In re A.P.
A Minor Child : No. 115350
[Appeal by Father, A.P.] :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: DISMISSED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 5, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Juvenile Division
Case No. PR11721029
Appearances:
A.P., pro se.
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:
{¶ 1} Father A.P. appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, denying his “Motion to Vacate Judgment” under Civ.R. 60(B). After a review of the pertinent facts and law, we dismiss this appeal.
{¶ 2} The record shows that on November 9, 2011, a complaint was filed against A.P. to establish paternity and for a child-support order for his minor child. Although service on A.P. was initially not perfected, on April 5, 2012, A.P. waived
{¶ 3} The juvenile court entered a child-support order ordering A.P. to pay $238.19 or $268.07 per month (the amount depending on if private health insurance was provided). He was also ordered to pay $64.58 in cash medical support for the child.
{¶ 4} On April 27, 2012, A.P. filed a motion to modify child support. A.P. appeared at the May 29, 2013 pretrial hearing on the motion. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on May 23, 2014, and A.P. appeared for that hearing as well. On June 25, 2014, the court issued its decision granting A.P.’s motion to modify and ordered that he pay $127.55 per month and $0 in cash medical support.
{¶ 5} On February 11, 2022, a motion to show cause was filed alleging that A.P. was $3,898.66 in arrears as of December 28, 2021. Although initial attempts to serve A.P. with the motion were unsuccessful, he was eventually served on July 14, 2022. A.P. appeared at hearings on the motion on October 5 and November 13, 2022. The court granted the motion to show cause and ordered A.P. to pay $127.55 per month in child support and $48.59 per month in arrears. The court also found A.P. to be in contempt for failure to pay child support, sentenced A.P. to serve eight days in jail, and suspended the sentence.
{¶ 6} A.P. continued to be involved in the case, appearing for hearings on July 14, 2023, December 27, 2023, and April 16, 2024. On April 16, 2024, the court
{¶ 7} On November 12, 2024, A.P. filed a “Demand for Dismissal with Prejudice,” pursuant to Civ.R. 60, arguing that he had not been served with the initial service of summons and, therefore, the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over him. The court denied his motion on November 26, 2024. A.P. did not appeal that decision. Rather, on June 4, 2025, A.P. filed another Civ.R. 60(B) motion, titled “Motion to Vacate Judgment and Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) and Civ.R. 4.” In this motion, A.P. again argued that he was never properly served with the complaint, so the court did not have jurisdiction over him. On June 17, 2025, the trial court denied his motion, and the case is now before us on appeal.
{¶ 8} In his sole assignment of error, A.P. argues that the trial court erred when it denied his June 4, 2025 motion.
{¶ 9} As an initial matter, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. A.P.’s two motions, filed on November 12, 2024, and June 4, 2025, are largely the same motion. Both state that the motion is being made pursuant to Civ.R. 60 and both contain substantially the same argument — the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him because he was never properly served with the complaint. Although the trial court denied A.P.’s first Civ.R. 60(B) motion, A.P. did not appeal that decision. Rather, he filed a second Civ.R. 60(B) motion, making the same arguments he made in his previous motion.
{¶ 11} We have consistently refused to address assignments of error from a final order that was not the subject of a timely notice of appeal when those assignments of error are raised as part of an otherwise timely appeal — an act known as “bootstrapping.” Issa v. Cleveland Metro. School Dist., 2025-Ohio-4848, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), citing Basit v. Chapman, 2016-Ohio-4562 (8th Dist.). “Bootstrapping” is:
“the utilization of a subsequent order to indirectly and untimely appeal a prior order (which was never directly appealed) [and] is procedurally anomalous and inconsistent with the appellate rules which contemplate a direct relationship between the order from which the appeal is taken and the error assigned as a result of that order. See, Appellate Rules 3(D), 4(A), 5 and 16(A)(3).”
Issa at id., quoting Winters v. Doe, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4221, *6 (8th Dist. Sept. 10, 1998).
Pursuant to Rule 34(J) of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure and Rules 3 and 4 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appeal of the order herein may be taken to the Eighth District Court of Appeals by filing a Notice of Appeal . . . within thirty days of the entry of judgment or final order. Failure to file a timely Notice of Appeal may result in the dismissal of the appeal.
{¶ 13} A.P. was required, under
{¶ 14} By appealing from the June 17, 2025 journal entry denying his motion to vacate, A.P. is attempting to bootstrap arguments that are time-barred. In other words, A.P. is attempting to utilize the instant appeal to improperly seek review of alleged errors that he failed to timely appeal. As a result, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See Issa, 2025-Ohio-4848, at ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing Bukovec v. Keger, 2024-Ohio-1162 (8th Dist.) (holding that this court does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal when appellant was trying to bootstrap a prior order
{¶ 15} Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
________________________
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR