This аppeal arises from a decision from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, sitting as a juvenile court, which ordered the termination of the parental rights of appellant— mother, Monet T. (“Mother”) for minor child, Adriana T. (“Adriana”). Mother apparently exhibited delusional behavior while in labor, and the Prince George’s County Department of Social Services (“Department”) authorized limited custody, and placed Adriana in foster care. The Department filed a Child in Need of Assistance (“CINA”) petition, alleging that Mother was unable to care for the child. The court ordered that Adriana be placed in the Department’s temporary custody for continued foster care placement. Following a hearing, the court determined that Adriana was a CINA and permitted placement with a relative. The Department filed a Petition for Guardianship with the Right to Consent to Adoption, to which Mother filed an objection. Adriana’s father, Detuan J. (“Father”), consented to the termination of his parental rights. Following a hearing on the petition, the court entered judgment terminating parental rights. Mother noted an appeal, and presents two questions for our consideration:
1. Did the court err in permitting a social worker to testify by telephone when [appelleej-child had not complied with Md. Rule 2-513?
2. Did the court err in admitting irrelevant evidence?
For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother, now thirty-seven years of age, has suffered from Delusional Disorder Persecutory Type since she was seventeen.
On November 25, 2009, Mother, who was pregnant, was admitted to the Prince George’s Hospital Center because of a preeclampsia diagnosis,
The hospital sent a report to the Department, explaining that Mother was a risk to herself and to others, and recommended that she not be left alone with the baby. The Department’s child protective services investigator interviewed Mother to determine if she was capable of caring for Adriana. Due to Mother’s mental state and the inability to identify other relatives in the interim, the investigator issued a report of limited custody.
During a hearing on March 10, 2010, Mother contended that Adriana was not a CIÑA, and that based on her history of compliance with therapy and medication, she posed no danger to the child. Although the court found that Mother’s physicians indicated her return to therapy and compliance with her medication regimen, there were no mental health evaluations or laboratory results to confirm this. The court “[was] not willing to take a chance on Mother,” and determined that Adriana was a CIÑA and could be placed with a relative.
In May 2010, after the approval of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC) process,
On June 28, 2011, Adriana filed a motion to take Ms. Trott’s testimony by telephone.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In In re Adoption/Guardianship of Ta’Niya C.,
Namely, [wjhen the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous standard of [Rule 8-131(c) ] applies.[13 ] [Second,] [i]f it appears that the [court] erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless. Finally, when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the [court] founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, the [court’s] decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion.
Id. (quoting In re Yve S.,
The trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence. See Md. Rule 5-104(a). “Whether to admit lay opinion testimony is vested in the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Bey v. State,
The trial court abuses its discretion “ ‘where no reasonable person would take
II. DISCUSSION
A. Did the Trial Court Err in Permitting the North Carolina Social Worker to Testify By Telephone?
Md. Rule 2-513 became effective on July 1, 2010. This rule permits telephone testimony in civil cases under certain conditions. See Reporter’s Note to Proposed Rule 2-513, Md. Reg., Yol. 37, Issue 3, Friday, January 29, 2010.
Our task is to determine whether the court erred in permitting Ms. Trott’s testimony by telephone. Md. Rule 2-513(b)(2) reads, in relevant part:
When testimony taken by telephone allowed; applicability. A court may allow the testimony of a witness to be taken by telephone (1) upon stipulation by the parties or (2) subject to sections (e) and (f) of this Rule, [infra] on motion of a party to the action and for good сause shown.
During trial, Mother avowed that Adriana failed to satisfy the “good cause” exception. Good cause permits the court to have “some discretion in enforcing the notice requirement, and allows a court, in certain circumstances, to avoid an unjust conclusion.” Prince George’s County v. Longtin,
Good cause. A court may find that there is good cause to allow the testimony of a witness to be taken by telephone if:
(1) the witness is otherwise unavailable to appear because of age, infirmity, or illness;
(2) personal appearance of the witness cannot be secured by subpoena or other reasonable means;
(3) a personal appearance would be an undue hardship to the witness; or
(4) there are any other circumstances that constitute good cause for allowing the testimony of the witness to be taken by telephone.
