225 F. 650 | N.D.N.Y. | 1915
(after stating the facts as above). The specifications of objection filed to the discharge of John Agnew challenge the validity of the order of the judge permitting the filing of an application for a discharge after one year and within the 18 months succeeding the adjudication, and also the right of the administratrix of a deceased bankrupt, duly adjudicated in his lifetime, to file or present a petition for his discharge, and also deny that Amy C. Agnew, who filed the application for discharge, is administratrix. These specifications of objection also present the following grounds for refusing a discharge, but whether sufficiently or not is the question, viz.:
That said John Agnew, while a bankrupt and unable to pay his debts, committed offenses punishable by imprisonment, as specified in section 29b of the Bankruptcy Act, in that he knowingly and fraudulently concealed and withheld from his trustee certain books, property, etc., and that said John Agnew made a false oath in relation to this bankruptcy proceeding, and on matters material therein, know»
The grounds for refusing a discharge, so far as involved here, may be summarized thus:
Offenses Punishable by Imprisonment. (See section 29.) The bankrupt:
(A) Must have knowingly and fraudulently concealed, while a bankrupt, from his trustee, property belonging to his estate in bankruptcy.
(B) Must have made a false oath or account in, or in relation to, some (any) proceedings in bankruptcy. (This bankruptcy proceeding.)
Other Grounds. (See section 14.) The bankrupt:
(C) Must have, with intent to conceal his financial condition, destroyed, concealed, or failed to keep books of account or records from which such financial condition might be ascertained.
(D) Must have obtained money or property on credit upon a materially false statement in uriting made by him to any person or representative for the purpose of obtaining credit from such person.
(F) Must have, at some time subsequent to the first day of the four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, transferred, removed, destroyed, or concealed, or permitted this to be done, some of his property, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors.
The sum and substance of these specifications of objection, charging the making of a false oath, is that Agnew “knowingly and intentionally” included in the schedules of assets of the firm a worthless note for $5,000 held as collateral only, knowing it to be worthless; that lie also included another note of $9,000, on which $750 had been” paid, as worth $9,000, when same “was worthless, or believed so to be by said John Agnew and his said firm,” and that he also stated in such schedules the value of the warehouse of the firm to be $6,000, when in fact worth only half that sum, and known to said Agnew to be worth only half the sum of 86,000. The requirement of the statul e (section 29b) is that the bankrupt must have “knowingly and fraudulently'1 made “a false oath or account in, or in relation to, any proceeding iu bankruptcy.” This, of course, refers to the pending proceeding, and not some other bankruptcy proceeding. The specifications of objection must state that the oath was “knowingly and fraudulently” made. In re Mayer (D. C.) 195 Fed. 571, 28 Am. Bankr. Rep. 342; In re Bryant (D. C.) 104 Fed. 789, 5 Am. Bankr. Rep. 114; In re Salsbury (D. C.) 113 Fed. 833, 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 771; In re Cohen (D. C.) 149 Fed. 908, 18 Am. Bankr. Rep. 84; In re Beebe (D. C.) 116 Fed. 48, 8 Am. Bankr. Rep. 597. This must be the charge in the specifications, and the oath made must be as to a material matter, which must appear from the specifications of objection. Says Collier (10th Ed., page 343):
“Tlie analogy of this objection to a crime usually compels strict pleading and even stricter proof.”
Says Remington on Bankruptcy, vol. 3, 2d Ed., p. 2405, § 2596, discussing opposition to discharge:
“When the act alleged is the commission of one of th,e offenses prohibited by. the Bankrupt Act, it must be alleged to have been done knowingly and fraudulently.”
Many cases are cited. In short, there must have been an intent or purpose to mislead, deceive, and defraud the creditors or some of them. See, also, In re Patterson (D. C.) 121 Fed. 921, 10 Am. Bankr. Rep. 371; In re Pierce (D. C.) 103 Fed. 64, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 554; In re Kaiser (D. C.) 99 Fed. 689. Errors or mistakes in making up schedules are not infrequent, and so errors in estimating values are of frequent occurrence.
I think the specifications of objection, so far as they charge or attempt to charge the taking of a false oath, are clearly insufficient, and the objections to the sufficiency thereof are sustained. The other specifications of objection are held sufficient and same will be referred to a special master under the rule.
So ordered.