207 A.D. 170 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1923
While the court, sitting to condemn land for a public use, is untrammeled by technical rules of evidence and unrestricted as to its source of information as to values, and should be guided by its own judgment and experience rather than by the opinions of expert witnesses, yet the court must consider relevant evidence on values in the vicinity as established by sales of similar properties and the prices paid for the very land itself within a not too remote
For parcel No. 1 is awarded a sum over double the value its owner placed upon it within a year of the vesting of title, in a proceeding to reduce the assessment for taxation against the land, ' where the owner swore that the objection to the valuation for assessment was based “ on recent auction sales in the immediate vicinity. This was a voluntary sale. The adjoining lots brought $250 a piece.”
The award made for parcel No. 2 presents an astounding departure from prevalent practice for determining with some approach to accuracy the fair market value of land. For this parcel an award is made which is nearly eight times the actual amount paid for this parcel by its present owner within ten months of the taking, which sum was paid at a voluntary public auction sale, which hitherto has had general repute as a proper basis for estimating the current equivalent of a fair marketable price. With these results as extravagant awards this court would not have power to interfere purely on a basis of difference of opinion as to values; but it is called upon to reverse solely when it appears that an erroneous rule of damage has been adopted by the court which made the award, or an erroneous conclusion of law has been applied to the facts in proof of damage. In the memorandum of the court announcing the basis of the awards to be made, it is stated that the short lot rule is to be applied in fixation of the entire award for each parcel. It seems to us impossible to find any adequate proof of what short lot rule was employed in the estimate of damage, and that what proof there was appears so confused, vague and unsatisfactory as to afford no reasonable ground for making it the basis of a rule of compensation for damage in the taking of land for a public use.
The record reads on this matter: “ Q. The rules you admit for valuing interior land with no street frontage, run from one-half to a third of the value per square foot for land in the same ownership in the same locality that abut on the street, don’t they? A." Yes, that is true. Q. You have discarded all those rules, such as the Harmon-Neill rule? A. No; the Harmon-Neill rule * * * Q. You will admit those rules call for only half or a third of the valuation for interior land? A. Not under the Hoffman-Neill rule. * * * Q. Take the Hoffman rule, are you familiar with it? A. I am. Q. Does that make any difference in valuation between a part of a lot that does not front on a street and that part which does front on a street? A. No; the Hoffman-Neill rule applies to a lot 100
This testimony and colloquy indicate that no precise rule of differentiation in values was ever received by the court, either as evidence in the form of an authenticated document, or in oral proof as to what the local custom was in respect of deductions for rear lots, or lots without frontage within 100 feet of a street. It is,
For this reason the order appealed from should be reversed, with costs to the appellant, and a new trial ordered.
Clarke, P. J., Smith, Finch and Martin, JJ., concur.
Order reversed, with costs to appellant, and a new trial ordered. Settle order on notice.