In attempting to orient the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure [hereinafter “Rules Committee”], concerning proposed Md. Rule 2-513, the Honorable Paul E. Alpert,
Md. Rule 2-513(c) reads:
Time for filing motion. Unless for good cause shown the court allows thе motion to be filed later, a motion to take the testimony of a witness by telephone shall be filed at least 30 days before the trial or hearing at which the testimony is to be offered.
Adriana’s motion was filed fourteen days prior to the first day of trial, and fifteen days prior to the date that the testimony was offered. As noted previously, during trial, Mother challenged the timeliness of the motion, alleging she was deprived of the opportunity to depose the witness because the motion failed to include the subject matter of the witness’ expected testimony. Additionally, she contended that she was unable to contact the witness because of Adriana’s failure to include the witness’ name, address, and telephone number.
During trial, the following colloquy indicated that there was good cause to permit the untimely motion:
THE COURT: I’m saying for the factor of community adjustmеnt, if I don’t grant this motion, then the only testimony will be from the grandmother.
[DEPARTMENT’S COUNSEL]: That is correct, Your Honor.
[ADRIANA’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I do know that Ms. Trott is the only unbiased resource that has monthly seen [Adriana].
THE COURT: I was trying to say that in a nice way—
[THE COURT]:—that she’s more independent.
THE COURT: ... But, I’m saying it would have appeared then that the only source for that element will be someone who’s with the child every day in North Carolina. 'And then I don’t know if they have, I looked at his witness list. I don’t think there’s anyone else who’s going to be able to provide that to me. You agree? Unless I let Ms. Trott testify.
Furthermore, Mother acknowledged that Ms. Trott’s testimony was “material to the case as it [went] to some of the core issues that ... the [c]ourt must [have] examine[d] under the [termination of parental rights] statute. So, it [did] impact the case.” Hence, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that there was good cause to allow the motion to be filed after the deadline.
The Rules Committee’s minutes read, in relevant part, as follows:
Judge Alpert told the Committee that the 30-day period provided for in section (c) had been decreased from the initial time period suggested. A lawyer may need time to prepare as to who the witnesses will be. The 30-day period [was] discussed before it was chosen. The [Committee] Chair [,the Honorable Joseph Murphy,] commented that when one lawyer proposes to the other that a witness’s testimony be taken by telephone, the lawyer who has been asked may wish to do some investigation before deciding whether to agree to this----The Chair suggested that the time period could be changed to 15 days, but he expressed the opinion that the 30-day time period [was] not unreasonable. The [trial] court [could] allow the motion to be filed later, so that solve[d] the time problem....
Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practiсe and Procedure, Minutes
Regarding the inability of Mother to depose Ms. Trott, although a thirty-day notice was not given, Mother had received Ms. Trott’s monthly reports to the Department, through their incorporation into the Department’s CINA review reports, which the court took judicial notice of at the onset of the hearing. Thus, Mother received notice of the content of Ms. Trott’s status reports and accordingly, was aware of what she would communicate through her testimony. Concerning Mother’s inability to contact Ms. Trott, the court willingly assessed the lack of the required contents and determined that Adriana’s failure to include the contents were immaterial:
THE COURT: [I will] address each and every one of these elements or it will come back. And I’m not going to leave anything out.
So if there’s something missing and I feel it’s material, I will, also, delay this and take [Adriana’s counsеl’s] suggestion and do it in two weeks if I’m not satisfied.
Mother next asserts that it was necessary for the court to assess Ms. Trott’s demeanor and credibility. “If a party objects to the testimony, a court shall not allow the testimony of a witness to be taken by telephone unless the court finds,” among other factors, that “the demeanor and credibility of the witness are not ... critical to the outcome of the proceeding.” Md. Rule 2—513(f)(3). During trial, Mother argued the following:
... [I]t has, the [c]ourt has the, it’s duty to determine the credibility of all witnesses and case law has in a variety of different cases said that it is absolutely preferred that witnesses be present for the [c]ourt to observe the demean- or of the witness as opposed to other means of providing that testimony....
