MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion of the United States Trustee (“the UST”) to Compel A.H. Robins Company, Inc. to Pay Quarterly Fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6). This is a core proceeding over which the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A) and 1334. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1409.
Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs, and after a hearing held on November 25, 1997, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On August 25,1985, the A.H. Robins Company, Inc. (“Old Robins”) filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11 reorganization in anticipation of the onslaught of the now-well-known Daikon Shield litigation. Almost three years later, on July 26, 1988, Old Robins’s Sixth Amended and Restated Plan of Reorganization (“the Plan”) was confirmed. According to the Plan, the property of the debtor-in-possession vested in the debtor or any successor-in-interest of the debtor, in consonance with 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b). The A.H. Robins Co. Inc. (“New Robins”) is the successor in interest of Old Robins. 1
On January 26, 1996, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) to require post-confirmation payment of quarterly fees to the UST. 2 Prior to this change, such fees were *147 owed only up until the time of plan confirmation. The purpose of such a change was to aid the balancing of the federal budget by making the UST more financially self-sufficient. 3 New Robins began paying the minimum fee of $250.00 per quarter in 1996, and has continued paying this amount up to the present. The UST, questioning the nominal amount of fees paid by New Robins, filed a motion on October 17, 1997 seeking reports from New Robins as to the extent of its quarterly disbursements, and demanding payment of any fees that may be owing as determined by those disbursements.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The 1996 amendment to § 1980(a)(6) (“the Amendment”) has generated a staggering amount of litigation due to its remarkably poor drafting. Not only has this new quarterly fees statute spawned a large number of cases, it has caused widespread disparity among the courts in their attempts to apply it. While this Court is reluctant to add to the flood of ink already spilled regarding this subject, to resolve the dispute in the instant case, the following analysis is in order.
The Court first points out that Old Robins’s plan confirmation took place almost eight years prior to the Amendment. Nevertheless, on September 30, 1996, Congress, through clarifying legislation (“the. Clarification”) made it known that the Amendment is to apply to
all
cases, regardless of their confirmation status at the time of the Amendment’s effective date.
4
Some courts have held that the Amendment is applicable only to cases that did not have a confirmed plan at the time of the Amendment. Many of these cases, however, were decided before the September 30, 1996 Clarification, and most have been reversed on appeal.
See. e.g., In re Beechknoll Nursing Homes, Inc.,
This Court agrees that Amendment is undergirded by a rational legislative purpose, and also chooses to align itself with those courts that hold that the Amendment is not substantively retroactive. Because the Court finds that the Amendment is substantively prospective in nature, the Court does not agree with those cases denying payment of UST fees on the ground that the Amendment improperly modifies debtors’ plans, such as
In re Hudson Oil Co., Inc.,
*149
The Court next finds that payment of UST fees in the instant case will terminate upon closing of the case.
See, e.g., In re Driggs,
Probably the most contentious issue in the case at bar is the interpretation of the term “disbursements” as it is used in the Amendment. Because the amount of fees payable to the UST is premised upon the
*151
sum total of “disbursements” paid by a party in a Chapter 11 proceeding, the clarification of the scope of this term is, naturally, of great importance to the parties here. While Congress clarified the scope of the Amendment itself, i.e., to whom the Amendment applies, Congress has provided no guidance as to what constitutes a “disbursement.” A number of courts, as well as New Robins, place heavy reliance upon
St. Angelo v. Victoria Farms, Inc.,
The Court turns now to the issue of whether bankruptcy courts have any jurisdiction to heai' cases involving the payment of fees under the Amendment, as such issue was raise.d in
Gryphon at the Stone Mansion v. United States Trustee (In re Gryphon at the Stone Mansion),
In summary, the Court finds that (1) the Amendment is applicable to New Robins, (2) the Plan in the case sub judice will not be modified by the imposition of the fees mandated by § 1930(a)(6), (3) the obligation to pay such fees will terminate upon the closing of New Robins’s Chapter 11 case, (4) New Robins has been making “disbursements” of an unknown amount upon which the UST’s quarterly fees are to be based, and (5) this Court has jurisdiction to award such fees. The Court is not unsympathetic to New Robins’s position. Indeed, Congress has done somewhat of a disservice both to the courts as a result of the haphazard drafting of § 1930(a)(6), and to reorganized debtors who must now pay fees that in many eases are not commensurate with the benefits gleaned from the continued involvement of the UST or the bankruptcy court. The Court, however, is bound by the acts of Congress, the strictures of logic, and the principles of stare decisis. In light of the above analysis, therefore, New Robins should forward to the UST information concerning the extent of its “disbursements” made since the effective date of the Amendment, and will be liable for the fees thereon pursuant to the schedule set forth in § 1930(a)(6).
