as its Decree 2017 awarding 78.704% of Lot 3A to Kahoma. We affirm the ICA‘s judgment on appeal to the extent it affirmed the land court‘s Decree 2016 regarding paper title to Lots 1 and 2.
We remand to the land court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, which is to include dismissal of the land court application as to Lot 3A. Although this dismissal is without prejudice, if a new application to quiet title as to Lot 3A is filed, current Hawaiʻi law will govern.
II. Background
A. Factual background and filing of land court application
In June 1919, Pioneer Mill filed the instant land court application to register and confirm fee simple title to the following five land parcels in Lāhainā: (1) the whole of “Puou,” a portion of Apana 2 of Land Commission Award 8520 to Josua Kaʻeo, Lot 1 (104.5 acres); (2) three-eighths of “Kuholilea,” a portion of Apana 26 of Land Commission Award 6559-B to W.C. Lunalilo, Lot 2 (166.5 acres); (3) the whole of “Kuhua,” a
Pioneer Mill asserted two bases for its claims to these parcels: (1) via deed from P. Isenberg and C.F. Horner, recorded June 29, 1895, in the Office of the Registrar of Conveyances of the Territory of Hawaiʻi; and/or (2) via adverse possession.
At the time, Pioneer Mill sought to register and confirm title to “Kuhua,” “Aki,” and “Puʻuki,” as one parcel identified as Lot 3 which, altogether, totaled 1,529 acres. It was not until decades later that Lot 3 was divided into Lots 3A through 3E. On certiorari, we focus on Lot 3A, Kuhua, a portion of Land Commission Award 7582 to Eseta Kipa. The Kuhua parcel, Lot 3A, consists of 240.90 acres.
With respect to the background of the Kuhua parcel, in An Act Relating to the Crown Government and Fort Lands, June 7, 1848, King Kamehameha III reserved the ahupuaʻa of Kuhua I and Kuhua II as private lands for the use of himself, his heirs, and successors.3
In 1877, Charles Kanaʻina died intestate. His estate was probated.4 His heirs and their interests were identified as:
| 2/9th | Bernice Pauahi Bishop |
| 1/9th | Ruth Keelikolani |
| 1/9th | Hana Lilikalani, Edward Lilikalani, and Naihe |
| 1/9th | A.W. Halilio, Levi Haalelea and Kahuakaiola |
| 1/9th | Pahau |
| 1/9th | Kaaua |
| 1/9th | Heirs of Kilinahe |
| 1/36th | KAIAPOEPOE (=2.777%) |
| 1/36th | Nahuhuleua & Namilimili, wife and husband |
| 1/36th | NAMAKALELE (=2.777%) |
| 1/36th | PUAHI (=2.777%) |
| 1/9th | Heirs of unidentified person |
| 1/45th | KAHONU (=2.222%) |
| 1/45th | Kukahiko |
| 1/45th | Heirs of Kaupae |
| 1/135th | PAMAHOA (=0.741%) |
| 1/135th | Kaneikolia |
| 1/135th | Maele |
| 1/45th | Heirs of Kaeakamahu: Kaupae, Kalepa, Maihui |
| 1/45th | Kamakamohaha |
1. Before the 1967 trial [1919-1967]
On July 8, 1919, the land court appointed Arthur Smith as Examiner of Titles5 to investigate records relating to Pioneer Mill‘s application and to file a report regarding title to the subject parcels. Smith‘s Report of Examiner, dated December 1, 1919, concluded that Pioneer Mill: (1) had paper title to all of Lot 1 in fee simple absolute; (2) had paper title to three-eighths of Lot 2 in fee simple absolute; (3) did not have good paper title to “Kuhua” (Lot 3A), but it may have acquired it by prescription; (4) did not have good paper title to “Aki” (Lots 3B and 3C); and (5) did not have good paper title to “Puʻuki” (Lots 3D and 3E).
On September 23, 1920, the land court entered default against all parties who had failed to respond to Pioneer Mill‘s application by July 3, 1920.
But then, for decades, nothing happened in the application. In 1935 and 1941, ten respondents appeared and moved to re-open
On March 2, 1965, the State of Hawaiʻi (“State“), not Pioneer Mill, moved for the matter to be set for trial. The land court issued a publication notice, which appeared in the Honolulu Advertiser and the Sunday Star-Bulletin and Advertiser, setting trial for August 31, 1965. The notice said that all those who failed to appear would have default entered against them. Essentially, the land court re-opened the 1920 default proceeding with the August 31, 1965, trial date serving as a new return date.