In Phillips v. Venker,
Since Md. Rule 2-513 is relatively new, we examine the development of the rule to obtain helpful background information. The Rules Committee drafted subsection (f)(2) as follows:
(f) When Testimony Taken by Telephone is Prohibited
If a party objects, a court shall not allow the testimony of a witness to be taken by telephone if the court finds that:
(2) the demeanor and credibility of the witness are or may be critical to the outcome of the proceeding
Judge Adkins noted that the Committee’s wording indicated a presumption that telephone testimony was permitted. She further stated, “Well, I’m wondering if it should be, if the burden should be shifted a little bit, so that the judge should only do it if it makes сertain findings.” The Court agreed, and decided to construct the letter of the rule such that it indicated “affirmative findings,” so the presumption was that telephone testimony was not permitted unless the court made specific findings. Thus, the wording was changed to the following:
(f) When testimony taken by telephone is prohibited. If a party objects, a courtshall not allow the testimony of a witness to be taken by telephone unless the court finds that:
(3) the demeanor and credibility of the witness are not likely to be critical to the outcome of the proceeding
We have not found any Maryland case law on the specific issue, nor have the parties supported their contentions with case law. While this issue is one of first impression in Maryland, several jurisdictions have undertaken consideration of the safeguards required under similar circumstances. Md. Rule 2-513 was modeled after a statute and rule in Oregon. Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Minutes of Meeting of November 16, 2007 at 12, 18. Hence, we consult Oregon’s cases, in addition to other sister states, to determine the extent a witness’ credibility may be material, as well as the fair opportunity to cross examine witnesses who testify by telephone in civil proceedings.
In State v. Parker,
The defendant averred that the court’s denial was prejudicial because he could not presеnt demeanor evidence. Parker,
In Babcock v. Employment Div.,
In In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 10155),
We cannot, however, say that the lack of a visual image seriously disadvantaged the trial court in making its determination. The referee heard the [father’s] testimony directly and took the opportunity to ask several questions of his own. On this record, limiting the opportunity to assess the [father’s] demeanоr to itsauditory component seems to us to entail only the most marginal risk that the referee would be misled in evaluating the [father’s] credibility.
Id.
In In re Megan L.,
In the case sub judice, when Mother’s counsel alluded to the court’s assessment of Ms. Trott’s demeanor and credibility, the following colloquy ensued:
THE COURT: That probably is more important with respect to a witness other than a social worker. Just your regular civilian witness. I think jurors more so than a judge need to look at their demeanor when they’re testifying. I don’t think that that [sic] criteria is actually applicable to this witness, per se. I just don’t think in the nature of her business that that [sic] would be a factor for me. I mean, she’ll say what’s she’s going to say. I’m not going to say that her demeanor she—
[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Certainly.
THE COURT:—slides this way or slides this way [sic], or sits up or sits down ...
Ms. Trott was involved in Adriana’s case since May 2010, and visited Adriana and Grandmother once a mоnth. On July 7, 2011, the following colloquy ensued during the hearing:
[ADRIANA’S COUNSEL]: And what have you observed about [Grandmother’s] case for Adriana?
LMS. TROTT]: I think she has provided excellent care for her. She certainly has everything materially that she needs at her apartment. When she talks to her, she has a firm but a gentle voice with her. She’s able to easily get her attention. Adriana is responsive. I don’t see any fear with Adriana. And I think just as she’s getting to her age now she has a little gleam in her eye when she wants to do something or she knows she’s being, you know, corrected or something like that.
Demeanor-based credibility is a witness’ outer appearance and mannerisms while testifying before the fact finder. State Bd. of Physicians v. Bernstein,
We do discern that another jurisdiction has ruled contrary to what we hold today. In People ex rel. O.S.,
The first time I heard from you was this morning when you requested a telephonic conference so your expert witness could appeal telephonically. Not now or no way by telephone. You’re judging credibility of the witness. ... ,[sic] but you can’t judge it on the telephone and it’s not going to happen telephonically, period.
