In the Matter of W. L. P, a Minor Child. STATE OF OREGON ex rel DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent on Review, v. W. P., Petitioner on Review.
CC 07201J; CA A136056; SC S055687
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
February 5, 2009
216 Or App 555, 173 P3d 841 (2007)
BALMER, J.
En Banc. On review from the Court of Appeals. Argued and submitted September 18, 2008. Appeal from Lane County Circuit Court, Eveleen Henry, Judge.
Anna M. Joyce, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.
BALMER, J.
We allowed review in this case to consider whether the exclusionary rule, under which illegally obtained evidence is excluded from certain court proceedings, applies to a parent‘s motion to suppress evidence in a juvenile dependency proceeding involving the parent‘s child. The juvenile court determined that it does not and therefore denied a motion to suppress filed by child‘s father. The court then found child to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and placed child in the custody of the Department of Human Services (DHS). Father appealed, arguing that the court had erred in denying his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. W. P., 216 Or App 555, 173 P3d 841 (2007). We allowed father‘s petition for review and now affirm.
In March 2007, in connection with a drug investigation involving mother, police executed a search warrant of the home of mother, father, and child. During that search, officers found drugs in the home and on father‘s person. Both parents were arrested, and the police contacted DHS concerning child. Due to both parents’ arrests and the fact that drugs were found within child‘s reach, DHS placed child in foster care and filed a juvenile dependency petition, requesting that the court take jurisdiction over child.
Father appealed the juvenile court‘s judgment of jurisdiction, arguing that the juvenile court had erred in refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to juvenile dependency cases. As noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion, and father petitioned this court for review. We allowed review to consider father‘s claim that, under
We begin by describing the statutory basis for juvenile dependency proceedings, because those statutes establish specific rights and duties of father, child, and the state that are central to our consideration of father‘s constitutional claims.
In furtherance of those state goals, the juvenile court “has exclusive original jurisdiction” in any case involving a child “[w]hose condition or circumstances are such as to endanger the welfare of the [child] * * *.”
With that background, we turn to father‘s argument that the evidence that he possessed drugs should have been excluded from the juvenile court jurisdictional hearing. We begin with father‘s state constitutional claims. See Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or 611, 614, 625 P2d 123 (1981) (court analyzes state claims before federal claims). As noted, the juvenile court did not decide whether the evidence was obtained in violation of father‘s constitutional rights, because it concluded that, even if the evidence had been unlawfully obtained, it should not be excluded. For purposes of this opinion, therefore, we assume that the evidence was unlawfully obtained. Oregon courts have consistently held that evidence obtained from a person in violation of
This court explained the analytical approach for resolving that issue in State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Rogers, 314 Or 114, 839 P2d 127 (1992). In Rogers, the issue was whether the exclusionary rule should be applied in a probation revocation hearing in a juvenile delinquency case. The juvenile‘s probation had been revoked, in part, because he had unlawfully possessed a gun, and he moved to suppress the gun, arguing that it had been seized in violation of
Father argues that the juvenile dependency proceeding interferes with his liberty interest in controlling the care and custody of his child. See O‘Donnell-Lamont and Lamont, 337 Or 86, 100, 91 P3d 721 (2004) (recognizing parents’ interest, protected by the Due Process Clause, in making decisions concerning their children);
Although any restriction by the state on father‘s control over the upbringing of child interferes with father‘s liberty interest, the restriction at issue here -- an order determining that child is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court -- is temporary and conditional. In a criminal prosecution, the defendant himself or herself is subject to a final adjudication that may result in incarceration and immediate loss of physical liberty, possible criminal fines, and temporary or permanent restrictions on travel, association, and behavior. The nature of the defendant‘s liberty interest at stake in a criminal prosecution is such that, as this court stated in Davis, the court will “denying the state the use of [illegally seized] evidence * * * against the persons whose rights were violated[.]” 295 Or at 237. But the interest at stake in this juvenile dependency proceeding is qualitatively different. The proceeding did not result in a final determination depriving father of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, such as could result from other criminal or civil proceedings.
Moreover, we do not consider a parent‘s interest in controlling a child‘s upbringing in a vacuum. As the statutes discussed above demonstrate, a child also has specific legal rights and interests, and the state initiates juvenile dependency proceedings to protect those rights. In exercising jurisdiction over a child, the juvenile court must “protect the rights and interests” of the child, as well as the parent‘s interest.
