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In Re a Member of State Bar of Arizona Riley
691 P.2d 695
Ariz.
1984
Check Treatment

*1 604

рrovide a sufficient finding (1978) basis for aff'd, P.2d 1149 sentence 124 Ariz. same aggravating 526, denied, 16, circumstance. The cert. 606 P.2d 891, 449 U.S. aggravating paragraph 252, circumstance in 5 101 (1980); S.Ct. 66 L.Ed.2d 119 State Clark, should be v. in those 428, cases 126 888, Ariz. cert. 616 P.2d denied, where part the murder 1067, of the defend- 449 796, U.S. 101 S.Ct. 66 goal ant’s overall pecuniary gain, (1980). not L.Ed.2d 612 We find that the reso merely when a during death occurs lution the instant case is dispropor not which time the defendant benefitted fi- tionate to these cases. There has been no nancially.” (emphasis original) suggestion or evidence in the record that judge’s impose decision to the death case, In this the murders were a penalty by passion, was affected prejudice part of the robbery overall scheme of the any arbitrary other factor. As to the specific with the purpose to facilitate the subsequent proceedings that have taken escape. robbers The defendant had the place after appeal, defendant’s last we three victims lie on the floor have searched the record for fundamental robbery leaving and before the bar shot § pursuant error to A.R.S. 13-4035 and each victim in turn with the intent that no have found none. witnesses be left identify the robbers. The murders were unexpected judgment accidental.The of conviction and sentence Poland, State v. Cf 269, 132 imposed by Ariz. the trial court are affirmed. . (1982) 645 P.2d (drowning Purolator Gretzler, guards State v. robbery); after HOLOHAN, C.J., HAYS, CAMER- (defendants committed the murders FELDMAN, JJ., ON and concur. “to obtain a they substitute car in which flight”); could continue their State v. Ti son, 546, (1981); 129 Ariz. 633 P.2d 355 denied,

cert. 882, 180, 459 U.S. 103 S.Ct. (1982) (homicides

L.Ed.2d 147 were commit

ted to secure a vehicle in which assailants

could continue flight. their 691 P.2d 695

As to the mitigating factors the court In the Matter of a found that Member of the defendant had obtained a State Bar of Arizona degree. G.E.D. James mitiga- We find that RILEY, Respondent. Lawrence by appellant tion offered sufficiently is not outweigh substantial aggravating No. SB-289. circumstance. Arizona, Court of In Banc. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW Lastly, pro this Court conducts a 28, Nov. 1984. portionality review to determine “whether thе sentences of death are excessive or

disproportionate penalty imposed cases, considering

similar both the crime Richmond, State

and the defendant.” 186, 196, 41, (1976)

114 Ariz. 560 P.2d denied,

cert. 433 U.S. 97 S.Ct.

L.Ed.2d We have considered

other in which defendants cases robbed and

murdered their victims. State v. Worat

zeck, (1982); 134 Ariz. 657 P.2d 865 Gretzler, supra; Tison, v:

State State v. Evans,

supra; State v. 120 Ariz. *3 Sophy,

Michael M. Martha McConnell Phoenix, Bush, State Bar Counsel. Shoenhair, Bilby & by P.C. William H. Tucson, Tinney, respondent. CAMERON, Justice.

Respondent, Riley, James L. was charged eight with counts of unethical con- by duct State Bar of Arizona. Al- though respondent currently a Cochise County superior court judge, all conduct in question related events which occurred while he a deputy county attorney. The Local Administrative Committee found respondent guilty of unethical conduct concerning eight four counts and thirty-day suspension. recommended Disciplinary agreed Board the find- ings and conclusions Adminis- Local Committee, trative respondent and the timely objected. We jurisdiction pur- 36(d) suant to Rules Rules of the Court, 17A We A.R.S. must ad- following dress the issues: Attorney I. Did State Discipli- Bar nary jurisdiction Board have to deter- mine a judge guilty whether unethical conduct occurred which be- fore a judge? he became II. Did the Local Administrative Cоm- in amending complaint mittee err its include two additional counts after the respondent had testified? III. Was the of un- ethical conduct that: 4.4, discipline agencies, Lawyer 1. Stan- parte he made ex communications dards, supra, matter; states follow criminal and some Earle, Turner v. rule. See State ex rel. 2. he made false denials as to said ex Proposed (Fla.1974); 295 So.2d communications; parte Disciplinary Action the Florida Bar 3. while a candidate office Judge, Against a Circuit 103 So.2d 632 derogatory public made comments (Fla.1958). against opponent; incumbent 4. he made unfair comments on a de- believe, however, the better cision made practice jurisdic and more workable is that IV. thirty-day suspension appropri- disciplinary Is a actions should be based tion