Id. at 427. The South Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Id.
People ex rel. O.S. is distinguishable from the case sub judice. In our case, Ms. Trott was not testifying as an expert, but rather as a lay witness who possessed personal knowledge of Grandmother’s relationship with Adriana. Furthermore, in People ex rel. O.S.,
Mother lastly asserts that substantial prejudice resulted because she was not able to have face-to-face cross-examination. In In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z980001,
Despite the father’s affidavit reflecting the arguments he desired to assert at trial, the court terminated his rights and granted the petition for guardianship. Id. at 191,
In Salerian v. Md. State Bd. of Physicians,
The ALJ found that the defendant was liable and imposed a two year probation period and a $5,000 fine. Id. at 238,
The ALJ found that the defendant had a “ ‘full and fair opportunity to cross examine the [witness], via telephone, and had every opportunity to request that the [witness] repeat his responses to the satisfaction of [c]ounsel.’ ” Id. Additionally, the witness’ testimony was supported by other witnesses who testified in person at the hearing. Id. Hence, there was substantial evidence in the record, independent of the telephone testimony, to substantiate the Board’s conclusion. Id. We affirmed the trial court’s judgment, and found that the admission of the telephone testimony was permissible. See id. at 238,
In In re Megan L.,
In In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 10155),
Here, Ms. Trott’s testimony was corroborated by other witnesses who testified in person at the hearing, including the Department’s social worker, Natalie Gimperling, whose testimony revealed:
Yes, [Grandmother was] beyond an appropriate placement for her granddaughter. She [was] meeting all of her needs. She ... stepped up, became licensed as a foster parent, which meant that she met all of that state’s regulations and requirements for someone to be approved, and ... soon to be approved as an adoptive resource as well.
Adriana view[ed] [Grandmother] as a mother figure. She, you know, was completely engaged with her, was giving her lots of affection, both, you know, vice versa. Very happy, excited, you know, and [Grandmother] was providing me with all kinds of updates on how well she [was] doing and was just a proud and beaming grandmother.
Similar to In re D.S.,
[ADRIANA’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, may I approach?
THE COURT: Approach who? She’s on the phone.
[ADRIANA’S COUNSEL]: I was going to get close so she [could] hear me, but I can just talk very loudly if you’d like.
THE COURT: Can you hear her?
[MS. TROTT]: Yes. Barely, but I can hear her.
THE COURT: All right. She said you’d better get closer.
THE COURT: Do you want to get closer, too?
[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: I’d better.
THE COURT: All right.
Unlike Salerian and In re D.S., in the case sub judice, there were no phone disconnections or any other technological problems.
Mother’s counsel asked Ms. Trott the following during cross-examination:
[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: [Grandmother] ... she’s not been approved as an adoptive placement at this point, correct?
[MS. TROTT]: She is—I’m in the process of writing that study. I have not completed it.
[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Okay. So she has not, in fact, been approved at this point.
[MS. TROTT]: No, she has not.
[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Okay. That’s my only question.
Although, there is no Sixth Amendment right to confrontation in this civil proсeeding, Mother still reserved her right to cross-examine Ms. Trott. Our review of the record reveals that Mother’s ability to effectively cross-examine was not stifled because Ms. Trott testified by telephone. Mother had a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine, but chose to limit her cross-examination to one question. We conclude that (1) Adriana’s inadequate notice was not an inconvenience to Mother; (2) Ms. Trott’s demeanor and credibility were not likely to be critical to the outcome of the proceedings; and (3) Mother had a fair opportunity to cross-examine
