In re Anthony R.-F.
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Scott, Motoike, Servino
Defendants S.P. (Mother) and Juan F. (Father) appeal from an order terminating their parental rights to their son Anthony. They assert the juvenile court erred in rejecting the parental-benefit exception to termination and in failing to conduct a proper inquiry of Anthony‘s extended relatives to determine whether he is or may be an Indian child as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (
We affirm. The record supports the juvenile court‘s finding that the parental-benefit exception does not apply and confirms the court conducted a proper ICWA inquiry of possible Indian ancestry.
FACTS
In June 2023, Anthony (then age two) was found unsupervised wandering down the hallway of the motel where his family was residing. The Orange County Social Services Agency filed a
Throughout the first and second reunification periods, Mother made “minimal” progress in her case plan: she missed nearly all her drug tests, she tested positive for methamphetamine and hydrocodone on several occasions, and she did not complete a substance abuse program.3 In addition, her supervised visits with Anthony, though often positive, were inconsistent and typically brief, despite her being awarded six hours of visitation per week.
As the case progressed, Mother repeatedly denied any Indian ancestry. Her mother, sister, and brother also denied any Indian ancestry. The Agency did not ask Mother‘s father about potential Indian ancestry, despite having some contact with him.
Father likewise repeatedly denied any Indian ancestry, as did his sister Elizabeth. The Agency did not ask his sister Brenda about potential Indian ancestry, despite having contact with her, and it did not attempt to contact his brother Angel. Father‘s parents are deceased and thus could not be interviewed.
The juvenile court terminated services in April 2025 after finding the parents had made minimal progress. At the
After considering the evidence, the juvenile court found ICWA inapplicable and concluded the parental-benefit exception to adoption did not apply; it therefore terminated parental rights and ordered adoption as the permanent plan for Anthony. The court noted that although “it is clear that these parents love their child,” the parents’ visits were “sporadic” and “not always consistent,” and Anthony‘s attachment to the parents was more akin to the attachment a child would have to “a friendly visitor.”
DISCUSSION
I.
THE PARENTAL-BENEFIT EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY
Mother asserts the juvenile court erred in finding the parental-benefit exception to termination does not apply. While we appreciate her connection with Anthony, we see no reversible error.
Once reunification services are terminated, the focus of proceedings shifts to the child‘s need for permanency and stability. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52.) Adoption is the Legislature‘s preferred permanent plan because “‘it gives the child the best chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker.‘” (Id. at p. 53.) Thus, if a child will likely be adopted, a juvenile court is required to terminate parental rights unless an exception to adoption applies. (
One such exception is the parental-benefit exception. (
Assessment of the first element—regular visitation and contact—is “‘“quantitative and relatively straightforward.“‘” (In re I.E. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 683, 691.) “‘“‘Sporadic visitation is insufficient.‘“‘” (Ibid.) The record here confirms Mother‘s visits were inconsistent; she concedes her “visitation was not perfect.” And even if that inconsistency was due to health and transportation issues, as Mother asserts, the fact remains that when she did visit, she was often late or stayed far less time than what the juvenile court allotted. Substantial evidence confirms the court‘s finding on this first element.
Substantial evidence also supports the juvenile court‘s finding on the second element—a beneficial relationship. “To satisfy this element, parents ‘must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the child, or pleasant visits’ [citations], they must establish a substantial, positive, emotional attachment between them and the child.” (In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 816 (Andrew M.).) The record here confirms the bond between Mother and Anthony, though loving, did not rise to that level. Anthony only lived with Mother until he was three years old, and his contact with her after that was positive but sporadic. The record does not suggest Mother had a recent, significant role in his life.
The third element—detriment—turns on “whether the harm of severing the [parental] relationship outweighs ‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.‘” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) Conversely, “does the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home
Mother identifies no particular harm Anthony would suffer from the termination of parental rights, aside from the loss of the parental relationship. “There is no question that there are benefits in continued visits with loving parents to which the child has some substantial attachment. Yet to justify withholding the ‘security,’ ‘stability,’ and ‘“sense of belonging a new family would confer“’ [citation], the parents . . . must prove some type of harm beyond the fact that their loving visits would cease.” (Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 820.) Mother did not do so. The juvenile court therefore did not abuse its discretion when it found the scales tipped in favor of adoption.
II.
THE AGENCY CONDUCTED A PROPER ICWA INQUIRY
Mother and Father next contend the Agency erred by failing to contact all known extended family members to inquire whether Anthony may be an Indian child as required by ICWA.
Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 ‘“to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families . . . .“’ (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1128–1129.) “ICWA establish[ed] minimum standards for state courts to follow before removing Indian children from their families and placing them in foster care or adoptive homes . . . .” (Id. at p. 1129.)
Under California law adopted pursuant to ICWA, agencies and juvenile courts have “an affirmative and continuing duty” in every dependency case to inquire whether the child is or may be an Indian child. (
Here, Mother, her sister, her brother, her mother, Father, and his sister Elizabeth all denied Indian ancestry. The Agency did not speak with Anthony‘s maternal grandfather, paternal aunt Brenda, or paternal uncle Angel to make a similar inquiry. Mother and Father assert the Agency erred by not interviewing all known relatives.
We disagree. Our Supreme Court has rejected the view that “every possible extended family member [must be] asked about the child‘s Indian ancestry.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140; see id. at p. 1167 (dis. opn. of Groban, J.) [such a rule would be “‘absurd at best and impossible at worst.‘“].) Instead, what ICWA requires is an inquiry that “‘reliably answer[s] the question at the heart of the ICWA inquiry: Whether [the] child involved in a proceeding “is or may be an Indian child.“‘” (In re E.W. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 314, 322 (E.W.).)
In other words, “[i]t is not mandatory for the Department always to ‘inquire of everyone who has an interest in the child.’ [Citation.] The law of diminishing returns is at work. ‘The juvenile court has discretion to determine when enough is enough.‘” (In re K.G. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 379, 385; see In re C.L. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 53, 69−70 [although maternal uncle was not interviewed, juvenile court reasonably relied on certain
The order terminating Mother and Father‘s parental rights is affirmed.
SCOTT, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
SERVINO, J.