Several respondents did appear on August 31, 1965, and the land court later entered default against all those who failed to appear. In May of 1966, the Estate of John Mamaki filed a
2. 1967 trial and its aftermath
On September 25, 1967, trial commenced.9 On that day, Judge King dismissed the claims of Lucy Moeikauhane, et al., and Chun Fook, et al., without prejudice, who had moved to set aside defaults and filed claims in 1935, finding they did not claim interest through any of Charles Kanaʻina‘s heirs. This left Titus Napoleon, the Estate of John Mamaki, and the Estate of Mary M. Brown, aka Mary K. Sylva, as challengers of Pioneer Mill‘s application.
On November 15, 1967, Judge King orally ruled from the bench. But he also stated that the decision would be effective upon filing of the decision and order. No written decision was filed at the time.
Then, on February 3, 1970, Judge King publicly declared his candidacy for the position of governor. Application of Pioneer Mill Co., 53 Haw. 496, 497-98, 497 P.2d 549, 550-51 (1972).
After this announcement, on March 13, 1970, Judge King entered a written decision containing 107 findings of fact and
C. Initial appeal
In April of 1970, the State and the estates of Mary K. Sylva (aka Mary K. Brown) and John Mamaki appealed.
Their appeal was based on the land court‘s refusal to grant their request to dismiss the application “because the issues had not been framed within a certain time.” Application of Pioneer Mill Co., 53 Haw. at 498, 497 P.2d at 551. In other words, even more than fifty years ago, parties had sought dismissal based on a failure to prosecute.
Instead of addressing the delay issue, this court requested supplemental briefing regarding “a more basic issue . . . posed by the Land Court judge‘s announcement relating to his candidacy for public office[.]” Id. At the time,
Based on this provision, after supplemental briefing, this court went on to hold that Judge King lacked the power to
This court then remanded the case for a new trial. Application of Pioneer Mill Co., 53 Haw. at 498, 497 P.2d at 551. A trial never took place.
D. Land court proceedings after 1972 remand
1. 1972 to 2008
After the remand, nothing happened in the case, this time for another ten years. In 1982, the land court, not Pioneer Mill, initiated a status conference with counsel, and set trial for April 1983.
Between the setting of trial and March 1983, six motions to set aside default and for leave to file answer were filed. On April 22, 1983, disclaimers of interest were filed regarding five of the six motions to set aside default. The last motion to set aside default was resolved by a stipulation entered between Myrtle N. Lee (“Lee“) and Pioneer Mill, which withdrew the motion to set aside default and substituted Lee as a party.
But for reasons unknown, trial did not take place in April 1983. On September 29, 1983, the land court sent a letter to Cades, Schutte, Fleming & Wright (“Cades“), which represented Pioneer Mill, and another to Lee, regarding a new trial date of
And yet another decade elapsed without any action in the case. In late 1993, the State filed a disclaimer and stipulation between itself and Pioneer Mill; the State disclaimed any interest in Lots 1, 2, 3A, 3B, and 3C, and stipulated that Pioneer Mill had title suitable for registration to these lots. Apparently as part of this stipulated disclaimer, in 1994, Pioneer Mill quitclaimed Puʻuki, Lots 3D and 3E, to the State.
2. 2009 and Kahoma‘s substitution motion
Once again, nothing happened in the case, this time for more than fifteen years. Pioneer Mill had apparently transferred Lots 1, 2, 3A, 3B, and 3C to Kahoma on August 28, 2000. And on December 21, 2006, Kahoma sold Lots 3B and 3C to Frank Valenta.
But Kahoma waited nine years after it obtained title, until July 14, 2009, to move for it be substituted for Pioneer Mill as the applicant on the land court application as to Lots 1, 2, and 3A. On August 28, 2009, the land court granted the motion.
Then, on November 2, 2009, Kahoma filed a motion for default judgment as to Lots 1, 2, and 3A, Kuhua. On December 24, 2009, the land court ordered publication of notice of its intent to grant the motion. The publication was advertised in the Maui News and the Honolulu Star Advertiser with a return date of March 29, 2010. The publication did not identify who might be a claimant, i.e., whose descendants’ interests might be at issue. It merely invited those with objections to either file written objections or appear on that date to orally object.
Some objections were filed over the months leading up to the hearing. On October 21, 2010, the court initially denied the motion for default judgment and ordered that any interested party now had until November 1, 2010, to file a claim of interest. Additional claims of interest were filed.
