In Re American Honda Motor Co. Dealerships Litig.
OPINION
Thе plaintiffs in this multidistrict litigation ease are current and former Honda dealers seeking recovery for losses suffered as the result of fraudulent schemes involving the sale and distribution of Honda and Acura automobiles during the 1980’s and early 1990’s. The four core defendant groups are: (1) American Honda Motor Co., Inc. and Honda North America, Inc., the domestic companies responsible for the distribution of Honda and Acura automobiles to dealers; 1 (2) Honda Motor Company, Ltd., a Japanese company and the corporate parent of the domestic Honda entities (“Honda Japan”) 2 ; (3) a number of current and former Honda dealers, including Richard Brooks, Dah Chong Hong Ltd, and affiliated entities, Peter Epsteen, Joseph Hendrick, Henry Khachaturian and Mid-Peninsula Motors, the estate of Martin Lustgarten, Cliff Peck, John Rosati, and WESH, Inc.; and (4) Lyon & Lyon, American Honda’s law firm. Four “representative” complaints have been filed.
The Borman eomplaint is the central complaint in this case. It has been individually brought by a handful of dealers, including Borman Motor, a New Mexico dealer. It also seeks relief on behalf of a broad class of plaintiff dealers, although plaintiffs have not yet sought class certification. Borman asserts claims against all of the defendants, including American Honda, Honda Japan, a number of dealers, a number of current and former Honda executives, and Lyon & Lyon. The complaint alleges a number of illegal acts involving these defendants, including:
• that Honda wrongfully misallocated cars on the basis of 'bribes paid by dealers (the “misallocation scheme”)
• that Honda pressured dealers to participate in sales training seminars offered by a vendor that paid kickbacks to Honda executives (the “sales training scheme”)
• that Honda pressured dealers to participate in group advertising activities provided by an advertising firm that paid kickbacks to Honda executives (the “dealer ad group scheme”)
• that Honda awarded “Letters of Intent” for new dealerships on the basis of bribes and kickbacks
• that Honda executives, prompted by attorneys at Lyon & Lyon, committed perjury, tampered with witnesses and otherwise obstructed criminal investigations of Honda that took place in the early 1990’s
.•that Honda falsified tax records to cover up the bribery activities of executives
Borman asserts a total of 19 counts. Of these, ten are federal claims:
Counts 1-k: RICO §§ 1962(a)-(d) against “all defendants”
Counts 5-6: RICO §§ 1962(c), (d) against Lyon & Lyon
Count 7: Dealers Day in Court Act against the Honda entities
Count 8: Robinson-Patman § 2(c)- against “all defendants” '
Count 9: Sherman Act § 1 against “all defendants”
Count 10: Sherman Act § 2 against the Honda entities 3
The remaining claims are for common law fraud, negligence, breach of contract, tortious interference and conspiracy.
Breakaway is a complaint filed by a South Carolina dealer, Breakaway Honda. . Unlike Borman, this complaint names only two sets of defendants: (1) individuals. and entities affiliated with Joseph “Rick” Hendrick, a South Carolina dealer (Hendrick); and (2) the Honda defendants. Breakaway otherwise .mirrors Borman. Like Borman, this complaint brings claims against Honda for violations of RICO; the Dealers. Day in Court Act; the Robinson-Patman Act; and the Sherman Act. In addition, Breakaway brings claims specifically against Hendrick under RICO sections 1962(a)-(d). Breakaway also asserts nine South Carolina law counts, including common law fraud,, negligence, breach of contract, estoppel and violations of the state Unfair Trade Practices and Manufacturers, Distributorships and Dealers Acts.
Austin Motors is a complaint brought individually by Austin Motors, Inc., a New York dealer. The complaint is similar to Breakaway in that it names both the Honda defendants and a competing New York/New Jersey dealer, Dah Chong Hong Trading Corp. Unlike Breakaway, however, Austin Motors also names Lyon & Lyon and a number of Honda executives. Austin Motors also offers some additionál factual allegations about specific ways that cars were misallocated in the New York/New Jersey area. Like the other complaints, however, Austin Motors asserts claims for violations of RICO; the Dealers Day in Court Act; the RobinsonPatman. Act; and the Sherman Act. The complaint also states seven common law counts, one count for .violation of New York’s Franchised Motor Vehicle Dealer Act and one count for unfair business practices under California law.
Trans-Oceanic is-a complaint brought individually by Trans-Oceanic Motors, a Connecticut dealer doing business as “Cardinal Honda.” This complaint names only the three Honda entities. It refers to the broad nationwide bribery activities discussed in the other complaints, but Trans-Oceanic focuses on Honda’s role in placing a competing dealership fifteen miles from Cardinal’s location. The complaint states only three federal claims: violations of RICO sections 1962(a) and (c), and of section 2(c) of the RobinsonPatman Act. These claims are identical to those against Honda in the Borman complaint. Trans-Oceanic also brings four Connecticut law claims.
Currently at issue are fourteen motions to dismiss. ' In keeping with my directive that the parties focus their energies on the “heartland” issues in this complex case, these motions seek dismissal only of the various federal counts—including those arising under RICO, the Sherman Act, the Robinson-Pat-
I have divided this opinion into five parts. The first addresses several general issues related to matters of pleading form and procedure. The second considers defendants’ argument that plaintiffs lack standing to bring their federal claims. The third discusses the RICO claims against the various defendants, as well as the question of plaintiffs’ claims against Honda Japan. The fourth addresses the antitrust claims. The fifth considers claims brought under the Dealers’ Day in Court Act.
I.
A General Form of Pleading
I begin by addressing two problems of form that are present throughout the representative complaints. Defendants argue that the Borman and Breakaway complaints have impermissibly pled that “Defendant Honda”—“consisting of Defendant Honda Ltd., Honda North America, and American Honda”—is а “person” that can be liable under RICO or the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Borman Compl. at ¶¶ 231, 253, 267, 282; Breakaway Compl. at ¶¶ 225,249, 264, 280. Defendants argue that the three corporate Honda defendants cannot be aggregated as a single “person” with shared RICO liability.
The
Borman
and
Breakaway
plaintiffs essentially concede this point. Case law also supports defendants’ position.
See United States v. Bonanno Org. Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra,
The dealer defendants note a second, related problem. The Borman complaint, which is the broadest complaint in this action, contains a number of claims which, according to their titles, purport to state claims against “all defendants.” These claims in Borman, however, are substantively addressed only to the Honda defendants. For example, the paragraphs of Borman’s section 1962(c) count, see Borman Compl. at ¶¶ 281-90, are devoid of any allegation against any non-Honda defendant. This count cannot be construed as implicitly stating claims against the dealer defendants; every sentence of each paragraph specifically makes claims about the conduct of “defendant Honda,” not “all defendants.” I therefore dismiss these counts as to the non-Honda defendants as a matter of basic pleading specificity. Plaintiffs remain- free to amend their complaints, however, to delineate specific RICO claims against the dealer defendants. 4
B. Choice of Circuit Law
A pending issue throughout the early stages of this multidistrict case has been the question of which circuit’s law I should apply. Appendix A to American Honda’s memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss summarizes the relevant issues and concludes that the proper solution “is for the court to decide each issue truly independently, using as the single overarching guideline the court’s best prediction of what the Supreme Court would do with a given issue, bringing to bear decisions from various circuits on that question.”
Id.
at 3-4. As I have indicated previously during the course of hearings and conferences, this would be my general preference, and my analysis below relies on a broad range of case law from different circuits. However, should an issue in this case arise in which I must expressly decide whether to follow either the Fourth Circuit or the well-reasoned view of another circuit, I will follow the Fourth Circuit. As a conceptual matter, this is the appropriate approach according to the prеsumption that federal
C. Statute of Limitations
Defendants argue that the statute of limitations under both RICO and the antitrust laws limits plaintiffs to damages incurred within four years of the filing their respective complaints, citing the Fourth Circuit’s “injury discovery” rule. Plaintiffs - responded in part at oral argument on May 17, 1996, but because the bulk of defendants’ written argument was contained only in the Schuiling defendants’ reply memorandum, the issue has not been extensively briefed.
I need not reach the limitations question at the present time. Although limitations may play a significant role later in this casé, it is not dispositive of any claim at this point. Also, as plaintiffs argue, any decision on limitations grounds in this case will be fact-intensive, and the record as it currently exists simply is insufficient. Finally, the -circuits are currently divided over the appropriate limitations rule, an issue of considerable potential importance in this case.
See, e.g., Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel,
I briefly note, however, that if I ultimately apply the Fourth Circuit rule, and if in fact some plaintiffs knew or should have known of their injuries dating back to the mid~1980’s, they will have to demonstrate the exercise of due diligence in attempting to discover the basis of their claims, and that defendants took affirmative steps to conceal the schemes. If plaintiffs have a good faith belief in such facts, it would be advisable for them to so replead in their amended complaints.
D. Primary Jurisdiction
Finally, defendants preemptively .urge me to remand consideration of all issues related to California dealerships to the California Motor Vehicle Board. Primary jurisdiction is a discretionary doctrine, however, and I decline to carve issues and parties out of a ease that has been consolidated on a nationwide basis for the express purpose of ensuring uniform resolution.
II.
I next move to the most overarching argument made by all of the various defendants in support of the present motions to dismiss. Defendants assert that plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient injury to have standing under the RICO and antitrust statutes.
