*1 11 of the Constitution Pennsylvania Article I D) for an every man open; “All courts shall be provides: lands, or goods, person reputation his done him in injury law, right course of have due remedy shall denial or delay.” sale, (Empha- without administered justice added) sis provision violates this Act Malpractice
The Medical Act creates an intol- because the Constitution two long to endure litigants requiring delay by erable full blown trials. and two backlogs
ASSOCIATION. Appeal VALLEY of CUMBERLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT In re PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RE ORDER OF FROM FINAL IN CASE NO. PERA-M-6966-C — . LATIONS BOARD Appeal LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. of PENNSYLVANIA Pennsylvania.
Supreme Court of Argued Sept. 1978. Nov.
Decided *3 Ruth, York, Gerald E. Newman, D. Anthony Harrisburg, appellant for at 244. No. Crawford, Wildeman,
James L. James F. Raymond W. Cromer, at Harrisburg, appellant No. 245. Snelbaker, C.
Richard Mechanicsburg, for Cumberland Valley Dist., appellees School at No. Crawford,
James Wildeman, L. James F. Harrisburg, for Pa. Labor Relations Bd. at No. 244. Snelbaker,
Richard C. Mechanicsburg, for Cumberland Valley School Dist. No. 245. York, Ruth, Newman,
Gerald E. D. Anthony Harrisburg, for Cumberland Ass’n Valley Ed. at No. 245. Levin,
Michael Harrisburg, I. for amicus curiae Pa. School Bd. EAGEN, J., O’BRIEN,
Before C. ROBERTS, POM- EROY, NIX, LARSEN, MANDERINO JJ.
OPINION MANDERINO, Justice.
The Valley (“the Cumberland Education Association Asso- ciation”) is the agent exclusive for the bargaining teachers in the (“the Cumberland School District Valley District”). 7, 1975, On July charged the Association the District with unfair practices 1201(a)(1),(3), (5) labor under Sections and of Pennsylvania’s Employee Act, Public popularly known as Act a collective entered into the District Association and
The 1, 1973 July from was effective which agreement agreed the District agreement, this 30, 1975. Under to June insurance hospitalization and for medical to pay premiums for life insur- premiums dependents, and their employees for employees. expenses tuition and employees, ance for negotiations while on June expired agreement The July were in On progress. agreement for a new life insur- for the health and payments District terminated teachers time, the District notified ance At the same plans. this During expenses. educational longer pay it would no strike. were not on period em- 1201(a)(1), (3), (5), respectively, Under Sections restraining “interfering, from prohibited: are ployers bar- of their collective exercise in the coercing employes” with act; discriminating from under rights gaining encourage or to employment tenure of to “hire or respect any employe organization,” membership discourage employe an faith with bargain good “refusing from of em- representative the exclusive which is representative ployes.” Board”) (“the Board Labor Relations
The Pennsylvania faith bargain good the District refused concluded that collective bar- employees’ with the thereby interfered however, the Board dismissed the discrimina- gaining right; 1201(a)(3). 6 PPER 211 charge tion countercharge the District’s support also found in Board violation of the the Association committed a technical an offer to continue the terms of Act when it mailed to the Board President instead of to contract School present in the rules. In negotiator agreed upon ground the chief final the Board ordered the District ruling, School payment or make whole the necessary keep reimburse and limited cost reimburse- employees’ coverage insurance ment current. plan the Board’s order appealed
The District to the Court however, court, Common Pleas. The dismissed the District’s decision of the and affirmed the Board. 26 Cumb. appeal
139
(1976).
197
The District
then
this
appealed
decision to the
Commonwealth Court which reversed
lower
court. The
Commonwealth Court
reasoned that because the contract
with the School District expired,
this event rather
than the
unilateral
termination
the Board caused the benefits to
407, 412,
cease. 31 Pa.Cmwlth.
We therefore reverse decision of the Commonwealth Court.