III. RELEVANCY
A. Did the Trial Court Err in Admitting Irrelevant Evidence?
Relevant evidence has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of thе action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Md. Rule 5-401. Generally, the trial court has wide discretion when considering the relevancy of evidence. State v. Simms,
Adriana asserts that Grandmother’s reference to the severity of the shooting incident, the injuries sustained, and her recovery was directly related not only to Grandmother’s ability to be a fit parent, but also to whether continuing the legal relationship between Mother and Adriana was detrimental. Likewise, the Department avers that the shooting and Grandmother’s recovery were probative to the question of whether Mother posed a safety issue to Adriana, and insofar as it had a bearing on Grandmother’s ability to care for Adriana and develop a positive emotional bond with her. In the court’s assessment of Mother’s objection to Grandmother’s testimony, the following colloquy ensued:
THE COURT: No, we have to get to the relevant, [sic] why would it not be relevant in terms of an interaction or how she has overcome what happened to her in the past with respect to her relationship with her own daughter?”
[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I argue that that [sic] has nothing to do with any decision regarding why she needs, why her, my client’s parental rights need to be tеrminated. I think that it’s being introduced to establish, quite honestly, some level of drama in the case that is unnecessary and prejudicial to my client.
THE COURT: Well, we haven’t heard what she had to say yet—
THE COURT:—to know if it’s dramatic or not. So it’s overruled. Go ahead. Answer the question.
It has long been established that a parent’s past conduct is relevant to a consideration of the parent’s future conduct. In re Dustin T.,
In In re Dustin T.,
In the case sub judice, Grandmother testified that:
Thank you. First of all, I want to say is [sic] that I don’t have any ill will against my daughter. I’m not here bash [sic] her or anything like that. I forgave her for what she did. I still love her. I love my granddaughter regardless of what people may think.
You know. When I was in the hospital, I was out for a while. I don’t know how long. I couldn’t even tell you. I was in a coma. And when I came to there [sic] were nurses around me because the doctor had given me up and called the family to let them know that I may not make it.
And to make a long story short, to go on to the, what you call it, the recovery part where I had to go [sic] rehab. They sent me to rehаb. The doctor sa[id], “Well, [Grandmother], be expected to stay in rehab for at least six months.” I said, “Six months?” I went into rehab. I did everything I could, had to do as far as the walking and pushing myself. A lot of mornings and days I did not feel like it. But I made myself do it and I came out of rehab in six weeks, not six months.
And that was, I had always been a strong person because I had strong parents and family. And then when I left rehab, my brother took me in his home and I had to go to, well, it’s okay, North Carolina to live with him for two years. And what he did, I had to have other operations. My brother would take off from work and take me back, bring me back to Baltimore, Maryland to have my operations....
And that’s what I did. But for two years, I mean, and then my brother would push me up the steps. I couldn’t walk when I first got there. And I couldn’t get out the bed by myself. They would pull my arms up, a nurse would come in once a week to monitor me and my blood pressure and change my wounds and all of that.
My sister-in-law would put me in the shower and I would have to sit on a bench and she would wash me.... But then after my last operation and I got well enough, I moved away and he used to come and visit me on a regular basis—
Yes, my brother. And come and visit me. And I still had, like, a nurse that would come when I had to go to doctors and nurses and stuff, you know. And it took a while. I mean, I’m not completely well but there are things that I can do and there are little limitations and I have wear [sic] a band for the rest of my life because my stomach is messed up so bad.
We find that Grandmother’s testimony regarding her recovery was relevant to the TPR proceeding because Grandmother’s recuperation demonstrated the extent of the damage caused by Mother’s violent conduct. Mother suffered from a psychiatric
“It is well settled in Maryland that a judgment in a civil case will not be reversed in the absence of a showing of error and prejudice of the appealing party.” In re Ashley E.,
Overall, the juvenile court considered all the factors enumerated in § 5-323(d) of the Family Law Article and found clear and convincing evidence that Mother was unfit to care for Adriana because of her chronic and severe mental illness. The court found that it was in Adriana’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Hence, the court did not abuse its discretion.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
Notes
. Delusional Disorder Persecutory Type аpplies when the central theme of the delusion involves the person's belief that he or she is being conspired against, cheated, spied on, followed, poisoned, or drugged, maliciously maligned, harassed, or obstructed in the pursuit of long-term goals. Individuals with persecutory delusions are often resentful and angry and may resort to violence against those they believe are hurting them. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 298 (4th ed. 1994).
