728 N.E.2d 437 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1999
Please note: We have sua sponte removed this case from the accelerated calendar.
Ward filed an objection to the proposed adoption. The Koszycis filed an amended petition alleging that Ward's consent was not necessary because he had abandoned the child. After a hearing, the probate court determined that Ward had not abandoned the child and had adequately objected to the petition. The probate court recognized that Holt had consented to the adoption, but because Ward's necessary consent had not been obtained, the court dismissed the petition for adoption. It granted temporary custody of the child to the Koszyckis and certified the case to the juvenile court for "appropriate action and disposition." The Koszyckis appealed the dismissal of their petition to this court, and we affirmed the dismissal based on Ward's right to object to the adoption.
In 1991, tThe biological father, Ward,fatherpetitioned for custody of the child in juvenile court. Holt testified unfavorably to Ward at that hearing. The juvenile court recognized that the probate court had granted the Koszyckis temporary custody of the child because Holt had relinquished custody and because Ward did not have a relationship with the child. The juvenile court denied Ward's petition for custody and granted the Koszyckis legal custody, with neither parent being ordered to pay child support. In 1997, the Koszyckis filed a petition for adoption of the child, who was then eight years old, indicating that the biological mother's consent to adopt had previously been filed and that the putative father's consent was not necessary. They also filed a motion captioned "Motion to Transfer and Adopt Previous Consent." The biological mother, Holt, filed a motion to withdraw her consent.
The magistrate asked the parties to brief the issue of whether "a consent executed in 1990 for an adoption proceeding filed in 1990, which was subsequently dismissed, is effective for an adoption proceeding commenced in 1997." In a well-written opinion, tThe magistrate determined that (1) the signing of the consent was not a total relinquishment of parental rights; (2) the probate court had made no finding that the consent would survive the dismissal of the petition; and (3) the *437
juvenile court's finding that the mother had relinquished custody did not refer to the consent to the adoption. It concluded that the legislature intended that a consent to adoption be effective only for the petition with which it is filed. The Koszyckis filed objections to the magistrate's decision. The trial court adopted the magistrate's decision and denied the Koszyckis' motion to transfer and adopt the biological mother's consent to adopt. It is the denial of their motion to use Holt's prior consent to adoption to support their current adoption petition that the Koszyckis appeal.
Consequently, in order to protect the inherent rights of biological parents and the best interests of children, which include the encouragement of adoption in general and an expeditious and positive adoption specifically, the Ohio legislature has enacted statutes, now codified in Title 31 of the Ohio Revised Code, to regulate adoptions. To answer the question posed by this appeal, we must review the applicable statutes and attempt to discern the legislature's intent in enacting them.
it is the duty of the courts to give a statute the interpretation its language calls for where this can reasonably be done, and the general rule is that no intent may be imputed to the Legislature in the enactment of a law, other than such as is supported by the language of the law itself.3
This duty is based on the presumption that the legislature knows the meaning of words and chooses the specific words contained in a statute to express its intent. Consequently, a court may not use words not in the statute to add to *438 or limit the expressed legislative intent.4 Further, a court may not ignore the plain language of the statute "under the guise of statutory interpretation or liberal or narrow construction."5 Moreover, "strict construction does not require that we interpret statutes in such a manner that would mandate unjust or unreasonable results."6
The legislature has made extensive changes in the Adoption Code over the last five decades. In 1953, the adoption statutes were codified in Chapter 3107. On January 1, 1977, the legislature repealed R.C. as evidenced by the Adoption Code now in effect.
In its earlier attempts at regulating adoptions, the legislature provided in R.C. In
1977, the legislature repealed R.C. statutes7 in the new Adoption Code: (1) the new version of R.C. Consent;" (2) R.C. (3) R.C. none ofthese statutes contained the language that consent was applicableonly to a specific adoption. The legislature thus specifically deleted that language from the law.Further, no other statutes in the Adoption Code contained such language. Subsequent revisions have not added the requirement.
Further the statutes do not place a time limit on the effectiveness of a consent to adoption. In fact, since 1977, the legislature has deemed a consent to adoption to be irrevocable.8 Thus, consent to adoption is viable until the court grants a motion to withdraw it, which must be filed before the entry of an interlocutory order or the entry of a final order of adoption.9 *439
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment denying the Koszyckis' motion to transfer and adopt previous consent and remand this case for further proceedings.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Doan, P.J., and Winkler, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this Opinion.
