67 W. Va. 213 | W. Va. | 1910
Lead Opinion
Section 1, chapter 119, Code 1906, is as follows: “1. Any person desiring to obtain a license to practice law in the courts of the S.tate must appear before the county court of the county in which he. has resided for the last preceding year and prove to the satisfaction of such court that he is a person of good moral character, that he is twenty-one years of age, that he has resided in such county for one year next preceding the date of his appearance; and upon such proof being made, the court shall make and enter an order on its record accordingly. The Supreme Court of Appeals shall prescribe and publish rules and regulations for the examination of all applicants for admission to practice law, which shall include -the period of study and degree of preparation required of applicants previous to being admitted, as well as to the method of examination, whether by the court or otherwise. And the Supreme Court of Appeals may upon the production of a duly certified copy of the order of the coiinty court, hereinbefore mentioned, and upon being satisfied that the applicant has shown upon an examination, conducted in accordance with such rules and regulations, that he is qualified to practice law in the courts of this State, and upon being further satisfied that such rules and regulations-have been complied with in all respects, grant such applicant a license to practice law in the courts of this State, and such license shall show upon its face that all the provisions of this section and of the said rules have been complied with: provided, that any person who shall produce a duly certified copy of such order of any county court of this State, and also a diploma of graduation from the law school of the West Virginia University, shall upon presentation thereof in any of the courts of this State be entitled to practice in any and all courts of this State, and the order so admitting him shall state the facts pertaining to the same. Every applicant for the examination required by this section shall
Pursuant to said section this Court on June 16, 1897, entered the following .order: “Until otherwise provided, it is ordered, under chapter 50 of the Acts of 1897, that any person hereafter applying for license to practice law in this State, shall, after a course of reading in the law for two years, appear before the Professors of Law of the University of "West Yirginia, who are hereby constituted a commission for the purpose, at such times and places as such commission may prescribe, and undergo an examination by them to ascertain his fitness to' practice the law in the courts of this State, and such examination shall be such as -is required to obtain a diploma of graduation from the Law School of said University and if, upon such examination such applicant shall be found to possess the requisite qualifications, that commission shall grant him a written certificate thereof, and upon it this Court will grant such applicant a license to practice the law.” • ¡
The applicant has presented a certificate of the law faculty of the University, showing compliance by him with the provisions of said statute and the order of this Court, and also a certified copy of the order of the county court of Kanáwha county, entered February 16, 1910, showing that on that day he had personally appeared before and proven to the satisfaction of that court that he was a person of good moral character, was 21 years of age, and that he had resided in said county one year next preceding the date of his application, and has moved the Court tó grant him license to practice law.
The Bar Association of the City of Charleston, by its president and secretary, has also appeared and filed their objection and protest against the granting of said license, representing that the applicant was a member of the City Council of the City of Charleston, elected in tlie Spring .of 1909; that a small majority of the Council, including the applicant, having voted against the granting of liquor license in said city, he subsequently, in the month of December, 1909, went to Morgantown, for the declared purpose of taking the Bar examination at the University; that while absent his seat in the council was declared vacant, and C. L. Topping elected to fill the vacancy, such action being based mainly upon what purported to be a telegram from
In support of these charges the protestante vouch the original papers and testimonjr taken in said cause.
To this protest applicant has appeared by counsel and moved to quash and dismiss the same, for the following reasons: (1) Said protest is not verified; (2) it does not attack the validity and sufficiency of the certified copy of the order of the County Court, heretofore filed by applicant; (3) it does not attack the regularity or sufficiency of the examination of applicant, or his qualification to practice law in the courts of this State, as set out in the certificate of the Law Faculty of the University of West Virginia, filed by said applicant; (4) it does not deny that the rules and regulations made by this Honorable Court, under which said examination was had, were in all respects complied with; (5) the matters set out in said protest do not
We do not think that there is any 'merit in the point that the protest is not verified. Protestants vouch the record in the judicial proceedings referred to for the verity of the charges preferred.