Then, in April 2011, Kahoma filed a motion for entry of default against all parties who failed to file a claim of interest by the November 1, 2010, deadline. On November 15, 2011, the land court granted this motion and entered default for those who had not met that deadline.
In the interim, on August 3, 2011, Kahoma filed a motion for summary judgment requesting confirmation and allowing registration of its title to Lot 1, outlining the chain of title as to that lot. On October 26, 2011, the land court granted the
In July of 2012, Kahoma moved for summary judgment to confirm its title to Lot 2. Kahoma asserted it had unbroken title as to that lot also. On January 16, 2013, the land court granted this motion.
4. Motions to dismiss based on laches/lack of prosecution
On November 19, 2015, self-represented certiorari petitioner Edward Kakalia (“Kakalia“) filed a motion asserting the case had been pending for too long.10 No order appears to have entered regarding this motion, but it was implicitly denied as the land court went ahead and later ruled on the merits.11
On July 29, 2016, some other Kanaʻina descendants, who are also petitioners on certiorari (collectively referred to as “Schneider descendants” based on Gladiola Aloha Schneider being the first named), filed a motion to dismiss based on laches as well as
5. Kahoma‘s motion to confirm undivided 78.704% interest in Lot 3A
Then, on January 17, 2017, Kahoma filed a motion seeking confirmation of a 78.704% interest in Lot 3A by adverse possession. The motion asserted that by the November 1, 2010, deadline set by the land court for filing claims of interest to Lot 3A, claims totaling a 21.296% interest had been filed by Kanaʻina descendants.
Kahoma requested that the land court enter a decree giving Kahoma title to the remaining 78.04%. This percentage represented the interests of defaulted Kanaʻina descendants. Kahoma said if the motion was granted, it would stipulate to the substitution of Kanaʻina descendants who had filed claims as applicants to the remaining undivided 21.296% interest in Lot 3A. Kakalia opposed, raising various concerns, including that he, as well as other descendants, were entitled to a fair trial and reasserting that the case had been pending for more than 90 years. Various Kanaʻina descendants also opposed this motion.
Kahoma then moved for an interlocutory appeal of the May 17, 2017, order, which the land court denied. But in its denial, the court indicated it would entertain a motion for reconsideration. Kahoma then filed a motion for reconsideration on July 18, 2017. The land court then granted Kahoma‘s motion for reconsideration and entered default judgment for Kahoma as to 78.704% of Lot 3A. Motions for reconsideration were filed by various descendants, but all were denied.
6. Land court‘s findings and decrees
The land court then filed its September 24, 2019, FOF/COL and its Decree 2017 granting Kahoma a 78.04% interest in Lot 3A based on adverse possession, as well as its Decree 2016 confirming Kahoma‘s paper title to Lots 1 and 2.
In its September 24, 2019, FOF/COL, the land court relied heavily on transcripts of witness testimony from the 1967 trial. The land court also concluded that the Kanaʻina descendants who
E. ICA proceedings
A joint notice of appeal as well as cross-appeals were filed by various Kanaʻina descendants, including the Schneider descendants and Kakalia.
Relevant here, the errors alleged by the Schneider descendants and Kakalia included the land court‘s (1) determination that Kahoma has a 78.04% interest in Lot 3A representing the percentages allocable to the defaulted Kanaʻina descendants, and determining that cotenants do not have standing to defend commonly held property on behalf of all cotenants against an adverse possession claim; and (2) denial of their motions to dismiss based on the delays in prosecuting this case.
In response, Kahoma argued that (1) the appellants lacked standing to defend the interests of the defaulted heirs of Kanaʻina and (2) the land court properly exercised its discretion in denying the motions to dismiss because the appellants failed to establish deliberate delay, contumacious conduct, or actual prejudice to the appellants.
The ICA agreed with Kahoma and ruled in a memorandum opinion that appellants lacked standing to challenge title to Lot 3A for the defaulted Kanaʻina descendants. In re Pioneer Mill Co. & Kahoma Land LLC, No. CAAP-19-0000704, 2024 WL 3085307, at *7-9 (Haw. App. June 21, 2024) (mem. op.). Citing
The ICA filed its judgment on appeal on July 17, 2024.
F. Certiorari proceedings
Kakalia and the Schneider descendants filed timely certiorari applications.12
Kakalia raises various historical perspectives and issues, including the ICA‘s ruling that Kanaʻina descendants lack standing to raise claims on behalf of other Kanaʻina descendants as well as the fact that this case had been pending for 100 years. The Schneider descendants also raise various issues,
Kakalia and the Schneider descendants are sometimes jointly referred to as “Petitioners.”
