In re Andre S.
Ordered that the order of disposition is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof adjudicating the appellant a juvenile delinquent based upon the finding that he committed, against the complainant O’Leary, acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the first degree, menacing in the third degree, and grand larceny in the fourth degree, and substituting therefor a provision dismissing those counts of the petition; as so modified, the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, and the fact-finding order is modified accordingly.
The appellant was charged with, inter alia, robbery in the first degree, menacing in the third degree, and grand larceny in the fourth degree stemming from an incident in which he allegedly robbed two persons. In an order dated October 14, 2005 the Criminal Court removed the matter to the Family Court pursuant to
As the Presentment Agency correctly concedes, the petition was facially insufficient as to the counts involving the complainant O’Leary because it failed to set forth sworn nonhearsay allegations for purposes of those counts (see
The appellant contends on appeal that the Family Court petition was jurisdictionally deficient in that, inter alia, the supporting depositions executed by an Assistant District Attorney and by the complainant Taylor were not properly verified. However, the supporting depositions, which were executed in accordance with
Contrary to the appellant’s contention, this Court may review a suppression determination in the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law if “there was a full and fair hearing on the motion to suppress and an adequate record has been made” (People v Golliver, 132 AD2d 618, 618 [1987]; see People v Rudolph, 266 AD2d 568 [1999]; People v Matthews, 222 AD2d 457 [1995]; People v Brown, 113 AD2d 893, 894 [1985]; see also
In particular, the complainant Taylor testified that he had an unobstructed view of the appellant while the appellant walked alongside him for a distance of approximately one-half block before the robbery, and also observed the appellant while handing his property to him. Thus, the Family Court did not err in admitting the identification testimony.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Presentment Agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; Matter of Charles S., 41 AD3d 484, 485 [2007]), we find that it was legally sufficient to support the findings in the fact-finding order that the appellant committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted robbery in the first degree against Taylor (see
Resolution of issues of credibility is primarily a matter to be determined by the finder of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses, and its determination should be accorded great deference on appeal (see Matter of Anthony R., 43 AD3d 939 [2007]; Matter of Charles S., 41 AD3d 484 [2007]; Matter of Christian M., 37 AD3d 834 [2007]; cf. People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 644-645 [2006]). Upon the exercise of our factual review power (cf.
Finally, the appellant contends that the Family Court erred in denying his request to play at the fact-finding hearing the tape of the complainant’s 911 telephone call for purposes of impeachment. The nature and proper scope of cross-examination is a matter generally left to the sound discretion of the hearing court (see People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 244 [1969], cert denied 396 US 846 [1969]; People v Roussopoulos, 261 AD2d 559 [1999]). Here, the court providently exercised that discretion, particularly since the attorney for the appellant cross-examined the witness regarding the substance of the 911 tape (see People v Hemphill, 247 AD2d 339 [1998]; People v Rowe, 236 AD2d 637, 638 [1997]; People v Dominguez, 210 AD2d 249, 250 [1994]). Further, the court providently exercised its discre-