The motion to quash involves mainly the proposition that the order of the county court is conclusive on the question- of the moral character of the applicant, and that being satisfied by the certificate of the law faculty of his legal attainments there is nothing left for this Court to do but to award the applicant license to practice, pursuant to the statute. It was conceded, in argument, however, that before adjournment of the term at which said order was entered, the protestants or some one else, might in that court have the order set aside and vacated, or perhaps might by bill in equity afterwards have it set aside for fraud, or on some other ground of equitable cognizance, but if no one shall volunteer to institute such proceedings the order is and continues to be res judicata, and that regardless of the seriousness of the charges preferred the court must shut its eyes to them and award the license. Such license, it is conceded, would not necessarily bind the Court to admit the licensee to practice in the Court, but would give the applicant a vested right which could be taken from him only for cause occurrring subsequently.
These propositions involve to some extent the question of power in the legislature to prescribe qualifications and rules and regulations for obtaining license and admissions to practice law, as well as the proper construction of the statute. The authority of the legislature is denied by some courts, on the ground that courts have the sole right to prescribe for themselves the qualifications of their ministers of justice, and rules and regulations for their admission, without interference by a co-ordinate branch of the government. In Re Day, 181 Ill. 90; In Re Mosness, 39 Wis. 509; In Re Splane, 123 Pa. St. 527; In Re Branch, 70 N. J. L. 537 (57 Atl. 431). The Illinois court in In Re Day denied the authority of the legislature to
The North Carolina case just cited is much relied on by counsel for the applicant. The court in this case was divided three to two, the two judges dissenting having filed vigorous dissenting opinions. And the editor of the note to this case just referred to says: “Aside from the above case, no case can be found wherein the court holds or recognizes the right of the legislature to encroach upon the right of the court to require that the attorneys practicing before it shall be of good moral character.” The decision of the majority in this case put the right to a license and to practice law in the courts upon the same plane with the right to .pursue any other avocation in life, and concedes the right to the legislature to prescribe rules and regulations therefor.
With scarcely an exception it has been held that both in the admission to and suspension from ¡practice of the law, courts act judicially in the exercise of an inherent power, and not in a mere administrative or ministerial capacity, and in the execution of the will of some other branch of the government. In Re Day, supra, pages 85, 91; Ex-parte Secombe, 19 How. 9; Garrigus v. State, 93 Ind. 242; In Re Splane, supra; In Re Garland, 71 U. S. 333, Syl. 6; Walker v. State, 4 W. Va. 749, 753; State v. McClaugherty, 33 W. Va. 250; State v. Stiles, 48 W Va. 425; State v. Shumate, Id. 359, and State v. Hays, 64 W. Va. 45.
But notwithstanding the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject it has been generally conceded that the legislature may in the exercise of its police power, prescribe reasonable rules and regulations for admissions to the bar, which will be followed by the courts. ’ But the legislature may not impose unreasonable rules or deprive the courts of their inherent power to prescribe other rules and conditions of admission to practice. In Re Day, supra p. 95; In Re Leach, 134 Ind. 665, 671-2; 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 287; 4 Cyc. 900; Ex-parte Secombe, supra; In Re
We axe not disposed here to question the validity of the statute of this state, or the power of the legislature in enacting it. We treat it as valid, and as a reasonable exercise of a power generally conceded to it by the courts. Indeed the statute is nothing more than a declaration of the qualifications which in all times have been considered essential to admission to the bar, namely, legal learning and good moral character.
In the light of the authorities what construction should be given our statute? Having accepted the duties of executing the law we should unquestionably give it a construction1 which will best accomplish its object. It could have but one object, namely, to bar out incompetent persons, and persons not possessing the requisite moral character befitting officers of the courts. Previous legislation may cast some light on the subject. By the Code of 1868, chapter 119, any two judges of the courts of this State were authorized to grant licenses in 'writing to practice law in the courts thereof to any person who should on examination be duly qualified, and who should produce the certificate of the board of supervisors of the county where he had resided for one year preceding, that he was a person of honest demeanor, and was over twenty one years of age. By the acts of 1872-3, any three judges composed either in part or in whole of the Supreme Court of Appeals were authorized to grant such license upon the same conditions. By the act of 1-882 the applicant as a condition to being examined by such
But many decisions are cited for the proposition that in the constructions of statutes the word may will be construed to be synonymous with the word shall when the public .or a third person have a claim de jure that the power should be exercised. The following are some of the eases. Bansemer v. Mace, 18 Ind. 27; Kane v. Footh, 70 Ill. 587, 590; Mayor, &c. v. Furze, 3 N. Y. 612, 615; Newburgh Turnpike Co. v. Miller, 5 Johnsons Ch. (N. Y.) 101, 113; Brokaw v. Com’rs, 130 Ill. 482; Fowler v. Pirkins, 77 Ill. 271; Hayes v. County of Los Angeles, 99 Cal. 74; Ex-parte Lester, 77 Va. 663. The language of Chancellor Kent in Newburgh Turnpike Co. v. Miller, supra, is that “the word may , means must or shall only in eases • where the public interest and rights are concerned, and where the public or third persons have a claim, de jure, that the power should be exercised.” This rule of construction as will be found by reference to the cases cited, is to enable the courts 'to' effectuate the will of the legislature, and for no other purpose. Can it be
A right to a license or to admission to practice law is not a right de jure given by statute, and we do not think the rule of construction invoked has any application to the case in hand. Ex-parte Lester, 77 Va. 663, relied on by counsel, involved a right given by statute to obtain a liquor license. The statute there was a revenue measure, in which the public, as well as
After this ruling of the Court applicant tendered and filed his sworn answer to the charges preferred against him. The only evidence' submitted, except sundry ex-parte affidavits of applicant’s previous good character and the affidavit of E. G. Hubbard as to the value of his property, is the record in the chancery cause of applicant v. Topping, vouched by protestants in support of said charges.