5
Defendants’ position is that the RICO claims are fundamentally flawed because each relies on a hypothetical “what should have happened” point of comparison as the basis for the various injuries allegedly caused by the bribery scheme. For example, the claim of injury common to all four representative complaints is that plaintiff dealers lost profits beсause bribe-paying dealers received unfair allotments of cars. Defendants argue that, because such a claim of injury necessarily assumes that a .given plaintiff dealer would have received some other ascertainable allocation, of cars absent the corrupt conduct, the inherent uncertainties involved in Honda’s allocation process
6
and the multiplicity of
Plaintiffs respond that they have adequately pled injury and that any difficulties in proof, quantification, or allocation of damages are matters for later stages of this litigation. Plaintiffs’ underlying position is that because it is undisputed that bribe-paying dealers received more cars than they should have, non-bribe-paying dealers necessarily received fewer cars than they should have. Plaintiffs argue that the logical inescapability of this reasoning means that they have been injured by the bribery scheme, even if it is not currently known, for example, how many more cars any given plaintiff dealer should have received.
RICO’s civil damages provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(e), countenances suits by any person “injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.” This language requires a plaintiff to make two showings: “(1) that he has suffered injury to his business or property; and (2) that this injury was caused by the predicate acts of racketeering activity that make up the violation of § 1962.”
Brandenburg v. Seidel,
Defendants challenge plaintiffs’ standing in terms of both the injury and the causation requirements. Although the four representative complaints articulate several different theories of injury, they agree on one basic claim: that plaintiff dealers were deprived of profits when bribe-paying dealers unjustly received extra cars. 7 I accordingly focus on this claim in my analysis below. I conclude that plaintiffs have satisfied the injury and causation requirements. The complexity of quantifying any given plaintiff dealer’s loss will be of central concern later in this litigation, but plaintiffs have alleged injury to their businesses caused by the bribery scheme. That is enough to survive defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
A Injury
Dismissal for lack of injury is appropriate where the claimed injury is not cognizable as a legal matter, not where the claimed injury is not easily susceptible to proof. Whether plaintiffs’ claims of “alloca
Other than the statutory requirement that a plaintiffs injury must be in the nature of harm to business or property, however, RICO imposes no “heightened” standing threshold. In
Sedima,
the Supreme Court held that the statute’s plain language requires only that the plaintiff “has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation.”
1. “Concrete Fintmcial 'Loss”
Addressing RICO’s statutory language first, defendants do not directly argue that plaintiffs have, failed to allege injury to “business or property” as a qualitative matter. Instead, defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to allege “concrete financial loss,” the RICO injury requirement expressly imposed in the Ninth Circuit.
See Oscar,
I do ■ not find this argument convincing. Defendants for the most part selectively rely on passages from cases that, based on particular factual settings, discuss out-of-pocket costs as a tangible contrast to more amorphous theories of injury. 8 Moreover, in Oscar itself the plaintiff claimed “decreased value of her apartment” and “personal discomfort and annoyance” caused by the conduct of an alleged drug-dealing conspiracy; the Ninth Circuit held that these claims faded to satisfy the “concrete financial loss” requirement because they at most were to a “valuable intangible property interest” and were more in the nature of personal injuries. The allegations of injury in this case are obviously distinguishable.
Defendants’ “concrete financial loss” argument, however, also has a second dimension. Although there is no question that plaintiffs have alleged “financial loss,” defendants also argue that plaintiffs’ injuries are insufficiently “concrete.” For example, in the “concrete financial loss” section of their argument they cite to
First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp.,
2. Injury in Fact
Injuries that are speculative or prospective in nature are insufficient to confer standing. This fundamental principle.of federal court jurisdiction has been widely applied in RICO cases. Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ alleged allocation injuries are too speculative in two respects: (1) they rely on assumptions about past consumer behavior, economic conditions and other factors, and (2) they assume an unascertainable “entitlement” to certain allocations of cars. The first argument fails under established case law. I also find that the second argument does not merit dismissal.
Defendants first posit that “[i]n the Ninth Circuit (whose analysis has not been disavowed or questioned by any other decision of which defendants are aware), when this kind of future profits comprise the sole claimed injury, a RICO claim cannot proceed.” Am. Honda’s Mot. to Dismiss at 26. They also cite cases holding that a mere “lost opportunity” is not a sufficient injury to confer standing under RICO.
E.g. In re Taxable Mun. Bond Litig.,
Plaintiffs, of course, do not allege that they have lost the opportunity to obtain future
The crucial premise of plaintiffs’ lost profits claim, however, is the notion that they “should have received” different allocations of cars than they in fact did receive. This is defendants’ second, and more compelling, basis for arguing that plaintiffs ‘have failed to allege injury in fact. The parties rely on different lines of cases to attack or support the cognizability of this theory of injury. I conclude that neither side has presented directly controlling ease law, but that plaintiffs’ claims should not be dismissed because at least some sets of facts would, sustain their claims.
Defendants cite eases holding that speculative injuries are not cognizable in RICO. For exampié, they rely on
In re Taxable Mun. Bond,
Plaintiffs respond by relying on a number of cases allowing standing to recover for injuries of an inherently uncertain nature, such as lost profits. For example, plaintiffs rely heavily on
Mid Atlantic Telecom,
I recognize that this case is different. In addition to the generally uncertain nature of a claim for lost profits, depending as it does on assumptions about past consumer behavior or economic conditions, here plaintiffs’ very entitlement to the ears is itself uncertain. Defendants therefore distinguish each of the cases relied on by plaintiffs on the following ground: each of those cases in
As a matter of ultimate liability, defendants may be correct. It is certainly arguable that plaintiffs cannot recover by simply claiming that bribe-paying dealers as a group received more cars than .they should have, and that plaintiff dealers as a group therefore received fewer cars than they should have. Instead, each dealer plaintiff may have to establish some reasonably certain entitlement to cars that were misallocated. 12 This may prove to be a daunting issue of proof for plaintiffs.
At the present time, however, the issue does not merit dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims. In
National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,
We have held that “[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” ... [Petitioners’] complaint must be sustained if relief could be granted “under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.”
Id.
at 256,
Defendants’ argument that plaintiffs have faded to allege injury is summarized by a single sentence from American Honda’s moving papers: “To determine the fact of injury, it is necessary to compare some single, actual history with an invented model of a past which never occurred.” Am. Honda’s Mot. to Dismiss at 20. At the pleading stage, however, plaintiffs are not required “to determine the fact of injury.” To survive a motion to dismiss, there need only be one set of facts consistent with plaintiffs’ allegations that would entitle them to relief. Even if defendants are correct that plaintiffs will have some difficulty establishing to which dealer certain cars should have gone, it is clear that some sets of facts could support plaintiffs’ claims.
B. Causation
In
Holmes,
the Supreme Court held that section 1964(c)’s grant of standing to persons injured “by reason of’ a RICO violation “require[s] a showing that the defendant’s violation not only was a ‘but for’ cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well.”
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in
Brandenburg v. Seidel,
In Brandenburg it was recognized that ‘the legal cause determination is properly one for the court, taking into consideration such factors as the foreseeability of the particular injury, the intervention of other independent causes, and the factual directness of the causal connection.’____ In conducting the traditional common-law proximate cause analysis ... courts should focus оn the temporal and circumstantial relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered by the plaintiff, and the foreseeability that intervening events would cause injury to the plaintiff.
Mid Atlantic Telecom,
Defendants argue that plaintiffs cannot even show causation in fact, much less proximate causation. This assertion essentially restates their above-discussed argument that plaintiffs have not pled injury. Because no plaintiff dealer can establish a specific entitlement to a certain allocation of cars, defendants claim, no plaintiff can show that any bribes received by Honda caused harm to any specific plaintiff. Defendants attempt to support this contention in three ways.
First, defendants argue that because no plaintiff dealer was the intended victim of any of the predicate acts alleged in the complaints, plaintiffs cannot show that their claimed injuries were caused by those acts. Defendants emphasize that any harm caused to plaintiff dealers was an unintentional and indirect result of the bribery scheme. Defendants therefore argue that no plaintiff dealer can claim to have been “defrauded” or otherwise directly duped out of property or money.
13
In response, plaintiffs point out
Second, defendants recite the
Holmes’
Court’s discussion of the three considerations that justify a proximate causation requirement as an element of RICO standing: (1) “the less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintiffs damages attributable to the violation;” (2) “recognizing claims of the indirectly injured would force courts to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts;” and (3) there is no need to grapple with problems (1) and (2) because “directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law.”
Plaintiffs correctly respond, however, that the Holmes’ factors are not themselves a “threе part test” of causation. Rather, Holmes’ causation “test” is that the alleged RICO violation must be a proximate cause of the claimed injury (as opposed to a mere cause-in-fact, a less exacting showing not literally precluded by the statute). The three factors are but the reasons behind the rule, and defendants’ argument attempts to turn Holmes’ holding on its head. If plaintiffs have alleged a sufficiently direct injury resulting from the bribery scheme, they have satisfied the proximate causation requirement, difficulties of quantification and allocation notwithstanding.
Third and finally, defendants place heavy reliance on
Sheperd v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.,
As plaintiffs point out, however,
Sheperd
is different from this case in one crucial respect. The plaintiffs in that case alleged injury in “the. diversion of popular makes, models, and colors of cars to other dealerships, as well as lower allocations of cars,
which impeded their ability to compete effectively and resulted in the sale of their dealership at a distressed price.”
