Dr. Andrew Kontrick filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on April 4, 1997. Dr.. Robert Ryan, a judgment creditor, then filed an adversary proceeding objecting to Dr. Kontrick’s discharge. Ruling on summary judgment, the bankruptcy court denied Dr. Kontrick discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A). The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. Dr. Kontrick now appeals and raises three objections to the bankruptcy court’s decision. First, he argues that Dr. Ryan’s complaint was untimely. Second, he argues that the bankruptcy court incorrectly concluded that he had waived his objection to the timeliness of Dr. Ryan’s complaint and, further, that he could not have waived such an objection because Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(a)’s time limit is jurisdictional and not subject to waiver. Finally, Dr. Kontrick contends that the bankruptcy court improperly granted summary judgment because there is a genuine issue of material fact about his intent in transferring his paychecks to his wife in the year before bankruptcy. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I
A. Facts
Dr. Ryan and Dr. Kontrick, both cosmetic and plastic surgeons, were business associates. Each was a 50% shareholder in a professional corporation that Dr. Ryan had established. Dr. Kontrick had begun as an employee of the corporation and then, in 1989, he became part-owner. The association of the two physicians in this arrangement was a short and unhappy one. A variety of disputes, the details of which are not material to this appeal, arose. These disagreements were heard in two separate arbitrations. In the first, commenced in January 1992, Dr. Ryan was awarded $47,157.81 plus interest, expenses and attorneys’ fees. Dr. Kontrick paid a total of $65,261.32 in satisfaction of this first arbitration. The second arbitration, commenced in October 1992, resulted in a 1995 award to Dr. Ryan of $519,324.42, including punitive damages, costs, expenses and attorneys’ fees. The Circuit Court of Cook County entered a judgment on the award; the Illinois Appellate Court later reversed the punitive damages award and reduced the prejudgment interest rate.
See Ryan v. Kontrick,
During the first arbitration, Dr. Ryan filed a citation to discover Dr. Kontrick’s assets. In an ensuing deposition, Dr. Kon-trick was asked about his family finances, including his decision to remove his name from the family checking account. Dr. Kontrick testified that personal expenses were paid from that account, now only in his wife’s name, and admitted that “[i]t used to be my personal account. I don’t have that account anymore.” R.16-1, Ex.7 at 7-8; see id. at 10-11, 17-19. He continued: “What prompted this change was the ridiculous maneuvers that you and your client [Dr. Ryan] have put me through in order to collect money which you don’t have coming to you.” Id. at 9. Dr. Kon-trick further elaborated, stating that “there are just thousands and thousands of thieves out there that are ready to come after you on any pretense and rob you of whatever belongings you might have. So I *728 felt this was a way of protecting myself.” Id. at 12. In Dr. Kontrick’s view, this arrangement would protect him from people who were “more than willing to take your money on some pretense or some technicality that they push through some court and all kinds of wranglings. As you know, this is exactly what went on.” Id. To protect himself from individuals, whom he identified as former patients who have suffered “some perceived wrong,” Dr. Kontrick divested himself of his personal wealth, transferring much of it to his wife and daughter. See id. at 13-14. As part of this effort to insulate his assets from potential judgment creditors, Dr. Kontrick removed his name from the family checking account, leaving his wife as the sole signatory; he continued to deposit his paychecks into that account. See id. at 17-19. Summing up his approach to his finances, Dr. Kontrick testified that “I felt that to have any sort of assets that could possibly be taken away from me would be foolish. So I basically divested myself of everything.” Id. at 29-30.
