In re A.B.

Aug 31, 2026
E088131

OPINION

T.M. (Mother) appeals from the orders entered at the selection and implementation hearing concerning her infant daughter, A.B. Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, which sought reunification services and additional visitation. (Unlabeled statutory references are to this code.) We disagree and affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. Referral and detention

In November 2024, law enforcement responded to a report that Mother was damaging a vehicle with a hammer. The following day, the vehicle owner told law enforcement that he had met Mother at a fast food restaurant. Mother told him that she had a baby (A.B.) and needed help. He tried to get Mother a motel room, but his credit card was declined. Mother then hit him in the face, took A.B. out of the car and put her in a stroller nearby, got a wrench from the vehicle, and vandalized it.

Mother told law enforcement that she had been in a relationship with the victim (C.C.) for two years and that he is A.B.’s father. She said that she “ripp[ed] out the cable from his car” during an argument. Mother was arrested and charged with vandalism.

In December 2024, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) interviewed maternal aunt Y.M. Y.M. reported that Mother said that she would be incarcerated for at least five months and up to five years. Mother asked Y.M. to care for A.B., who was with maternal cousin R.F. Mother had told R.F. to take A.B. to Y.M., but Y.M did not hear from R.F. after several attempts to contact her. Y.M. spoke to R.F.’s family in Ohio and told them to tell R.F. to bring A.B. to her, which she did on December 17, 2024.

Mother told Y.M. that she had engaged in prostitution while A.B. was present. Mother said that C.C. was her client, and he agreed to pay her by paying for her hotel room. When his credit card was declined, Mother got upset and “started breaking his vehicle.”

Y.M. told CFS that she had tried to help Mother because she was concerned about Mother’s methamphetamine use, prostitution, and transient lifestyle. Y.M. said that she helped Mother get into a transitional housing program in Beverly Hills, but Mother left the program with A.B. and returned to prostitution. Y.M. said that Mother “ha[d] been helped by being enrolled in great programs before, but [Mother] would leave, or she would get kicked out within a couple weeks.” Y.M. said that Mother had been using methamphetamine since 2020 and had admitted using methamphetamine “to stay up for her job.” Y.M. also said that Mother had been a prostitute “for as long as she [could] remember” and that it had “worsened over the past five years.” Y.M. believed that A.B.’s biological father was one of Mother’s clients.

CFS’s investigation revealed that Mother had six other children, including two minor children. The father of one of Mother’s minor children reported that he obtained sole legal and physical custody after she left their five-month-old child on a neighbor’s lawn in the middle of the night. He said that Mother had been working as a prostitute and “messing with unknown drugs or pills.” The father of Mother’s other minor child told CFS that he had “full custody” of their child since July 2022 and that there was no contact with Mother.

CFS contacted C.C., and he denied that he was A.B.’s father. He said that he tried to help Mother by paying for a hotel room. He also said that A.B. “was present when [Mother] punched him [in] the face and when she broke his vehicle wi[n]dows using a wrench.”

In January 2025, CFS obtained a warrant and took three-month-old A.B. into protective custody.

CFS reported that Mother had a child welfare history, which included reports that she suffered from “severe mental health disorders and uses substances” and had a criminal history including convictions for vandalism, providing false identification to a peace officer, assault with a deadly weapon, and second degree robbery.

CFS filed a petition under subdivisions (b)(1) and (g) of section 300, alleging that Mother engaged in domestic violence in A.B.’s presence; has a substance abuse problem; has an unstable, unsafe, and transient lifestyle; has a criminal history; and is incarcerated.

At the detention hearing, the juvenile court granted Mother’s request for predisposition services. The court detained A.B. in the home of licensed foster parents Mrs. P. and Mr. C.

II. Jurisdiction and disposition

CFS filed a jurisdiction and disposition report in February 2025. CFS reported that Mother had served a two-year prison sentence after pleading guilty to second degree robbery in 2020. CFS interviewed Mother by telephone in February 2025, and she said that she started using drugs at age 14 and had been homeless since her father died in November 2022. Mother “refused to acknowledge that she [had a] criminal history.” CFS could not schedule any visits between Mother and A.B., because Mother was still incarcerated.

CFS interviewed C.C., who said that he tried to help Mother because she looked hungry. He said that they drank together “all night,” and Mother asked him to get her and A.B. a hotel room. When C.C.’s credit card was declined, Mother became “pissed off,” hit him with her fist, and destroyed his car.

At the continued jurisdiction and disposition hearing in July 2025, Mother testified that she had “evaluated [her] circumstances that led up to the incident, and [her] daughter being physically removed from [her] custody.” She testified that she had completed certain courses, including “Stressful Life Events,” anger management, parenting, “Scientific Communication and thinking,” and a “20-plus hours” “Straight A Guide” program designed to prepare parolees for “adjustment back [into] the community.” She said that she completed “the MATT program,” which “is a substance recovery program to help the parolee continue to stay off drugs.” Mother acknowledged that she had not had any visits with A.B., and she said that she stays informed about her by calling the social worker. Mother also testified that if she were given the opportunity to reunify with A.B., she “would protect her safety first, first and foremost.”

Mother testified that she had been living on a hotel voucher and did not have the means to support A.B. She said that A.B. was in a hotel room and not nearby during the altercation with C.C. Mother also denied that she had a history of prostitution. Mother testified that she had previously gone to jail for three months and was placed on probation for four years when she was released. She said that she was currently in custody for violating the terms of her probation, and she acknowledged that her conviction was for second degree robbery.

The juvenile court declared A.B. a dependent of the court, removed her from Mother’s custody, and bypassed Mother for reunification services pursuant to subdivision (b)(12) of section 361.5 because of her robbery conviction. The court ordered that Mother have weekly supervised visits with A.B.