We appreciate the importance of our decision to the applicant. But the case presented imposes upon us a solemn duty, involving as it does not only his interests and future prospects, but the interests of the whole State in the honor and purity of the bar, and the administration of justice in-the courts. We are impressed, tlitiugh. not unduly, with the fact that this is not an ordinary lawsuit, in which the protestants are contending for some personal or property right. The bar association at the seat of the State Government, composed of men of the highest standing in the profession, who could have been inspired thereto by no other possible motive than to maintain the standing of the profession, and to protect the courts against imposition, and after a thorough investigation of the facts, have petitioned this Court not to grant a license to applicant. We can not turn a deaf ear to this appeal. We must assume the responsibilities and discharge the duties of our office.
The answer of the applicant does not deny that he swore as a witness in both instances substantially as charged. ‘ He could not have done so in the face of the record. He does not deny but admits in his evidence given at Charleston, that at the time he testified at Morgantown he had sold his property on December 2, 1909, and had on December 6, 1909, with his wife, acknowledged and delivered the deed therefor to the attorney for the purchaser. Nor does he deny that on December 31, 1909, he met the same attorney at a hotel in Charleston, where they together calculated the amount that was coming to him after deducting a balance of purchase money he still owed on the property, and which was secured by a vendor’s lien. He does not deny but admits that this amount was there tendered to him in cash, and that at his request the attorney agreed to deposit the amount to his credit in bank, and that it was so deposited, not
We are also satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that applicant’s evidence that his sale and conveyance of his property had no connection with or relation to his vacating his seat in the city council, was false. He confesses to numerous meetings in private places with various liquor dealers and other persons
Lastly, did the applicant as charged corruptly sell out his
The fact that applicant had refused diréct offers of bribery, had not directly resigned, (unless he actually sent the telegram of resignation denied and branded by him as a forgery), and had never voted for license, were all “urged upon us in argument to absolve applicant from the charges of wrong doing. It was plainly not applicant’s jilan to resign, or sell out his office directly, but indirectly. In this he showed some shrewdness. His plan was to go away and have his seat declared vacant, and the consideration for the betrayal of his trust covered into the price for his property, and thus accomplish by indirection what he feared to-do directly. At the meeting of council on the night of December 6, 1909, the day on which he acknowledged and delivered the deed for his property, and just béfore leaving for Morgantown the following morning, he took the precaution to say to some of his fellow councilmen that that was the last
In council there was no substantial disagreement between us as to what the evidence proves. We divided on the question of jurisdiction to go behind the order of the county court on the question of the applicant’s moral character. Three of us were and are still of the opinion that that order is only prima, facie evidence, and that its force as evidence has been wholly overborne by the other evidence submitted to us.
Our conclusion, though with great regret, is to refuse the _ applicant license upon his present application.
Justice, however, may always be tempered with mercy; and after a reasonable lapse of time, and a satisfactory showing that the applicant has repented of his 'wrong, and is living the exemplary life and maintaining the good character which numerous affidavits filed show he bore prior to the offences charged against him, he will be entitled to the favorable consideration of this Court, and this decision shall in no way conclude us upon a subsequent application.
