IN THE MATTER OF: A.R.A., P.Z.A., Z.K.A.
No. 65A19
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
Filed 6 December 2019
MORGAN, Justice.
On discretionary review pursuant to
Charles E. Wilson, Jr. for petitioner-appellee Cleveland County Department of Social Services.
Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by William L. Esser IV, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.
Surratt Thompson & Ceberio PLLC, by Christopher M. Watford, for respondent-appellant mother.
Respondent-mother appeals from the district court‘s 12 December 2018 order terminating her parental rights to A.R.A. (Amy), P.Z.A. (Peter), and Z.K.A. (Zara) (collectively, the children).1 We affirm.
IN RE: A.R.A., P.Z.A., Z.K.A.
Opinion of the Court
The Cleveland County Department of Social Services (DSS) has an extensive history of involvement with respondent-mother and the father2 of the juveniles in this matter, based upon the father‘s substance abuse and domestic violence issues. In 2013, the father was convicted of assaulting Amy and respondent-mother. In 2015, the father assaulted Peter and threatened to kill Peter and respondent-mother. The father assaulted Amy again in 2015, resulting in a conviction of habitual misdemeanor assault. After serving time in prison for the habitual misdemeanor assault conviction, the father was released from incarceration in October 2016. In December 2016, respondent-mother allowed the father to return to the home where she lived with the children, despite his prior assaults on them and in violation of a specific condition of the father‘s post-release supervision conditions.
On 20 December 2016, respondent-mother voluntarily placed all three children in foster care so that the father could reside in the family home with her. On 13 January 2017, DSS obtained nonsecure custody of the children and filed a juvenile petition alleging that the children were neglected juveniles. In its petition, DSS alleged that respondent-mother and the father had repeatedly failed to comply and
cooperate with DSS and the court to assist the parents in keeping the children safe and in avoiding the need for an out-of-home placement.
The district court entered a combined adjudication and disposition order on 24 March 2017. Based upon stipulations made by the parties, the children were adjudicated to be neglected juveniles, and custody of the juveniles was continued with DSS. Respondent-mother was ordered to complete a court-approved parenting education program; demonstrate appropriate parenting skills and an understanding of how substance abuse and domestic violence affects the children; complete an assessment by the Abuse Prevention
At a review hearing held on 14 June 2017, pursuant to
On 1 November 2017, the district court held a permanency planning hearing pursuant to
On 20 December 2017, the district court held a permanency planning review hearing. The district court entered an order on 11 January 2018 finding that, although respondent-mother and the father had made some effort to comply with the court‘s requirements, they had not demonstrated to the court any significant progress in correcting the conditions that led to the children‘s removal from their care. Respondent-mother was scheduled to complete the APC program on 22 December 2017 but had failed to comply with the court‘s recommendations for mental health services and substance abuse treatment. Both parents continued to deny responsibility for their situation and placed the blame on the children, particularly
Amy. In its January 2018 order, the district court changed the primary permanent plan to adoption, concurrent with a secondary permanent plan of reunification.
On 22 January 2018, DSS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent-mother and the father on the grounds of neglect, willful failure to make reasonable progress, and willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care. See
Respondent-mother gave timely notice of appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. On 8 April 2019, respondent-mother filed a petition with this Court seeking discretionary review of the order terminating her parental rights, prior to a determination of the Court of Appeals. This Court allowed respondent-mother‘s petition for discretionary review on 1 May 2019.
The North Carolina Juvenile Code provides for a two-stage process for the termination of parental rights: adjudication and disposition.
“clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” the existence of one or more grounds for termination under
Respondent-mother challenges both grounds for termination as found by the district court. Because a finding of only one ground is necessary to support a termination of parental rights, we only address respondent-mother‘s argument regarding the basis for termination of her willful failure to make reasonable progress. See In re T.N.H., 831 S.E.2d 54, 62 (N.C. 2019). A district court may terminate a parent‘s parental rights pursuant to Section 7B-1111(a)(2) if the parent “has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.”
The findings in the adjudication order indicate that the father‘s issues with substance abuse, the commission of domestic violence in the presence of the children, and respondent-mother‘s failure to protect the children by allowing the father to reside in the home were the underlying reasons for the children‘s removal. The district court observed that upon intervention by DSS, respondent-mother elected to voluntarily place the children in foster care “so that the . . . father could reside in the home with her.” In its termination order, the district court found that respondent-mother had continued to live with the father since December 2016. Instead of protecting the children, respondent-mother continued to blame the children, as well as other people such as the father‘s probation officer, for the father‘s return to the home. She continued to defend the father throughout the termination hearing. The district court further found that because respondent-mother displayed “a lack of understanding or acceptance of responsibility for the circumstances and conditions that led to the [children‘s] removal,” she had failed to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the district court that she had made reasonable progress under the circumstances in correcting those conditions.
On appeal, respondent-mother initially challenges several of the district court‘s findings of fact. Those findings of fact which she does not challenge are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991) (citing Schloss v. Jamison, 258 N.C. 271, 275, 128 S.E.2d 590, 593 (1962); Williams v. Williams, 97 N.C. App. 118, 121, 387 S.E.2d 217, 219 (1990)). Moreover, we limit our review of challenged findings to those that are necessary to support the district court‘s determination that this ground of respondent-mother‘s willful failure to make reasonable progress existed in order to terminate her parental rights. In re T.N.H., 831 S.E.2d at 58–59 (citing In re Moore, 306 N.C. at 404, 293 S.E.2d at 133).