As a final matter, the Court is aware of the fact that the various trusts arising out of the reorganization of A.H. Robins Co., Inc. have disbursed, and continue to disburse, funds in compensation for Daikon Shield-related injuries;
18
a viable argument might well be made that such funds should be included in the total disbursements upon which UST fees are due, if necessary, to yield the maximum amount payable under § 1930(a)(6). Nevertheless, the Court notes that the UST has not sought the payment of fees from any of the various trusts established during the course of A.H. Robins Co., Inc.’s bankruptcy proceeding, although ample authority exists to hold the trusts liable for such fees, had they been made parties to the case at bar.
See, e.g., In re Corporate Business, Prods., Inc.,
Notes
. As part of Old Robins's reorganization, American Home Products, Inc. ("AHP”) bought out Old Robins, funded the Daikon Shield Claimants Trust ("Claimants Trust”) with $2,450,000,-000.00 to pay personal injury claims against Old Robins, and established New Robins as a subsidiary of AHP. In addition to the Daikon Shield Claimants Trust, the reorganization included the Daikon Shield Other Claimants Trust funded with $50,000,000.00 for non-personal injury claims, and $100,000,000.00 paid into the Bre-land Insurance Trust by the Aetna Life and Casualty Company in settlement of the "Breland” class-action lawsuit against Old Robins. The Claimants Trust, Other Claimants Trust, and Bre-land Insurance Trust still have monies to distribute to claimants, and the operations of these trusts are still being overseen by this Court.
. Prior to its amendment in 1996, § 1930(a)(6) stated,
[T]he parties commencing a case under title 11 shall pay ... the following filing fees: ... In addition to the filing fee paid to the clerk, a quarterly fee shall be paid to the United States trustee, for deposit in the Treasury, in each case under chapter 11 of title 11 for each quarter (including any fraction thereof) until a pían is confirmed or the case is converted or dismissed, whichever occurs first.
(emphasis added).
Section 111(a) of H.R./076, 104th Cong. (1995) provided as follows: "Section 1930(a)(6) of Title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking ‘a plan is confirmed or' ...." H.R.2076 was enacted into via Pub.L. 104-91, § 101(a), 110 Stat. 7, 11 us amended Pub.L. 104-99 § 211, 110 Stat. 26, 37 (1996), thus making quarterly UST fees payable post-confirmation.
§ 1930(a)(6) now states:
[T]he parties commencing a case under title 11 shall pay ... the following filing fees: ... In addition to the filing fee paid to the clerk, a *147 quarterly fee shall be paid to the United States trustee, for deposit in the Treasury, in each case under chapter 11 of title 11 for each quarter (including any fraction thereof) until the case is converted or dismissed, whichever occurs first. The fee shall be $250 for each quarter in which disbursements total less than $15,000; $500 for each quarter in which disbursements total $15,000 or more but less than $75,000; $750 for each quarter in which disbursements total $75,000 or more but less than $150,000; $1,250 for each quarter in which disbursements total $150,000 or more but less than $300,000; $3,750 for each quarter in which disbursements total $300,000 or more but less than $1,000,000; $5,000 for each quarter in which disbursements total $1,000,-000 or more but less than $2,000,000; $7,500 for each quarter in which disbursements total $2,000,000 or more but less than $3,000,000; $8,000 for each quarter in which disbursements total $3,000,000 or more but less than $5,000,000; $10,000 for each quarter in which disbursements total $5,000,000 or more.
. See infra note 5.
. The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub.L. 104-208, § 109(d), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-19 (1997), states,
Section 101(a) of Public Law 104-91, as amended by section 211 of Public Law 104-99, is further amended by inserting Provided further, That, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) shall accrue and be payable from and after January 27, 1996, in all cases (including, without limitation, any cases pending as of that date), regardless of confirmation status of their plans” after [the words] "enacted into law”.
Section 211 of Public Law 104-99, in turn, reads as follows:-
Public Law 104-91 is amended by inserting after the words "the protection of the Federal judiciary" in section 101(a), the following: “to the extent and in the manner and”, and by inserting at the end of the paragraph containing those words, but before the semicolon, the following: Provided, That, with the exception of section 114, the General Provisions for the Department of Justice included in title I of the aforementioned conference report are hereby enacted into law."
*148 (second emphasis added).
. "The rational legislative purpose” is the desire to balance the federal budget by
inter alia
making the UST system self-sufficient.
In re McLean Square Assoc.,
. The Court notes that the Amendment is, however, retroactive in the sense that it applies to cases having plans that were confirmed prior to the effective date of the Amendment. As the Court has already discussed, this retroactivity is not improper due to the Amendment’s rational legislative purpose, and Congress' explicit intent.
. One court has held that plans confirmed
after
the effective date of the Amendment must include a provision for the payment of UST fees if the UST is to receive such fees.