License Refused.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
Being of the opinion that practically all the premises laid down in the 'opinion of the majority of the Court, as legal propositions, constituting the basis of the decision, are unsound and condemned by reason, historical facts and the best considered decisions, and that the conclusion announced is contrary to law, I am unable to concur in it. In my opinion, the certificate of the county court, as to the requisite of good moral character, is conclusive. Hence I neither make, *nor concur in, any finding as to the charges set forth in the. protest. Disregarding them and all the evidence adduced to sustain them, as being wholly immaterial, I favor the granting of the license. I have never come to any final conclusion that the applicant is guilty of false swearing or perjury. There is much doubt, in my mind, as to whether, in saying he had not sold or conveyed his property,
There is a distinction between the licensing of a person to practice law and his admission to the bar of the court, after he has been licensed. This Court alone can grant a license. That license is good all over the state, but it alone does not admit its holder to the bar of any court in the state, not even this, the granting, Court. A subsequent act of admission is essential to enrollment as a member of-the bar, and each court must do that for itself. The license is an essential pre-requisite to admission. Without it no application for admission can be made, but it is not admission, nor the equivalent thereof. Practicing without admission, after having obtained a license, is made a misdemeanor and punished by fine. Whether a licensee can be denied admission is another question altogether, and has no material bearing on the interpretation of the statute. In marking this distinction between license and admission, I am merely stating the plain terms of the statute. 4 Min. Inst. Part I, 204.
From this it is plain that the license only enables its holder to apply for admission. The requirement is a limitation upon the right to make such application. The legislation, imposing this restraint, is directed -primarily to citizens not attorneys. It concerns the entrjr of a citizen upon a certain vocation. Without this limitation, any citizen could apply for admission. Under it, only those who have complied with certain conditions can do so. This measure of regulation is justified by the police power of" the state, vested in the legislature. In nature, it is not unlike other license statutes. It is not an enabling act. On
This distinction between license and admission or membership of the bar has not escaped judicial notice. On the contrary, it has been asserted and emphasized. In Fisher's Case, 6 Leigh 619, the superior court summarily revoked and annulled Fisher’s license for what it deemed malpractice committed in its presence. On an appeal to the general court of Virginia, this judgment was reversed, the court holding that, before such a judgment could be pronounced by the court below, the party accused must be regularly prosecuted by information or indictment and found guilty by a jury. It was observed, however, that the court, for misconduct, could have suspended or annulled the license, so far as it authorized the attorney to practice in the particular court, but no further. This would have amounted to nothing more, in effect, than disbarment or striking the attorney’s name from the roll of that particular court. Fry,
From the nature of a license, as we define and interpret it, as well as from tlie character of an attorney’s business, it follows that the regulation thereof belongs to the- police power of tlie state, exercised by the legislature and not by the'courts, except in so far -as tlie latter are charged with some duty in the execution of tlie power of the former. While the legal profession, .like all other vocations, rising to the dignity of professions, is honorable, such as those of teaching and medicine, tlie practice •of the law is still nothing more than a vocation. An attorney is in no sense a representative of the court in which lie practices. By virtue of his mere office of attorney, he neither represents nor binds the court by any act of his. He is .neither its agent nor its servant, although it may require of him the performance ■of certain duties.' His subjection to the power of the court in this respects does not flow from any representative relation. It is based upon the power of the court to make his right to practice therein dependent upon conditions, or upon the law imposing conditions enforcible by the court. He lias no judicial power and performs no judicial function. He is merely the adviser and advocate of his client. His advice never binds the court nor protects liis client, and, as advocate, he can demand ■nothing. These propositions are, or should be, matters of com* mon knowledge, such as even laymen should know. Those who •doubt them and rely upon bad advice of attorneys suffer a rude awakening in the courts. This is every day experience in litigation. The contention, therefore, that legislative, regulation of the licensing and admission of attorneys is an invasion of the power and authority of the judiciary, stands upon no legal principle. Legislative interference with something, pertaining to tlie courts, which is not, in any sense, judicial in character ■or function, cannot possibly constitute an invasion of the judicial department of the government. Suppose an attorney is an officer of the court in a certain sense. So are its clerk and ■sheriff. Certainty these offices can be made elective, notwithstanding their relations to the court are just as close in nature as that of attorneys, and their" powers and functions, as instru-mentalities in the administration of justice, are far more im