The Board’s decision finds substantial rec- support ord also promotes the labor Act policy embodied in providing peaceful resolving means of orderly 195— disputes through the collective 43 bargaining process. 1101.101 (Supp.1978-79). §
Findings of the Board Pennsylvania Labor Relations are if conclusive supported by substantial evidence. 43 P.S. 563, (Supp.1978-79). 1101.1502 P.L. No. (July § 195, XV, 1501, 146, 1971, 3, art. amended June P.L. No. § 6, 1 (§ 509(a)(180), (181)). Hospital g., Joseph’s See e. St. Board, 101, v. Labor Relations 473 Pennsylvania Pa. 373 (1977); Borough A.2d 1069 of Wilkinsburg v. Sanitation Dept. 521, Borough Wilkinsburg, 463 Pa. 345 641 A.2d (1975); Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Res Sand’s taurant, 429 479, Pa. 240 A.2d (1968); 801 Pennsylvania Butz, Labor Relations Board 411 Pa. A.2d (1963); Board Pennsylvania Labor Relations v. Kaufmann Inc., Department Stores, 345 Pa. 29 A.2d This Court has said that substantial evidence means more than a “mere Labor scintilla.” Restaurant, Board v. Sand’s Labor supra; Pennsylvania Stores, Relations Board v. supra. Kaufmann Department Kaufmann, substantial test fully evidence articulated Pa. at 29 A.2d at means “. it is function of the board not only evidence, appraise conflicting credibility determine the fact, but also issues witnesses, primary and to resolve *6 facts and circum- the established from to draw inferences ” omitted) (Citations . . . stances. function to decide the exclusive delegated The Board is instance, 43 in the first Act 195 arising cases on our correspondingly, appeal and (Supp.78-79), 1101.501 § have said: limited. We of review is standard judg- lightly will not substitute . “. Court] [this whose expertise for its of a selected body ment for that than a qualified make it better experience expertise and Pennsylva- facts within its field.” weigh court of law 377, 192 Butz, 411 Pa. at Board v. nia Labor Relations A.2d at 716. feder- with review is also consistent
This limited standard of
provision
a similar
interpreted
which have
al court decisions
29
Compare
Act.
U.S.C.
Labor Relations
of the National
(3) with 43 P.S.
158(a)(1) and
29
160(e) and
U.S.C. §
§
v. National
Corp.
e.
Universal Camera
g.,
1101.1502. See
474,
456,
L.Ed.
Board,
71
95
340
S.Ct.
Labor Relations
U.S.
Rela-
Labor
Edison Co. National
(1951);
Consolidated
217,
206,
Appellee suggests
the line
cases defining
good
faith obligation of employer
employee
which
the Board considered under
the National Labor Relations
isAct
inapplicable because the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) concerns private
195
employment while Act
con
cerns
However,
employment.
case does
present
present
a situation where there
a meaningful
exists
difference in policy between the NLRA and Act 195. See
Pennsylvania Labor
College
Relations Board v.
Area
State
District,
494,
School
461
(1975). Accord,
Pa.