I therefore conclude that plaintiffs’ allegations of allocation injury satisfy the proximate causation element required for RICO standing. Assuming plaintiffs’ allegations of injury to be true, they have pled an obvious causal connection between their lost profits and the predicate acts constituting the bribery scheme. That plaintiff dealers would be deprived of profits is the direct and foreseeable result of the alleged scheme to give and receive bribes in exchange for higher allocations of cars.
See Mylan Labs.,
III.
I next consider the various defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ RICO claims. I will consider the claims against each group of defendants in turn. Three Honda corporate entities—American Honda, Honda North America and Honda Motor Company, Ltd.— are named as RICO defendants in each of the four representative complaints. American Honda does not dispute for present purposes that it is subject to respondeat superi- or liability for the acts of its executives. American Honda instead challenges the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ allegations of predicate acts of mail fraud and of the claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), (b), & (d).
Honda Motor Company, Ltd. (“Honda Japan”), the domestic defendants’ Japanese corporate parent, first joins in the domestic defendants’ arguments. Honda Japan then offers a separate set of arguments that it has no connection to -the U.S. activities of American Honda and therefore cannot be held vicariously or directly liable in this case.
A number of current and former Honda dealers are also named as defendants. They echo several of the Honda defendants’ positions with respect to standing and pleading sufficiency. They also offer separate arguments for dismissal of the RICO claims. • .
Finally, the law firm of Lyon & Lyon argues that plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege RICO claims against it based on its role representing American Honda.
A American Honda
1. Predicate Acts of Mail Fraud
American Honda argues that the allegations of mail and wire fraud in the complaints are fatally flawed because “plaintiffs do not identify any defrauded party within the proscriptions of the mail -fraud and wire fraud statutes.” Am. Honda’s Mot. to Dismiss at 30 (emphasis omitted). Many other defendants join in- this argument. Defendants’ underlying point is that the acts of bribery that plaintiffs characterize as mail fraud were not fraudulent at all; because both the bribe-paying dealers and the bribe-taking Honda
The federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, provides: “Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, ... [uses the mails to further the scheme, shall be guilty of mail fraud].” The elements of mail fraud derived from this definition are clearly established: “(1) the, devising of a scheme or artifice either (a) to defraud or (b) for obtaining money by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, (2) the specific intent to defraud, and (3) the use of the United States mails to execute the scheme.”
United States v. Kennedy,
The Supreme Court has held that “the words ‘to defraud’ in the mail fraud statute have the ‘common understanding’ of ‘wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes,’ and ‘usually signify the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane, or overreaching.’ ”
Carpenter v. United States,
Defendants’ argument that Lew compels dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims is not persuasive. In Lew, the Ninth Circuit reversed the mail fraud convictions of an attorney who was found to have made misrepresentations to the INS in order to obtain employment certifications for his non-citizen clients. The indictment in that case charged the defendant with defrauding his clients out of legal fees, however, and did not allege that he received any money or property from the INS. The court therefore held that no party had been “defrauded” under section 1341— not the INS because it had not paid out money or property, and not the defendant’s clients because they had not been deceived.
This argument fails for the same reasons as defendants’ contention that plaintiffs lack standing. Plaintiffs have asserted a contractual entitlement to fair and reasonable allocations of cars and have alleged that defendants engaged in a scheme to deprive them of this property right. Taking this claim as true, even
Lew
supports the validity of plaintiffs’ mail fraud allegations. The Ninth Circuit noted in
Lew
that the crucial element missing from the government’s case was “an intent to obtain money or property from the victim of the deceit.”
Lew, 875
F.2d at 222;
see also United States v. Leonard,
I also note that, at best, defendants’ argument that an admitted bribery ling—one in which Honda executives took bribes to divert cars from plaintiff dealers to bribe-paying dealers—is not a “scheme to defraud” rests on. a technical definition of what it- means “to defraud.” • Although cases such as
Lew
have identified certain categories of conduct beyond the reach of section 1341,
21
in general courts have broadly interpreted the Supreme Court’s statement that “the words ‘to defraud’ commonly refer to wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes.”
E.g., Altman,
2. Claims Under Sections 1962(a), 1962(b) and 1962(d)
American Honda finally argues that the complaints fail to properly plead claims under sections 1962(a), 1962(b) and 1962(d). I will consider these claims in turn.
a. Section 1962(a)
Section 1962(a) states, in relevant part, “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived ..from a pattern of racketeering activity ... to use or invest ... any part of such income ... [in] the establishment or operation of ... any enterprise which is engaged in ... interstate or foreign' commerce.” Most circuits require that section 1962(a) plaintiffs plead “a specific injury to the plaintiff caused by the investment of income into the racketeering enterprise,
distinct from,
any injuries caused by the predicate acts of racketeering.”
Vemco, Inc. v. Camardella,
Plaintiffs initially argue that- the Fourth -Circuit has declined to adopt the “investment use” injury requirement.
See Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc.,
Recognizing that
Busby
is not the prevailing rule, however, plaintiffs also argue that they have sufficiently pled “investment use” injury. Each of the complaints’ section .1962(a) counts, alleges specific ways in which the domestic Honda defendants received income from the bribery scheme and invested such income in ways that injured plaintiffs. In particular, plaintiffs offer two primary allegations of “use or investment” of racketeering proceeds: (1) that corrupt Honda executives used the bribes and kickbacks they received to obtain ownership interests in existing or new dealerships, and (2) that Honda received income in that it was able to pay its executives substantially less than other manufacturers, and that Honda used this income, directly or indirectly, to finance its
Defendants offer two arguments in response. First, defendants argue that the literal injury allegations in the section 1962(a) counts are almost identical to those of the section 1962(c) counts, and that therefore the section 1962(a) allegations must be viewed as failing to allege any distinct injury.
See, e.g., Breakaway
Compl. at ¶¶245, 276. Second, defendants note that courts have supplemented the “investment use” injury requirement with the following rule: a plaintiff cannot allege investment injury merely by claiming that subsequent racketeering acts would not have happened but for the use of prior racketeering income to maintain the existence of the enterprise itself. Because a RICO pattern requires at least two predicate acts, allowing plaintiffs to artfully plead such allegations of “reinvestment injury” would effectively allow any section 1962(e) claim also to be brought as a section 1962(a) claim, thereby circumventing the very purpose of the “investment use” injury requirement.
See Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp.,
I find, however, that plaintiffs have alleged “investment use” injury. First, the allegations in the Borman and Austin Motor complaints that plaintiffs were injured when corrupt Honda executives used bribes and kickbacks to obtain ownership interests in bribe-paying dealerships clearly allegе a distinct injury. As the Borman plaintiffs argue, “[bjeyond sustaining and perpetuating the conspiracy, the illicit ownership interests resulted in further wrongful diversions of cars. But for the Honda executives’ investment of racketeering income in Bribe-paying Dealerships, the Plaintiffs’ damages would have been less.” Borman Opp’n at 39. In other words, plaintiffs allege that these bribe-paying dealerships received particular favoritism because they were owned by Honda executives, not just because they paid bribes. , This is a distinct allegation of injury caused by the investment of racketeering income. 24
Moreover, I also find that defendants’ “reinvestment” argument—that plaintiffs have not alleged distinct investment injury because the injury allegations in their section 1962(a) and section 1962(c) counts are somewhat circular as to the overall alleged enterprise
25
—misapprehends the purpose of the “investment use” injury pleading requirement. This rule does not force plaintiffs to choose whether to bring a given claim of injury either under section 1962(a) or section 1962(c); instead, it requires allegations under section 1962(a) to be supported by distinct allegations of how the use or investment of illicit income played a causative role. Similarly, the rule against “reinvestment” allegations is not a
per se
rule that the use of proceeds from predicate acts chargeable under section 1962(c) can never support a separate claim under section 1962(a). Instead, this rule requires only that plaintiffs do more than allege that income received from one predicate act was used in the operation of an enterprise and thereby facilitated the commission of later predicate acts.
Cf. Newmyer v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd.,
These pleading rules do not, however, prevent a plaintiff from alleging that the same injuries were caused by violations of both section 1962(a) and section 1962(c). Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Honda (1) received racketeering income by encouraging sales executives to rely on the “supplemental income system;” (2) that Honda invested this income by its financing of its nationwide sales and' allocation system; and (3) that plaintiffs suffered various injuries—including allocation injuries, competitive harms and out-of-pocket losses—as the result of the operation of that system. This claim satisfies the pleading requirements of section 1962(a), even to the extent that plaintiffs claim the same kinds of injuries, as were caused by the predicate acts themselves. In effect, plaintiffs’ section 1962(a) counts represent an alternate theory of liability agаinst the Honda corporate defendants: in addition to asserting violations of section 1962(c) on a theory of respondeat superior liability, plaintiffs also allege direct violations of section 1962(a) based on the Honda defendants’ use of the income it indirectly received.
6. Section 1962(b)
18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) makes it “unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity ... to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in ... interstate or foreign commerce.” Defendants restate their section 1962(a) argument in challenging plaintiffs’ claims under section 1962(b): because the plaintiffs have articulated the same claims of injury in each of their RICO counts, they necessarily have failed to plead the “acquisition injury” required under section 1962(b).