The history of the law, concerning the licensing and admission of attorneys in Virginia, as set forth in 4 Min. Ins., p. 199, shows that, from the earliest times, the subject has been regulated by statute. In 1642, what was then known as the Grand Assembly required licenses from what was called the Quarter-Court, held by the governor and council, and one county court, and prohibited practice without it. In 1645, what were called mercenary attorneys were prohibited and required to be expelled. In 1656, the legislation, relating to mercenary attorneys, was repealed. In 1658, it was enacted “that noe person or persons whatsoever, within this eollony, either lawyers or any other, shall pleade in any courte of judicature within this eollony, or give councill in any cause, or controvercie whatsoever, for any kind of reward or profit whatsoever.” In 1680, it was provided that lawyers should be licensed by the governor, in order to exclude impertinent, busy and ignorant men from pretending to practice law. In 1682, this act was repealed. In 1718, a statute was passed regulating the charges of attorneys. In 1732 practicing in the county courts, without a license, issued by the governor and council, upon examination by persons learned in the law, was prohibited. In 1786, a statute was passed by the General Assembly providing “That no person except the attorney general, shall be permitted by any court to practice therein as a counsel, attorney at law or proctor, unless he shall heretofore have obtained a license, in the manner prescribed by the law then in force, or until he shall obtain a license in
The general effect of this legislation has been a subject of judicial determination and interpretation by this Court. In Ex-parte Hunter, 2 W. Va. 122, 152, Judge BeowN said: “Again,- attorneys have been the unquestioned subject of legislative control by the British Parliament from the reign of Henry III to the present time, and by the colonial legislature of Virginia, almost from the time of its inauguration until the Bevolution. Tins control has at all times beeen most absolute, and by the colonial government most arbitrary, and often inconsistent, unjust and even oppressive; prescribing their oaths and how they might be licensed, and admitted, to practice, and again expelling the whole profession from the bar; sometimes prescribing a fee, then changing them as suited the caprice of the legislature, and then again prohibiting, under severe penalties, their receiving any fees at all, and in some acts called and treated as a nuisance, and in some as mercenary attorneys. Yet no complaint is heard nor opposition offered to the power of the legislature in the premises except in a single instance, and then the power was re-asserted and enforced by the assembly. * * * Thus it would seem that in England and Virginia, until the ratification of the Constitution of the United States, attorneys at law were subject to the absolute control of the legislature as respects license, admission to the bar, and expulsion from it, oaths, fees and no fees, duties, conduct and punishment; and whether that control affected them prospectively or retrospectively, it was all the same; that control being influenced by considerations of a public nature, and based on the right and duty to subserve the public, was rarely, if ever, subordinated to the private interests of the attorneys.-” We have already analyzed cases in which this Court and the Virginia court have acknowledged the power of the legislature to control their action in respect to an attorney’s license. In both Fisher’s (Jase and the HoCUmgherty Case it has been solemnly declared and adjudged that the court cannot revoke a license in any manner other than that prescribed by the statute. Legislative
There could not have been any such exclusive power in the courts at common law. The power of the British, Parliament was supreme. It could dethrone the King and did so. It could destroy the courts and replace them with others of its own creation, and has done so. Judge Cooley, in his treatise on'Constitutional Limitations, pp. 124 and 125, says the parliament can do everything that is.not naturally impossible, wherefore some have not 'scrupled to call its power, by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of parliament; and quotes Sir Matthew Hale as having said “This being -the highest and greatest court, over which none other can have jurisdiction in the kingdom, if by any means a misgovernment should any way fall upon it, the subjects of this kingdom are left without all manner of remedy;” and Lord Burleigh as having said “That England could never be ruined but by a parliament.” Of course our legislatures have no such power, but they do have all the sovereign power not vested by express constitutional provision in the other two departments, the executive and judicial. Judge Cooley says, at page 126: “In creating a legislative department and conferring upon it- legislative power, the people must be understood fo have conferred the full and complete power as it rests in, and may be exercised by, the sovereign power of any
It is always proper to look to the possible consequence of the determination of any question, as having some bearing upon the correctness thereof. If the courts have exclusive power to say who shall and who shall not be attorneys and what qualifications they shall possess, and the legislature can exercise no power in this respect, that the courts are bound to submit to, the latter can raise the standard of educational, social and moral qualifications to such an extent as to exclude all but a few of the great body of citizens from the legal profession, and there is no power in the state that can prevent it. They could exclude women, the colored citizen, all male citizens who have not acquired the highest possible educational attainments, all but Methodists, or Baptists, or Presbyterians, or Catholics, or any other class. Gentlemen composing the bench and bar, and clothed with such absolute power, could soon make themselves a very select and exclusive class of citizens, from which worthy and competent men would be barred out on fanciful pretexts, bearing no just or reasonable relation to the nature or efficiency of the profession. There would be no limit to their arbitrary power. They might come in contact with 'some of the late amendments to the Constitution of the United States, but.the state is not supposed to look to them as factors in the determination of its own domestic policy, except as a limitation upon its powers. There was a time when these amendments did not
Having thus examined all the decisions, relied upon to sustain the supposition of exclusive power in the courts, in the light of legal principles, our system of popular government, and considerations of public policy, I am thoroughly convinced that, in so far as they assert the doctrine, they are founded upon mere sentiment and over-zealousness for the interests Of the profession, mistaken for reason and law, and accord to the courts a power far in excess of means necessary to preserve and maintain the efficiency of the judiciary. ■ Stilted exclusiveness and puritanical fastidiousness may be desirable and pleasant to bench and bar, but are not at all necessary to the due administration of justice, nor accordant with the spirit of our institutions.