insubstantial Kaufmann, unfair labor practice); cient of an evidence supported were (whether findings the Board’s supra, faith bargain good evidence). duty substantial effort must “make a serious parties means that NLRB v. ground.” reach a common resolve differences and 736, 1969), cert. Co., (2nd Cir. Electric 418 F.2d General 995, L.Ed.2d 257 denied, 397 90 S.Ct. U.S. faith obli good in this case violated The District to the Associa terminated the benefits gation. The District was in action process. Such tion while collective effort” a serious “represent cannot be said to the District Accord, bargaining agreement. a collective reaching Area Board v. Mars School Labor Relations District, (unilateral employment termination supra with volunteer and substitution teacher-aides paid employee faith bargaining). workers constitutes bad Katz, 369 in NLRB v. Supreme Court The United States (1962) 8 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. wages unilateral increase employer’s found an improper were while those matters sick-leave benefits changed uni- that an employer’s The Court said negotiation. under bargain- of the collective was also in violation change lateral ing process: in condi- change unilateral that an employer’s
“We hold a viola- similarly negotiation tions of employment *8 collective- duty bargain to 8(a)(5) tion employer’s of § [the negotiate to which duty it a circumvention of the ly] for is a flat as does 8(a)(5) much of objectives frustrates the § refusal.” Id. LRRM 80 NLRB, 196 NLRB No. Borden,
In Inc. v. unilateral employer’s an held that (1972), the NLRB while contract prior under a withdrawal of insurance plans contract constitute for a new are in negotiations progress and collectively to right bargain employees’ violation of the underly- policy The in this process. not to coerce employees NLRB, in Hinson this was well-stated ing proposition 1970): (8th F.2d 133 Cir. of spirit
“The the National Labor Relations Act and the persuasive that, more authorities stand for proposition of expiration contract, even after a collective bargaining an is an obligation with bargain to may Union before he permissibly make any unilateral change in those and terms conditions of com- employment prising subjects mandatory bargaining.” (Emphasis added.) explain Court went on to the employer’s duty
bargain arose
“. . . not reason of the contract itself but because of the dictates of the policy embodied the National Labor Relations Act.” (Emphasis original.) 428 F.2d at 138. case,
In this the District cancelled payments to the Associ- ation members while process. collective was in The coercive effect of the cancellation unilateral of benefits during the bargaining process is obvious. The bargaining authority freely union to is seri- bargain undermined. In Leeds ously Northrup, supra, F.2d Third Circuit Court said: Appeals “The Act National Labor Relations only [the Act] protects the from economic effect the direct action, the employer’s unilateral but also forbids the by- passing of the collective for this would bargaining agent, undermine the union’s authority by disregarding status as the representative the employees.”
The collective is bargaining process fundamental the policies of Public Pennsylvania’s Employee Relations Act. 43 P.S. (Supp.1978 79). 1101.701 Under 701: § —
“Collective bargaining performance of the mutual obligation of the public employer representative of the public at reasonable times and employes meet confer in good faith with hours respect wages, ” other terms and conditions of . . employment 1101.701. (Supp.1978-79). *9 and life insurance such as health benefits
Fringe ter Employer unilaterally which the tuition reimbursement 301(14) the meaning within Section “wages” minated are 301(14) wages “hourly defines of the PERA. for compensation or other forms of salaries, rates of pay, added.) 1101.- services rendered.” (Emphasis 301(14). (Supp.1978-79). public out the vital role of also pointed
This Court has
to minimize
bargaining
public employee
employee
Dis-
College
Area School
in PLRB
State
labor
disputes
trict,
There, we said:
“. . in the sector. It harmony to restore any attempt deliberate- legislature suggest would be absurd an by providing to meet this need pressing intended ly 461 Pa. at bargaining.” of collective illusory right at 266. 337 A.2d of fact and conclusions are findings
Because the Board’s evidence, we must affirm the by substantial supported circumstances, these this Court will Board’s order. Under for the of the Board. judgment judgment not substitute its challenges authority District School whole. remedy making Board to order required The final order issued the Board the School by Board to make whole each
“(a) employe Reimburse or otherwise and life insurance cover- hospitalization whose medical terminated, was and tuition reimbursement age amount which the District Valley Cumberland School keep coverage would have been such required pay in effect for that or otherwise from time employe it was again paid was terminated until coverage District.” School are to be It is well established that final orders of Board discussion, supra. affirmed if are reasonable. See they the Board formulated is within Because the which remedy set forth in Act 195 and consistent scope powers *10 Court, reject with other decisions of this we must the School contention. District’s 1301 Act is to empowered
Under of the Board Section unfair “prevent any person engaging any practice from in listed the Act.” 43 (Supp.1978-79). 1101.1301 power More 1303 the grants Section Board the specifically, to
“. . . order . such to cease and desist person . . from such unfair and to take such reasonable practice, action, of including employes, affirmative reinstatement act, (the in violation Article XII this discharged section) (citation practice omitted) unfair labor with or will without back the of this pay, policies effectuate added.) act.” 43 1303 (Emphasis (Supp.1978-79). P.S. § powers The are remedial in Board’s nature not punitive. Co., Labor Relations Board v. Martha 359 Pa. A.2d unfair labor practice at issue is the termination payments unilateral for the fringe employees represented by benefits the Union. result, As a those were to employees required forego either medical, hospital and life insurance and tuition reimburse- ments or make the benefits payments themselves. Common dictates those be employees sense that made whole for the had to as a payments they make result of unfair practice. When the Board in employer’s this case ordered the School District “to reimburse or otherwise make in whole each such action employe,” purest sense remedial and not punitive.
