OPINION
This сause comes into this court as an appeal on questions of law and fact from a judgment of the Common Pleas Court. The action is one in which the plaintiffs, Donel F. Lоose and Edna Loose, are seeking to acquire the title to a twenty foot strip of ground by reason of adverse possession for more than twenty-one years, аnd that the title of the defendants be quieted and forever barred from claiming any right or title to said premises.
The answer of the City of Columbus admits that plaintiffs are the owners of thе two lots between which the twenty-foot strip, designated as an alley, runs, but alleges that the same had been dedicated as a public highway and accepted by the Board of County Commissioners of Franklin County, which is of record in Plat Book 1, page 248, Recorder’s Office, Franklin County, Ohio.
It alleges further that since the said dedication the areа involved was duly annexed to the City of Columbus, affirmatively denies the adverse holding and also denies generally all of the other allegations con *401 tained in the petition not specifically admitted to be true. No issue was raised by the other defendants, who are the heirs of the subdividers of the tract. So as to these the relief sought in the petition will be granted and the plaintiffs’ motion for a judgment, sustained.
Now, the questions presented are: (1) Was the alley duly dedicated and accepted as a public thoroughfаre? and (2) has it been held adversely by the plaintiffs for a period in excess of twenty-one years as provided in §2305.05 R. C.?
The record reveals that in the year 1906 Lyman H., Charles L., Nettie A. and Sarah A. Innis subdivided a tract of land in Franklin County, made a plat thereof and dedicated the said alley as a public highway therein, all of which was accepted by thе Board of County Commissioners, and the same was duly recorded. It is admitted that the owners signed the plat but their signatures were neither witnessed nor acknowledged. It is urged by the plaintiffs that because of these failures in the execution of the plat there was no statutory dedication and the plaintiffs’ claim of adverse possession should be sustained. An acknowledgment by an officer authorized to take acknowledgments to deeds is required under §711.04 R. C. (§5383 GO, but the defendants urge that the dedication may be considered as onе for road purposes and §5553.31 R. C., would become applicable. This section provides:
“Any person may, with the approval of the board of county commissionеrs, dedicate lands for road purposes. A definite description of the lands to be dedicated with a plat of such lands thereto attached and signed by the party dеdicating such lands, with the approval and acceptance of the board indorsed thereon, shall be placed upon the proper road recоrds of the county in which such road is situated. If the lands so dedicated * *
It will be noted that this statute requires no acknowledgment but only that the plat shall be signed by the party dedicating suсh lands, approved and accepted by the board of commissioners and filed for record. All of these requirements have been complied with. Hence it is our сonclusion that there has been a statutory dedication of this alley. However, should this determination be incorrect, there can be no question of it being a dedication under the common law. The record is clear and convincing that the dedication was intended by the owners of the land and that the same was accepted by thе Board of Commissioners on behalf of the public. The plat in question contains the following notation:
“Approved this 1st day of March, A. D. 1906, and the roads, streets and alleys therein dedicated to public use, are hereby accepted as such for the County of Franklin, State of Ohio.”
This approval and acceptance was signed by the three County Commissioners then in office. These facts are sufficient to establish a common law dedication.
In Railroad Co. v. Roseville, 76 Oh St 108, it is said in paragraph 1 of the syllаbus:
“To show the establishment of a street by a common law dedication, it is essential to prove clearly that the owner of the land intended to donate it for that use, аnd to prove also an acceptance.”
*402
In Byerlyte v. City of Cleveland,
“It is not necessary to have a statutory dedication in order to achieve a public thoroughfare; therе may be a common law acceptance either by the municipality or by public use.”
See also, Fulton v. Mehrenfeld, 8 Oh St 440; Scott v. Snyder, 73 Oh Ap 424.
The City of Columbus also urges, and we think prоperly so, that the plaintiffs are estopped to question the validity of the dedication. It was stipulated that sales in the platted subdivision, including the sale of lot No. 64 to the plaintiffs, were made with reference to the plat in that subdivision.
In 17 O. Jur. 2d, 28, Sec. 26, the author states:
“It is well established in Ohio, in accordance with the general rule elsewhere, that where the owner of rеal property makes a plat thereof, showing streets, alleys, squares, or commons, and sells lands with reference to such plat, and the streets or other ways or рlaces indicated thereon are used by the public, he thereby, in the absence of any circumstances to show that they are limited or restricted to a privatе use or purpose, dedicates them to a public use. This was the rule prior to the enactment of any statute providing for the recording of plats of a subdivision of рroperty, and even since the enactment of the statute, a valid dedication of property to a public use may still result from the platting or laying out of ground on the usual common-law principles, where such platting or laying out is not sufficient to constitute a statutory dedication. * * *”
In Cincinnati v. Leeds, 3 Oh Ap 123, the court says on pages 130, 131:
“It has been repeatedly held that where the owner of real property makes and records a plat showing streets, highways or public squares, and sells land with reference to that plat and the streets, highways or public squares thereon are used by the public, he thereby dedicates them to the public. And this is true whether the plat is properly еxecuted and acknowledged or not. 13 Cyc., 455, and cases cited; Daiber, et al. v Scott, 3 C. C., 313; Wright v. Oberlin, 23 C. C., 509, 511; Doren v. Horton, 1 Dis., 401, 404; Brown v. Manning, et al., 6 Ohio, 298, 303; Huber, et al. v. Gazley, et al.,18 Ohio 18 .”
See also, Thompson v. City of Columbus, 22 O. N. P. (N. S.) 33.
It is conceded that .when the plat was filed for record, the land was outside any village or municipality, but in 1920 it was annexed to the City of Columbus; hence the City is a рroper party defendant.
The next question for consideration is whether or not the plaintiffs acquired title to the strip of ground by prescription. It is said in 1 O. Jur. 2d, 765, that municipal cоrporations are not subject to the loss of their property by adverse possession or prescription, and that no public body holding rights in the streets or highways can lose the same by such methods. However, there appears to be an exception to this general rule which is found in §2395.05 R. C. This statute provides that when a street or alley is enclosed with a fence and has remained in the open and uninterrupted use of such owners for a period of twenty-one *403 years, the public easement shall be еxtinguished. The specific requirement of this section is that the alley be “enclosed with a fence.” Now the facts in this case do not show that there ever was a fencе surrounding this alley. There was a fence for many years along the entire west line and also an obstruction across the south end, but the east border and north entrance сontained no fence or other obstruction. Hence it may not be said that the alley was enclosed. The word “enclosed” is defined in Patterson’s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. as fоllows:
“To surround; to encompass; to bound; fence, or hem in on all sides.”
The case of Orangeville v. Powell,
“Under thе provisions of §2305.05 R. C., providing for the acquisition of the’'title to streets by the adjoining land owner through adverse possession it is an absolute requirement that the street be fenced and remain in the possession of the original proprietors and where the evidence shows that neither of these requirements have been fulfilled no title is acquired by thе adjoining landowner.”
We are of the opinion that the requirements of the cited section of the Code have not been established and that the plaintiffs’ cause of action must fail. Our judgment will be rendered for the City of Columbus, defendant, for costs of suit.