IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF R.P. AND S.P., PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE. S.Z. AND S.Z., Appellants, v. S.B. AND H.B., Appellees.
No. 20230120-CA
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
October 18, 2024
2024 UT App 149
JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY
Emily Adams, Freyja Johnson, Sara Pfrommer, and Anna Grigsby, Attorneys for Appellants
James K. Tracy, Stacy J. McNeill, Hyrum J. Bosserman, and KC Hooker, Attorneys for Appellees
JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.
LUTHY, Judge:
¶1 This case concerns the proposed adoption of twelve-year-old R.P. and ten-year-old S.P. (collectively, the Children). The Children‘s paternal grandmother, S.Z. (Paternal Grandmother), and her husband, S.Z. (Paternal Grandfather) (collectively, Paternal Grandparents), filed a petition for adoption, commencing this case. The Children‘s maternal grandmother, S.B. (Maternal Grandmother), intervened in the case. Maternal Grandmother and her husband, H.B. (collectively, Maternal Grandparents), subsequently filed their own petition for adoption, commencing a second adoption proceeding. Paternal Grandmother failed to intervene in that second proceeding, and due to that failure, Maternal Grandmother filed a motion for partial summary judgment in this adoption case, asserting that Paternal Grandmother failed to comply with the Utah Adoption Act,
BACKGROUND
¶2 After the Children lost their parents in a helicopter accident in 2019, their two grandmothers were appointed as their co-guardians, with a shared visitation schedule. However, the relationship between the grandmothers was difficult, and in early 2021, Paternal Grandmother petitioned the district court to terminate Maternal Grandmother as a co-guardian of the Children. The district court dismissed Paternal Grandmother‘s termination petition, determining that Paternal Grandmother (1) “failed to make any allegations . . . or provide any evidence that [Maternal Grandmother] is unfit or otherwise unsuitable to serve as guardian“; (2) “failed to provide any evidence showing that this current arrangement is not in the best interests of the [C]hildren“; and (3) “failed to allege . . . or provide evidence of the existence of a substantial and material change in circumstance” because, although it was “undisputed that communication was strained” between the grandmothers and that they had “been involved in litigation” with each other, those conditions were true prior to their appointments as co-guardians.
¶3 Shortly thereafter, in November 2021, Paternal Grandparents filed a petition for adoption of the Children, which commenced the instant case. As required by statute, Paternal Grandparents served notice of their adoption petition on Maternal Grandmother. See
¶4 Around the same time that Maternal Grandmother moved to intervene in Paternal Grandparents’ adoption proceeding, Maternal Grandparents filed their own petition for adoption, commencing a second adoption proceeding. This second adoption proceeding was filed in the same court and assigned to the same judge who was presiding over Paternal Grandparents’ adoption proceeding. Maternal Grandparents served Paternal Grandmother with notice of their adoption petition, both through email to Paternal Grandparents’ counsel and through regular mail to Paternal Grandmother. Each notice advised Paternal Grandmother as to the statutory result for failing to respond to the notice and intervene in the adoption proceeding, saying:
If you do not file a Motion to Intervene within 30 days after this notice is served on you, you:
- Waive any right to further notice in this adoption;
- Forfeit all rights in relation to the adoptee; and
- Are barred from bringing or maintaining any action to assert any interest in the adoptee.
See generally
¶5 Maternal Grandmother moved to consolidate the two adoption proceedings with the earlier guardianship case. And Paternal Grandparents moved to simply consolidate the two adoption proceedings. The district court granted Maternal Grandmother‘s motion and transferred both adoption proceedings to the judge presiding over the guardianship case. Almost immediately after
¶6 Following the entry of this order striking the consolidation order, Maternal Grandparents again served Paternal Grandmother with notice of their adoption proceeding, once more warning Paternal Grandmother of the consequences of failing to intervene in the proceeding. Again, Paternal Grandmother failed to intervene.