This
Hollinger Dept.
Welfare,
Court
Public
469 Pa.
(1976)
“In
view
language
provision
our
of this
is broad
to
enough
permit
the PLRB
order
only
cessation
dues
if it
improper
deductions
finds that they are being
made,
compel
but also to
payment
employes of
which have
moneys
been
deducted.”
improperly
(Federal
omitted).
court citations
Pa. at
Federal courts remedies. Under enforced similar have also Section NLRA, Labor the National 10(e) of the Board issue of fact and shall findings . shall state requiring an order person on such cause to be served labor such unfair and desist from to cease person
such *11 including action take such affirmative practice, and to back pay, with or without of employees reinstatement ” (cid:127) (Cita- . . of this Act. effectuate the policies will added.) omitted.) (Emphasis tions or- Relations Board case, National Labor In a similar the pro- insurance to reinstate a cancelled dered the employer any employees to reimburse employer the required and gram which arose claims any and to honor premiums paid for NLRB, Borden, supra. Inc. v. The during cancellation. enforced a also the District of Columbia for Circuit Court to reimburse employer the required which NLRB order of the employer’s reason by losses suffered for employes benefits fringe and similar pay withholding premium 155 of International Local contract termination. after NLRB, Allied Workers v. U.S.App.D.C. Molders and the NLRB’s reimburse- When 26, 442 F.2d vires, as ultra the Court was attacked remedy ment said, Eighth for the Circuit Appeals is made the reme- upon assault vigorous “A particularly requiring petitioner which the Board fashioned dy contributions health, welfare, and retirement benefit pay the date of collective bar- expiration from and after the practice as the unfair labor Inasmuch gaining agreement. substantial satisfaction to our charges supported were record, must be given the Board on the whole evidence 160(c), to Act, 29 U.S.C. authority broad losses ante any to make whole quo restore the status prac- suffered because of the unfair labor (Citations omitted). tices. Board, courts,
It is that is for not well settled ‘[i]t determine how the effect unfair labor prior practices may (citation omitted.) be expunged.’ The bargaining agreement fact the collective has the remedy, terminated does bar even it is though geared to the terms of that specific spirit contract. per- National Labor Relations Act and more suasive proposition that, authorities stand even contract, after bargaining a collective an expiration bargain is under an with Union obligation (citation omitted) permissibly before he make may any unilateral the terms and conditions of change employ- NLRB, ment.” Hinson (Emphasis original.) supra, F.2d we Because find the above-cited authorities persuasive of the PLRB remedy necessary effectuate policy Act the Board’s final order is proper.
The Commonwealth Court’s decision is vacated and the order of the Common Pleas Court which reinstates Board’s order affirmed. POMEROY, JJ.,
LARSEN filed separate concurring *12 opinions.
POMEROY, Justice, concurring.
I concur in the Court’s holding that the Cumberland (“School District Valley School District” or “District”) com- mitted an unfair labor practice under 1201(a)(5) Section of the Public Employe (“PERA” Act1 or Act”) “the by eliminating through unilateral action of own all medi- cal and life insurance benefits and tuition cost reimburse- ments to its I employees. cannot, however, agree that School District violated Section 1201(a)(1), 43 P.S. 1101.- § 1201(a)(1), nor can I assent to the majority’s wholesale July XII, 1. Act of 1201(a)(5), P.L. No. art. § P.S. 1101.1201(a)(5) (Supp.1978). private in the interpretive case law of federal importation in (NLRA) Relations Act National Labor sector under the Pennsylvania case under deciding public this sector statute. action constitutes a finds that the District’s majority under both to in faith Sections bargain good
refusal
Court,
1201(a)(5)
Opinion
of PERA.
of
1201(a)(1) and
Labor Relations Board v.