III. Standards of Review
A. Standing
The issue of standing is reviewed de novo on appeal. Tax Found. of Haw. v. State, 144 Hawaiʻi 175, 185, 439 P.3d 127, 137 (2019).
Standing is that aspect of justiciability focusing on the party seeking a forum rather than on the issues he wants adjudicated. And the crucial inquiry in its determination is whether the plaintiff has alleged such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant their invocation of the court‘s jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court‘s remedial powers on their behalf.
Tax Found. of Haw., 144 Hawaiʻi at 196, 439 P.3d at 148 (cleaned up).
B. Laches
A trial court‘s application of the equitable doctrine of laches is reviewed for abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court has clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant. Chun v. Bd. of Trs. of Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of State of Hawaiʻi, 106 Hawaiʻi 416, 430, 106 P.3d 339, 353 (2005).
A. Cotenants have standing to assert the interests of other cotenants against a party claiming adverse possession
The ICA held that Petitioners lacked standing to challenge Decree 2017 because “it is well established in Hawaiʻi that a respondent may not defeat a petitioner‘s [applicant‘s] claim to title by showing that even though they have no title, a third-party not in the action has superior title to the petitioner [applicant].” In re Pioneer Mill, 2024 WL 3085307 at *9 (emphasis added). In so ruling, the ICA cited to its 2011 opinion in Silva, 124 Hawaiʻi at 482, 248 P.3d at 1213.
But Silva is clearly inapplicable based on its own language. It involved claims to title by defendants having no title. Unless adverse possession is established, actual Kanaʻina descendants are in the chain of title to Lot 3A. It is Kahoma that is without title to Lot 3A without establishing adverse possession. In any event, Silva did not involve plaintiffs seeking to quiet title based on adverse possession; rather, it involved competing claims to title based on paper title. Silva, 124 Hawaiʻi at 478, 248 P.3d at 1209.
This case, in contrast, involves a claim to quiet title based on adverse possession, which requires proof of actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous, and exclusive possession
And in cases involving possessory interests to real estate, co-tenants have the right to defend not only their individual interests, but the interests of all their cotenants, with whom they are tenants in common. Black‘s Law Dictionary defines tenancy in common as “[a] tenancy by two or more persons, in equal or unequal undivided shares, each person having an equal right to possess the whole property but no right of survivorship.” Black‘s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
Thus, as each cotenant has an equal right to possess the whole property, each cotenant is entitled to possession of the commonly held property against everyone but their cotenants, and one cotenant “may recover the entire property from a stranger.” 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 162 (2024).
This concept of cotenants being able to assert the interests of other cotenants has historically been recognized in case law. For example, in 1875, the Supreme Court of California stated in Chipman v. Hastings, 50 Cal. 310 (1875), as follows:
The court below found that the plaintiff Caroline is the owner in fee of an undivided half of the premises as a tenant in common with persons other than the defendant, and held that, as such tenant in common, she was entitled to the possession of the whole of the premises as against all persons having no title, and that the defendant tortiously entered upon the premises and ousted her. Upon these facts the judgment was correctly entered below that she recover the whole of the premises.
Similarly, in 1891, the Supreme Court of Texas, in an action for trespass, ruled that “one tenant in common may recover the whole land as against a stranger, and that the recovery will inure to the benefit of his cotenants.” Boon v. Knox, 80 Tex. 642, 644, 16 S.W. 448, 450 (1891) (emphasis added).13
Also, in 1941, the Supreme Court of Oregon, in an ejectment action, held that “a tenant in common may maintain an action of ejectment for recovery of possession of the property against the strangers to title.” Nat‘l Surety Corp. v. Smith, 168 Or. 265, 269-70, 114 P.2d 118, 119-120 (1941) (emphasis added).
And in Hawaiʻi, we have recognized that a tenant in common shares a general fiduciary relationship with their cotenants. City & Cnty. of Honolulu v. Bennett, 57 Haw. 195, 208, 552 P.2d 1380, 1390 (1976). Further, almost fifty years ago, we took judicial notice of the critical attitude towards previous over-generous rules of adverse possession. Bennett, 57 Haw. at 208, 552 P.2d at 1389. And although our holding today is not limited to our indigenous peoples, we note that Native Hawaiian descendants have a collective stake in the protection of their ʻāina rights through being able to assert their non-appearing cotenants’ interests against adverse possession claims.14
We therefore hold that cotenants have standing to assert the interests of other cotenants against a party claiming adverse possession.