Although section 1962(b) ease law is sparse, the clear direction of courts in requiring an “investment use” injury under section 1962(a) indicates that section 1962(b) plaintiffs must plead a specific causal nexus between defendants’ acquisition or maintenance of control over an enterprise and claimed injuries. I find that plaintiffs have done so. Plaintiffs have alleged that high-ranking Honda executives “maintained their control” over Honda’s nationwide sales operation by manipulating the allocation and dealership award processes, encouraging zone managers to participate in the “supplemental income system,” by directing executives to carry out fraudulent schemes such as the “dealer ad group” campaigns that funneled funds to corrupt officials; and by threatening to demote or fire any Honda whistleblowers. Plaintiffs’ claimed injuries directly resulted from these activities. Plaintiffs therefore have properly stated their counts for violation of section 1962(b).
c. Section 1962(d)
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) makes it “unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.” The circuits are split over whether a section 1962(d) claim must allege injury caused by a predicate act of racketeering,
see Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank,
Plaintiffs correctly, respond that they have, as discussed above, properly alleged numerous injuries caused by violations of sections. 1962(a)-(c). There is no dispute that- plaintiffs have alleged that Honda executives conspirеd to defraud plaintiff dealers
B. Honda Japan
Honda, Ltd., American Honda’s Japanese corporate parent, (Honda Japan), both has joined in the arguments in support of the motion to dismiss by the domestic Honda defendants and has filed a separate brief. The major issues separately presented by Honda Japan are: (1) whether plaintiffs have adequately alleged a basis for holding Honda Japan liable through the doctrine of alter ego liability; (2) whether Honda Japan could be held liable vicariously on the basis of the alleged activities of persons who were officers or directors of both American Honda and Honda Japan; and (8) whether plaintiffs have adequately alleged aiding and abetting claims against Honda Japan.
One of the underlying questions with respect to Honda Japan is the extent to which the corporate parent can be held liable for the activities of American Honda and its employees. As I noted earlier, however, each of the complaints attempts to sidestep this issue by referring genetically to Honda Ltd., Honda N.A. and American Honda as the “defendant Honda.” Plaintiffs of course cannot pierce the corporate veil simply through a pleading device, and I have already directed plaintiffs to replead their complaints to delineate the specific claims against each of the Honda defendants. See supra section LA.
1. “Alter Ego ” Liability
Honda Japan first challenges plaintiffs’ attempt to assert an “alter ego” theory of liability. Defendant argues that “piercing the corporate veil” requires an extraordinary showing that plaintiffs have not alleged and could not possibly prove. Plaintiffs do not dispute defendant’s basic legal arguments, but they argue that alter ego liability is a factual issue that is not properly resolved by motion to dismiss.
The corporate form will be disregarded only where upholding it would lead to a patently unjust result.. Courts therefore evaluate factors such as (1) the amount of respect given to the separate identity of the subsidiary by the parent; (2) the fraudulent intent of the incorporators; and (3) the degree of injustice that will result if the two companies are treated as separate entities.
See Orloff v. Allman,
There are cases however, as Honda Japan asserts, in which courts have dismissed alter ego claims against corporate parents. In
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Driscoll,
Plaintiffs’ allegations are not sufficient to permit them to proceed on a theory of alter ego liability. Their allegation that
2. Liability Based Upon Activities of Persons Acting in Dual Capacities
Plaintiffs allege that certain corrupt executives were acting in their capacities both as officers and directors of American Honda and Honda Japan when they participated in the bribery scheme. Most notably, plaintiffs allege that Koichi Amemiya, who during a relevant time period was both the president of American Honda and a director of Honda Japan, masterminded the scheme. Plaintiffs argue that their allegations are sufficient to establish that Honda Japan is vicariously liable for what occurred. 27 As I have indicated above, the specificity of the complaints are clouded by plaintiffs’ use of “defendant Honda” as a pleading device. Nevertheless, I am of the view that plaintiffs have stated claims against Honda Japan.
If what plaintiffs assert is true, Amemiya and others who served American Honda and Honda Japan in dual capacities were fully aware of the bribery scheme and directly participated in it. Honda Japan contends that this is not enough. It points out that plaintiffs’ artful pleading reflects that plaintiffs are unable to distinguish between the roles which Amemiya and his fellows were playing. Further, it asks “where was the benefit that we (Honda Japan) were receiving? We simply manufacture vehicles and how they are allocated to dealers is of no consequence to us as long as we are able to sell (as plaintiffs assert we were able to do during the relevant period) all of the vehicles that we produced.”
Honda Japan’s arguments are not without their force. However, they are essentially
This is a difficult area of the law, one that simultaneously calls for a proper respect for legitimate corporate formalities and a wariness against permitting form to prevail over substance. Generalized and vague pleadings cannot be allowed to circumvent the statutes and common-law rules that protect corporate separateness. Here, however, even recognizing the pleading deficiency in telescoping all of the “Honda defendants” into one, plaintiffs have done more than simply allege that Honda Japan should be held liable for the actions of its American subsidiary and its agents. It has particularized individuals who were closely associated and identified with Honda Japan, who were chosen by it to run a major portion of its worldwide distribution network and who actively participated in what, if plaintiffs’ allegations are accepted to be true, can only be characterized as egregious misconduct.
It is facts, not allegations, that will finally determine the outcome of this litigation. Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving not only the underlying bribes and the damages that they suffered therefrom but also the part played by each of the defendants whom they have named. This will be no easy task. If, however, they produce facts that demonstrate that Honda Japan' officials situated in the United States actively were involved in a bribery scheme, that they advised other high-ranking officers and directors of Honda Japan about it and that Honda Japan did nothing to stop the scheme, they will have gone a long way in meeting their burden. They will- have gone even further if they can prove that the scheme broadened because of the involvement of executives who were identified with Honda Japan because, for example, dealers were more likely to pay bribes based on their perception that the bribery system was endorsed by the Japanese parent, or that dealers or Honda employees declined to inform anyone about the scheme out of despair or fear of retaliation. And presumably even Honda Japan would concede its liability if plaintiffs could establish that it directed and encouraged the scheme for reasons of its own. These and similar issues must be explored through discovery, and the adequacy of plaintiffs’ proof under their various legal theories tested by summary judgment.
3. Aiding and Abetting
As a third alternative theory of liability, plaintiffs also assert claims against Honda Japan for aiding and abetting. Honda Japan first argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A,
C. Dealer Defendants
Of - the many dealer defendants filing motions to dismiss, only three have filed substantive memoranda: the Hendrick defendants, Schuiling defendants 29 and Lustgarten defendants. All of the other dealer defendants filing motions to dismiss join the arguments of at least one of these three. The dealer defendants echo the Honda defendants’ arguments with respect to plaintiffs’ standing, the sufficiency of the predicate acts of mail fraud and the adequacy of the Borman complaint’s allegations against “all defendants.” My analysis of these issues set forth above applies equally to the dealer defendants. The dealers also offer several independent challenges to the ádequacy of the complaints’ claims under sections 1962(a)-(d).
My analysis in this section will focus on the claims against the various individuals and corporate entities associated with the Hendrick Automotive Group (Hendrick), who are named in each of the
Borman, Breakaway
and
Austin Motor
complaints. Hendrick allegedly owned more than 25 Honda dealerships during the time period at issue in this case and is allegedly one of the largest dealers to participate in the various bribery schemes. Of the three complaints,
Breakaway
is the primary complaint stating claims specifically against Hendrick.
30
I therefore focus my separate analysis of the claims against the dealer defendants on the
Breaka
Hendrick challenges the sufficiency Of each of plaintiffs’ three substantive RICO violations. With one possible exception, 31 all of the complaints allege the same “enterprise” in their claims against Hendrick:
Defendant Honda, consisting of Defendants Honda Ltd., Honda North America, and American Honda, constituted an enterprise within the meaning of § 1961(4) of RICO. Defendant Honda was and is an ongoing corporate organization subdivided into a managerial structure with Defendant Honda Ltd. at the top, which wholly owns Defendant Honda North America, which' in turn wholly owns Defendant American Honda. At all times stated in this Complaint, Defendant Honda operated as a cohesive continuing unit for the purpose of manufacturing, promoting, distributing and selling. Honda and Acura automobiles.
Breakaway Compl. at ¶379; see also id. at ¶¶394, 407; Borman Compl. at ¶¶234, 256. Thus, in its claims under sections 1962(a)-(c), Breakaway alleges that Hendrick: (1) “used or invested” racketeering income in the management or operation of the Honda enterprise’s activities; (2) “acquired an interest” in Honda; and (3) participated in thе conduct of Honda’s affairs. I conclude that, even if true, the payment of bribes to obtain influence over an enterprise’s activities falls short of “investing in” or “acquiring an interest in” the enterprise. However, as clearly stated in controlling case law, payment of bribes is sufficient to “participate in the conduct” of the enterprise.
1. Sections 1962(a) & (b)
Plaintiffs’ section 1962(a) and 1962(b) allegations are for the most part identical. As an initial matter, plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Hendrick “received income” from racketeering activity. For example, they allege that Hendrick received extra profits on cars misallocated on. the,.basis of bribes and kickbacks. Plaintiffs then claim that Hendrick “used or invested” this income “by paying bribes to Defendant Honda employees to obtain more LOIs [i.e., “Letters of Intent” for new dealerships], dealerships and cars from Defendant Honda.” Breakaway Compl. at 385. The complaint then adds that Hendrick “used and invested this income in the ‘supplemental income system’ at Defendant Honda for Defendant Honda executives.” Id. at 386. Plaintiffs’, section 1962(b) claims against Hendrick repeat this “indirect investment” allegation: plaintiffs claim that Hendrick “maintained a direct and indirect interest in and control of the RICO enterprise of Defendant Honda” by “bribing Defendant Honda executives and employees.” Breakaway Compl. at 398. Plaintiffs claim that by paying bribes, Hendrick “manipulated the system for awarding dealerships and allocating cars, and thus maintained direct and indirect control over the enterprise of Defendant Honda.” Id. In other words, plaintiffs characterize Hendrick’s payment of bribes as an “investment” intended to obtain' partial control over Honda’s allocation and dealership award activities.