ate upon position under of this case? the individual held at the the facts alleged time of the misconduct: May required V. pay [hjere, Disciplinary presented cоsts incurred we are with an action investigating Board eight discipline person, serving while all now as a *4 counts, though respondent judge, even was for misconduct committed while lawyer violations con- he a he ethical and before became a cerning only judge. position four of those counts? Does on the his bench discipline him render immune to for vio- lation of the Code of Professional Re- sponsibility persons to all applicable li- JURISDICTION practice censed to law this state? Re- Pursuant to Art. 6.1 the Arizona Con- spondent argues may since he not stitution, Quali- on Judicial Commission practice judge, may law while a he not be fications has jurisdiction exclusive to inves- disciplined judge while a for misconduct tigate the conduct of a while he lawyer. Although he committed while a remains judge. a is This the law in most judge, may practice not while a he law jurisdictions, In Investigation, re 93 So.2d (a practice still to law holds a license (Fla.1957), and the rule recommended qualification to hold the he must have by the American Bar Association. ‍‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‍ See judge), lawyer, still a office of he is 3.1, Rule Relating Standards to Judicial if he has of Profession- violated the Code Discipline Disability Retirement, Pro- is, Responsibility al as an officer of Discipline fessional Lawyers for * * court, discipline *. this amenable to Judges (1979), National Center for Profes- refuge judicial in a He not take sional Responsibility and The American prior for discipline office from miscon- Bar Association. duct, would of which be remov- effect lawyer disciplinary The agency has qualifications occupy- al for of one of jurisdiction lawyer over a for conduct ing refuge. permit To the use of a lawyer, which occurred while a as well as a sanctuary office as such would jurisdiction lawyer longer over a who is no travesty upon justice. be a for conduct that occurred Mills, (Mo. 539 S.W.2d 449-50 prior lawyer to the time the becamе a 1976); Spriggs, see also In re 36 Ariz. Standards, 3.2, See judge. Judicial 284 P. 521 believe McCain, supra; Florida Bar v. 330 So.2d Disciplinary Bar Board and its State local (Fla.1976). jurisdiction disciplinary committees alleged jurisdiction lawyer’s As to over incumbent consider unethical con prior though lawyer for conduct occurred is which duct even now an becoming judge, judge. courts are not in incumbent be noted in It should agreement. Lawyer regard for that the Court of Ari Standards this Discipline Disability Proceedings jurisdiction regu has the rec- zona exclusive practice judges ommend that should the admission to the of the law incumbent late subject jurisdiction discipline admitted. and the of those case, dealing instant while we are with the These are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal power Board, Disciplinary of the State Bar charge nature. The must be known we before actually talking are about our the proceedings own au- com- They mence. thority when, become a Disciplinary trap because the Bar Board after they underway, are charges its committees mere are arms of are amended on the basis of greater jurisdiction testimony court and can have no accused. given He can then be or authority than this court. See Florida oppor- no tunity to expunge McCain, earlier Bar con- supra, at 714. We statements and start afresh. subject clude that jurisdiction Bar of Arizona of the State Ruffalo, U.S. S.Ct. at Disciplinary Board for conduct which oc- 1226, (citations omitted). at 122 L.Ed.2d curred he became a before respondent’s interpretation We believe that is overbroad would lead Ruffalo Maryland absurd results. As the

