431 Mass. 678 | Mass. | 2000
On June 3, 1996, Douglas Scott Stransky applied for admission to the bar of the Commonwealth. The Board of Bar Examiners (board) held a hearing on his application and, on July 9, 1999, reported to this court, pursuant to G. L. c. 221, § 37.
1. Facts. The record reveals the following. Stransky was bom in 1957. He attended college for one year in 1975-1976. Beginning in January, 1986, he attended Harvard University and received his Bachelor of Liberal Arts degree in June, 1993. Stransky entered the University of Miami Law School in August, 1993, and received his juris doctor in May, 1996. He received his master of laws in taxation from the same university in May, 1997.
Stransky also has significant work experience. From 1976 to 1993, he held several positions, primarily in restaurant and hotel management. In addition, he worked in other capacities during this time period and while in law school. Stransky has been employed as an accountant in Cincinnati, Ohio, since June, 1997.
Before graduating from law school, Stransky, as a student and as permitted by Florida law, filed an application for registration with the Florida bar. The Florida Board of Bar Examiners conducted a formal hearing in January, 1996. Stransky, represented by counsel, appeared and testified on specifications concerning failure to file tax returns, filing false unemployment compensation reports, and other matters. Subsequently, the Florida board, in a report filed with the Supreme Court of Florida, concluded that Stransky was unfit for admission to the Florida Bar. In January, 1997, the Supreme Court of Florida denied the applicant admission to the Florida Bar, with leave to file an appropriate petition demonstrating rehabilitation two years from that date.
In separate proceedings, Stransky applied to be admitted to the Massachusetts bar in June, 1996. After a hearing on his application, the board submitted its report to this court, recommending that Stransky not be admitted. The board’s report focused on two areas of Stransky’s past conduct, and on his
With respect to Stransky’s attitudes toward this conduct, the board found: “At his hearing before the Florida Bar, the applicant attempted to establish that the statement in his application was truthful in that all he meant was that he did not have a criminal intent when he failed to file. The Florida Board found, and this Board finds[,] that the explanation is unworthy of belief. . . . Throughout his testimony [at the Massachusetts hearing], he failed to recognize that his violation of law with respect to his deliberate failure to file federal tax returns reflected a moral inadequacy which went beyond Tack of financial responsibility.’ ”
The second area of focus for the board was Stransky’s receipt of unemployment compensation payments from the Commonwealth between February, 1993, and January, 1994. During this period, Stransky was either employed gainfully or a full-time student. Nevertheless, he reported that he was neither employed nor attending school on a short form that he was required to submit to Massachusetts authorities on a biweekly basis. As a result, Stransky improperly received more than $6,400 from the Commonwealth.
The board found: “His explanation was that he simply did [not] think about it when he did it; that, at most, it was somewhere lost in his non-conscious state. His explanation was not credible. He deliberately and repeatedly filed false statements to procure the funds which he needed.”
2. Discussion. Although we grant substantial deference to a decision of the board, “we have the final authority to determine
Prior misconduct, however, is not an absolute bar to admission. Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. 86, 91 (1996). “[N]o offense is so grave as to preclude a showing of present moral fitness.” Id., citing Matter of Allen, 400 Mass. 417, 421-422 (1987); and Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 452 (1975). An attorney may be reinstated after demonstrating that “he or she has the moral qualifications, competency and learning in law required for admission to practice law in this Commonwealth, and that his or her resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar.” S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18(6), as appearing in 425 Mass. 1325 (1997). In Prager, we concluded that an attorney seeking admission must make parallel showings. Matter of Prager, supra at 93-95.
We first consider whether the applicant “has sufficiently proved such rehabilitation that he [or she] currently possesses the necessary moral character to be admitted to the bar of the Commonwealth.” Id. at 92. Rather than establishing a quantum of proof necessary to prevail in a showing of moral character, we have stated that five considerations are particularly relevant to such an assessment. Id. at 95. These considerations are (1) the nature of the offense(s); (2) the applicant’s age, maturity, and experience at the time of the last offense; (3) the applicant’s
Stranksy offered evidence that he has been active in public service. He has worked in different capacities at several organizations through law school and after graduation. In addition, Stransky submitted numerous recommendations attesting to his character, competence, and commitment to public service. Stransky also offered testimony and an affidavit from faculty of his law school in support of his application.
Nevertheless, after reviewing the record carefully, including a transcript of the March 9, 1998, hearing, we conclude that Stransky has not demonstrated good moral character through rehabilitation, based on the Hiss factors. Stransky’s major offenses — failing to file taxes for three years and filing false documents with a State agency ■— are very serious offenses
We conclude that, given his misconduct, Stransky may not reapply for admission to the bar of Massachusetts before two years from the date of this opinion.
This matter is remanded to the county court for entry of a judgment affirming the decision of the board.
So ordered.
General Laws c. 221, § 37, provides in part: “A citizen of the United States, if over eighteen, may file a petition in the supreme judicial court or superior court to be examined for admission as an attorney at law. Unless the court otherwise orders, the clerk of such court shall refer the petition to the board of bar examiners to ascertain his acquirements and qualifications. If the board reports that the petitioner is of good moral character and sufficient acquirements and qualifications and recommends his admission, he shall be admitted unless the court otherwise determines, and thereafter may practice in all the courts of the commonwealth. ...”
The board also made a brief reference to one other area: “In 1980, when the applicant was 22 years of age, he retained a credit card which a customer had left in a restaurant where he worked and he subsequently attempted to use the credit card to make a purchase for himself. He was arrested and pleaded guilty.”
Stransky has since reimbursed the Commonwealth for the funds he received improperly.
In reaching this conclusion, we note that “[t]he board has heard testimony and observed witnesses and, by virtue of this firsthand observation, is better able than a reviewing court to judge the relative credibilities of witnesses and to assign weight to^the evidence they give.” Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 461 (1975).
Here, the board found Stransky’s explanation regarding his untimely tax filings was insufficient. Specifically, the board found that Stransky’s explanation of this conduct to the Florida board was “unworthy of belief.” Further, the board found that, in testimony Stransky gave at the hearing in Massachusetts, he “failed to recognize that his violation of law with respect to his deliberate failure to file federal tax returns reflected a moral inadequacy which went beyond ‘lack of financial responsibility.’ ” In addition, the board found Stransky’s explanation of his improper responses on biweekly forms to be “not credible.”
Because the board does not appear to have weighed the 1980 credit card incident, we do not consider it.
Generally, in bar discipline cases, the filing of false documents before a court or an agency requires suspension, as does the failure to file tax returns. See, e.g., Matter of McCarthy, 416 Mass. 423, 431-432 (1993) (one-year
In bar discipline cases, we weigh the cumulative effect of the attorney’s violations. Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. 315, 328 (1989). There is no reason not to do the same relative to applicants in bar admission cases.