. Mother was charged with attempted murder, first-degree assault, a handgun violation, and reckless endangerment. On April 2, 2002, Mother was admitted to Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center ("Perkins Hospital”), a psychiatric hospital, for a competency evaluation. While there, she required four-point and bilateral wrists restraints due to self-injurious behavior. On May 17, 2002, she was found not competent to stand trial.
. As part of Mother’s conditional rеlease, she was to receive mental health treatment and case management services once a week with a mental health therapist and once a month with a psychiatrist, respectively. Mother failed to attend her appointments, and was recommitted to Perkins Hospital in May 2010. While there, she refused to take her medications and attempted to strangle a physically-disabled, elderly patient in a bathroom with a towel.
. Preeclampsia is the development of hypertension with proteinuria or edema, or both, due to pregnancy or the influence of a recent pregnancy. Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 1133 (24th ed. 1982).
. After the limited custody was issued, the investigator continued to search for family members. She identified Father, who was a registered sex offender and incarcerated for violating Mother’s proteсtive order, paternal grandparents, and Mother's cousins, but they either expressed no interest or were unable to care for Adriana. Grandmother did express interest, but because she lived in North Carolina, the Department could not place Adriana with her at that time.
. A "Child in Need of Assistance” is a child who requires court intervention because he or she has been abused, neglected, has a developmental disability and/or a mental disorder, and his or her parents, guardian, or custodian, are either unwilling or unable to provide proper care and attention to the child and the child's needs. Md.Code (Repl.Vol.2006), § 3-801(f) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
. Adriana was in foster care between January 2010 through May 2010, and Mother visited approximately six times between January 13, 2010 through March 24, 2010. On March 30, 2010, the Department’s social worker contaсted Mother to confirm the next visitation meeting. Mother indicated her desire to cancel all remaining visits and have Adriana placed for adoption.
. The court ordered that the Department perform psychological and psychiatric evaluations of Mother to determine whether she was able to safely parent Adriana. The Department made an effort to schedule the court-ordered evaluations, but Mother never complied, and ceased all communications with the Department’s social workers.
. The ICPC process entails that “[n]o sending agency shall send, bring, or cause to be sent or brought into any other party state any child for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption unless the sending agency shall comply with each and every requirement set forth in this section and with the applicable laws of the receiving state governing the placement of children therein.” Md.Code (Repl.Vol.2006), § 5-604(a) of the Family Law Article.
. Counsel was appointed for Adriana.
. Rule 2-513. Testimony taken by telephone.
(d) Contents of motion. The motion shall state the witness's name and, unless excused by the court:
(1) the address and telephone number of the witness;
(2) the subject matter of the witness’s expected testimony;
(3) the reasons why testimony taken by telephone should be allowed
(4) the location from which the witness will testify;
(5) whether there will be any other individual present in the room with the witness while the witness is testifying and, if so, the reason for the individual's presence and the individual's name, if known; and
(6) whether transmission of the witness's testimony will be from a wired handset, a wireless handset connected to the landline, or a speaker phone.
. In ruling on a petition for guardianship of a child, a juvenile court shall give primary consideration to the health and safety of the child and consideration to all other factors needed to determine whether terminating a parent's rights is in the best interests of thе child. Md.Code (Repl.Vol.2006), § 5-323(d) of the Family Law Article.
. Md. Rule 8-131(c) reads:
Action tried without a jury. When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
. Judge Alpert, a former member of our Court, sponsored the addition of Md. Rule 2-513. See Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Minutes of Meeting of November 16, 2007 at 12, 18.
. The New Mexico Court of Appeals determined that the mother’s contentions involved a question of law relating to due process, as well as a review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion. In re Megan L.,
. The trial was scheduled to be held in the southwest region of New Mexico. The witnesses resided or were located in the northern area of New Mexico. In re Megan L.,