II Court Appeals has stated: AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT recommendation, In reviewing this we initially strictly note if During hearings before the local dis- Ruffalo reads, applied literally as then its it ciplinary committee the testi- holding crippling broad would have ef- fied as to a matter in which he hаd been primary purpose discipli- fect on jailed eight for and fined $150 hours which, nary proceedings, as we have Judge contempt. Riley Richard After held, punishment “not rather but this testimony, the State Bar added the *5 profession a catharsis for the and [is] allegations of unethical conduct found prophylactic public.” the For exam- Counts Seven and Eight. The amended ple, if in all means cases what complaint was Ruffalo respondent served on the indicate, its words seem to an once attor- and granted he was opportunity an re- to ney brought disciplinary is before a tri- By spond. stipulation respondent’s counsel bunal for some minor offense he can and agreed Bar counsel to waive further every take the stand and make known hearings upon Counts Seven Eight, the professional (perhaps other indiscretion charges. Respondent additional alleg- now nature) even those of a more serious right procedural to es that his process, due and, in perpetrated way, ever this im- Constitution, States V, United Amend. any potential pro- from munize himself §2, 4, violated, Art. Ariz. Const. was citing because, censorship fessional for them 544, Ruffalo, 390 U.S. Matter 88 S.Ct. Ruffalo, process” pre- under “due would (1968). Eg., 1222, 117 L.Ed.2d Com- 20 vent allega- an amendment of the initial Ethics and mittee on Griev- Professional tions. Virgin Bar Islands Associa- ances of Johnson, Bar (3rd Cockrell, F.2d 173 tion v. 447 Association Cockrell, (1975) (cita- Md. Association v. Cir.1971); Bar 334 A.2d at 88-89 omitted, omitted). tions 279, 286, A.2d footnote Md. agree. We do Our rule states: Su Ruffalo, supra, the United any States Amendment. The committee at time charged prior attorney to the preme disciplinary conclusion of the held that an Court hearing may to due is entitled allow amendments to with conduct unethical complaint the attor formal or process. The court stated that answer. procedural complaint formal ney had that case been denied amended to testimony proоf conform to process due because his own to include fur- charges charges, occurring ther defense was made the basis whether before charges complaint to after the added after commencement disci- hearing. Supreme plinary hearing. If to the The United States an amendment made, respondent complaint Court formal stated: plea entered into a nie, you agreement given time to answer shall be reasonable respondent case?” The this testified amendment, produce evidence inadvertent, and on this the motion for respond charges. trial new another this Court, 34(c), Rules of the not intentional and the Local Administra- consti- 17A A.R.S. We believe our rule tive respondent. found for the Committee to assure long tutional so as care is taken time respondent that the trial, has a reasonable During Judge Riley commented: respond appropriate opportunity and an earlier, you say Now I said let me as Matter charges, to the additional any yesterday of us weren’t candid (1981), Swartz, P.2d 129 Ariz. place previous at the about what took reasoning. To which is consistent with going report- trial. I am not to have attorney hold otherwise would allow reading it go through er the exercise of testifying as to addi- immunize himself up again, you again will stand because misconduct, see also Bar tional items of argu- give slippery some semantical case, In the instant Association, supra. it you really ment don’t know what about ample had respondent appears that time possi- you you might time and said that respond. opportunity find no bly polygraph. with a I think it come out error. you intentionally elicited is obvious that polygraph, you the reference to the Ill sandpap- did it over the lunch hour and been your ered witness because she had THE WAS RESPONDENT GUILTY OF terribly examination Mr. UNETHICAL hurt on cross CONDUCT? you were Hoggatt, Lerma and Mr. The Committee eight considered some al- hеr. trying to rehabilitate legations respondent misconduct and found that he had violated Code of many years Judge Riley for though Even Professional Responsibility in instanc- four County becoming judge had been prior to es. agree Because we with the Committee County, it is evident Attorney of Cochise in their findings allegations that as to four Judge Riley was respondent believed was not unethical County Attorney’s Of- against biased conduct, we need not set forth the facts of particu- general fice in *6 those alleged instances of misconduct. We apparent respondent’s that lar. It is also will only by consider the acts found the Bar against Judge Riley run was decision to to be unethical. part in on animosity least based at In two. that respon- election between matter, considering In the facts of this Judge Riley. We also dent defeated note however, we must at the note that outset of Judge Riley conduct that is not only the record reflects can be de- what this court. If before there was misconduct great animosity scribed aas deal of be- Judge Riley, and express we opinion no respondent Riley tween the James L. misconduct, that there was it is not con- (no relation) Judge Riley Richard over an opinion. this sidered period Riley of Judge extended time. on respondent had held one occasion con- 1. Ex Parte Communication $150, tempt, imposed a fine of and ordered eight respondent spend hours in the The to first set of facts “Moroy- involve the oqui” county jail. 1979). The facts of incident were (July, case Moroy- Defendant allegations against oqui for one of the drug the basis had been convicted transporta- respondent, but for which the Committee tion. sentencing Prior to defendant’s hear- In respondent. ing found for the another inci- respondent approached Judge Riley in trial, Judge Riley Breen, dent a criminal chambers with Officer a criminal respondent question a wit- Agent. orderеd not to Strike respondent Force When plea agreement. arrived, ness about her first the officer Ber- defense counsel was, question jury after the returned “Jen- tram sitting Judge Riley’s Polis was Riley to the Respondent Judge told justice, 1-102(A)(6), chambers. administration of impart he had information to to him conduct adversely reflects on a law- prior sentencing and Polis was to asked to yer’s law, fitness practice to and 7-110(B), objected, did leave. Polis but leave. Offi- 29(a), Rules of the Arizona conveyed then cer Breen information Court, 7-110(B) 17A A.R.S. DR reads: by Judge Riley. and was asked to leave (B) In an adversary proceeding, sentencing Polis at his stated client’s hear- shall not communicate, or cause anoth- ing that such a communication had oc- er to communicate, as to the merits of registered objection. curred and At the cause with or an official hearing before the Local Administra- before whom proceeding pend- Committee, Judge Rilеy respon- tive ing, except: gave differing testimony dent about what (1) In the course proceed- of official that, Judge Riley then occurred. testified ings in the cause. trying after he accused the (2) writing if he promptly delivers a sentencing through an ex to influence the copy writing opposing counsel parte communication, or to party the adverse if he is not desk and pounded judge’s his fist on the represented by lawyer. denies these yelled Respondent at him. (3) Orally upon adequate notice Breen, to op- who and Officer accusations. Polis posing counsel or to judge’s the adverse party cham- standing were outside represented by if he bers, voice a lawyer. loud testified enough be heard outside chambers (4) As otherwise authorized law. Judge Riley. Although respon- was that of This DR is buttressed the ABA Stan- time trying dent at the denied to influence Justice, I, Vol. dards for Criminal Ch. sentencing the defend- states, 3-2.8(c) “It Standard which is un- ant, he did admit this in his testimony professional prosecutor conduct for a before the Local Administrative Commit- engage parte in unauthorized ex discus- tee: sions with or submission of material to a ** (Committee member): MR. CAVETT judge relating particular to a case which is you testified this morning to it See also judge.” before the come brought you think —that the Strike Bell, 202, 210, Conduct of 294 Or. Judge’s man Force chambers in accord, (1982); The Flor- 655 P.2d get give order to him to information to Mason, (Fla.1976). ida Bar v. 334 So.2d Judge. right? Is that agree We with the Committee that re- MR. RILEY: That’s true. did, indeed, spondent improper make an ex MR. CAVETT: And informa- parte Judge communication to Richard Ri- be, you would tion that believed ley. charge find further that this regard aggravation, terms of through supported presentation as opposed sentencing procedure *7 convincing evidence. Matter of clear and mitigation? Swartz, supra. respon- We therefore find true. MR. RILEY: That’s —that’s making improper parte dent of an ex Respondent chargеd making was with an 1-102(A)(5) (6) communication under DR & parte ex improper communication to a 7-110(B), 29(a), and Rules the Ari- Judge Riley respon- testified Court, 17A A.R.S. See also zona intentionally made communica- dent such Rules of ABA Model Professional Conduct enhancing punish- hope tion in the (MR) 8.4(f). 3.5(b) and above, ment, respondent, noted ad- as this was mitted to the Committee that his 2, False Denials respon- The intent. Committee found incident the Moroyoqui After this and at parte in an communication engaged dent ex hearing, counsel Riley Discipli- sentencing object- defense Judge with violation 1-102(A)(5), ed, nary prejudicial conduct claiming: Rules Moroyoqui’s position attempt prose- has been made and his conduct by going cution to influence and that in order impose just this Court to sentence, one, your prior into office hearing just to this with it was necessary tow, an officer in being the officer for the to fully Ser- Court informed and Breen, geant the officer on this conveyed cаse. information to the Court nature, was of a sensitive Breen, Sergeant I and if that believe also came into information were your to be you office to talk released to the dispo- about the public, defense or to the it jeop- would right sition of this case before the hear- on-going ardize an investigation ing requested that I leave. tion took During THE COURT: That’s correct. MR. RILEY: Your before Polis has accused mation was conveyed to ing like the record to reflect that no infor- I would like about Mr. Polis was in with (sic) the Judge here have been in ance of things that defense counsel have said attacks sentence. record reflect law, about every place: Mr. hearing upon my arrived I and one Moroyoqui, duties as I see them under me the record to show sentence, refute before the sense of them, only Honor, following me of upon Sergeant Breen, one and ask that Judge speak- and I would many of the my perform- ex-parteing imposition thing. deny I the infor- conversa- personal Judge that, each Mr. THE COURT: THE COURT: Was it not derogatory MR. RILEY: Your me if I would be bers. your ance. record. knowledge. uals we discussed in more than benefit of the whatever has been done perhaps jeopardize the lives of certain lieves Mr. the conduct and the discussion of that conduct in Mr. individuals. [*] Moroyoqui? I arrival, I left am I [*] invited Mr. Polis into giving Moroyoqui your my likely Well, because Mr. Polis asked [*] doubt, by door receptive chambers. Honor, ‍‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‍. Mr. let me done without open [*] had no Moroyoqui chambers the State be- to continu- clear saying that anticipating the individ- % I believe, part up cham- % mation Breen concerned other indi- Riley, I can Mr. characterize what that participated, believe, viduals we place my took chambers before the the commission of this offense and sentencing as attempt to influence * * * their activities up and their conduct the Court. attempted You point in time were the substance tell me matters that derogatory were of the information that felt we of Mr. Moroyoqui, and when I asked necessary conveyed Judge, to be to the you you if were aware of the law no bad and that was faith and no at- about sentencing someone on matters irregularities or an end run tempt at that were not in the Presentence Re- posi- attitude this Court’s around port, you advised me that I could come tion, sincerely apologizes and the State into Court ignoring and state I was all Polis, Mr. if he Judge and feels that, just going with the Presentence in the any impropriety case. there was Report. That you was after had ab- purpose in What was the ruptly THE COURT: removed my Mr. Polis from of- Sergeant prior Breen talk to me having fice and told you going him were sentencing my chambers? deal with concerning a sensitive matter *8 Moroyoqui. Mr. position, MR. RILEY: The State’s Your * * * Honor, impose was that in a order attempt An was made to influ- sentence, just decisiоn, the Court should be well my ence not between of all aware facts and circumstances imprisonment probation, or but also surrounding just this case and not Mr. imprisonment, the date of and I was