Although father acknowledges that this court has applied the exclusionary rule only in criminal cases and in the analogous setting of a juvenile delinquency probation revocation hearing, he argues that this court‘s statements about the rule in earlier cases support his position. In particular, he points to Davis, where this court stated that it has given effect to the prohibition on unlawful searches “by restoring the parties to their position as if the state‘s officers had remained within the limits of their authority.” 295 Or at 237. Father argues that Davis demonstrates that the exclusionary rule prevents the state from using any evidence secured in violation of a person‘s rights against that person, whether in a criminal or civil proceeding. He asserts that the only way in which a court can “restor[e] the parties to their position as if the state‘s officers had remained within the limits of their authority” is to exclude the wrongfully obtained evidence from this juvenile dependency proceeding.
Father‘s reliance on Davis is misplaced. First, Davis did not purport to state a rule that would apply in every case. Rather, Davis simply reviewed this court‘s earlier cases (and some federal cases) discussing when the exclusionary rule had and had not been applied, id. at 233-37, and then attempted to summarize those holdings in the sentence that father cited. However, every Oregon case that the court cited involved the application of the exclusionary rule in a criminal proceeding, and Davis itself was a criminal case. Thus, the holding in Davis provides little guidance with respect to the application of the exclusionary rule to other proceedings.
Second, a closer examination of the statement upon which father relies shows that it does not support his position here. The court stated in Davis that protections against illegal searches should be “given effect” by “restoring the parties to their position” as if the illegal search had not occurred. 295 Or at 237 (emphasis added). In Davis, as in other criminal cases, the remedy of exclusion makes sense, because the persons (or “parties“) whose interests are involved in the criminal prosecution -- the state and the defendant -- are the same persons who were involved in the illegal search. However, in a juvenile dependency proceeding, as discussed in detail above, the dispute involves not just the state and the person whose Article I, section 9, rights were violated in the search and who now seeks exclusion of the evidence. Rather, an additional critical interest is involved: that of the child who is the subject of the proceeding. The statutes make the child‘s interests paramount on a sufficient showing of danger to the child. Restoring the state and the parent who invokes the exclusionary rule to their previous “positions” may vindicate the privacy interest of the parent whose Article I, section 9, rights were violated and prevent the state from making use of illegally obtained evidence, but it would do so at the potential cost of failing to protect the interests of the vulnerable subject in a dependency proceeding, viz., the child.
Father is correct that
Having concluded that the Oregon Constitution does not require exclusion of the evidence illegally seized from father, we now turn to whether the
In determining the likely social benefits, the Supreme Court has stated that “the ‘prime purpose’ of the [exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, ‘is to deter future unlawful police conduct.‘” Janis, 428 US at 446 (quoting Calandra, 414 US at 347). For example, in Janis, the government attempted to use evidence seized by local law enforcement in a federal civil tax proceeding. The Court noted that the improperly seized evidence would be excluded in both a state and a federal criminal trial, so “the local law enforcement official [wa]s already ‘punished’ * * *.” 428 US at 448. Either the exclusion of the evidence in the criminal cases would sufficiently deter law enforcement from violating Fourth Amendment rights, in which case excluding the evidence from civil cases would have only a marginal effect, or law enforcement would not be deterred by exclusion, in which case the exclusionary rule is not a useful deterrent and should not be used at all. Id. at 453-54. Thus, the Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply in a civil tax proceeding. Similarly, the search here was conducted by local law enforcement officials investigating potential criminal activity. If it was improperly seized, the evidence will be excluded in any criminal proceedings against father. As in Janis, applying the exclusionary rule to the juvenile dependency proceeding would provide little, if any, additional deterrence.
In contrast, the likely costs of applying the exclusionary rule to juvenile dependency proceedings are great. In any proceeding, the cost of the exclusionary rule includes “the loss of often probative evidence and all of the secondary costs that flow from the less accurate or more cumbersome adjudication that therefore occurs.” Lopez-Mendoza, 468 US at 1041. In a juvenile dependency proceeding, those “secondary costs” include the likelihood that the state will be unable to respond effectively to threats to a child‘s safety. In cases where illegally seized evidence is the state‘s only evidence of neglect or abuse, the state would be required to leave the child, potentially, in harm‘s way. Weighing the substantial social cost of ignoring children‘s safety against the minimal additional deterrence achieved by applying the exclusionary rule to juvenile dependency proceedings, we conclude that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply in juvenile dependency proceedings.
Notes
“[T]he juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in any case involving a person who is under 18 years of age and:
“* * * * *
“(c) Whose condition or circumstances are such as to endanger the welfare of the person or of others[.]”
“No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.”
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”