Defendant dealers argue that paying bribes to obtain influence over allocation decisions does not constitute “investing” or “acquiring or maintaining an interest” in the Honda enterprise. Defendants rely on
Moffatt Enters., Inc. v. Borden, Inc.,
“A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer ... shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities ... do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer ... the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.”
Id. at 143 (quoting section 1962(a)). Thus, section 1962(a) uses “control” to refer to a proprietary interest in an enterprise, and not simply some degree of influence over the enterprise’s affairs. Moffatt reasons that the same meaning should be used for purposes of section 1962(b), absent express congressional intent to the contrary.
Moffatt then describes how RICO’s legislative history in fact confirms that the two subsections are to be read together.
Subsection (b) prohibits acquisition or maintenance of an enterprise through the proscribed pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. There is no 1 percent limitation here as in subsection (a) because (a) focuses on legitimate acquisition with illegitimate funds. Subsection (b) focuses on illegitimate acquisition with illegitimate funds---- Consequently, any acquisition meeting the test of subsection (b) is prohibited without exception.
Id. (quoting H.R.Rep. No 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 4007, 4033). Moffatt therefore concludes that “the ‘interest’ eontemplated in both sections 1962(a) and 1962(b) is in the nature of a proprietary one, such as the acquisition of'stock, and that the ‘control’ contemplated is in the nature of the control one gains through the acquisition of sufficient stock to affect the composition of a board of directors.” Id. The opinion carefully notes, however, that it is not purporting to announce a per se rule that section 1962(b) applies only to acquiring stock or controlling directors. Instead, it holds that actions cognizable under section 1962(b) must be “in the nature” of these activities.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ allegation that paying bribes constituted “investing” or “acquiring an interest” in Honda is not in the nature of obtaining such a proprietary interest. I agree.
32
I therefore adopt Moffatt’s reasoning that sections 1962(a) and (b) properly apply to activities in the .nature of acquiring a proprietary stake in an enterprise, not simply obtaining some influence' over discretionary activities.
See also NCNB Nat’l Bank v. Tiller,
Hendrick next argues that plaintiffs have failed to allege that Hendrick “participated in the conduct” of the Honda enterprise. Hendrick relies on
Reves v. Ernst & Young,
Plaintiffs do allege that Hendrick, a .major bribe-paying dealer, paid bribes not only to receive specific reciprocal benefits, but also to obtain a general degree of influence over Honda executives.
35
Moreover, the
Reves
Court noted that the operation or management test does not necessarily limit section 1962(c) liability to an enterprise’s “insiders.” Specifically, the Court stated that “[a]n enterprise also might be ‘operated’ or ‘managed’ by others ‘associated with’ the enterprise who exert control over it as, for example, by bribery.”
Id.
at 184,
S. Section 1962(d)
The parties’ arguments with respect to the RICO conspiracy count address familiar issues of conspiracy liability. The parties do not dispute that plaintiffs have pled the elements of a section 1962(d) claim: the dealer defendants allegedly committed predicate acts of mail fraud in furtherance of their agreements with various specific bribe-taking Honda executives. The only disputed issue is whether plaintiffs have properly pled facts supporting the scope of the conspiracy they allege. Plaintiffs allege a “global” conspiracy: that “[Hendrick] conspired with Defendant Honda and certain other bribe-paying Honda and Aeura dealers, some of whom are named above and others whom are yet unknown to Plaintiffs ... to violate RICO § 1962(a), (b) and (e).” Breakaway Compl. at ¶420; see also Borman Compl. at 385; Austin Motor Compl. at ¶ 220.
Hendrick argues that plaintiffs have not alleged that any of the dealer defendants communicated with each other in connection with the alleged schemes, nor that Hendrick had any knowledge of or an intent to further a global conspiracy to defraud plaintiff dealers as a group. Hendrick thus invokes the familiar “hub and spoke” conspiracy analysis: although there is no question that plaintiffs have alleged the existence of a “hub” (i.e., Honda) and of “spokes” (i.e., the individual conspiracies between specific bribe-paying dealers and Honda), plaintiffs have alleged no facts supporting the existence of a “rim” to the conspiracy (i.e., communication among the various bribe-paying dealers). Plaintiffs’ main response is that specific facts indicating a “rim” to the conspiracy are not necessary because they have pled that Hendrick knew about the scope of the global conspiracy and intended to further it. Plaintiffs’ contention really amounts to a claim that Hendrick, allegedly a major bribe-paying dealer, must have known about the conspiracy because it was so widespread.
See generally Kotteakos v. United States,
L Miscellaneous Issues
The remaining group of dealer defendants filing separate memoranda are the individuals named in their capacities as executors of the estate of Martin Lustgarten, an alleged bribe-paying dealer who died in 1989 (Lustgarten). Lustgarten is named only in the Borman complaint.
Lustgarten argues that plaintiffs failed to comply with Pennsylvania probate requirements and therefore cannot assert claims against Martin Lustgarten’s estate.
36
Plaintiffs filed their claims against the Lustgarten estate by serving one executor, Raymond Hovsepian, in 1995. The Lustgarten defendants argue that plaintiffs’ claims against the estate are deficient for two reasons: (1) under Pennsylvania law, all executors must be jointly sued to state a claim against an estate,
see
21 Standard Pa.Practice 2d § 115:28;
Gram v. May,
Plaintiffs respond that they should not be penalized (1) for serving the only executor reasonably known to them at the time of filing, or (2) for failing to act on notice of a probate proceeding published only in a local newspaper. Putting aside the procedural sufficiéncy of plaintiffs’ service on the estate, I find that defendants are correct that plaintiffs’ claims against the estate are time-barred. In
Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope,
In any event, plaintiffs seem to concede that Lustgarten’s estate is not the proper party. In their opposition, plaintiffs state that “[t]he Lustgarten Executors have ignored the Borman Plaintiffs’ allegation that it .was Lustgarten’s entities through which bribes and kickbacks flowed to various Honda agents. The Lustgarten Dealerships, which are not ‘deceased’, conducted Lustgarten’s business affairs and acted, for all practical purposes, as conduits for Lustgarten’s bribe-paying activity. Plaintiffs have requested leave to add those entities as defendants once they are identified.” Such leave is granted.
D. Lyon & Lyon
Roland Smoot, a partner in the California-based law firm of Lyon & Lyon, served on
Lyon & Lyon and Smoot are named as defendants in the Borman and Austin Motors complaints. Borman asserts violations of sections 1962(c) and (d); Austin Motors brings a claim under section 1962(d) that is effectively the same as Borman’s count under that section. I evaluate these counts below. I find that, as currently alleged, these claims are insufficient. Because they may be properly restated, however, plaintiffs are granted leave to amend.
1. Section 1962(c)
Plaintiffs offer the following section 1962(c) allegations: (1) that there was an enterprise consisting of the association of the three Honda entities; (2) that Lyon & Lyon “participated in the conduct” of the Honda enterprise’s affairs because Lyon & Lyon attorneys held management positions with American Honda, covered up reports of bribe-taking and conflicts of interest by executives and advised Honda executives to withhold information during the criminal investigation; and (3) that defendants engaged in a pattern of activity by committing predicate acts of obstruction of justice, witness tampering and mail fraud. Plaintiffs allege that defendants knew about the bribery scheme, played a central role within Honda to further the scheme by “keeping the lid” on complaints from non-bribe-paying dealers and then carried out a cover-up that prolonged the scheme’s duration.
a. “Participation” by Lyon & Lyon
Defendants first argue that they did not' “participate in the conduct of’ Honda’s affairs. They rely on
Reves v. Ernst & Young,
Defendants cite several
post-Reves
cases finding that somewhat similar allegations against attorneys fail to constitute “operation or management” of the enterprise. In
Bowdoin Constr. Corp. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat’l Bank,
These cases reveal an underlying distinction between acting in an advisory professional capacity (even if in a knowingly fraudulent way) and acting as a direct participant in corporate affairs.
E.g., Bowdoin Constr.,
I find that allegations of this kind do assert “participation” in the Honda enterprise. Unfortunately, as drafted, the current complaints do not offer sufficiently specific allegations to put Lyon & Lyon on notice as to precisely how it allegedly played such a direct role; much of my above discussion derives frоm plaintiffs’ opposition memoranda and oral argument. Plaintiffs are accordingly directed to amend their complaints.
b. Pattern Requirement
Lyon & Lyon’s second argument under section 1962(c) is that plaintiffs have failed to allege a “pattern” of racketeering. Obviously, that argument is mooted if plaintiffs properly replead to allege Lyon & Lyon’s direct role in the bribery scheme as discussed above. In that event plaintiffs’ present allegations that between 1990 and 1992 various Honda executives committed perjury or otherwise obstructed criminal investigations on the advice of Lyon & Lyon will simply supplement its allegations concerning Lyon & Lyon’s earlier involvement. 39 If, on the other hand, plaintiffs conclude that they cannot properly allege facts sufficient to support their presently eonclusory averment regarding Lyon & Lyon’s direct participation, but that they can properly allege facts to support an averment of Lyon & Lyon’s direct management of a coverup in the later years, I will then consider the issues raised by this more limited theory.