612 it

told that would be an Judge insult to B. Campaign Judicial Conduct. Helm if I were to Moroy- sentence Mr. (1) A candidate, including an incum- now, oqui right that I was to leave him judge, bent judicial for a office dangling his term start after filled either by public election between competing or when he arrived at the State Prison. candidates or on the basis judge. that no ments in Committee dent knew such statements were dent to Respondent made an candidly attempt Based court was improper were upon charged was and forthrightly describe that “respondent’s false, made communication to a with that the testimony, denying false, respon- respon- state- Rule identity, qualifications, present posi- or other fact. tion, (c) should priate (a) should of 45, [******] merit Rules system judicial not maintain thе of the ** election: office Supreme * misrepresent * * * dignity Court, appro- 17A A.R.S. Even if not a candidate judicial parte ex the actual At conversation.” office, lawyer a is held to a narrower stan- time, respondent had been admitted to of dard speech non-lawyer free than a practice years, for less than five and even discussing when judiciary: though respondent’s improper conduct layman may, A perhaps, pursue his theo- parte the ex judge might comments to the ries of speech political free or activities respondent’s have been excused because of until he penalties runs of afoul of youth inexperience, respondent’s lack slander, libel or into some of infraction sentencing of candor at the It cannot. statutory our law. A member bar trying obvious that ex can, will, stopped point at the parte hope to influence the Ethics; infringes where he our Canon of impose would more a severe if he wishes remain a member sentence, respondent, a fact which after bar he will conduct himself in accord- reflection, years several did admit to the ance therewith. Local Respon- Administrative Committee. Woodward, dent In re violating 385, DR 1- 300 S.W.2d 393-94 102(A)(4), misrepresentation, Russell, 1-102(A)(5), (Mo.1957); e.g., State 227 Kan. 901-02, 897, 1122, In prejudicial (1980); conduct 610 administration of P.2d 1126 Raggio, re 7-102(A)(5), 369, 370-71, justice, 87 false Nev. statements. 487 P.2d 499, (1971). 29(a), 501 lawyer may A Rules the Arizona be disci Court, plined public if his comments 17A A.R.S. threaten

significant state interest. Polk v. State Texas, 784, Bar F.Supp. (N.D. Tex.1974); Russell, supra, 227 Kan. at 901, Derogatory 3. Comments good standing 610 P.2d at 1126. judicial system significant inter is such state public We now consider Polk, est. See Generally, 788. also respondent, some before ments made judicial campaign, lawyer may during respondent's cam judicial and some accurately sitting judge, criticize a but provides: paign. DR 8-103 impugn the integrity of the (A) judi- A who is a candidate system question decisions of the comply appli- cial office shall Cf., 622, Sawyer, re U.S. 7 of the provisions of Canon cable 636, 1376, 1383, 1473, 79 S.Ct. 3 L.Ed.2d of Judicial Code Conduct. Hinds, (1959); In re 90 N.J. Conduct 7 of the Code of Judicial Canon Baker, (1982); 449 A.2d part: reads in 209, 214, Kan. 542 P.2d Political Judge A. Should Refrain from Respondent derogatory public made Inappropriate His Judicial Activity against Judge Riley. Respon- statements Office (1) reporters told dent that: as to the con- [******] tempt order, “it’s crazy, it’s abso- *9 Baker, re In re- at 542 P.2d at 705. “motivated lutely insane” and was agree. We Riley],” and venge part of on the [Richard vindictive, (2) Riley was later Richard that ju that We believe candidates for get simply state doesn’t partial, and “[t]he right dicial office have a First Amendment Respondent court.” a fair trial his such to criticize an incumbent for 1-102(A)(5), violating DR guilty of behavior, intemperate injudi matters as prejudicial to the administration conduct actions, judicial temperament, lack of cious that although stated justice, the Committee unnecessary delay in unpredictability, and for the re- empathy it felt “considerable We are aware thаt rendering decisions. in which spondent in the circumstances imper fair comment and the line between **made these statements were that is indistinct also missible comment relatively helpless to defend judges are agree the Committee that We with from such attacks. Neverthe themselves prejudi guilty of conduct less, elec require the jurisdictions justice administration of under cial to the al comment must be judges, tion of such 1-102(A)(5). Respondent’s DR comments lowed. above, particularly the cited statement Lawyers who candidates are simply get state doesn’t a fair that “[t]he integrity judicial may impugn not the office court,” questioned the trial in his decisions deci judicial system question the the jus the court and administration of the Sawyer, In supra. re sions of the do, lawyer in a tice. This cannot even fair the Lawyers may make comment on judicial campaign for office. long judge’s fitness so as the comment note, however, Committee question call into decisions of does not following also found that remarks judi question integrity court or amounted to unethical conduct. lawyer may system. example, a cial For The two criticisms we’ve leveled at the unnecessary delay in judge for criticize a any more than other lack of are decision, question but not reaching a temperament judicial unpredictabili- except appeal. This is itself on the decision go ty. They A hand-in-hand. man who however, lawyer may not say, that a judicial temperament lacks has his emo- disagree publicly judge’s decision. reason, tions rather than his ac- control Proper questioning a avenues for decision happens you and when that tions arrive appellate disciplinary include the route and unpredictable results. proceedings appropriate. where What we disagree In this we with the Committee. denigrates condemn is conduct which judicial system as a whole and undermines speеch Freedom of does fair allow public’s confidence it. dissent comment even con candidate notwithstanding, this case we believe judge opponent: cerning a today opinion way in no dimin our here judicial A non candidate for office is free en ishes the First Amendment freedoms his stand on the issues he announce lawyers. joyed by office, pass upon pledge and to must issues; on those can- vote Comments 4- Unfair to enter custom- didate is forbidden serious, Six, con- Count most Hence, ary campaign arena. unless by respon- made cerned unfair statements pure popularity is to contest election Judge Riley running against dent while alone, recognition on based name These included judicial office. statements legitimate area for debate is the meeting following evening made at an qualifications of the candidates. relative County employees: of Cochise habits, view, health, work our experience ability are a number of decisions of the candidates There legitimate are matters of concern have been made all [Richard no in fact or in law Riley] who must make the choice. that have basis electorate *10 614 they I Hargis the McMullen v.