¶7 As a result, Maternal Grandmother filed a motion for partial summary judgment in Paternal Grandparents’ adoption case, arguing that Paternal Grandmother‘s adoption petition should be dismissed with prejudice: “Because [Paternal Grandmother] has failed to meet the statutory deadlines to intervene in [Maternal Grandparents‘] adoption proceedings, she has forfeited any rights in the Children and is barred from bringing or maintaining any action, including these proceedings, or asserting any interest in the Children.” The district court agreed and granted partial summary judgement, concluding, “[Paternal Grandparents] are barred from participating in this adoption matter because they did not timely intervene [in Maternal Grandparents’ adoption proceeding] according to the statutory requirements.”
¶8 Paternal Grandmother thereafter petitioned this court for permission to appeal the interlocutory partial summary judgment decision, and this court granted that petition.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 Paternal Grandmother challenges the district court‘s grant of partial summary judgment based on its application of the Adoption Act. “An appellate court reviews a trial court‘s legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness and views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (cleaned up). Likewise, “the proper interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law reviewed for correctness.” State v. Robertson, 2017 UT 27, ¶ 14, 438 P.3d 491 (cleaned up).2
ANALYSIS
¶10 Paternal Grandmother argues that the district court erred by strictly applying a provision of the Adoption Act to effectively dismiss her adoption petition due to her failure to intervene in Maternal Grandparents’ adoption proceeding. The provision at issue,
(a) A person who has been served with notice of an adoption proceeding and who wishes to contest the adoption shall file a motion to intervene in the adoption proceeding:
- within 30 days after the day on which the person was served with notice of the adoption proceeding;
- setting forth specific relief sought; and
- accompanied by a memorandum specifying the factual and legal grounds upon which the motion is based.
(b) A person who fails to fully and strictly comply with all of the requirements described in Subsection (6)(a) within 30 days after the day on which the person was served with notice of the adoption proceeding:
- waives any right to further notice in connection with the adoption;
- forfeits all rights in relation to the adoptee; and
- is barred from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to assert any interest in the adoptee.
¶11 “When interpreting a statute, we look first to its plain language and presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.” Boyle v. Christensen, 2011 UT 20, ¶ 27, 251 P.3d 810 (cleaned up). Generally, “if the plain meaning of the statute can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are needed.” Id. (cleaned up).
¶12 The plain meaning of the Intervention Provision is clear. It requires that an individual who receives notice under the statute of an adoption proceeding and wishes to contest the referenced adoption must move to intervene in that adoption proceeding within thirty days of receiving notice. See
¶13 “Normally, where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, our analysis ends; our duty is to give effect to that plain meaning. However, an equally well-settled caveat to the plain meaning rule states that a court should not follow the literal language of a statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result.” In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 11, 165 P.3d 1206 (cleaned up); see also Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 27, 387 P.3d 1000 (explaining that the absurdity doctrine “reforms unambiguous statutory language where the language would lead to an absurd result” (cleaned up)). And that is what Paternal Grandmother contends here—that applying the plain meaning of the Intervention Provision leads to an absurd and unsupportable result.3
¶14 Our supreme court “has developed a narrow, exacting standard for determining whether to apply the absurdity doctrine and read a statute contrary to its plain meaning.” Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 28. This standard provides that we will apply the absurdity doctrine only when “the operation of the plain language is so overwhelmingly absurd that no rational legislator could have intended the statute to operate in such a manner.” Id. (cleaned up). That is, “[t]his standard is satisfied only if the legislature could not reasonably have intended the result.” Id. And when determining whether the legislature could have reasonably intended the result, we are particularly mindful of “the intent of the pertinent legislative body,” which is “the guiding star of the absurd results doctrine.” In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 12. See generally id. (“Rather than controverting legislative power, the absurd results doctrine functions to preserve legislative intent when it is narrowly applied.“). Even under this exacting standard, the Intervention Provision—when applied to the particular circumstances of this case—
¶15 We first identify a circumstance under which application of the Intervention Provision does not yield an absurd result. That circumstance is where persons who have not filed their own adoption petition receive notice that someone else has filed an adoption petition and then fail to timely intervene in that adoption proceeding. In such a circumstance, the Intervention Provision precludes the persons who received notice and failed to timely intervene from thereafter initiating their own adoption proceeding. We believe that the legislature could have reasonably intended this result. The legislature might very well have determined to place the interest that adoptive children have in receiving a prompt and definitive resolution of their familial status ahead of the remote possibility that a person who is unable to timely conjure up and act upon a desire to adopt the child might turn out to be the best adoptive placement for the child.
