IN RE: A.P.
C.A. No. 12CA0022-M
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
August 27, 2012
[Cite as In re A.P., 2012-Ohio-3873.]
DICKINSON, Judge.
STATE OF OHIO COUNTY OF MEDINA ss: APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO CASE No. 2010 06 DE 0023
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
DICKINSON, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
{1} This appeal involves the permanent custody of a minor who had been removed from the legal custody of her maternal grandmother and adjudicated a dependent child. Although Medina County Job and Family Services filed initial case plans that had the goal of returning the child to the grandmother‘s home, the juvenile court later ordered that the grandmother be removed from the case plan. The juvenile court reasoned that the grandmother was not a suitable relative to provide a home for the child and that she lost her status as the child‘s legal custodian when it placed the child in the temporary custody of Job and Family Services. Because there were no other suitable relatives to provide the child with a permanent home, Job and Family Services moved for, and was granted, permanent custody. The grandmother appealed, arguing that the juvenile court‘s removal of her from the child‘s case plan violated her constitutional and statutory rights as the child‘s legal custodian. She has further
BACKGROUND
{2} In a prior dependency case, the juvenile court removed the minor child, A.P., from the custody of her mother and later adjudicated her a dependent child. Although the facts of that case are not part of the record, it is not disputed that A.P. lived in a foster home for several months and was not reunified with her mother. In November 2009, the juvenile court placed A.P. in the legal custody of her maternal grandmother. The juvenile court initially ordered protective supervision by Job and Family Services, but terminated protective supervision and closed the case the following month.
{3} This case began in June 2010, when Job and Family Services filed a dependency complaint, alleging that the grandmother had left A.P. in the care of her mother, who was not a suitable caregiver and was living in an inappropriate environment. By stipulation of the grandmother and the mother, A.P. was adjudicated a dependent child under
{4} For several months after A.P. was removed from the grandmother‘s home, Job and Family Services developed and maintained a case plan that focused on returning A.P. to the home of the grandmother, her legal custodian. The case plan noted as family “strengths” that A.P. was “very attached to [the grandmother] and ha[d] adjusted to living in her home very well.” The “strengths” further emphasized that the grandmother was “very bonded and committed to [A.P.]” The case plan goals for the grandmother focused primarily on her need to develop an understanding of how to protect A.P. from inappropriate adults. To accomplish that goal, the grandmother and A.P. each began individual counseling. The grandmother later began joint counseling sessions with A.P. and the child‘s individual therapist. The grandmother was also required to complete drug treatment and submit to random, weekly drug screens to address her admitted use of marijuana and alcohol. She completed drug and alcohol treatment and consistently submitted negative drug screens throughout this case.
{5} On October 27, 2010, given the grandmother‘s progress on the case plan, Job and Family Services proposed an amendment to the case plan to allow visits away from the agency that would be supervised by the maternal great-grandmother, rather than Job and Family Services. The grandmother later moved the juvenile court to return A.P. to her legal custody or, alternatively, to grant her increased visitation.
{6} The guardian ad litem, however, filed an objection to the amendment proposed by Job and Family Services and further requested that the juvenile court remove the grandmother from the case plan. The primary concern alleged by the guardian was the grandmother‘s involvement with a man named Richard. After A.P. mentioned “Richard” to the foster parents as the grandmother‘s friend with whom she had also spent time, they discovered through internet research that he was a convicted sex offender. The foster parents were unable to convince Job
{7} The juvenile court held a hearing on the proposed case plan amendments filed by Job and Family Services, the grandmother, and the guardian ad litem. During the hearing, however, Job and Family Services withdrew its request to amend the case plan. Consequently, the hearing focused on whether the grandmother should have increased visitation with A.P., have A.P. returned to her custody, or be removed from the case plan. The guardian ad litem presented evidence that focused on the primary reason that A.P. had been removed from the grandmother‘s custody and adjudicated a dependent child in this case: the grandmother‘s failure to protect A.P. from inappropriate people. Specifically, the guardian focused on the grandmother‘s relationship with Richard and the fact that she had allowed A.P. to spend time with him. Job and Family Services had been aware of the grandmother‘s past involvement with Richard but, prior to the hearing, believed that the grandmother had ended the relationship because she told her caseworker that she had.