B. Bankruptcy Court Proceedings
Dr. Kontrick filed for bankruptcy in April 1997. On January 13, 1998, Dr. Ryan, after having been granted three extensions of time, filed his adversary complaint objecting to Dr. Kontrick’s discharge. This adversary complaint included four counts (I — IV) objecting to discharge under 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(2)-(5) and three counts (V-VII) seeking a determination of the nondischargeability of Dr. Kontrick’s debts to Dr. Ryan under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2), (4) & (6). Dr. Ryan filed an amended complaint on May 6, 1998, without a court-approved extension, which included for the first time the specific allegation that Dr. Kontrick had violated § 727(a)(2)(A) by taking his name off of a family checking account (“family account”) and continuing to deposit his paychecks into the account. 1 Dr. Kon-trick answered the amended complaint on June 10, 1998; in his answer, Dr. Kon-trick admitted the transfers to the family account but denied violating § 727(a)(2)(A).
In March 1999, Dr. Ryan moved for summary judgment on all counts. Appended to his motion was a statement of facts pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 402 (“402 M statement”). In August 1999, Dr. Kontrick filed a motion to strike portions of Dr. Ryan’s 402 M statement. Dr. Kontrick maintained that “Ryan’s 402 M statement contains an array of material that is not tied to anything alleged in the complaint.” R.10-1, Ex.12 at 2. In this motion, Dr. Kontrick quoted Dr. Ryan’s amended complaint for the purpose of comparing the allegations in the amended complaint with the facts claimed in the 402 M statement. Dr. Kontrick also filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.
The bankruptcy court granted Dr. Ryan’s motion for summary judgment on Count I. The court also granted in part and denied in part Dr. Kontrick’s motion to strike. The court found that, because Dr. Kontrick continued to place his paycheck into the family account, there was a transfer within one year of bankruptcy, as required by § 727(a)(2)(A). Further, the court reasoned that, although “[gjenerally, the question of intent will prevent the granting of summary judgment ... here, the Debtor’s intent is clear.” Bankr.Op. at 14. “Kontrick, during the deposition pursuant to the citation to discover assets, freely admitted he transferred the bank account to Carolyn [his wife] to prevent his creditors from attaching the funds.” Id. at *729 14-15. Therefore, the court concluded, Dr. Kontriek had made transfers within one year of bankruptcy with the “intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors” within the meaning of § 727(a)(2)(A). The court denied discharge and then dismissed the remaining counts in Dr. Ryan’s complaint.
Dr. Kontriek filed a motion to reconsider the bankruptcy court’s decision. He argued that he had objected to the timeliness of Dr. Ryan’s amended complaint and that the family account claim was improperly considered because it was untimely under Bankruptcy Rule 4004(a). In denying the motion to reconsider, the bankruptcy court held that Dr. Kontriek had waived an objection to the timeliness of the family account claim.
C. District Court Proceedings
Dr. Kontriek appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Dr. Kontriek submitted that the bankruptcy court had erred in finding that he had waived his Rule 4004(a) objection and that, even if he had failed to raise the objection, it could not be waived because Rule 4004(a) is jurisdictional and thus not subject to equitable doctrines such as waiver. Dr. Kontriek also contended that the bankruptcy court erred in granting summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact about his intent in transferring his paycheck to his wife’s account in the year before bankruptcy.
The district court rejected all of Dr. Kontrick’s arguments. First, the court concluded that Rule 4004(a) was not jurisdictional; it was more like a statute of limitations and could be waived. Second, the court determined, that, although Dr. Kontriek had mentioned that the amendment was late in his motion to strike, he did not raise the issue in his responsive pleading and thus had waived it. Finally, the court agreed with the bankruptcy court that Dr. Kontrick’s deposition testimony from 1993 was conclusive on the issue of intent and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment.
II
A.
We turn first to the timeliness of Dr. Ryan’s objection to the discharge in bankruptcy. There is no dispute that Dr. Ryan’s amended complaint, which included the family account allegation, was filed beyond the 60-day limit for filing objections and that there was no court-approved extension of time permitting him to file when he did. 2 The bankruptcy court and the district court concluded that Dr. Kon-trick had waived any objections to the timeliness of Dr. Ryan’s complaint. To determine whether the 60-day time limit precludes consideration of Dr. Ryan’s objection to discharge, we must engage in a two-part inquiry. First, we must decide whether the 60-day time limit for filing objections to discharge under § 727(a), see Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4004(a), is a jurisdictional prerequisite that cannot be waived, or whether it is akin to a statute of limitations and thus subject to waiver. If Rule *730 4004(a) is a jurisdictional requirement, then Dr. Kontrick cannot have waived his ' objection. Second, if we determine that the time limit is not jurisdictional, we must decide whether the bankruptcy court correctly determined that Dr. Kontrick did indeed waive objection.