2. Section 1962(d)
The elements of. a claim under section 1962(d) traditionally have been stated to be: (1) knowledge of the general nature of the conspiracy; (2) agreement by the defendant: (a) to personally commit a violation of sections 1962(a)—(c); (b) to aid or abet a violation; or (c) that another co-conspirator commit a violation; and (3) injury caused by an act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
See United States v. Pryba,
IV.
Plaintiffs assert claims under two antitrust statutes: (1) The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, 41 and (2) the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(e). Each will be addressed in turn. 42
A Sherman Act Claims
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: “Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states ... is declared to be illegal.”
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court has long since interpreted the statute as applying only to those restraints that unreasonably restrain trade and competition. See
Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
While most restraints require elaborate inquiry under the rule of reason,
43
Plaintiffs attempt to invoke the
per se
rule by classifying the bribery scheme as a “group boycott.” In their representative complaints, plaintiffs allege that the bribery scheme was illegal since it acted as a horizontal agreement among the defendants and eoeonspirators giving favorable allocations to defendant dealers.
See
Borman Compl. ¶ 329; Breakaway Compl. ¶ 304; Austin Compl. ¶236. As a result, plaintiffs were excluded from access to products and competition on an equal basis. Determining whether concerted action qualifies as a group boycott, thus meriting
per se
treatment, has historically been the most difficult issue facing courts in the context of the
per se
rule.
As
the Supreme Court noted: “[T]here is more confusion about the scope and operation of the
per se
rule against group boycotts than in reference to any other aspect of the
per se
doctrine.”
Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery,
The Supreme Court has cautioned against application of the
per se
rule by pigeonholing certain conduct as a group boycott.
Id.
(noting that types of conduct that fall -within category of group boycotts is far from certain and thus courts must use great care);
FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists,
The category of restraints classed as group boycotts is not to be expanded indiscriminately, and the per se approach has generally, been limited to cases in which firms with market power [at the same level of distribution] boycott suppliers or customers in order to discourage them from doing business with a competitor.
Some courts have used the phrase “classic group boycotts” to describe the type of boycotts obviously anticompetitive and thus deserving of
per se
treatment. “Classic” boycotts essentially have two characteristics. First, they involve horizontal agreements among competitors at the same level of distribution refusing to deal with suppliers or customers who deal with their competitors.
See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp.,
Plaintiffs in this ease have failed to allege facts that demonstrate a classic group boycott by the Honda defendants and the defendant dealers. First, despite their eonelusory allegations that the bribery scheme was a horizontal restraint, the agreements between individual defendant dealers and the Honda defendants were vertical in nature. Honda is a manufacturer and the defendant dealers act as distributors: Plaintiffs make-no allegation that the dealers conspired among themselves to exclude the plaintiffs from competition. Second, they have failed to adequately allege anticompetitive purpose. Indeed, the facts alleged demonstrate that Honda executives participated in the scheme in order to receive supplemental income in the form of bribes. The defendant dealers wanted more favorable allocations, in both numbers and “mix,” in order to reap extra profits. See, e.g., Borman Compl. ¶ 137. While it is true that the defendant dealers allegedly intended to injure the plaintiffs through the bribery scheme, the complaints make clear that they intended to do so only to the extent they would receive extra profits from misalloeated cars rather than the plaintiffs. See id.
Plaintiffs contend that the bribery scheme was a horizontal restraint, and thus deserves
per se
treatment, since the anticompetitive
effects
were horizontal in nature. Both
Borman
and
Breakaway
rely heavily on
ComTel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp.,
DuKane
is distinguishable from the facts here, and the plaintiffs’ reliance on
Du-Kane
is otherwise misplaced. First, the defendants in
DuKane
conspired to rid plaintiff, in totality, as a competitor by agreeing not to sell any equipment to the plaintiff. Here, there is no allegation that the defendants conspired to completely exclude-the plaintiffs from the relevant markets. Second,
DuKane did
involve a horizontal agreement since the defendant distributors, in addition to conspiring with the manufacturer, conspired among themselves to exclude plaintiff as a competitor. Here, there has been no allegation that the defendant dealers conspired among themselves.
See Dunn & Mavis, Inc. v. Nu-Car Driveaway, Inc.,
This last point was explicitly addressed by the Supreme Court in
Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics,
Restraints imposed by agreement between competitors have traditionally been denominated as horizontal restraints, and those imposed by agreement between firms at different levels of distribution as vertical restraints---- The dissent apparently believes that whether a restraint is horizontal depends upon whether its anticompetitive effects are horizontal, and not upon whether it is the product of a horizontal agreement. That is of course a conceivable way of talking, büt if it were the language of antitrust analysis there would be no such thing as an unlawful vertical restraint, since all anticompetitive effects are by definition horizontal effects____ [A] restraint is horizontal not because it has horizontal effects, but because it is the product of a horizontal agreement. .
Id.
at 730 & n. 4,
On its facts,
Business Electronics
involved a far more egregious restraint designed to exсlude competition than the bribery scheme at issue in this case. Indeed, the very goal of the restraint in
Business Electronics
was to eliminate price competition, a goal ultimately fulfilled. Here, no agreement has been alleged by which defendant dealers sought to restrain price competition or to entirely exclude plaintiffs from competing. The preferential allocations occasioned by bribes might constitute fraud and common law violations in this case, but they do not constitute
per se
violations of the Sherman Act.
See also Gregoris,
B. Robinson-Patman Act Claims
Plaintiffs’ second antitrust theory arises under section 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act. Section 2(c) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid.
15 U.S.C. § 13(c).
The Robinson-Patman Act was enacted to curb tactics that had been developed by large buyers and sellers to circumvent the discriminatory price provisions of
Although “dummy” brokerage fees constituted the species of the problem that the Robinson-Patman Act addressed, section 2(c) is broadly phrased and covers a generic practice: discrimination in the pricing and distribution of goods because of a buyer’s or a seller’s demand for a receipt of benefits below or above the stated price by way of rebate, discount, payment (direct or indirect) or otherwise. The Act .also makes unlawful the conferral of such benefits by the other party. The course of conduct alleged by plaintiffs in this case is an iteration of this practice and falls squarely within the literal terms and the intendment of the statute. According to plaintiffs, Honda executives, acting within the scope of their authority, demanded that dealers make payments, or provide gifts to them in order to purchase vehicles which Honda zone managers had the discretionary authority to allocate. The defendant dealers at least acquiesced in (and perhaps encouraged) these demands and therefore received more of the allocated vehicles to plaintiffs’ detriment. This, in effect, mirrors the practice of charging “dummy” brokerage fees. Here, it is the manufacturer/supplier who is alleged to have possessed leverage and demanded payments to third parties (the executives in their personal capacity) that ultimately benefitted the manufacturer/supplier itself. The alleged benefit was the reduction in compensation that American Honda had to pay to its executives by virtue of the payments and gifts that they were receiving from dealers.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs claim is flawed because they have failed to allege any independent antitrust injury. While I recognize that there is a split of authority on the issue,
compare Federal Paper Bd. Co., Inc. v. Amato,
Plaintiffs assert claims under the Dealers’ Day in Court Act (“DDCA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221 et seq. The DDCA provides a cause of action for automobile dealers against automobile manufacturers who fail to “act in good faith in performing or complying with any terms or provisions of the franchise, or in terminating, canсeling, or not renewing the franchise.” Id. § 1222. “Good Faith” is narrowly defined by the Act:
The term “good faith” shall mean the duty of each party to any franchise, and all officers, employees, or agents thereof to act in a fair and equitable manner toward each other so as to guarantee the one party freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation from the other party.
Id. § 1221(e) (emphasis added).
Courts have universally concluded that lack of “good faith” has a limited and restricted meaning; it does not mean simple unfairness or breach of a franchise agreement, but rather “actual or threatened coercion or intimidation” imposed upon the dealer by the manufacturer.
See, e.g., Wallace Motor Sales v. American Motors Sales Corp.,
Despite their conclusory allegations that they felt “coerced and intimidated” into purchasing vehicles from dealer defendants at high prices because of the bribery scheme, plaintiffs’ complaints are plainly insufficient to establish a DDCA claim against any Honda defendant. Plaintiffs have made no allegation that Honda executives threatened them with termination, or that other dealers would get more cars, if they did not embark on a certain course of conduct. Nor have they alleged that they felt “forced” or “compelled” to purchase cars from other dealers because they thought they would be sanctioned. They purchased vehicles from other dealers because they were not getting enough to keep up with demand, not because they felt they would be sanctioned by Honda if they did not. If Honda executives had elicited bribes from plaintiffs with the threat that allocations would go to other dealers if not paid, then the elements of coercion and wrongful demand necessary to establish a claim would be present. But plaintiffs make no allegation that Honda executives approached them with a quid pro quo. Indeed, they specifically aver that they had no knowledge regarding the alleged bribery scheme until certain Honda executives pleaded guilty to criminal indictments after a criminal investigation. See, e.g., Borman Compl. ¶225.
Plaintiffs contend that an
explicit
“wrongful demand” is not required to state a claim. Rather, coercion and wrongful demand can be inferred from a course of conduct.
See
Borman Opp’n at 58-9. In support of this proposition, plaintiffs rely heavily on
Marquis v. Chrysler Corp.,
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss are granted in part and denied in part, and plaintiffs are granted leave to amend. A separate order is being entered herewith.