and feel that have been a waste case of with a mem- your your money time and of County and mine. ber the Cochise of Super- Board Respondent of I examples One the best that have visors. stated: seen, it happened has in the last all, First of I you would like to read to couple weeks, gentlemen, of ladies is of one canons of ethics. Can- Hargis. the case McMullin Many v. of 3, four, page “Adju- on it entitled you of are aware of the enormous Responsibilities”: dicative coverage amount of media of that case— judge A every person should accord indigent it is the one that involves the legally proceed- who is a interested in standards, couple health care and a of ing his lawyer, right full to be heard perhaps ago, slightly weeks more than according to the except law and as that, Judge Riley made a decision which law, by authorized either initiate nor indigent would have lowered the stan- parte ex applications consider concern- county point in dards that the ing pending a or impending proceed- impact you financial on and would have however, ing. A may obtain the Many people been tremendous. were advice a expert disinterested on the talking of bankruptcy in terms of the applicable proceeding. law to a (cid:127) county, laying county off employees. says, gentlemen, What that ladies and found, sup- The Committee and the record any proceeding, that criminal civil ports finding, quot- that “the statement criminal, right both sides have the to be ruling ed above was reference a [njeither right heard side has the Riley [made], Judge pursuant Richard be heard alone. Both sides havе the of Ap- mandate the Arizona Court case, right going to know what’s on peals; knew, that the or should by calling the phone Mr. Jones on known, Judge Riley had no dis- by discussing merits ruling; in making cretion and that the Jones, Hargis McMullen v. case with Mr. statement was made either with an aware- Judge Riley committed unethical untrue, ness that it was or with reckless act. simple as It’s as that. disregard falsity for the truth or of the grievance Any lawyer may have concern- ** statement ing by sitting judge ethical misconduct light Appeals’ ruling, of the Court of on should submitted to the Commission Judge Riley had no choice but to issue the Qualifications. “Going public” Judicial Respondent’s order did. statement con- appropriate a member of the Bar is not the cerning the McMullin case exceeded the method to redress misconduct limits fair comment and left his audience Supreme As South Dakota Court has impression with a false of what actually noted: occurred concerning this matter. This kind respondent sought Thаt instead voice of “campaign rhetoric” is contrary to Can- precisely the manner complaints on 7 of the Code Judicial Conduct which likely most cast and forum that would provides that a who is a candidate integrity competence and upon the doubt misrepresent political office should without judiciary the member of the 45, 7(B)(1)(c), Rule facts. Canon Arizona any con- slightest possibility Court, of the 17 Rules A.R.S. structive, actions would result remedial ex rel. Nebraska State Bar See State respondent’s from belies those remarks Michaelis, 545, 559-61, 210 Ass’n Neb. he made the statement assertions that 46, (1982). Respondent’s N.W.2d 54-55 316 good spirit and in the of construc- faith the realm of fair com- comments exceeded tive criticism. Richeson, 87, 85, In Re See ment. Ariz. 250, (S.D. Lacey, 283 N.W.2d 583, (1946). 166 P.2d 1979). Accord, People Chicago rel. ex Bar Metzen, 55, 58, criti Ass’n v.

We note also that 291 Ill. 125 N.E. Judge Riley allegedly ‍‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‍discussing cized Wines, Ariz. 660 P.2d re

IV (1983). We believe that the sanctions APPROPRIATE SANCTION in the instant imposed the Committee note at first that a fair, reasonable, justified. case were *11 superior to the court shall be “admitted thirty-day suspension impose would practice of the in and a resident of the law respondent for the fact that the were it not years preceding next their state five purpose an incumbent The is now §6, taking office.” Ariz. 22. Const. Art. lawyers and disciplining judges both by provides This court rule protect “[m]em the courts and punish not to but to bers of the State Bar shall be divided into Echeles, public. 430 F.2d the active, retired, three classes: and honor 1.1, (7th Cir.1970). Comment See also ary.” Honorary judges. members include Relating Discipline to Judicial Standards 27(c), Court, Supreme Rule Standards, Rules of the Disability Retirement su- and § 17A Although A.R.S. 28 of Art. 6 of the pra. also note: The standards prohibits practice Arizona Constitution Apart suspension, from interim the stan- record,” “judge by any of law a court of suspension of dards do not recommend this does not mean that a need not pay. Suspension punishes judge without good standing in remain with the Bar when colleagues they judge’s because must judge. By including he becomes a both suspen- carry an extra burden in membership residency the Bar and sion. phrase, people, same we believe the 6.7, Relating to Judi- Standards Comment Constitution, that, adopting the intended as Disability Retirement. Discipline cial office, requisite holding judicial a The the court contains affida- record before good standing must remain both in judges vits from the other two Cochise Indeed, and be a resident of the state. as County concerning disruption § latter, provides Art. that if a respondent would occur if the were sus- judge “absents himself from the state for (both pended judges evidently assumed sixty days,” more than consecutive suspension would not result in forfei- judge shall deemed to have forfeited his office). ture of Because we believe that office. We believe it follows that disbar suspension unnecessarily disrup- would be suspension operatе ment or even would as tive, public we find that censure is the a removal from office. Spriggs, But see appropriate more sanction and so hold. supra, where the court refrained from de V