1.
We first focus on whether the time limit for filing objections to discharge contained in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(a) is a jurisdictional prerequisite and, therefore, cannot be waived. “Statutory filing deadlines are generally subject to the defenses of waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”
United States v. Locke,
We begin with the text of the provision in issue. Rule 4004(a) provides: “In a chapter 7 liquidation case a complaint objecting to the debtor’s discharge under § 727(a) of the Code shall be filed no later than 60 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors.” Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4004(a). The analogous provision to Rule 4004(a) for objections to the dischargeability of a particular debt is Rule 4007(c) which provides: “A complaint to determine the dischargeability of a debt under § 523(c) shall be filed no later than 60 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors under § 341(a).” Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4007(c). Both of these rules contain provisions for the extension of the time limit. Rule 4004(b) permits the bankruptcy court to extend the time limit for cause, if the motion is filed before time expires. See Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4004(b). Rule 4007(c) has a similar provision for extending its time limit. See Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4007(c). 3
As the opinions of the courts that have confronted this issue demonstrate, the texts of these bankruptcy rules yield no definitive answer to the question of whether the time limitations contained in these rules are jurisdictional in nature. The rules we have just described do not, as a matter of textual interpretation, address the issue. Although Rule 9006(3) restricts the grounds upon which the bankruptcy court may enlarge the time for actions required by Rules 4004(a) and 4007(c), these restrictions still vest a great deal of discretion in the bankruptcy court.
In the absence of a clear textual resolution of the issue, we must look else
*731
where. In our view, the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Appeals Panel of the Ninth Circuit in
In re Santos,
a.
We turn first to an examination of the role that these rules play within the overall structure of the bankruptcy rules in the hope that such an inquiry might yield a more definitive understanding of whether the rules in question ought to be governed by the general principle that a filing deadline is subject to equitable defenses or whether they are jurisdictional in nature.
In a thoughtful effort to apply this methodology, one bankruptcy decision,
In re Kirsch,
In light of the policy concerns that animate the bankruptcy rules at issue, we do not think that the analogy to the civil rules relied upon by the court in
Kirsch
is very helpful in resolving the problem before us. Rule 50(b) and the other civil rules referenced in Rule 6(b) govern actions after a final judgment has been entered. Unless the time limits are strictly construed, a prevailing party will be left uncertain as to the status of his judgment. Substantial prejudice to a prevailing party could occur if the defeated party had an indefinite time period to seek a new trial. By contrast, Rules 4004(a) and 4007(c) apply before any adjudication has taken place and govern the timeliness of a complaint, which in turn invites a responsive pleading, an answer. A debtor can defeat an untimely complaint by raising Rule 4004(a) or Rule 4007(c) as an affirmative defense in his answer. Al
*732
though there is an important interest in limiting the time in which the discharge-ability of debts can be challenged in order to ensure that debtors are not “harassed by creditors after their claims have been discharged in bankruptcy,”
Kirsch,
Even when the underlying policy concerns of the Bankruptcy Code are reviewed without reference to the analogy to the civil rules suggested in
Kirsch,
characterization of these bankruptcy rules as jurisdictional would yield too rigid a result to achieve the goals of the bankruptcy statute. As the bankruptcy panel pointed out in
Santos,
there are, to be sure, some goals of bankruptcy relief that are promoted by expeditious and definitive resolution of the question of dischargeability. Indeed, among the goals of the rules in question is furtherance of the prompt administration of bankruptcy estates and protection of the “fresh start” objective of the Code by allowing the debtor to enjoy finality and certainty of relief.
