OPINION OF THE COURT
In this matter, the Orphans’ Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County involuntarily terminated the parental rights of the natural father рursuant to § 311(1) of the Adoption Act, Act of July 24, 1970, P.L. 620, § 311(1), 1 P.S. § 311(1) (Supp. 1980-81). In this direct appeal, the natural father seeks to challenge the validity of thаt determination. The question in this case is whether the record reflects that the conduct of the mother of the child posed a legally sufficient barrier so as to preclude appellant from performing his required parental duties.
J. S. M., Jr., was born on Decеmber 6, 1968, the second child of James Steven Mursch, Sr. and Veronica Mursch, now Veronica Elkowitz. The parents separated about nine *316 months after the birth of the child in question and were divorced on December 23, 1969. The mother remarried, and her new husband, Joseph E. Elkоwitz, initiated this proceeding by attempting to adopt J. S. M., Jr. Appellant has also since remarried.
Section 311(1) provides:
The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated ..., on the ground that: (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months either has evidеnced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parentаl duties.”
Under this provision, it must be established that for a period of six months, appellant either evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishment of his parental claim or that he has refused or failed to perform his parental duties.
Matter of Adoption of David C.,
Our scope of review in these matters has been clearly defined. We are limited to determining whether the Orphans’ Court’s termination оf appellant’s parental rights is supported by competent evidence.
In re Adoption of Baby Boy P.,
On this record, it is virtually uncontroverted that the natural father had no significant contacts with his child for a period fаr in excess of the statutory six months. Nevertheless, our law recognizes there may be situations where the parent who has custody оf the minor may create such barriers as to impede communications between the absent parent and the child. Where the absence of communication results from the deliberate conduct of the opposing parent, it may not be used as а basis for termination of parental rights, even when the lack of contact may have extended significantly beyond the statutory period.
In re D. J. Y., supra; Adoption of S. H.,
These considerations must be weighed against the obligation of the non-custodial parent to make an affirmative effort to exert himself to take a place of importance in the child’s life. In re D. J. Y., suрra; Adoption of S. H., supra; Matter of Adoption of David C., supra. There is, therefore, a need for the record to demonstrаte that reasonable resolve was reflected in the actions of the parent in question, to overcome those imрediments to a relationship with the child which would permit that parent to remain a positive force in the life of the child. In re D. J. Y., supra; Adoption of S. H., supra.
*318 In the instant case, the father stopped visiting his child for a period of approximately six years prior to the hearing. He providеd no support, did not attempt to communicate, nor did he exhibit any other type of serious concern for the well-being of thе child. Appellant argues that his ex-wife placed numerous obstacles in his path, including threats of police action, verbal abuse, and moving to a new residence unknown to him. However, the record reflects that this version of the relationship was not unсontroverted. There was testimony in the record that the police action referred to by appellant resulted beсause he attempted to visit the child at a time when he was under the influence of alcohol and became unruly. Moreovеr, although the mother did move to a second address, she remained in the same general neighborhood where it would appear that reasonable diligence would have easily produced the new address, if there had been a sincere effort made towards that end.
While the court recognized that there were gifts of money made by appellant’s parents to the child еarly in the separation, no letters, cards or gifts were forwarded directly by the father. Moreover, there was a basis in the reсord for the court to conclude, as it did, that the grandparents’ actions were not primarily inspired at the behest of apрellant. Under such circumstances, a finding of a refusal or a failure to perform parental duties, within the statutory period, was сlearly supportable. Moreover, there was also a basis for the chancellor to reject the proffered explanation for this failure.
Appellant relies heavily on the opinion of this Court in In re D. J. Y., supra. In that case, we did sustain a refusal to terminate parental rights where a mother did not have contаct with a child from 1974 to 1977. There, too, the absent parent offered an explanation for that failure. At that point, the similarities еnd. The court below in In re D. J. Y., supra, accepted the credibility of the testimony offered by the non-custodial parent to establish the exсuse, and the record supported those findings. Here, the Court rejected *319 the credibility of the evidence offered to establish the excuse for appellant’s derelictions and the record here supports that rejection. In light of our scope of review, there is no reason to disturb the finding made by the learned chancellor in this case.
Accordingly, the decree is affirmed.