949, citing Pennsylvania
ante
at
District,
Mars Area
In
this case the Court once
deciding
case
leading
in the
its found determination
1201(a)(1) necessarily requires
finding
A
a violation of Section
finding
or restraint or coercion of
of interference with
PERA,
guaranteed
rights
401 of
their
exercise of
“employe rights” provision
That
is the
section
§ 1101.401.
statute,
provides as follows:
form,
public employes
organize,
join
or
lawful for
“It shall be
engage
organizations
employee
or to
in lawful concerted
assist
purpose of
or other mutual
for the
activities
collectively
representa-
bargain
through
protection or to
aid and
employes
choice and such
shall also have
tives of
own free
their
activities,
any
except may
right
or all such
be
refrain from
*13
provision
membership
required pursuant
in a
to a maintenance of
bargaining agreement.”
District,
Relations Board v. State College
Labor
Area School
494,
we
(1975),
461 Pa.
337 A.2d
where
said that al-
decisions
though
may provide
guidance,
federal
some
“it
necessarily
does not
follow that federal precedent relating to
is
in
private
helpful
resolving diffi-
employment
particularly
sector.” 461 Pa.
public
culties in the
at
A.2d at 264.
College
The Court in
also observed:
State
are mindful of the
that
distinctions
necessarily
“[W]e
legislation
must exist between
primarily directed
private sector and that for public employes. The distinc-
private
tion between the public and
sector cannot be
minimized.
sector are
Employers
private
motivated
by
profit
be returned from the enterprise whereas
public
are custodians
funds
employers
public
and man-
dated
perform governmental
functions as economically
effectively
possible.
private
employer
sector
constrained only by investors who are most
concerned with the return for their investment whereas
must
public employer
statutory
adhere to the
enact-
ments
operation
which control the
of the enterprise. We
that we are not
emphasize
that the
suggesting
experience
gained in
private
here,
sector is of no value
rather we
stressing
analogies
are
have limited application and
the experiences
gained
the private employment sector
will not necessarily provide an infallible basis
for mono-
lithic model for public
499-500,
461 Pa. at
employment.”
(footnote
The cautious approach College State seems now have been abandoned in expansive favor of a more doctrine Katz, expressed NLRB v. 369 U.S. 82 S.Ct. 230, 236, Borden, NLRB, 8 L.Ed.2d Inc. v. 196 NLRB No. (1972), LRRM 1240 and other cases decided under the NLRA. The ultimate effect could very well be the swallowing up special and distinctive character of the PERA aby of law larger body developed a statute which is not all concerned with the delicate problems which inhere in labor where relations is a This is body. an effect that is neither desirable nor intended legislature.
