In re Application for a Tax Deed
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Washington County, No. 14-TX-11; the Hon. Daniel J. Emge, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Appeal dismissed.
Mindy S. Salyer, Amanda L. Moressi, and Brittney B. Rykovich, of Salyer Law Offices, LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.
Paul T. Slocomb, of Hoffman & Slocomb, LLC, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellee.
JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the cоurt, with opinion. Presiding Justice Schwarm and Justice Goldenhersh concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 SI Resources, LLC, appeals the November 16, 2015, order of the circuit court of Washington County which granted the intervenor, William Groome‘s, motion to dismiss pursuant to
FACTS
¶ 2 ¶ 3 On September 19, 2014, Castleman filed a pro se petition for tax deed in the circuit court of Washington County, naming the following respondents: Jerry Jean, Stewart Producers, Inc., Washington County Clerk, Evelyn M. Fair, unknown owners оr interested parties, and non-record claimants. The petition alleged that Castleman had purchased the delinquent real estate taxes with respect to all oil, gas, and other mineral rights relatеd to parcel No. 07-72-23-000-052-00, located in Washington County. According to the petition and the attachments thereto, the redemption period for these mineral rights expired on February 25, 2015. The circuit court issued аn order directing the issuance of the tax deed on March 4, 2015.
¶ 4 On April 2, 2015, SI Resources filed a petition, pursuаnt to
¶ 5 On July 1, 2015, Groome filed a motion to intervene in the litigation, alleging that he obtained a quit clаim deed to the mineral rights in the subject property from Castleman, and the circuit court granted the motion to intervene that same date. On September 10, 2015, Groome filed a motion, pursuant to
ANALYSIS
¶ 6 ¶ 7 “As an appellate court, we have the duty to consider our jurisdiction to decide an appeal and to dismiss the appeal if we find that jurisdiction is lacking.” MidFirst Bank v. McNeal, 2016 IL App (1st) 150465, ¶ 12. In this case, SI Resources was not a party to the proceedings resulting in the circuit court‘s order directing the issuance of the tax deed on March 4, 2015, having no interest in the subject property during the pendency of those procеedings. On April 2, 2015, without seeking leave to intervene using the procedures set forth in
“[i]n all cases tried without a jury, any party may, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment *** file a motion for a rehearing, or a retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment of for other relief.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2014) .
¶ 8 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015) requires thаt a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of a final order, unless a “timely posttrial motion directed against the judgment is filed.” Here, SI Resources filed a motion to vacate the judgment within 30 days. However, by its express terms, section 2-1203 applies only to parties and does not allow nonparties to move for postjudgment relief. MidFirst Bank, 2016 IL App (1st) 150465, ¶ 31. Accordingly, SI Resources’ section 2-1203 motion was a nullity and was not a proper postjudgment motion which would extend the time period for filing a notice of appeal to 30 days after the order disposing of it. Id. Although SI Resources filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the dismissal оf its section 2-1203 motion to vacate, its erroneous filing of the motion did not extend the 30-day time period for appealing the March 4, 2015, order directing the issuance of the tax deed. Id. No proper pоstjudgment motion having been filed, the order became final 30 days after it was entered. Id. Accordingly, the Novеmber 24, 2015, notice of appeal was untimely and does not vest this court with jurisdiction over this appeal. Id.
CONCLUSION
¶ 9 ¶ 10 For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal for a lack of jurisdiction.
¶ 11 Appeal dismissed.