Notes
. Although the complaints generally allege that Honda North America owned American Honda and coordinated North American distribution of Honda automobiles, there is a perplexing lack of discussion from either plaintiffs or defendants as to the specific role of Honda North America in this case. My opinion therefore focuses on the claims against American Honda and Honda Motor Company, Ltd.
. Because of the distinctly different issues presented by American Honda Motor Company, Inc. and Honda Motor Comрany, Ltd. ánd the possibility of confusion of names, I will for ease of identification refer to Honda Ltd. as “Honda Japan” throughout this opinion.
. Plaintiffs since have voluntarily dismissed this count. See infra section IV.
. For example, as I discuss below, the Breakaway complaint has pled a valid section 1962(c) count against one of the dealer defendants.
. American Honda’s memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss makes this argument, with which all other defendants join. Also, both defendants and plaintiffs agree that standing analysis for both RICO and antitrust claims, at least with respect to injury in fact and proximate causation, is the same.
See Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,
. The parties agree that Honda’s standard dealership agreement provided for an “85/15” allocation system: - 85% of a dealer's monthly allocation was based on that dealer's “travel rate," a rating based on the number of cars sold during
Plaintiffs claim that bribe-taking zone managers initially misallocated cars out of the discretionary allocation. Plaintiffs also allege, however, that the 85% “travel rate” component of the allocation formula multiplied the effect of the initial "discretionary” misallocations. In other words, each misallocated car sold by a bribe-paying dealer increased that dealer's travel rate, entitling that dealer to a greater unfair share of cars in subsequent months.
. All four of the representative complaints allege injury in the form of lost profits caused by improper misallocation of cars. This "allocation injury” is Borman's sole claim of injury; moreover, the Borman complaint alleges only the loss of direct profits that would have obtained from the sale of each misallocated car. Borman thus articulates the most basic claim of injury. The other complaints contain additional descriptions of related losses, such as lost profits that would have obtained from aftermarket activities associated with the sale of a new car.
In addition, Austin, Breakaway and Trans oceanic—each of which are actions brought by individual plaintiff dealers—also allege lost profits caused by the bribe-influenced placement of a competing dealer within a plaintiff dealer’s market. Breakaway additionally claims that the improper placement of a competing dealer caused the value of plaintiff's dealership to decline.
Finally, the complaints allege several categories of out-of-pocket costs. Breakaway claims injury for the costs it incurred to prepare its bid for a "rigged” dealership award process; defendants concede that this claim satisfies the injury requirement. Borman also refers generally to out-of-pocket costs in each of its injuiy paragraphs, but is not more specific; these costs may refer to fees paid by plaintiff dealers to participate in the fraudulent advertising and sales training schemes that plaintiffs allege were part of the pattern of racketeering activity.
. For example, defendants emphasize that
Fleischhauer v. Feltner,
. I construe this statement as indicating that “money paid out” is simply the
most
tangible form of financial loss, not that it is the
only
cognizable form of loss. I note, however, that another court has interpreted this statement as a “suggestion ... that the Ninth Circuit, to recognize a cognizable RICO injury, might even require proof that plaintiff actually paid money out as a result of racketeering activity.”
Sheperd v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 822
F.Supp. 625, 628 (N.D.Cal.1993) (citing
Imagineering,
. Mid Atlantic Telecom and Mylan Labs. were decided - on proximate causation grounds, but they demonstrate that courts in the Fourth Circuit have considered and allowed claims of injury based on lost profits.
. For example, in
Mid Atlantic Telecom
the plaintiff alleged that some of its
existing
customers had been lured away. Similarly, in
Bieter Co. v. Blomquist,
. Comparing the Borman complaint with the Trans-Oceanic complaint illustrates the issues plaintiffs face. In Trans-Oceanic, a dealer in Rhode Island (Cardinal Honda) alleges that Honda officials received bribes in exchange for allowing the creation of a competing dealership in Westerly, Rhode Island, just 15 miles from Cardinal’s location. Paragraphs 86, 88 and 89 of Cardinal’s complaint allege:
Once the Westerly dealership opened in September, 1993, Honda favored the Westerly dealership over Cardinal by allocating more cars and more saleable cars to the Westerly dealership____
The Westerly, Rhode Island Dealership competed directly with Cardinal. The Westerly, Rhode Island dealership sold cars and serviced cars that otherwise would have been sold and serviced by Cardinal had Westerly not conspired with Honda in the bribery scheme.
The Westerly dealership opened in late September, 1993. According to financial statements, ... from January 1, 1993 to September 30, 1993, Cardinal sold 444 new Honda cars, 206 used cars, and turned a $369,230 profit. In the nine months-from October 1, 1993 until June 30, 1994, after the Westerly, Rhode Island dealership opened, Cardinal sold 374 new cars, 179 used cars, and earned a profit of $203,516.
Taken at face value, this allegation raises a relatively strong inference that cars that were misallocated to Westerly would otherwise have gone to Cardinal.
On the other hand, the Borman class alleges that each dealer plaintiff was individually injured by the misallocation of cars to bribe-paying dealers. As illustrated by the Trans-Oceanic complaint, a showing of injury may be supported by proof that a given plaintiff dealer was in the same "zone of allocation” as a bribe-paying dealer and that there is some reasonable basis for identifying how may cars were misallocated. In "one plaintiff dealer/one bribe-paying dealer” settings, as is apparently the case with Cardinal, this may be relatively simple. Such a showing will be more difficult, however, where there are multiple plaintiff dealers for every bribe-paying dealer, or where there are multiple bribe-paying dealers.
. This position is part of a broader theme that defendants revisit periodically: that American Honda and its corporate parent, not the plaintiff dealers, are the direct victims in this case. Earlier criminal mail fraud indictments have alleged that bribe-taking Honda executives had defrauded
Honda
of its "intangible right of honest services.”
See
18 U.S.C. § 1346. Thus, Honda
. Plaintiffs also argue that they have in fact alleged certain kinds of direct and intended harm; Borman, for example, alleges harm in the out-of-pocket costs it paid to participate in the advertising and sales training schemes.
. The "turn and earn" scheme allegedly sought to inflate the number of reported sales by U.S. Honda dealers in order for American Honda to receive higher allocations of cars from Honda's corporate headquarters in Japan. Dealers who inflated their reported sales received better allocations of cars from American Honda.
. That is, rather than seeking the inflated sales reports sought in Sheperd., the allegations here are that corrupt Honda executives sought direct bribes of money and property.
. I note, however, that some of the subsidiary claims of injury asserted in the Breakaway, Austin and Trans-Oceanic complaints do offer such downstream theories. For example, Breakaway claims that unfair allocations of cars and the unfair placement of a dealership in close proximity to plaintiffs' dealership caused the value of the Breakaway dealership to decline.
These complaints also seem to allege injury in the very existence of adjacent dealerships that were granted in exchange for bribes. In other words, beyond claiming that a corruptly granted dealership received unfairly high allocations of cars that plaintiff dealers would otherwise have received, these complaints claim injuries for lost market share, pirated sales and other "competitive injuries."
Finally, the Breakaway complaint also alleges injury in that it was denied the right- to open a new dealership- that was instead awarded to a bribe-paying dealer; plaintiff Breakaway alleges that it participated in a purportedly competitive application process that was in fact rigged from the start. Defendant does concede that Breakaway’s out-of-pocket costs spent preparing its application are cognizable injuries. However, absent some fixed contractual entitlement to the new dealership, Breakaway's claim that it would have received the dealership absent the bribes would seem to be rather speculative.
. Plaintiffs in part respond that they have sufficiently pled various predicate acts that are distinct from the bribery scheme.
Borman,
for example, asserts that various plaintiff dealers paid money based on mailed representations that those sums would go to pay for group dealer advertising, when in fact somе money was diverted to corrupt Honda officials.
Austin Motors,
to take another example, points out that defendants have not challenged the allegations of obstruction of justice or tax fraud. Plaintiffs' core allegation of harm, however, is that plaintiff dealers have suffered allocation injury as the result of the bribery scheme, and
Sedima
holds that a civil RICO plaintiff’s "compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by the predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern,”
. Several of plaintiffs' memoranda seem to misunderstand defendants to argue that no mail fraud occurred because plaintiffs have not alleged that they specifically relied on any
mailed
representation or statement. Plaintiffs therefore offer citations to a line of cases that clearly establish that a mailing need only be a necessary step in furtherance of a scheme, and need not be fraudulent in and of itself.
E.g., Tabas v. Tabas,
.
Plaintiffs also argue that they have satisfied even a strict ''convergence” requirement. They claim that they relied on misrepresentations from Honda (in dealership agreements, for example) that cars would be allocated on a fair and reasonable basis, and that in exchange they paid money in the form of dealership fees and new car purchases, and that they gave up their "contractual rights” by agreeing to, e.g., only distribute Honda cars. The Supreme Court has determined that "property” does include intangible property rights for purposes of section 1341.
Cf. Carpenter,
Although this posits a different theory of property injury than the allocation injuries plaintiffs seek to recover for under section 1964(c), the underlying mail fraud theory is irrelevant for purposes of RICO causation. As discussed in cases such as Mid Atlantic Telecom, plaintiffs need only show that the allocation injuries were proximately caused by the bribery scheme, not that they were the immediate result of the predicate acts. Thus, even if plaintiffs' mail fraud theories rely on the fact that they gave up "contractual rights” based on Honda's misrepresentations, plaintiffs can still claim that their allocalion injuries were the proximate result and therefore are remediable under RICO.
