In Re Anastaplo
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Daily
delivered the opinion of the court:
George Anastaplo, to whom we shall refer as petitioner, having successfully passed the Illinois bar examination, filed with the Committee on Character and Fitness for the First Appellate Court District, an application for admission to’ practice before the courts of this State, together with affidavits as to his good moral character and general fitness to practice law, as required by section IX of Rule 58 of this court. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap, no, par. 259.58.) Subsequently, and as further ordained by the rule, he appeared both before a two-man section of the committee and before the entire committee for the purpose of furnishing evidence of his moral character and good citizenship. Ultimately, on June 5, 1951, petitioner was advised that he had failed to prove such qualifications as to character and general fitness as, in the opinion of the committee, would justify his admission to the bar of Illinois. Petitioner did not seek a rehearing, as was his right, and while the committee has continued to refuse to issue him a certificate of character, it has held itself open to further suggestions and arguments of petitioner, presented through
Petitioner has now filed in this court what is termed a “Petition and appeal from the refusal of the Committee on Character and Fitness * * * to sign a favorable certificate for admission to the practice of law for the Applicant and Motion to the Supreme Court of Illinois to provide for the admission of the Applicant to the practice of law in the state of Illinois.” Although we have held that the discretion exercised by the committee on character and fitness will not ordinarily be reviewed, (In re Frank, 293 Ill. 263,) and it is well established that a petition for admission to the bar, though a judicial function, is an administrative act rather than a judicial proceeding, (In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 89 L. ed. 1795,) it is our opinion, in the light of petitioner’s claims that the committee abused its discretion and that certain of his constitutional rights were infringed upon, there exist circumstances which should cause us to set the matter down for argument and opinion. (In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 89 L. ed. 1795; Brooks v. Laws, 208 Fed. 2d 18.) Accordingly, petitioner has filed a brief and argument, we have granted leave to the American Civil Liberties Union and to the National Lawyers Guild, as amici curiae, to file briefs in petitioner’s behalf and have permitted Stephen Love, a Chicago attorney and one-time committee member who apparently did not concur in its action, to file his suggestions in the cause.
Looking to the record, to the committee report to this court, and to petitioner’s brief, we find that the crux of the controversy is centered upon petitioner’s refusal to answer as to whether he was a member of the Communist Party or of any of the subversive organizations on the list compiled by the United States Department of Justice. When first asked if he was a member of the Communist Party petitioner responded that the question was an inquiry into his political beliefs and an “illegitimate question.”
Petitioner presently contends that the committee abused its discretion and exceeded its function by inquiring into his political views, directly and indirectly, and charges that its
In this jurisdiction it is firmly established that the power to regulate and define the practice of law is a prerogative of the judicial department, as one of the three divisions of the government created by article III of our constitution, an inherent adjunct of which is to prescribe regulations for the study of law and the admission of applicants for the practice of the profession. (In re Day, 181 Ill. 73; People ex rel. Illinois Bar Assn. v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462; People ex rel. Chicago Bar Assn. v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346.) A concomitant principle, established by the decisions of this court, is that the right to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue cases and collect fees therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury service and arrest on civil process while attending court. (In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 80.) In the exercise of its judicial power over the bar, and in discharge of its responsibility for the choice of personnel who will
In the case of Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 95 L. ed. 1137, wherein the provisions of the Smith Act directed at conspiracy to teach or advocate the overthrow of the government by violence were held to be valid, we find an authoritative characterization of the Communist conspiracy and the purposes of the Communist Party in these terms: “Their conspiracy to organize the Communist Party to teach and advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence created a ‘clear and present danger’ of an attempt to overthrow the Government by force and violence.” (341 U.S. 494, at 516-517, 95 L. ed. 1137, at 1156.) Prior to that case, in American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
Neither the committee nor this court, faced with the question of whether membership in the Communist Party is relevant to a determination of petitioner’s good citizenship and his ability to take the oath of lawyer in good conscience, need be oblivious to the existence of that party and its established conspiratorial nature, nor to the view in which it is held by the people of this country. Aside from the fact that membership in an organization advocating the forceful overthrow of our government would give rise to questions concerning the sincerity of an applicant’s oath of loyalty, it is proper to consider that the lawyer, as an officer of the court, holds a position of public trust, or at least of semipublic trust. As is stated in In re Both, 376 Ill. 177, 182: “Attorneys at law admitted to the bar of this State are officers of this court. * * *
We are next met, however, by petitioner’s contention that inquiries about his “political affiliations and organizational memberships” are unconstitutional, as being in derogation of the right to free speech guaranteed under the first and fourteenth amendments to the constitution of the United States. Though petitioner argues forcefully and at great length, it is our impression and interpretation that American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 94 L. ed. 925, and Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 95 L. ed. 1137, authoritatively establish that such an inquiry, under the circumstances presented, does not violate the constitutional mandate relied upon. The rationale of both cases is that belief in the overthrow of the government by force, in the face of the reality that beliefs are the springs to action, is a substantial enough interest to limit speech. They both say, that while one may be permitted
In the Summers case an applicant for admission to the bar of this State was denied admittance, though otherwise qualified, on the sole ground that he had conscientious scruples against war and would not use force to prevent wrong under any circumstances. The Supreme Court of the United States upheld our refusal and expressly held that our action did not violate the first amendment, as its demands are incorporated in the due-process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In analyzing the Summers decision during the course of the Douds opinion, the court said: “Again, the relation between the obligations of membership in the bar and service required by the state in time of war, the limited effect of the state’s holding upon speech and assembly, and the strong interest which every state court has in the persons who become officers of the court were thought sufficient to justify the state action.” (339 U.S. 382, 405, 94 L. ed. 925, 947.) We see no substantial difference, or basis for a different application of the limitations on the right of free speech, between an inquiry into Summers’ belief that he would not bear arms in support of his government and an inquiry, where the existence of a clear and present danger is known, directed to petitioner’s membership in an organization which advocates the overthrow of the same government, by force of arms if necessary.
Further, in regard to the contention that petitioner’s right of free speech has been infringed upon by the inquiries of the committee, we may also consider the established principle of this jurisdiction that the practice of law is a privilege, not a right. In granting that privilege we may impose any reasonable conditions within our control and if an applicant does not choose to abide by such conditions he is free to retain his beliefs and go elsewhere. Among other things, the granting of the privilege to practice law in this State is conditioned upon proof by the applicant of his good moral character, of his general fitness to practice law and of his good citizenship, and upon the taking of an oath to support the State and Federal constitutions. Such conditions are almost universal in this land and, so far as we can ascertain, their reasonableness has never been attacked. When an applicant, knowing of such conditions, applies for admission and signifies that he will take the oath of lawyer, we think it inconsistent with the privilege he seeks that he should be permitted to defeat pertinent inquiry into his ability to fulfill such conditions by any claim of the right of free speech. This has been the principle applied in the field of public employment to sustain a finding that such employees agree to suspend their constitutional rights of free speech by the implied terms of their employment, (See: McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517; Drury v. Hurley, 339 Ill. App. 33, 88 N.E. 2d 728; Joyce v. Board of Education, 325 Ill. App. 543, 60 N.E. 2d 431 ; Faxon v. School Committee of Boston, (Mass.) 120 N.E.
We conclude that the committee’s inquiry into petitioner’s membership in the Communist Party was relevant to a determination of his good citizenship and his ability to take the oath of lawyer in good conscience, and that petitioner’s constitutional rights were not infringed upon by such action. On the present record the petition
must be denied.
retition denied.