In re Antoine P.

Jan 17, 2006
Versions:25 A.D.3d 614
806 N.Y.S.2d 882
Kraft text

In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Robert Slowey appeals from an order of protection of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Lynaugh, J.), dated September 8, 2004, which, upon a finding made after a hearing that he had committed acts which would constitute the offense of harassment in the second degree, inter alia, directed him to stay away from petitioner‘s home and place of employment until September 8, 2006. Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with Anders v California (386 US 738 [1967]) in which he moves to be relieved as assigned counsel.

Ordered that the order of protection is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

We have reviewed the record and agree with the appellant‘s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel‘s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted (see Anders v California, supra; Lara v Vasquez, 103 AD2d 681 [1984]; cf. Matter of Kotzker v Bonafilia, 284 AD2d 535 [2001]). Florio, J.P., Krausman, Lifson and Lunn, JJ., concur.

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (O‘Donoghue, J.), dated April 7, 2005, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated January 13, 2005, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of assault in the third degree and attempted assault in the third degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent, and conditionally discharged him and directed that he comply with certain conditions for a period of 12 months. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated January 13, 2005.

Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of assault in the third degree and attempted assault in the third degree (see Matter of Stafford B., 187 AD2d 649, 650 [1992]; cf. People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]). Moreover, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses (see Matter of Dennis G., 294 AD2d 501 [2002]; Matter of Stafford B., supra; cf. People v Gaimari, 176 NY 84 [1903]). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see Matter of Dennis G., supra; Matter of Stafford B., supra; cf. People v Garafolo, 44 AD2d 86, 88 [1974]). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the findings of fact were not against the weight of the evidence (cf. CPL 470.15 [5]). Florio, J.P., Krausman, Lifson and Lunn, JJ., concur.

In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to annul the non-competitive permanent appointment of William Sherwood to the position of Chief of Police of the Town of Clarkstown, and action, inter alia, for a judgment, in effect, declaring that the appointment violated Rockland County Police Act § 4 (L 1936, ch 526, as amended by L 1946, ch 941) and the Merit and Fitness Clause of the New York State Constitution (NY Const, art V, § 6), the Rockland County Patrolmen‘s Benevolent Association, Inc., appeals, as limited by its brief, from stated portions of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Kelly, J.), dated June 21, 2004, which, inter alia, denied those branches of the petition which were to annul the appointment and for a judgment declaring, in effect, that the appointment violated Rockland County Police Act § 4 and the Merit and Fitness Clause of the New York State Constitution (NY Const, art V, § 6).

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provisions thereof denying those branches of the peti-

groundtruth

In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Robert Slowey appeals from an order of protection of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Lynaugh, J.), dated September 8, 2004, which, upon a finding made after a hearing that he had committed acts which would constitute the offense of harassment in the second degree, inter alia, directed him to stay away from petitioner‘s home and place of employment until September 8, 2006. Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with Anders v California (386 US 738 [1967]) in which he moves to be relieved as assigned counsel.

Ordered that the order of protection is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

We have reviewed the record and agree with the appellant‘s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel‘s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted (see Anders v California, supra; Lara v Vasquez, 103 AD2d 681 [1984]; cf. Matter of Kotzker v Bonafilia, 284 AD2d 535 [2001]). Florio, J.P., Krausman, Lifson and Lunn, JJ., concur.

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (O‘Donoghue, J.), dated April 7, 2005, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated January 13, 2005, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of assault in the third degree and attempted assault in the third degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent, and conditionally discharged him and directed that he comply with certain conditions for a period of 12 months. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated January 13, 2005.

Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of assault in the third degree and attempted assault in the third degree (see Matter of Stafford B., 187 AD2d 649, 650 [1992]; cf. People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]). Moreover, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses (see Matter of Dennis G., 294 AD2d 501 [2002]; Matter of Stafford B., supra; cf. People v Gaimari, 176 NY 84 [1903]). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see Matter of Dennis G., supra; Matter of Stafford B., supra; cf. People v Garafolo, 44 AD2d 86, 88 [1974]). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the findings of fact were not against the weight of the evidence (cf. CPL 470.15 [5]). Florio, J.P., Krausman, Lifson and Lunn, JJ., concur.

In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to annul the non-competitive permanent appointment of William Sherwood to the position of Chief of Police of the Town of Clarkstown, and action, inter alia, for a judgment, in effect, declaring that the appointment violated Rockland County Police Act § 4 (L 1936, ch 526, as amended by L 1946, ch 941) and the Merit and Fitness Clause of the New York State Constitution (NY Const, art V, § 6), the Rockland County Patrolmen‘s Benevolent Association, Inc., appeals, as limited by its brief, from stated portions of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Kelly, J.), dated June 21, 2004, which, inter alia, denied those branches of the petition which were to annul the appointment and for a judgment declaring, in effect, that the appointment violated Rockland County Police Act § 4 and the Merit and Fitness Clause of the New York State Constitution (NY Const, art V, § 6).

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provisions thereof denying those branches of the peti-