¶16 A circumstance more similar to the situation in this case presents a closer call on the question of whether application of the Intervention Provision yields an absurd result. That circumstance is where spouses who are both serving as guardians of the adoptive children first file their own adoption petition and then both receive notice that someone else has also initiated an adoption proceeding and the spouses subsequently fail to timely intervene in the other adoption proceeding. On the one hand, one might argue—with some force—that the legislature could have reasonably intended to require persons filing competing adoption petitions to promptly intervene in each other‘s proceeding—regardless of which one was commenced first—so that the various individuals involved in each case, including judges, are aware of all asserted interests in the children. This is so especially because it is entirely possible that competing adoption petitions might be filed in different judicial districts in the state and therefore be assigned to different judges. On the other hand, one might also argue—again with some force—that if it really “is the intent and desire of the Legislature that in every adoption the best interest of the child should govern and be of foremost concern in the court‘s determination,”
¶17 The circumstance presented to us here is one in which spouses (namely, Paternal Grandparents), one of whom is already serving as a guardian of the adoptive children, filed an adoption petition; the spouse entitled to notice of a competing adoption petition (namely, the guardian spouse, Paternal Grandmother) then received notice of such a petition; and the spouse entitled to notice failed to intervene in the competing adoption proceeding. Strict application of the Intervention Provision in this circumstance requires a ruling that prohibits the guardian spouse (Paternal Grandmother) from maintaining her adoption petition while allowing the non-guardian spouse (Paternal Grandfather) to continue to pursue adoption. We can identify no logical or principled reason for such a regime, and we do not believe that our legislature reasonably intended for the Intervention Provision to operate in this manner.4
related to Paternal Grandfather, there would be no differential treatment of Paternal Grandmother and Paternal Grandfather, thus avoiding the absurd result we identify here. However, there are two problems with the district court‘s findings and analysis in this regard.
First, we question whether Maternal Grandmother‘s notice, which was addressed only to Paternal Grandmother, could properly serve as notice to Paternal Grandfather as well, even if both Paternal Grandparents lived at the same location when the notice was served or were both represented by the same attorney to whom the notice was emailed.
Second, and more importantly, we conclude that the Intervention Provision does not apply to persons—like Paternal Grandfather—who are not entitled to the notice mandated by
¶18 In sum, we conclude that
not entitled to notice has received notice sufficient to trigger the intervention requirement of the Intervention Provision—we conclude that the Intervention Provision is not applicable to persons who, like Paternal Grandfather, are not entitled to the notice that section 78B-6-110 mandates. See State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ¶ 54, 63 P.3d 621 (“Each part or section [of a statute] should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.” (cleaned up)). Thus, application of the Intervention Provision as written yields in cases like this the absurd result we have identified, notwithstanding the district court‘s apparent ruling to the contrary.
Moreover, our reaching the issue of the Intervention Provision‘s inapplicability to persons who, like Paternal Grandfather, are not entitled to notice under section 78B-6-110 is appropriate here, despite the fact that Paternal Grandfather has not appealed the court‘s decision as to him, because resolution of this issue is necessary to the proper resolution of Paternal Grandmother‘s appeal. Cf. In re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, ¶ 40, 472 P.3d 827 (“[T]he parties cannot force a court into a strained interpretation of a statute by the arguments they advance. A court‘s duty is to get the law right and parties cannot push us off that path.“). In light of our conclusion regarding the inapplicability of the Intervention Provision to persons not entitled to notice under section 78B-6-110, the district court would be well advised, before it issues a final judgment, to revisit the ruling in its summary judgment order that purports to apply the Intervention Provision to Paternal Grandfather and thereby bar his further participation in this matter.
adoption proceeding, that spouse need not comply with the intervention requirement of the Intervention Provision.
CONCLUSION
¶19 Because the absurdity doctrine is triggered under the narrow circumstances of this case, we hold that the Intervention Provision does not apply to Paternal Grandmother. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment against her, and we remand this matter for such further proceedings as may now be appropriate.
JOHN D. LUTHY
JUDGE