Justification for the position taken in the majority opinion is sought in those decisions which say the function of admitting and disbarring attorneys is judicial. These enunciations do not imply what is claimed for them. In Walker v. State, 4 W. Va. 749, State v. McClaugherty, 33 W. Va. 250, State v.
Another serious misapprehension, entering into the. reasoning and conclusion of the majority opinion, is the failure to distinguish between a license and admission. All of the decisions relied upon, for the controlling proposition, of that opinion, were rendered in cases of application for admission, except the ease in 70 N. J. L., and that was not an application for a license. It was an application for a certificate or recommendation to the governor as the basis of an application to him for a license. To say there is no difference between an application for a license and one for admission is to contradict the solemn, emphatic and deliberate decisions by which we are bound. Fisher’s Case, 6 Leigh 619; State v. McClaugherty, 33 W. Va. 250. To say the Court can do, in respect to a license, what it can do, concerning an application for admission, or by way of disbarment, is to assert the exact contrary of what those decisions say. They declare that a license cannot be taken away by summary proceedings nor at all but for the causes and in the manner speci
None of the decisions, relied upon in the majority opinion are authority for the position that the granting of a license to practice law is a judicial function. They say admission and disbarment are judicial functions, but not that the granting of a license is, and we have shown that the two things are not the same. ■ Our legislation on the subject of licenses to practice law indicates that the granting thereof is a purely ministerial function. Never, until 1897, was the granting of a license to practice law made the duty, or committed into the ■ power, of any court. For more than a hundred years the duty had been imposed upon judges, acting in vacation, and no record of their action in' granting the same was made in their courts. It was purely a ministerial matter. They examined the applicants and acted upon- their own individual judgment as to whether, they had sufficient professional attainments or qualifications, and never looked beyond the order of the county court as to age, residence or character. The power was not exercised by any court, but only by judges off of the -bench and in obedience to, and by authority of, an act of the legislature. Nothing in the statute required or authorized them to look beyond the certificate of the county court. Their authority in the premises was purely statutory and the statute stopped short of any inquiry back of that certificate. They could not have had any common law power to do so, for they were not acting in any common law capacity, not as courts, but as judges. Now, what sort of a power was that and whence its emanation? How can it be said to have come from a court', when no court had anything to do with it? How can it be said not to have come from the legislature, when it all sprang from the legislature and not elsewhere? The act of 1897 simply transferred this power from the three judges to this Court, without any indication of any
The statute declares a right in favor of. a citizen. It says that, upon compliance with certain conditions, the court may grant a license to any citizen of the state. The applicant here has complied with every one of them. That vests in him a right de jure, in law, for the legislature is competent to give it and has done so. It is to be read as if it said any citizen may have a license, upon compliance with the conditions imposed. It follows'that the Court cannot withhold it. To say the right is not given and is not de jure is simply to confound license with admission, a matter in respect to which the legislature may not have restrained the judicial power. In my judgment, the authorities cited in the majority opinion, call for the reading of “may” in this statute as if it were “must.” To these a great many others could be added.
For these reasons, I would reject the protest and all the evidence, offered in support of its charges, and grant the license.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur with Judge PoeeeNBárger.