115 Kan. 232 | Kan. | 1924
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This is an appeal from a decision of the district court disallowing a claim for a soldier’s compensation, who died since his discharge from military service. It was brought by Ralph
On the appeal to this court the question submitted for determination is, should compensation due the deceased veterans be regarded as a part of his estate and subject to the payment of his debts or is it exempt property payable to his widow or other proper claimant? There is no dispute as to the facts involved. The case turns upon the law applicable to them. The statute relating to the disposition of the property of a deceased person and the duties of executors and administrators in respect thereto provides that the executor or administrator shall take possession of all personal and real property of the deceased which are by law to be administered, and render an account thereof when required by the court or the law. (R. S. 22-303.) Is the compensation which is now due for the service rendered by the soldier but which had not been provided for when the soldier died, something “which is by law to be administered,” that is, administered according to the general statute provided for the control and disposition of decedent’s estates?
The act relating to compensation for veterans of the world war provides that:
“Claims for compensation under the act entitled ‘An Act relating to compensation for veterans of the world war,’ either before or after the allowance or approval of said claim, shall not be the subject of assignment, transfer, or*234 power of attorney, nor subject to attachment, garnishment, or execution, except by an order of a court of competent jurisdiction for the support of the wife or children of the claimant.” (Laws 1923, ch. 210.)
At the special session of 1923, the legislature amended the fore-' going section adding:
“And where the soldier has failed or neglected to file his application therefor, the wife may file for the same, and where so ordered by said court or judge thereof, the clerk of said court shall issue an order thereof directed to the director of said compensation board to pay into said court or to the clerk thereof, for the use and benefit of said widow and minor children, if any, such sum as the court or judge thereof may direct,” etc. (Laws 1923, Special Session, ch. 7, § 1.)
In section two of the act last cited it is provided that where the soldier and his deserted wife or children are nonresidents of Kansas, the wife may bring a suit against the compensation board and the soldier, and the court may hear and determine the question as to the rights of the deserted wife or deserted children to such soldier’s compensation. It is provided that the county boards of compensa-’ tion shall consider all claims presented, and as to those who die before compensation’is paid, it is provided:
“If the claim is based upon the service of one who died before receiving compensation the finding shall show the capacity of the claimant and a complete list of the names, ages, residence, address of the widow and children, if any, and the father and mother, if surviving.” (Laws 1923, ch. 204, §4, [/].)
From these provisions it appears that the legislature intended the compensation granted should be exempt. It expressly provides that .the compensation cannot be reached by creditors or the representatives of creditors by any of the processes of law. It is subject to the order of the court only that it may be directed to be paid for the support of the soldier’s wife and children. The creditor of a soldier therefore cannot look to nor enforce his claim by the appropriation of the compensation. The same exemption is carried over to the wife or widow and children by the exception that the court may order its payment for their support. The provision excludes the idea that it may be claimed by and paid to creditors or to an administrator who represents them. It was a humane and beneficial provision which should be liberally interpreted in furtherance of the benevolent and humane purpose for which it was enacted. All the provisions quoted point in the same direction and manifest the intention that it shall not be subject to administration under the law relating to decedent’s estates. For instance in case a soldier fails’
It appears, however, that the board has correctly interpreted the act governing the application for and payment of compensation and the rule made is in conformity with the statute and in harmony with its true intent. The whole tenor of the legislation on the subject is that the compensation is exempt to the soldier, and in case of his death before payment, it is equally exempt to his wife or widow and children, if he has any. It is therefore plain that the legislature intended to take compensation out of the operation of the law relating to the decedent’s estate, and it must be held that the wife rightfully claimed the compensation of her deceased husband and that the trial court correctly decided that it was not assets of the estate of the deceased, subject to administration under the law of decedents’ estates.
Judgment affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring specially): The judgment of the court below should be affirmed for this reason: By the act relating to compensation for veterans of the world war (Laws 1921, ch. 255; Laws 1923, ch. 200; R. S. 73-101), the state acknowledged a debt to and promised to pay to each “person who served.” No debt was acknowledged in favor of, neither was there any promise to pay any sum, to the estate or to the creditors of such person. Hence,