. In particular, a number of cases involve settings, such as the one in
Lew,
in which defendants have made misrepresentations or offered bribes to
government
officials in order to obtain favorable regulatory actions, not to directly obtain money or property from the government. These cases have declined to find "intent to de- , fraud” within the scope of section 1341 in such cases because the mail fraud statute protects money and property interests, not an "intangible right to good government.”
See generally McNally,
. Courts also have noted that section 1341’s prohibition on "schemes to defraud" therefore reaches far beyond narrow, common law definitions of fraud.
See Richards v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am.,
. The Fourth Circuit’s rule has not been adopted by any other circuit, and
Busby
has been widely and persuasively criticized.
E.g., Nugget Hydroelectric v. Pacific Gas & Elec.,
. Indeed, this is an allegation that perhaps could be construed as a claim that corrupt executives laundered the bribes they received by converting them into profits from ostensibly legitimate dealerships. Courts have noted that section 1962(a) “was primarily directed at halting the investment of racketeering proceeds into legitimate businesses, including the practice of money laundering.”
Brittingham v. Mobil Corp.,
. "Circular” in the sense that plaintiffs claim that they suffered “allocation injury" not only from the predicate acts of bribery themselves, but also from Honda's use or investment of bribery proceeds (i.e., amounts saved in executive salaries) to run its nationwide operations so as to cause additional allocation injury. And so on.
. Plaintiffs also seem to suggest that the “inter-corporate agency” between Honda Japan and American Honda is sufficient to impute liability from American Honda to Honda Japan. "Inter-corporate agency" can be established for some purposes—‘service of process, for example—by showing that a subsidiary is completely controlled by the parent, or that a separately incorporated subsidiary is but a conduit for that the parent would otherwise have to do for itself.
E.g., Wells Fargo
&
Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co.,
. Ordinary principles of vicarious liability apply in RICO cases.
See generally Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co.,
I also note that because of the manner in .which plaintiffs have framed their pleadings against Honda Japan it is unclear whether they are asserting claims for direct liability against it. If they are, several technical and difficult issues are raised, particularly in regard to any claims under sections 1962(a) and (b). I will not consider these issues now but will wait to see if plaintiffs assert direct claims against Honda Japan when they file their amended complaints.
. Honda Japan alternatively argues that plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead facts that would support aiding and abetting liability under existing case law. Plaintiffs rely on
Jaguar Cars,
where the Third Circuit stated the elements of aiding and abetting liability: "(1) that the substantive act [i.e., the commission of two or more predicate acts] has been committed, and (2) that the defendant alleged to have aided and abetted the act knew of the commission of the act and acted with intent to facilitate it.”
Defendant refers to the Third Circuit's statements of aiding and abetting liability as the "minority view.” Defendant also points to two cases finding mere "negative acquiescence” insufficient to prove the intent required for аiding and abetting liability.
See Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co.,
. Plaintiffs have recently reached a final settlement of their claims against the Schuiling defendants that has received Court approval. To the extent any other dealer defendant has relied on Schuiling's motion to dismiss, however, I have considered those arguments in my discussion below.
. The Borman complaint, although purportedly stating claims against "all defendants,” focuses its allegations and arguments against the Honda defendants. Austin Motors states only one claim against Hendrick—for violation of section 1962(d)—and its pleadings and arguments echo those; offered in Breakaway.
. The exception is the Borman complaints’ section 1962(c) allegation of an enterprise consisting of the "Honda Dealer Network,” consisting of the corporate entities and individuals who owned Honda and Acura dealerships. Borman Compl. at'¶¶ 270-73. Borman alleges that the Honda Dealer Network is both a formal entity and an association in fact. It is clear that any dealer defendant subject to such a claim could be said to have “participated in the conduct of the affairs of” this enterprise. As described supra section I.A, however, the Borman complaint’s counts 1-4 cannot properly be construed as stating claims against Hendrick (or any other defendant aside from the three Honda entities).
. Plaintiffs argue in opposition that the language of section 1962(b) broadly refers to "acquiring, directly or
indirectly,
any interest or control" in an enterprise, and that the provisions of RICO are to be construed liberally.
See generally United States v. Vogt,
. As suggested by my discussion of plaintiffs' section 1962(a) claims against American Honda, plaintiffs could replead valid section 1962(a) claims against the dealer defendants by alleging an enterprise—such as a dealer network—in which they could be found to have "invested." For example, a claim against a dealer who allegedly used profits from misallocated cars to obtain a new dealership that won customers away from a plaintiff dealer could satisfy section 1962(a). Altеrnatively,’ an allegation that a dealer used illicit, profits to fund his existing dealership’s efforts to woo additional customers (by, for example,- launching a legitimate advertising campaign using extra profits obtained from misallocated cars) could also state a claim under section 1962(a). Of course, as discussed supra note 16, such theories would run into the possibly insurmountable problem of proving such "competitive harm" to a reasonably certain degree.
. Hendrick also argues that the "control through bribery" allegation is inconsistent with other allegations that Honda executives engaged in extortion by threatening some dealers with low allocations if they did not pay bribes. Plaintiffs have alleged, however, that dealers such as Hendrick willingly participated in order to manipulate the dealer allocation system.
. I note that this allegation is offered only at a general level in the complaints. It was discussed more clearly at oral argument and in plaintiffs’ opposition memoranda. Plaintiffs should amend their complaints to more specifically outline these claims.
. Lustgarten also argues that plaintiffs’ civil RICO claims are punitive in nature and therefore do not survive the death of Martin Lustgarten. “Courts that have considered the question of claim survival in the context of civil RICO have adopted a common law rule that remedial claims survive while punitive claims abate upon the death of the defendant.”
Confederation Life Ins. Co. v. Goodman,
. In any event, the sufficiency of the publication notice in Lustgarten's probate proceedings is not really at issue. According to plaintiffs themselves, they could not even have asserted a claim in 1989; they contend for statute of limitations purposes that they did not become aware of the facts in this case until years later.
. I note, however, that in Biofeedtrac the attorney-defendant’s directorship was more in the nature of a transactional formality; he had no vote as a shareholder and had no employment contract. Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Smoot was a full-fledged director of American Honda, with full voting power and a monthly salary.
. I note, however, that based upon the information contained in the parties' memoranda, it appears that at least some of the activities that plaintiffs have characterized as “obstruction of justice" may have been an entirely proper course of legal representation.
. What I mean by this is that under traditional conspiracy theory it appears clear that an outside advisor who intentionally lent her services to an illegal schemе knowing of its purpose could be held criminally culpable and civilly liable for the conspiracy. This would include, for example, an attorney who, without any direct participation, knowingly advised her client to prepare false
Of course, section 1962(d) cases could be treated differently from those arising under section 1962(c) on the very ground that different subsections of the statute are involved. Such technical distinctions abound in decisions interpreting other RICO provisions, particularly with regard to the differences between sections 1962(a) and (b) and section 1962(c). Perhaps for that reason several post-frevas opinions upholding criminal convictions of advisors under section 1962(d) have not seemed to be very troubled by the issue.
E.g., MCM Partners v. Andrews-Bartlett & Assoc.,
The Third Circuit focused more closely upon these concerns than have other courts in
United States v. Antar,
. While the plaintiffs originally asserted Sherman Act claims under sections 1 and 2, they have since consented to the dismissal of their section 2 claims. They also have consented to the dismissal of their rule of reason claims under section 1 as well as their per se theory alleging resale price maintenance. Remaining for consideration, therefore, is their per se claim under section 1 resting on a "group boycott” theory.
. While Honda Japan argues separately that the antitrust claims should be dismissed at least as to it, the vicarious liability principles outlined in my discussion of plaintiffs’ RICO claims against Honda Japan,
see supra
section III.B, also apply to the plaintiffs' antitrust claims.
See generally American Soc’y of Mechanical Eng’rs,
. Under the rule of reason, "the fact finder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in dеciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.”
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
. Plaintiffs do allege, in conclusory fashion within its section 2 claim, that defendant
Honda
intended to drive plaintiffs out of the competing market in an attempt to monopolize. See,
e.g.,
. Citing
Stephen Jay Photography,
defendants contend that in a commercial bribery case such as this the Robinson-Patman Act does not apply unles's the alleged payment was made to someone who has breached a fiduciary duty that she owes to her principal. From this it flows, so argue defendants, that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim since, according to their own allegations, Honda executives did not breach any fiduciary duly that they owed to their employer but, instead, were acting within the scope of their authority. Defendants have misread
Stephen Jay Photography
and created a false syllogism. In that case the Fourth Circuit ruled that in determining whether a person to whom payments are made in connection with a sales transaction is acting as a purchasing agent or similar intermediary for the buyer, it is appropriate to examine whether she stands in a fiduciary relationship to the buyer.
See Stephen Jay Photography,
. Plaintiff Breakaway also alleges that it was "coerced" into withdrawing its application for an additional dealer point. If it did not submit a “weaker" application, Breakaway claims it would have no chance at receiving the award. Breakaway Opp’n at 96. Breakaway’s complaint makes no allegation that Honda executives made any threats to this effect. See Breakaway Compl. ¶¶ 169-175. Breakaway also argues in its opposition that Honda "coerced” it into falsifying sales reports and into buying unpopular models. These allegations, however, are not contained in Breakaway's complaint.