ciding question. this We must now determine whether a thir- ALLOCATION OF COSTS ty-day suspension appropriate is an sanc- Respondent argues that he because was respon- tion in case. We this believe guilty concerning eight found all prejudiced dent’s conduct the administra- alleged pay counts he should not have to justice, tion of undermined the decisions of expenses the total costs and incurred court, intentionally superior and was pro- the State Bar while investigating misleading. Additionally, although respon- ceeding argues with his case. further He judge, concern about the he dent voiced that he the costs pay should have to to contact the Commission on Judi- failed expenses arising the counts from following Qualifications. Instead of cial whereupоn unethi- redress, appropriate channels of cal conduct. public” his com- respondent “went Our that: rules state plaints part campaign as of his for office. any . 1. of this court judgment The that, We have noted “The disci fix proceedings shall disciplinary pline in each situation must be tailored for expenses paid to be amount of costs case; perfection neither attorney individual nor before he uniformity absolute can be achieved.” suspended and no at- be reinstated torney general power practice lawyer shall resume until court amount expenses of the costs and so control the conduct counsel. ** paid, fully fixed has been *. however, hesitancy, joining with the no holding par- that comments from a 37(g), Rules of the Arizona ticipating in trial characterize a which Court, 17A A.R.S. ruling “crazy” or or the as “insane” State Bar found majority opinion, ante 705-706) {see guilty of four counts unethical conduct inappropriate may form a proper are agree findings. we with these Al subject for imposition discipline under though the very State Bar submitted a Woodward, re 1-102(A)(5). See In DR detailed itemized list expendi of costs and (Mo.1957). Lawyers S.W.2d 385 are not tures, categorized list was not *12 try free in newspaper, to their the cases think, counts. We however, do not that bring nor they appeal are free to their ato categorization by counts necessary. is Re newspaper board editors rather than the spondent was found of four ethical appellate Thus, court. I believe that re- responsible violations therefore for spondent may disciplined be for comments costs and expenses during incurred this Judge Riley made about the Kleindienst, proceeding. See In re pendency of a case in appear- which he was (1982) Ariz. (attorney P.2d ing Judge Riley. before found guilty charges of two out of nine pay expenses ordered to costs and of thе agree I majority also with the re- that proceeding). Only pro if the Bar fails to spondent may disciplined criticizing be for vide an itemized breakdown of costs will Judge Riley entering for an order which the Bar be In re such disallowed costs. required by higher mandate of a Davis, 1, 4, Ariz. 628 P.2d Lawyers special court. obligation have a 37(g), not expressly does state uphold to integrity existence and of the expenses that costs and must be allocated (DR 102(A)(5)), judicial system and their 1— separate to counts. We have reviewed curtailed, rights may first amendment be Bar’s itemized list expenses of costs and little, accomplish at least a in order to this and have they determined that were neces objective. Therefore, lawyers may criticize sary and reasonable. We also believe that decisions, they a or his but are not pursued the Bar investigation each misrepresent free to or mislead to in good count respondent faith. respondent Judgе facts. When criticized pay should the amount assessed. Riley entering for the mandated order It is respondent, ordered that the James indicating Judge Riley without had no Lawrence Riley, publicly be for censured doing, intentionally choice in so he conduct, pay unethical further he misrepresented knowingly distorted to the State Bar of Arizona costs ex- the facts. of a While criticism or his penses $6,459.22 totaling days sixty within lawyer’s decisions is not a breach of the from the in issuance the mandate duty uphold judicial integrity to of the case. system, by knowing accomplished criticism misrepresentation or distortion of fact does HAYS, J., GORDON, Y.C.J., and concur. lawyer’s special duty breach is the subject proper discipline. FELDMAN, Justice, specially concur- ring, respondent I may do believe that be disciplined for his other comments or criti- disagree

I I separately write because Judge Riley Judge Riley’s cisms of portion opinion deci- majority with a of the right sions. Whether pertains lawyer’s right which to the to wrong, right he public regarding sitting make had a first amendment statements necessary judge, judge’s qualifications I do not believe that it is criticize judge’s attempt performance this case to to draw line be- and a office. This rights especially tween the such first amendment true states as Arizona Although majority judges acknowledges where some are elected and where judges authority matter there is substantial which the retention of other is a Const, §§ 12, for the that an incumbent voters. Ariz. art. holds should not Thus, jurisdiction I subject 38. do not believe that to the of a ante, disciplined discipline 698; can be for all of the comments agency, neverthe- less, made. majority concludes that the better practice and more workable is to allow the I be disci- Because do believe lawyer agency proceed to hear the mat- plined involving the the comments ter. pending the en- relating case and those try order, of the mandated I concur in the case of fifty years ago Over specifically join portion result. Spriggs, (1930), Ariz. 284 P. 521 opinion relating jurisdiction judicial Arizona Court held that a disciplinary process sitting judges. bar over leaving officer could be disbarred after of- a rule which would cannot establish fice for acts committed while a permit erring lawyer discipline to avoid an ordinary if attorney officer could be conduct because he or she for unethical disbarred for the same acts. The court at happened get appointed elected or expressly ques- time left undecided the judiciary. sanctuary The bench is not a tion of the effect of if disbarment the re- attorneys. miscreant spondent was still on the bench. At first *13 appear blush this case would to be authori-

HOLOHAN, Justice, dissenting. Chief ty support in majority’s position of the except for one vital jurisdiction If had hear factor —the this court the Constitu- us, tion of Arizona was in agree matter as it came to I could amended 1970 tо add with provisions Article respondent guilty the 6.1. The of the court that of Article 6.1 of the provide in Arizona Constitution unethical conduct at least three instanc- the exclu- opinion remedy any I sive for disciplinary es. dissent from the of the action court against justices peace, of judges because I conclude that this the of the court has no court, jurisdiction matter, superior judges ap- to hear the of the court of be- peals, justices by lieve of this court. that the restrictions announced the limiting majority by lawyer statements can- Qualifications Whether the Judicial Com- judicial incompatible office didates for are by mission created Article 6.1 would have granted by the freedoms the First jurisdiction over judicial the acts of a offi- Amendment to the United States Constitu- judge cer committed before the assumed tion. the bench is a presently matter which is pending in before us another case. Irre- JURISDICTION spective question, of our answer to it The State Bar of juris- Arizona assumed gross appears me a that there has been diction to conduct hearings eight on counts in the method violation of the Constitution of unethical charged conduct against the act in this by presumed to which we have respondent for his activities as a candidate for this can be said case. The most that superior for judge. court The proceedings the conduct of the is that court’s decision were undertaken after respondent the be- majori- compelled the respondent may superior came a of the court. It is clear mandates of the ty ignore the my conclusion that the State Bar of Arizo- Constitution., Arizona jurisdiction na has no hearings conduct or make a recommendation discipline for of THE OF JUDICIARY CRITICISM superior judge. a court The Bar’s in action in assumption power case results an of The of vio- lawyer group a judiciary over the 1-102(A)(5), in lating prejudicial a DR conduct wаy that constitutes a threat to the inde- justice. of administration The ma- pendence judicial department. of the jority finding sustained of the commit-