150 here unfair labor was committed practice
I believe that an the violated employer PERA for the sole reason that to have acted The District to me 1201(a)(5). appears Section manner vis-á-vis capricious in an arbitrary existing the of the expiration it cut off all benefits at when procedure pre- the mandated following contract without in clear language the Act.3 The PERA sets by scribed forth 4 establish an required “impasse.” necessary steps 4, 1101.801, supra PERA, provides note 43 801 of the P.S. § request the must the services parties that as a first step Mediation; must this event Pennsylvania Bureau following Pennsylvania Board advances the Labor Relations 3. The argument p. in 27: its brief employer public procedures may public “[0]nly impasse or a after strike, lockout, or employes such as a a take unilateral action fringe employe benefits. This rule has termination of unilateral Appeals adopted by in New York Court of been in essence County Cooperative of Rockland Educational Services Board of Public Board, Employment 753 N.Y.S.2d 41 N.Y.2d [395 original). (1977).” (Emphasis 439], in See n. 363 N.E.2d infra. part: pertinent VIII of PERA reads 4. Article IMPASSE BARGAINING “COLLECTIVE Submission to mediation 1101.801 § negotiation, dispute impasse period or a If after a reasonable public and the representatives of the exists between the voluntarily may employes, parties submit to mediation twenty- parties agreement within but if no is reached between commenced, negotiations later days but no event after have one date,’ fifty days ‘budget prior submission than one hundred to the parties, parties both mediation has not been utilized Pennsylvania writing, immediately, call in the service shall Bureau of Mediation. Fact-finding panels 1101.802 § commenced, long shall continue for so as mediation has it Once If, however, agree- agreement. parties an have not reached an the ment has not been reached commenced or in no event later days twenty after mediation has within thirty days prior than one hundred date,’ shall ‘budget the Bureau of Mediation to the submission receiving Upon notify such notice the board of this fact. the board panel may fact-finding panel may appoint which a in its discretion panel designated If a is so of either one or three members. consist or selected it shall hold testimony hearings or and take oral written during parties subpoena power. this time the If and shall have have not reached an fact findings panel agreement, shall make recommendations: “budget to the days prior occur no later than submission calculation, According to School District’s own date.”5 been requested mediation should have no later than January PERA, supra 802 of 1978. Section note 1101.802, requires if an agreement further the “budget reached days prior submission date” the Bureau of Mediation must La- notify which, Board, discretion, bor Relations at its may institute supra. process “fact-finding.” known note See This stage could have been apparently reached well before the *15 expiration of the 1973—1975 collective bargaining agreement.
The processes designed above described are to facilitate an accord, comport and with the of the policy “promote Act to and orderly relationships constructive between all their employers employees.” and 43 P.S. 1101.101. The § District circumvented the procedural safeguards of the PERA by negotiations continuing which had been com- menced before the contract expiration date, and then with- out warning terminating the benefits prior the contract afforded. urges The District that “the union shares equally with the employer the responsibility instituting media- (1) findings by fact be recommendations shall sent registered parties forty tomail the board and to both not more them days after the Bureau Mediation has notified the board as provided preceding paragraph. in the (2) days .findings Not more than ten after the and recommenda- sent, parties notify shall tions each other whether fact-finding panel have been shall the the board and they accept not or the recommendations the not, they panel publicize if do shall findings of fact and recommendations. (3) days days Not less than five nor ten more than after the publication findings recommendations, par- of the of fact and again
ties shall inform the board and each or other whether they accept fact-finding panel.” will recommendations “budget by 301(12) 5. The submission date” is defined Section practice PERA as date follows: “the which under the law or public employer’s proposed budget, budget proposed containing or expenditures applicable public employer to such is submitted to the Legislature body purposes or other similar for final action. For the act, budget of this submission date for the Commonwealth shall February year nonprofit be institution, organization 1 of each and for a or case, day year.” last its fiscal In the instant involving district, budget a school submission date was June (District 16). tion.” brief at position, This while technically correct, supra, see note does not remove the District’s responsibility bring negotiations process to an “im- passe” before off cutting benefits. Utilization and exhaus- tion of the mediation and finding fact stages contemplated Act are a to the prerequisite right to strike. See PERA, Section 1003 of 43 P.S. 1101.1003.6 This statutory precondition must to the equally apply right terminate benefits following the of a expiration collective agreement. The District’s action in violation of Sections 801 subverted the orderly bargaining process and as such constituted a transgression 1201(a)(5).
LARSEN, Justice, concurring.
I I wish to join majority opinion; additionally with the note that if the were on strike then the these even faith though good could have terminated benefits negotiations occurring. were
Decided Nov. pertinent part: 6. Section 1003 of PERA reads in by public employes the collective bar- occurs after strike “[A] gaining processes Article in sections 801 and 802 of VII set forth completely .” and exhausted . . this act have been utilized