III. Section 388 petition and section 366.26 hearing

In October 2025, CFS filed a section 366.26 report recommending adoption as A.B.’s permanent plan. A.B. turned one year old in September 2025. She was taken into protective custody in January 2025 and had not had any contact with Mother since then. A.B. had been with the same caregivers throughout that period. CFS was trying to obtain A.B.’s birth certificate in order to initiate the approval process for A.B. to have in-person visits with Mother in prison. Mother had not had any video visits with A.B. “due to ongoing technical issues with the application on the caregiver’s end.”

Mrs. P. described her relationship with A.B. as a “‘mother-daughter relationship’” and said that “the child loves us and we love her.” She said that A.B. refers to her and Mr. C. as “‘mama and papa.’” Mrs. P. and Mr. C.’s children said that they loved A.B. too. Mrs. P. said that her “child rearing philosophy included teaching [A.B.] to be loving, respectful, and [to have] moral values.” CFS thought that A.B. “appear[ed] to be very comfortable in her home environment and in the care of [Mrs. P.] and her family.” Mother was released from incarceration on January 6, 2026, and filed a section 388 petition nine days later, requesting that the court order “reunification services and additional visitation.” Mother alleged that she had “engaged in an entire case plan, completed case plan, been appropriate at visits, and has since been released from custody.” The petition said nothing else about the alleged visits, including how many there were or when they took place. Mother claimed that granting her petition would be in A.B.’s best interests because A.B. would be raised by her biological mother. Mother attached certificates of completion for the courses she took in prison, including “Learn Your Strengths from Shining Light,” “PTSD For Veterans,” “Learning How to be a Better Parent,” “Straight-A Guide,” “Parenting While Incarcerated,” a substance abuse recovery course, “Neil deGrasse Tyson Teaches Scientific Thinking and Communication,” “Stressful Life Events,” and anger management. She also completed over 10 hours of supplemental learning.

As of January 2026, Mother was in a transitional living program for formerly incarcerated individuals. She was unemployed and on parole. She “anticipate[d] participation in substance abuse treatment and anger management classes as part of her parole requirements.” She was also participating in counseling services.

At the section 366.26 hearing in March 2026, the juvenile court began by hearing argument on whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on Mother’s section 388 petition. Mother’s counsel argued that Mother made a prima facie showing that her circumstances had changed and that was in A.B.’s best interests to grant Mother’s requests. The court disagreed, found that Mother had not made a prima facie showing that her circumstances had changed or that her requested relief was in A.B.’s best interests, and denied Mother’s petition without an evidentiary hearing. The court then found that A.B. was likely to be adopted and that the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption did not apply, and the court accordingly terminated parental rights.

DISCUSSION

Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing. She contends that she “alleged sufficiently specific facts” to make a prima facie showing that circumstances had changed and that reunification services and increased visitation would be in A.B.’s best interests. We disagree.

“Section 388 permits the parent of a dependent child to petition the juvenile court for a hearing to modify an earlier order on the basis of changed circumstances or new evidence.” (In re N.F. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 112, 120.) The petitioner bears the burden of showing that new evidence or changed circumstances exist and that the proposed modification would be in the child’s best interest. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 (Stephanie M.).)

The petitioner must make a prima facie showing of both changed circumstances and best interests to trigger the right to an evidentiary hearing on a section 388 petition. (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 205.) “‘However, if the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child, the court need not order a hearing on the petition. [Citations.] The prima facie requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.’” (Ibid.)

Regarding the best interest element, once the court has bypassed or terminated reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing, “‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.’” (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317; In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527 (J.C.).) A court considering a section 388 petition at that stage in the proceedings “must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child.” (Stephanie M., at p. 317.)

“Whether the juvenile court should modify a previously made order rests within its discretion, and its determination may not be disturbed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” (J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 525.) “‘“The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.”’” (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319.)

It was reasonable for the juvenile court to determine that Mother had not made a prima facie showing that granting her request for reunification services and additional visitation would be in A.B.’s best interests. A.B. was three months old when taken into protective custody in January 2025, thereafter had no contact with Mother at least through October 2025, and was approximately one and one-half years old when the juvenile court denied Mother’s section 388 petition in March 2026. Mother’s petition asserted that Mother had “been appropriate at visits,” but the petition said nothing else about any alleged visits, including how many Mother had attended or when they occurred. There was no other evidence of any such visits. Thus, the record before the juvenile court when it ruled on Mother’s petition reflected that A.B. had almost no relationship with Mother. A.B. had been in Mother’s custody for at most three of the 18 months of A.B.’s life, and for most of A.B.’s life she had no contact with Mother at all.1

In contrast, A.B. had been living with her caregivers for over one year, and she was bonded with them. Her caregivers loved her, and she loved them. A.B. was “very comfortable in her home environment and in the care of [her caregivers]” and their family.

For all of these reasons, it was reasonable for the court to determine that Mother had not made a prima facie showing that ordering reunification services or additional visits would serve A.B.’s interest in stability and permanency. A.B. was already thriving in a safe and stable permanent placement, and there was no prima facie showing that it would be in her interest to disrupt or jeopardize that placement in order to attempt reunification with Mother, whom A.B. hardly knew. The court therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing.

DISPOSITION

The orders denying Mother’s section 388 petition and terminating parental rights are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ

J.

We concur:

McKINSTER

Acting P. J.

FIELDS

J.

Notes

1
At the section 366.26 hearing, Mother testified that she had attended three visits since her release from incarceration. The social worker testified that was incorrect. Even if the juvenile court had heard and credited Mother’s testimony before ruling on Mother’s petition, it would not have changed the analysis. The record would still have shown that Mother and A.B. had almost no relationship.