See In re Santos,
b.
As the bankruptcy panel in
Santos
also noted, the overall statutory structure of the bankruptcy statute also provides support for the view that the rules are not jurisdictional.
See In re Santos,
Matters of timeliness are, notably, present in other provisions. For instance, section 157(b)(3) states that “[t]he bankruptcy judge shall determine, on the *733 judge’s own motion or on timely motion of a party, whether a proceeding is a core proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(8). Further, for a party to obtain de novo review in the district court of a bankruptcy court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in a non-core proceeding, that party must “timely and specifically object[ ].” 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). These references to timeliness in sections other than the grants of jurisdiction support the view that timeliness is not a prerequisite to the bankruptcy court’s exercise of jurisdiction in a core proceeding such as Dr. Ryan’s objection to discharge.
c.
We find the legislative history of the rules in question to be of marginal assistance in our task. The notes of the Advisory Committee with respect to Rule 4007 state in part:
Subdivision (c) differs from subdivision (b) by imposing a deadline for filing complaints to determine the issue of dis-chargeability of debts set out in § 523(a)(2), (4) or (6) of the Code. The bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine dischargeability of these debts. If a complaint is not timely filed, the debt is discharged. See § 523(c).
One plausible reading of this passage is, as the court in
Santos
acknowledged, that the bankruptcy court can only act on a dischargeability complaint if it is filed in a timely manner.
See Santos,
d.
Accordingly, we join our colleagues in the Second and Fourth Circuits in holding that the timeliness provisions at issue here are not jurisdictional.
See In re Benedict,
*734 2.
Having determined that an objection to the timeliness of a complaint under Rule 4004(a) is subject to waiver, we must now decide whether Dr. Kontrick did waive his objection. In making that determination, we must keep in mind the Congressional policy of resolving the matter of dischargeability promptly and of permitting the debtor to begin his fresh start without lingering doubts about the finality of the bankruptcy court’s actions.
As a general matter, a statute of limitations defense must be raised in an answer or responsive pleading.
See
Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(c);
see also Jackson v. Rockford, Housing Auth.,
Dr. Kontrick argues that he raised the issue in his motion to strike portions of Dr. Ryan’s motion for summary judgment. Dr. Kontrick’s motion to strike was filed on August 2, 1999. Even assuming, ar- *735 guendo, that Dr. Kontrick’s motion to strike was an acceptable vehicle for raising a Rule 4004(a) objection, we must conclude that Dr. Kontriek waived his objection to the timeliness of Dr. Ryan’s complaint.
Waiver is the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”
United States v. Sumner,
What is clear from Dr. Kontrick’s motion to strike is that he is relying on Dr. Ryan’s amended complaint, including the family account claim, to object to additional allegations made in Dr. Ryan’s 402 M statement. Nowhere does Dr. Kontriek contest the timeliness of the allegations in the amended complaint. This failure is sufficient to constitute waiver of Dr. Kon-trick’s objection to the timeliness of the complaint. Indeed, Dr. Kontriek did not raise the timeliness issue until after the bankruptcy court entered summary judgment for Dr. Ryan.
Under these circumstances, we must conclude that Dr. Kontriek waived the argument that Dr. Ryan’s allegation that discharge ought to be denied because of Dr. Kontrick’s handling of his checking account was untimely. This conclusion is compatible with the general principles that govern the application of the waiver defense and is also compatible with the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code. Here, the timeliness issue was not presented to the bankruptcy court until after it had ruled on the’ question of whether a discharge ought to be refused. The policy concerns of expeditious administration of bankruptcy matters and the finality of the bankruptcy court’s decision hardly are fostered by requiring the bankruptcy court to consider the timeliness of an issue that it already has adjudicated.
B.
We must now determine whether the bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment to Dr. Ryan and denied Dr. Kontriek his discharge. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.
