{¶ 2} On November 22, 2005, the agency filed a complaint in the Juvenile Court alleging that D., and her half-brother, E.B. (hereinafter "E.") (d.o.b. 8/22/91), were abused, neglected and dependent children. According to the complaint, D. was sexually abused by E., who entered a plea of "true" to a charge of Gross Sexual Imposition, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} On November 28, 2005, the trial court appointed Carolyn and Rick Kirkpatrick as guardians ad litem for the children.
{¶ 4} On November 30, 2005, the trial court entered an order placing D. in the temporary custody of the agеncy, with the consent of appellant and Scott, D.'s father.1 A preliminary case plan was subsequently filed which, among other things, ordered that E., D., and Regina complete mental health assessments.
{¶ 5} On January 13, 2006, the trial court held an adjudicatory hearing on the complaint. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that D. was an abused and dependent child. In so concluding, the court stated as follows: *3
{¶ 6} "[T]he court finds that [E.] was sexually abuse[d] by his mother and father. Mother engaged in sexual intercourse with her son, and his father, Merl * * *, actively participated in helping to facilitate the sex act. [D.] was sexually abused by her brother, [E.], who was adjudicated to have committed the offense of Gross Sexual Imposition in violation of 2907.05(A)(4), a felony of the fourth degree if committed by an adult. The court further finds [E.] to be a neglected child as defined by ORC
{¶ 7} The court held a dispositional hearing on February 13, 2006. In its judgment entry following the hearing, the court ordered that the children remain in the temporary custody of the agency. The court noted that E., D. and Regina had cоmpleted their initial assessments, and that E. and D. had begun treatment, but Scott and Merl had not. The court noted, in its concerns that "[treatment for [E.], [D.] and Regina is expected to be lengthy and has only just begun." In addition, the court issued a no contact order against Regina, which ordered her not to intentionally bе within 1/4 mile of the children, with the exception that she "may have contact with the children consistent with the therapeutic recommendations of the children's counselors."
{¶ 8} On March 23, 2006, the trial court issued an agreed order of child support, in which Regina was ordered to pay $84.21 per month.
{¶ 9} On May 19, 2006, the сourt held a review hearing. At this time, Regina was in the Trumbull County Jail awaiting trial on the criminal charges brought as a result of her sexual activity with E.. As a result, Regina was unable to continue counseling, and had not completed a sexual aggression assessment, as ordered. *4
{¶ 10} Another review hearing was held on August 11, 2006. Following the hearing, the trial court found that although Regina had initiated a STOP assessment as ordered, she had recently been sentenced to three years of incarceration for her conduct related to the case.
{¶ 11} On October 18, 2006, the agency filed a motion for permanent custody, pursuаnt to R.C.
{¶ 12} A hearing on the agency's motion was held on January 11, 2007. At the hearing, Rеgina executed a voluntary permanent surrender of custody of E. to the agency. On January 22, 2007, the trial court entered judgment granting permanent custody of E. and D. to the agency. *5
{¶ 13} Regina appeals the decision of the trial court on the limited basis of the trial court's grant of custody of D. to the agency, assigning the following as error for our review:
{¶ 14} "The Juvenile Court erred in determining that granting permanent custody to the Agency was in the best interest of the child."
{¶ 15} In her sole assignment of error, Regina raises three arguments: First, she argues that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to discuss of all the bеst interest factors as contained in R.C.
{¶ 16} As an initial matter, we note the well-established legal axiom that a parent's right to raise a child has been described as an essential and basic civil right. In re Hayes (1997)
{¶ 17} These protections are embodied in Revisеd Code Chapter 2151. Pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 18} If any of the preceding elements are found by clear and convincing evidence, the court is then obligated to ascertain, by clear and convincing еvidence, what is in the best interest of the child.Noda,
{¶ 19} In making a permanent placement determination based upon the best interest of the child, the court is required to consider all relevant factors under R.C.
{¶ 20} When reviewing a trial court's decision on a manifest weight of the evidence basis, an appellate court is guided by the presumption that the findings of the trial court were correct. Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v.Cleveland (1984),
{¶ 21} The aforementioned "standard of review for weight of the evidence issues applies * * * when reviewing awards of permanent custody to public children services *8
agencies * * *. If the record shows some competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court's grant of permanent custody to the county, * * * we must affirm that court's decision, regardless of the weight we might have chosen to put on the evidence." In re Kangas, 11th Dist. No. 2006-A-0084,
{¶ 22} In the instant matter, the trial court found that R.C.
{¶ 23} In its judgment entry, the trial court considered D.'s "interaсtion with parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and * * * other significant persons," and made the following relevant findings:
{¶ 24} "[D.] was sexually abused by her brother, [E.]. [E.] was sexually abused by his mother * * *. [E.] has no contact with either of his parents or his sibling * * *. [D.] initially resided with her grandmother, but was removed from her grandmother's home and plaсed with her aunt due to grandmother's inability to provide for her. [D.] has adjusted well to her aunt's home. Her aunt has expressed an interest in adopting [D.] if [D.] becomes eligible for adoption."
{¶ 25} As is clear from the foregoing, there is no evidence that the trial court failed to consider this first factor. "This court hаs held on several occasions that the provisions of R.C.
{¶ 26} Contrary to Regina's assertions, the trial court addressed D.'s interrelationship and interactions with her in other portions of the judgment entry. In this regard, the court stated as follows:
{¶ 27} "Before * * * Regina * * * could be considered as a possible custodian * * * [she] would have to successfully completed intensive sex offender treatment and be closely monitorеd for an extended period of time after [she] is released from prison. Adult sex offender treatment typically takes approximately 3-5 years to complete successfully." * * * Regina * * * is currently incarcerated for committing a sexual offense against her son. She has not yet complеted sex offender treatment."
{¶ 28} As is clear from the foregoing, the trial court addressed the interrelationship or interaction between D. and Regina in making its decision. Essentially, the trial court acknowledged that therewas no interrelationship or interaction between D. and Regina.
{¶ 29} Our review of the record supports the trial court's findings. D. had been in the temporаry custody of the agency since December 1, 2005. A no contact order was issued against Regina in February of 2006 following the adjudicatory hearing. Regina had been incarcerated since March of 2006, pending her trial on the Sexual Battery charges. In June 2006, Regina was sentenced to four concurrent three year prison terms for these charges. Thus, there was competent, credible evidence to support the aforementioned finding of the trial court. *10
{¶ 30} Finally, we find no merit to Regina's argument that the trial court erred or abused its discretion by failing to consider the "less drastic alternative" of granting legal custody of D. to her aunt, Sharon.
{¶ 31} At trial, Sharon testified that she has had custody of D. since February 2006. By all accounts, D.'s grades, attitude, personal hygiene, and behavior had improved dramatically since that placement. She is attending counseling regularly. Although D. misses her mother, she remains "angry" with her and doesn't think she can provide her with a safe environment. When asked if the agency had discussed the possibility of having legal custody of D., Sharon stated that she was only interested in adoption rather than legal custody, because she felt that D. "needs a stable home and stable guidance."
{¶ 32} With regard to fulfilling its statutory duty under R.C.
{¶ 33} Regina's sole assignment of error is without merit.
{¶ 34} The judgment of the Geаuga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division is affirmed.
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, P.J., MARY JANE TRAPP, J., concur.