B. The land court abused its discretion by denying the motions to dismiss based on laches
The second issue we address on certiorari resolves the adverse possession claim as to Lot 3A.
We hold that the land court abused its discretion by refusing to dismiss the Lot 3A adverse possession claim based on laches.
The doctrine of laches reflects the equitable maxim that equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights and is a defense to cases brought in law and in equity. Ass‘n of Apartment Owners of Royal Aloha v. Certified Mgmt., Inc., 139 Hawaiʻi 229, 231, 234, 386 P.3d 866, 868, 871 (2016). Laches requires two essential elements: (1) an unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing or advancing the claim, and
As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Johnston v. Standard Mining Co., 148 U.S. 360, 370 (1893), “It has been frequently held that the mere institution of a suit does not, of itself, relieve a person from the charge of laches, and that if [they] fail[] in the diligent prosecution of the action the consequences are the same as though no action had been begun.” Our court also recognizes that laches can be raised in response to undue delays occurring during litigation, not just at the commencement of an action. See Herrmann, 138 Hawaiʻi at 155, 378 P.3d at 871; HawaiiUSA Fed. Credit Union v. Monalim, 147 Hawaiʻi 33, 37-38, 464 P.3d 821, 825-26 (2020).15
With respect to the second element, prejudice, the adverse possession claim as to Lot 3A was based on possession that allegedly occurred before the 1919 filing of the land court application. The Examiner was not able to make a determination regarding adverse possession, indicating there were factual issues. By the time Petitioners filed their motions to dismiss in 2015 and 2016, witnesses, Kanaʻina descendants, oral histories, and memories, were simply gone. Petitioners were also unable to cross-examine the 1967 trial witnesses, upon which the land court relied in its adverse possession ruling. The prejudice is obvious.
Therefore, the land court abused its discretion by denying Petitioners’ motions to dismiss based on laches.16
For these reasons, we vacate the ICA‘s July 17, 2024, judgment on appeal to the extent it affirmed the land court‘s September 24, 2019, FOF/COL as well as the land court‘s Decree 2017. We vacate the land court‘s September 24, 2019, FOF/COL as well as its Decree 2017 awarding 78.704% of Lot 3A to Kahoma. We affirm the ICA‘s judgment on appeal to the extent it affirmed the land court‘s Decree 2016 regarding title to Lots 1 and 2.
We remand to the land court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, which is to include dismissal of the land court application as to Lot 3A. Although this dismissal is without prejudice, if a new application to quiet title as to Lot 3A is filed, current Hawaiʻi law will govern.
Michael J. Matsukawa for petitioners Gladiola Aloha Schneider, et al.
Edward P. Kakalia pro se petitioner
W. Keoni Shultz and Calvert G. Chipchase for respondent Kahoma Land LLC
David B. Kaapu for respondents Arlene K. Kakalia, et al.
Lance D. Collins, Bianca Isaki, Ryan D. Hurley, and Diego A. Rivera
/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
/s/ Todd W. Eddins
/s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
/s/ James S. Kawashima
Notes
Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (“HRS“) § 501-11 (2018) currently provides:Examiners of Title; appointment, removal. The Judge of land registration may appoint one or more examiners of title in the first judicial circuit, or when necessary in any other judicial circuit, who shall be persons of good moral character and shall have been declared by the supreme court of the Territory to be qualified for said office after examination in term or vacation. They shall be subject to removal by the supreme court of the Territory.
§ 501-11 Examiners of title; appointment, removal. The [land court] judge may appoint one or more examiners of title in the first judicial circuit, or when necessary in any other judicial circuit, who shall be persons of good moral character, and shall have been declared by the supreme court to be qualified for the office after examination. They shall be subject to removal by the supreme court.
In other words, when possible, personal service would now be required.Notice by publication or registered mail. In any action brought under section 669-1(a) or (b)[adverse possession], unknown persons and any known persons who do not reside within the State or cannot after due diligence be served with process within the State may be served as provided by [other sections].
In Herrmann, this court addressed a laches defense raised in a post-decree motion for reimbursement of child support overpayments. 138 Hawaiʻi at 153, 378 P.3d at 869. The father waited seven years before seeking reimbursement for overpayment, and the mother argued that the delay was unreasonable and had prejudiced her, as her financial situation had changed during that time. Herrmann, 138 Hawaiʻi at 153-55, 378 P.3d at 869-71. We remanded for the family court to assess whether the delay was unreasonable and whether it caused prejudice to the mother. Herrmann, 138 Hawaiʻi at 157, 378 P.3d at 873.