See In re Lefkas Gen’l Partners,
The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment on Count I of Dr. Ryan’s complaint, which alleged that discharge should be denied because Dr. Kontrick had violated 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A). Section 727(a)(2)(A) provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he court shall grant the debt- or a discharge unless ... the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor ... has transferred ... property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the filing of the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A). To prevail, Dr. Ryan must prove that (1) the debtor, Dr. Kontrick, (2) transferred (3) the debtor’s property, (4) with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor (5) within one year of bankruptcy.
See id.
The exception to discharge in § 727(a)(2)(A) essentially “consists of two components: an act (i.e., a transfer or a concealment of property) and an improper intent (i.e., a subjective intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor).”
Rosen v. Bezner,
Dr. Kontrick does not dispute that he continued to deposit his paycheck into the family account in the year before bankruptcy. Instead, he argues that there is a question of fact about his intent and that there was no act to hinder, delay or defraud creditors within one year.
See
Ap-pellee’s Br. at 13. Dr. Kontrick cites
In re Ratner,
In his 1993 deposition pursuant to Dr. Ryan’s citation to discover assets, Dr. Kon- *737 trick admitted that he took his name off the checking account, stating that “[i]t used to be my personal account. I don’t have that account anymore.” R.16-1, Ex. 7 at 7-8. Moreover, he said that he took this action because of “the ridiculous maneuvers that you and your client [Dr. Ryan] have put me through in order to collect money which you don’t have coming to you.” Id. at 9. Dr. Kontrick wanted to protect himself from the “thousands and thousands of thieves out there that are ready to come after you on any pretense and rob you of whatever belongings you might have.” Id. at 12. Dr. Kontrick freely admitted that his divestitures were designed to diminish the amount of money creditors would be able to obtain from a judgment against him, including Dr. Ryan with whom Dr. Kontrick was engaged in a nasty business dispute at the time. “I felt that to have any sort of assets that could possibly be taken away from me would be foolish. So I basically divested myself of everything.” Id. at 29-30.
Intent is normally a question of fact and often not susceptible to summary judgment. Here, however, we have direct and unrebutted evidence, from Dr. Kontrick’s own words, of his intent. Dr. Kontrick cannot defeat summary judgment simply by raising a “metaphysical doubt” about his intent.
See Matsushita,
The bankruptcy court was entitled to conclude that those deposits were “transfers” of Dr. Kontrick’s property, with the “intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor” within one year of filing for bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A). By depositing his paycheck into an account over which he had no control, Dr. Kontrick put those assets beyond the reach of his creditors, just as he had done with the property that he transferred to his wife and daughter before 1993.
In support of his contention that summary judgment was inappropriate here, Dr. Kontrick invites our attention to
Rosen v. Bezner,
There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the applicability section 727(a)(2)(A)’s exception to discharge. Dr. Kontrick violated section 727(a)(2)(A) by depositing his paycheck into the family account, over which he had no control. Dr. Ryan is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count I of his amended complaint.
Conclusion
Dr. Kontrick waived his objection to the timeliness of Dr. Ryan’s amended complaint. The bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment to Dr. Ryan and denied Dr. Kontrick’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A). The judgment of the district court sustaining that decision is therefore affirmed.
AFFIRMED
Notes
. The original complaint included an objection to discharge based on § 727(a)(2)(A), but did not include a factual allegation with respect to the family account.
. Neither the bankruptcy court nor the district court discussed whether the family account allegation properly related back to the timely complaint of January 13, 1998, such that the family account claim itself was timely.
See In re Magno,
. Because the rules are almost identical, it is appropriate to consider decisions by courts construing Rule 4007(c) as well as Rule 4004(a).
See In re Santos,
. Contrary to Dr. Kontrick’s assertion, we do not think that the Supreme Court's decision in
Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,
In
Taylor,
the debtor had claimed as exempt the proceeds from an employment discrimination lawsuit that was pending in state court at the time of her bankruptcy filing.
See Taylor,
The Supreme Court rejected this argument.
See Taylor,
While the Court in
Taylor
did stress the importance of deadlines,
see Taylor,