See United States Trustee v. Craige (In re Salina Speedway, Inc.),
. Some cases have held that the payment of UST fees is in some way related to the UST’s duties in a particular case, e.g., monitoring the debtor and preparing reports.
See, e.g., In re McLean Square
*149
Assoc.,
. The Court finds that imposing UST fees only on unsuccessful cases would have the following disturbing consequence: Presumably, a Chapter 11 debtor facing conversion or dismissal of its case will be liable for all quarterly fees arising from the time it files its petition; and, because it is impossible to ascertain whether a Chapter 11 proceeding is unsuccessful until the moment of conversion or dismissal, no fees will be payable until that moment. So when a Chapter 11 debt- or is faltering to the point of being unable to remain in Chapter 11, it will be asked to somehow marshal enough funds to pay for outstanding UST fees that have been accruing since the date of the order for relief. Therefore, the parties who can least afford to pay such fees will be solely responsible for them. The Court cannot believe that such an application of the Amendment is consonant with the Amendment’s purpose of aiding the UST in funding itself.
. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1101(2), “substantial consummation” means "(A) transfer of all or substantially all of the property proposed by the plan to be transferred; (B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the debtor under the plan of the business or of the management of all or substantially all of the property dealt with by the plan; and (C) commencement of distribution under the plan.”
According to 11 U.S.C. § 350(a), “After an estate is fully administered .,. the court shall close the case.” Closing of cases in Chapter 11 is governed by Fed. R. Bankr.P. 3022, which provides, “After an estate is fully administered in a chapter 11- reorganization case, the court, on its own motion or on motion of a party in interest, shall enter a final decree closing the case.” A number of cases have held that a case is "fully administered” at the point of substantial consummation.
See, e.g., Walnut Associates v. Saidel,
*150 The Advisory Committee notes to current Bankruptcy Rule 3022 incorporate the standard of substantial consummation found in Section 1101(2) for determining whether the estate has been fully administered and a final decree should issue: "(1) whether the order confirming the plan has become final, (2) whether deposits required by the plan have been distributed, (3) whether the property proposed by the plan to be transferred has been transferred, (4) whether the debtor or the successor of the debtor under the plan has assumed the business or the management of the property dealt with by the plan, (5) whether payments under the plan have commenced, and (6) whether all motions, contested matters, and adversary proceedings have been finally resolved.”
In re Jordan Mfg., Co., Inc.,
This Court finds that with the exception of the time it has taken to settle the Daikon Shield Claims in the instant case, all issues existing at the time of Old Robins's bankruptcy filing were resolved prior to January, 1996, thus warranting closure of New Robins's case since the Plan was substantially consummated and the éstate fully administered at that time.
.It was probably not even necessary to keep the case open to handle such matters. As the Advisory Committed Notes to Fed. R. Bankr.P. 3022 state,
The court should not keep the case open only because of the possibility that the court’s jurisdiction may be invoked in the future. A final decree closing the case after the estate is fully administered does not-deprive the court of jurisdiction to enforce or interpret its own orders and does not prevent the court from reopening the case for cause pursuant to § 350(b) of the Code.... If the plan or confirmation order provides that the case shall remain open until a certain date or event because of the likelihood that the court’s jurisdiction may be required for specific purposes prior thereto, the case should remain open until that date or event.
See In re Jordan Mfg., Co., Inc.,
. The Court notes that many of the proceedings arising post-confirmation related to the administration of, and were filed by, the various trusts responsible for compensating the Daikon Shield claimants. Nonetheless, New Robins still gleaned a benefit from the Court post-confirmation, and could have closed its case to avoid the payment of UST fees had it wanted to. See infra p. 153.
. Nevertheless, the possibility of reopening a case begs the question as to whether a debtor whose case is reopene.d post-Amendment would be liable for quarterly UST fees. In
In re Jr. Food Mart of Arkansas, Inc.,
.
See United States Trustee v. Hays Builders, Inc. (In re Hays Builders, Inc.),
. Some cases that hold that
St. Angelo
established "disbursements” as a term of art further hold that Congress is deemed to have known of judicially created law when it enacted the Amendment, and hence Congress intended "disbursements” to mean only payments from the bankruptcy estate.
See, e.g., In re Maruko, Inc.,
. The "statutory limitation” referred to by the Goodman court can be found in 11 U.S.C. § 1142, which reads as follows:
(a) Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, rule, or regulation relating to financial condition, the debtor and any entity organized or to be organized for the purpose of carrying out the plan shall carry out the plan and shall comply with any orders of the court.
(b) The court may direct the debtor and any other necessary party to execute or deliver or to join in the execution or delivery of any instrument required to effect a transfer of property dealt with by a confirmed plan, and to perform any other act, including the satisfaction of any lien, that is necessary for the consummation of the plan.
. The Court further notes that in
Official Dalkon Shield Claimants Committee v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc.),
. See supra note 1.