618 704, ante at opinion, majority guaranteed

tee. The Under the freedom Constitution, states that the comments of begin prop- we must with the questioned the decisions of the court and citizens, attorneys osition that other “[l]ike justice. of administration “This a law- protection are entitled to full of the yer do, cannot campaign even in a for Amendment, participants First even as in Further, 704, ante at judicial office.” justice.” administration of In re lawyers court holds that are candi- who Hinds, 614, 604, 483, 90 N.J. 449 A.2d 489 judicial impugn dates for office not (1982). A review cases which judicial system ques- integrity or of the disciplined attorneys were campaign for tion the decisions The ma- comments directed at an incumbent jority lawyer allows to criticize a that, strongly suggests misrepre- absent unnecessary delay reaching deci- sentation, courts should be most reluctant sion, attorney may question but the not impose discipline upon attorney an except ante appeal, decision itself on judicial comments campaign ex- broad, and 705. sweeping gener- cept egregious circumstances where a alities of these statements casts serious seriously denigrates candidate constitutionality doubt on their view impugns system, reputation in- the First Amendment to the United States judge, in any way cumbent interferes 6, Constitution and Section Article II of the ongoing with an proceeding. See In re opin- Arizona If the Constitution. court’s Donohoe, 173, 90 Wash.2d 580 P.2d 1093 ion had limited itself to statements Baker, (1978); In re 218 Kan. 542 P.2d false, which candidate were mis- Gorsuch, In re (1975); 76 S.D. leading, concerning pending litigation, I State Board Law (1956); N.W.2d 644 joined could have portion Wyo. Spriggs, ‍‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‍Examiners v. opinion. The holding a lawyer as a Hinds, (1945); P.2d cf. judge may candidate for criticize the Russell, 610 P.2d 227 Kan. State sitting however, decisions judge, Election (1980); generally, Cam- cf. neither in harmony with the First Amend- *14 Disciplin- as Ground paign Activities for ment nor with the of free necessities ing Attorney, 26 A.L.R. 4th 170. Cam- society. paign judge’s criticism of an de- incumbent Judges unique are the realm of cisions, record, voting courtroom demean- public books re- officeholders. The record or, habits, however, or work should con- be gretfully show some have been dishon- sidered fair comment. est, ruling A incompetent, prejudiced. Attorney discipline clearly is warranted judici- for lawyer candidate the as a speech where directed at an ary public incumbent bring such facts cannot notice, facts, knowingly judge is a threat contains a false statement if such be the Donohoe, supra, (cen- In re our See system. Often the of fact. constitutional of a way prejudices campaign misrep- the sure for advertisements deficiencies referring spe- record); opponent’s resenting can be is trial shown by Baker, (censure cific cases or cases decided suрra, categories of for advertisement judge. misrepresenting judge’s eligibili- incumbent disability income), ty for and retirement cf. some Although there are statements Russell, (censure supra, v. State for adver- support of the the cases which seem to misrepresenting opponent’s tisement hon- majority the position, analysis of closer transactions), Louisiana esty in business con- cases shows that the questioned actual Karst, Bar Ass’n v. State 428 So.2d 406 duct dealt with matters of misstatement (La.1983) (suspension for false accusation general and falsehood rather than state- Thus, against public judge). state- See ments about decisions of a ments incum- Attorney’s Criticism of A.L.R.3d responsible for Acts judge would have been Disciplinary Judicial As Ground of bent lowering indigent health care standards Action. upon his role in the McMullin based v. 691 P.2d 710 Hargis type case example is Arizona, Appellee, STATE misstatement which sanctions imposed. The incumbent follow- SCHAD, Jr., Appellant. appеllate Edward Harold ing the mandates of the court as required by he was do. The respon- law to No. 4876-2-PC. dent’s statements about incumbent Arizona, Supreme Court judge’s responsibility false were and mis- En Banc. leading. While fact by misstatement of an attor- 29, 1984. Nov. sanction, universally

ney warrants the law equally attorney may clear that an criti- legal cize decisions of a without

sanction, long so as these comments do not with ongoing proceedings. interfere See Sawyer, re

In U.S. S.Ct. Hinds,

L.Ed.2d Accord In re

supra. dealing

We are awith delicate balanc-

ing rights involving public, judge,

incumbent candi- judicial

date On the one office. hand courts, institution, as an are entitled respect due because office acceptance decisions ulti-

mately depends upon the citizens’ belief

in the integrity impartiality of the hand,

courts. On the other the members judiciary subject are legitimate

and accurate criticism and evaluation. Donohoe, re 90 Wash.2d ‍‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‍at P.2d at political 1097. In a system in premium placed

which a upon the free

dissemination of information to allow the

electorate make an informed decision

concerning candidates, choice of however, to impose

courts should be hesitant rules

restricting the flow of information. general

The broad statements in the ma- opinion serve to stifle

jority honest and discussion about

truthful decisions of a court. As I read the majority lawyer may appeal case,

opinion, but lawyer may never comment after finally resolved case

case made law, poor policy, resulted in an injus-

bad position Such a contrary

tice. Constitution, deprives it also but necessary

public information make an performance decision

informed about the judges.

their

Case Details

Case Name: In Re a Member of State Bar of Arizona Riley
Court Name: Arizona Supreme Court
Date Published: Nov 28, 1984
Citation: 691 P.2d 695
Docket Number: SB-289
Court Abbreviation: Ariz.
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