Respondent-mother challenges finding of fact 47, which states:
That the . . . parents did not give the Social Worker their address until August 21, 2018. However, the parents have continued, th[r]ough this termination hearing, to refuse the Social Worker access to their home . . . . The [parents] have therefore not established safe and stable housing.
Specifically, respondent-mother argues that her testimony directly contradicts the court‘s finding that the parents refused access to the home and contends that the district court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof onto respondent-mother to prove at the termination hearing the existence of safe and stable housing. We disagree.
Thus, it was reasonable for the district court to infer that by repeatedly canceling home visits, respondent-mother and the father were preventing the social worker from having access to their home. Moreover, the district court did not improperly shift DSS’ burden of proof onto respondent-mother. Rather, the court simply observed that respondent-mother had failed to rebut DSS’ clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that she and the father had not established safe and stable housing for the children. See, e.g., In re Clark, 72 N.C. App. 118, 125, 323 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1984) (holding that instead of shifting the burden of proof, the challenged finding was “nothing more than an accurate statement of the procedural stance of the case. The finding recites only that the respondents did not produce evidence that contradicted the allegations set forth in the petition.“).
Next, respondent-mother challenges the portion of finding of fact 49 that provides that the parents “have failed to complete their case plan.” Respondent-mother claims that she has completed the only case plan referenced in the underlying record.
Unchallenged findings of fact establish that respondent-mother was required to complete a parenting education program and demonstrate appropriate parenting skills, to complete an assessment through APC and comply with recommendations for treatment, and to provide a safe and stable home which was free from substance abuse and domestic violence. While the evidence shows that respondent-mother made some progress in her case plan by completing the APC program and a parenting education program, nonetheless clear, cogent, and convincing evidence also demonstrates that she failed to establish an ability to provide a safe and stable home environment for the children. Thus, these findings are supported by the evidence and establish that respondent-mother failed to complete her case plan.
Lastly, respondent-mother challenges the portion of finding of fact 51 that provides that she “has demonstrated that her relationship with the . . . father takes priority over the safety of her children.” She argues that the district court erred by finding that she prioritized her relationship with the father over the safety of the children, where there was no evidence that the parents had engaged in domestic violence or that the father had engaged in abusive behavior during visits.
The unchallenged findings of fact reveal that respondent-mother voluntarily placed the children in DSS custody so that the father could live with her, that she consistently blamed others for the father‘s return to the home, and that she continued to defend the father throughout the termination hearing. Additional unchallenged findings of fact demonstrate that the father denied responsibility for assaulting the children and that he failed to acknowledge responsibility for the children‘s removal from the home.
Secondly, respondent-mother contends that the district court erred by concluding that a ground existed to terminate her parental rights under
Respondent-mother‘s argument disregards the primary reason for the removal of her children—the presence of the father in the home. The district court‘s findings of fact demonstrate that respondent-mother failed to protect her children by allowing the father, who had assaulted Amy, Peter, and respondent-mother, to return to the family home. Instead, respondent-mother voluntarily placed the children into DSS custody so that she could live with the father. She continued to live with him through the time of the termination hearing. The district court further found that, at the time of the termination hearing, respondent-mother continued to deny the effect the father‘s domestic abuse had on the children and to blame others, including the children, for the father‘s return to the home. Throughout the termination hearing, respondent-mother displayed a lack of understanding or acceptance of responsibility for the conditions that led to the children‘s removal. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the district court‘s findings support its conclusion that respondent-mother failed to make reasonable progress under the circumstances toward correcting the conditions that led to the removal of the children.
Finally, respondent-mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that it would be in Peter‘s best interest that respondent-mother‘s parental rights be terminated. She asserts that several of the district court‘s dispositional findings of fact are not supported by the evidence and that the district court failed to make sufficient findings regarding the factors set forth in
Once the district court finds at least one ground to terminate parental rights pursuant to
- The age of the juvenile.
- The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
- Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
- The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
- The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.
- Any relevant consideration.
First, respondent-mother disputes some of the findings of fact contained in the dispositional portion of the district court‘s order.
Respondent-mother argues that the district court did not make sufficient findings regarding the factors set forth in
“It is clear that a [district] court must consider all of the factors in section 7B-1110(a). . . . The statute does not, however, explicitly require written findings as to each factor.” In re A.U.D., 832 S.E.2d 698, 702 (N.C. 2019). We agree with the Court of Appeals that the district court is only required to make written findings regarding those factors that are relevant. In re D.H., 232 N.C. App. 217, 221, 753 S.E.2d 732, 735 (2014). We also agree with the Court of Appeals that “a factor is ‘relevant’ if there is ‘conflicting evidence concerning’ the factor, such that it is ‘placed in issue by virtue of the evidence presented before the [district] court[.]‘” In re H.D., 239 N.C. App. 318, 327, 768 S.E.2d 860, 866 (2015) (quoting In re D.H., 232 N.C. App. at 222 n.3, 753 S.E.2d at 735 n.3).
In the present case, the transcript of the hearing demonstrates that the district court properly considered the appropriate factors. The district court found that Peter was almost nine years old and that the termination of respondent-mother‘s parental rights would aid in achieving the permanent plan of adoption. See
In addition to the statutory factors set out in
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the 12 December 2018 order of the district court terminating respondent-mother‘s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.