171 F. 254 | S.D.N.Y. | 1909
(after stating the facts as above). The question in this case turns, I think, entirely upon a question of fact, namely, whether the broker intended, when he purchased the shares of stock in question, to apportion them as the property of those persons to whom he was under obligation to deliver stock of a similar kind in the place of the stock which lie liad formerly converted. We have it on the highest authority that there is no earmark to shares of this sort. Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S. 365 at page 379, 28 Sup. Ct. 512, 52 L. Ed. 835. There are two possible cases: First, that there are no customers entitled to stock of a similar character, except the claimant, and that his claim is exactly covered by the number of shares found in the receiver’s possession; second, that the claimant or claimants would require for their satisfaction more shares than those on hand. I presuppose that there cannot be found any shares actually purchased with the customer’s money, and that either'the money was not so used at all, or
A more difficult question of fact arises in case the stock on hand turns out not to be enough to meet all the obligations to customers. Still in that case I think I must likewise assume in the absence of contradictory evidence, that the broker’s intention was to contribute so much- of the assets as he invested in this stock in general toward the fulfillment of such obligations. Each share being of equal value .and unidentified, he- cannot- be said to. have favored one customer rather than another; nor can I say that, because all the obligations are not fulfilled by the stock which is left, therefore I must assume that he had no intention whatever of fulfilling any part of them. Of .course, he did not complete his intention; but so- far as he went I think I must assume that he intended to replace the stock which he should have, but did not have, on hand. To adopt the analogy suggested by Mr. Justice Holmes in his opinion in Richardson v. Shaw, supra, suppose an elevator man has depleted the elevator below the amount due to all depositors; when he subsequently puts back into the elevator enough, or part of enough, wheat to answer his obligations to all, the claimants become co-owners of it. Could the elevator man’s general creditors claim that they were entitled to the subsequent accretions? Or suppose it could be shown that he had entirely emptied the grain elevator; is there any doubt that his subsequent filling of it, or partial filling of.it, must be assumed to be an appropriation by him of so .much of his property to make good his conversion? The analogy in law seems to me to be complete in spite of the diversity of the subject-matter.
In this case, therefore, the 100 shares of Bay State Gas are to be regarded as the property of all customers who held such stock. If there are no such customers except the'claimant, he is entitled to a delivery of the certificate. If there are, they are tenants in common.