{8} No evidence was presented to explain the details of Richard‘s sex offense, but none of the parties disputed that he was a convicted sex offender and an inappropriate adult to have contact with A.P. Although not made clear in the juvenile court, the evidence also established that any contact between Richard and A.P. predated the child‘s removal from the grandmother‘s home. At the time of the hearing, the threat posed by Richard was that the
{9} The primary dispute at the hearing was whether the grandmother had ended her relationship with Richard and the extent to which she understood that she could not allow A.P. to have contact with him. Although the grandmother had told her caseworker that she had ended her relationship with Richard in August 2010, she admitted at the hearing that their relationship had continued for at least three more months. The guardian ad litem presented evidence that the grandmother and Richard had exchanged text messages for even longer. For that reason, the guardian no longer believed that the grandmother was a suitable custodian for A.P. and asked the juvenile court to remove her from the case plan.
{10} In addition to the evidence about the grandmother‘s relationship with Richard, the grandmother and Job and Family Services presented evidence about the significant bond and attachment between the grandmother and A.P. and the progress that the grandmother had made on the reunification goals of the case plan. It was not disputed that the grandmother consistently visited A.P. and that their visits went well. The grandmother had been regularly participating in individual counseling and, more recently, had been involved in joint counseling with A.P. Her individual counselor testified that the grandmother was learning to set boundaries with people and make appropriate decisions. The therapist who conducted the joint sessions testified about the “healthy bond” and “very appropriate attachment” between the grandmother and A.P. and noted that A.P. looked to the grandmother for support, had a loving respect for her, and followed her guidance. She also testified that the grandmother‘s interaction with A.P. and ability to
{11} In her closing argument to the juvenile court, the guardian ad litem argued that the grandmother should be removed from the case plan because she was an unsuitable relative to assume custody of the child. In opposition, the grandmother argued that she was not simply a relative who was seeking legal custody, but instead was already the child‘s legal custodian and had the right to be part of the case plan.
{12} Job and Family Services argued that, although it no longer supported expanding the grandmother‘s visitation because it was uncertain about the status of her relationship with Richard, it also did not support the guardian‘s request to remove her from the case plan. The agency stressed that its philosophy, as well as the underlying goal of Ohio‘s dependency statutes, was for the agency to assume “temporary” custody of a child while it assisted the family in working toward reunification. Given the positive family bond between A.P. and her grandmother and the progress that the grandmother had made on the reunification goals of the case plan, Job and Family Services expressed its position that reunification of A.P. with the grandmother continued to be the appropriate goal of the case plan.
{13} The juvenile court ordered that the agency remove the grandmother from the case plan based on its conclusion that she had lost her status as the child‘s custodian and was not a suitable relative to become the custodian of A.P. The following month, because Job and Family Services had found no other suitable relative for placement of A.P., it moved for permanent custody.
{14} Although the grandmother immediately appealed the juvenile court‘s order that removed her from the case plan and denied her motion for legal custody, this Court dismissed
REMOVAL OF GRANDMOTHER FROM CASE PLAN
{15} The grandmother‘s first assignment of error is that the juvenile court violated her fundamental rights as A.P.‘s legal custodian by removing her from the case plan and ultimately placing A.P. in the permanent custody of Job and Family Services. Although the grandmother has based her legal argument on both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Revised Code, this Court is more persuaded by her statutory argument and will limit its review accordingly.
{16} This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the juvenile court‘s authority in abuse, dependency, and neglect cases is strictly governed by a comprehensive statutory scheme set forth in Chapter 2151 of the Ohio Revised Code. E.g., In re I.S., 9th Dist. No. 24763, 2009-Ohio-6432, ¶ 10-11. The grandmother has argued that Ohio‘s dependency and neglect statutes explicitly recognize a legal custodian as a person who has assumed the parental role in a child‘s home and is entitled to certain procedural protections in abuse, dependency, and neglect cases. Specifically, she maintains that the juvenile court violated its authority under Chapter 2151 of the Ohio Revised Code when it removed her from the case plan and prevented Job and Family Services from continuing to work toward returning A.P. to her home.
{17} As the grandmother emphasized to the juvenile court, the Ohio Revised Code explicitly contemplates that, as A.P.‘s legal custodian, she had rights as the child‘s legally-recognized caretaker, which were subject only to the residual rights of A.P.‘s parents.
{18} The parties did not dispute that the grandmother was A.P.‘s legal custodian at the time Job and Family Services commenced this dependency and neglect case. The agency alleged that A.P. was dependent due to the condition or environment of the home where she lived under the care of the grandmother. Job and Family Services later filed the initial case plan that focused on remedying the problems in the grandmother‘s home that posed a risk to A.P.‘s safety. After A.P. was removed from the grandmother‘s home and placed in the temporary custody of Job and Family Services, the agency began reunification efforts, with a goal of returning A.P. safely to the grandmother‘s home. The parties worked toward reunification for the next several months.
{19} It was not until after the guardian ad litem moved the juvenile court to remove the grandmother from the case plan that Job and Family Services and the juvenile court took the position that, when the juvenile court placed A.P. in the temporary custody of Job and Family Services, the agency became the child‘s legal custodian and the grandmother lost her status as legal custodian. Although it did not further explain in its order, the juvenile court apparently based its conclusion on the definition of “[c]ustodian” set forth in
{20}
{21} Reading the definition of “[c]ustodian” in isolation, the juvenile court‘s construction might seem reasonable. Considering this term as it is used in Chapter 2151, however, it would also be reasonable to construe the definition to mean that a custodian is either the person with legal custody or the agency with temporary custody, depending on the context in which the term is used.
{22} This Court must also construe the definition in a manner that achieves a reasonable result, reading it within the context of the statutes in which it is applied, and considering the object sought to be attained and any administrative construction of the term.
{23} Other than the disjunctive word “or” in the definition of custodian, there is no language in Chapter 2151 to suggest that the juvenile court‘s order of temporary custody to Job and Family Services terminated the grandmother‘s status as A.P.‘s legal custodian, insofar as that status pertained to the reunification and case planning efforts that were required in this case. To begin with, although the definition of “[c]ustodian” includes an agency that has temporary custody of the child, that status is explicitly intended to be “temporary.” It is a status of necessity that grants the agency the temporary legal right and duty to care for a child who has been removed from the custody of her permanent caretaker. “Temporary custody” is defined in
{24} On the other hand, under
{25} Job and Family Services did not seek to modify or terminate the juvenile court‘s 2009 legal custody order under
{26} Rather than pursuing a modification or termination of the prior legal custody order under
{27} Under
{28} Although the term “home” is not defined in Chapter 2151, the child‘s home is explicitly recognized as the place where the child resided, prior to the commencement of an abuse, dependency, of neglect case, with one or both of her parents, guardian, or custodian.
{29} In addition to specific statutory requirements for case plans,
{30} From the beginning of a dependency case, the child‘s legal custodian, who stands in the place of a parent in the child‘s home, is included in the reunification process.
{31} That provision obviously contemplates that the “custodian” is the person who had legal custody of the child at the time of removal and that the custodian retains that status for reunification purposes after the child is removed from the home. Although a child is sometimes physically removed from the home before the juvenile court grants temporary custody to the agency, it would be illogical to require the agency to provide the custodian with procedural rights, particularly a visitation schedule prior to the case plan, if it were intended that those rights would be lost if and when the agency later acquires temporary custody. To construe the term “custodian” in that manner would also defeat the underlying goal of the case plan to return the child to the home.
{32} Even after the formal transfer of custody to the agency, although the agency acquires temporary legal rights and obligations as the child‘s custodian, for case planning purposes, the term “custodian” continues to refer to the person who, prior to the child‘s removal from the home, cared for the child under an order of legal custody. For example,
{33} More directly on point,
{34} It is apparent throughout the administrative regulations that the “custodian” to whom the agency must direct case planning reunification efforts is not the agency itself, but can only be the person who formerly had physical and legal custody of the child.
{35} The references quoted here are only examples of how the term “custodian” is consistently used within the context of statutory and administrative provisions governing the case
{36} Although the guardian ad litem may have raised a legitimate concern about Richard posing a potential threat to A.P., the juvenile court had other means to protect A.P. that would have allowed the grandmother to remain on the case plan and continue working toward the goal of returning A.P. to her home. For example, it could have required continued supervision of the visits or added requirements to the case plan to ensure that A.P. had no contact with Richard. See also
REMAINING ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{37} The remaining assignments of error have been rendered moot. Accordingly, they will not be addressed.
CONCLUSION
{38} The grandmother‘s first assignment of error is sustained. Her remaining assignments of error were not addressed because they have been rendered moot. The judgment of the Medina County Juvenile Court is reversed, and this matter is remanded.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
CLAIR E. DICKINSON
FOR THE COURT
CARR, J. CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
APPEARANCES:
DANIEL GIGIANO, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
JENNIFER A MOORE, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.
EUGENE ELIAS, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.
RICHARD BARBERA, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.
JENNIFER MATYAC, Guardian ad litem.
