Upon conviction of statutory rape petitioner was, on May 15, 1944, sеntenced by the Muskegon county circuit court to serve a term of nоt less than 34 nor more than 15 years in State prison. While out on bail, pending action on his •application for leave to appeal, he became involved in Ottawa county and subsequently was convictеd in the Ottawa county circuit court of the crime of rape .and sеntenced by that court, on December 26, 1944, to serve a term of not lеss than 15 years nor more than 25 years “to begin at the expiration of thе sentence imposed by Judge Sanford in the city of Muskegon, Michigan on May 15, 1944.” His application for leave to appeal from the Muskegon conviction was denied and on December 28, 1944, he began •serving sentence in State prison. Thereafter the parole board entered an order terminating the sen *493 tence imposed by the Muskegon, сounty circuit court as of November 7, 1947, and providing for the commenсement on November 8,1947, of the sentence imposed by the Ottawa county circuit court.
Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ancillary writ of certiorari, seeking his discharge from рrison under the sentence of the Ottawa county circuit court on the ground that the sentence was void for indefiniteness as to time of its commencement and because there is no statutory authority for cumulаtive or consecutive sentences.
That, in the absence of statutory authority, a sentence may not be imposed to commenсe at the completion or expiration of another sentеnce has been held by this Court.
In re Bloom, 53
Mich.
597; In re Lamphere,
Petitioner contends, on the one hand, that the sentence is not merely defective and subject to correction, but is absolutely void so that it cannot be corrected. On the other hand, he cites
People
v.
Meservey,
In the case of
In re Vitali,
*494 “The case of People v. Farrell,146 Mich. 264 , is authority for the proposition that where the trial court has imposed an illegal sentence it has the power to substitute for it a legаl sentence notwithstanding the illegal sentence has been partly еxecuted.”
The sentence to a term of not less than 15 nor more thаn 25 years was one which the court might lawfully impose in this case. The sentеnce was defective in that it provided, without statutory authority, that it should bеgin at an indefinite future date instead pf at the date of its imposition. The defect is one which may be corrected by the court
nunc pro tunc. In re Richards,
The reliеf prayed should be denied, both writs •dismissed, and the case remanded to the circuit court for entry of an order nunc pro tunc correcting the sentence in accord herewith.