{¶ 2} In his sole assignment of error, Puterbaugh contends the trial court erred in granting the Chases visitation because they are not related to C.C. and do not meet the *2 statutory requirements for non-parent visitation.
{¶ 3} The record reflects that the trial court adjudicated C.C. dependent shortly after his birth in 2000 based on his father's absence and his mother's inability to care for him. The trial court awarded the Chases legal custody at that time, and the child remained in their care for approximately six years. In 2005, Puterbaugh established paternity and moved for custody of C.C. Following a two-day hearing, a magistrate filed an April 27, 2006 decision awarding Puterbaugh legal custody of C.C. and granting the Chases "every other weekend visitation in light of their long contact with the child[.]" The trial court later overruled objections by both parties and adopted the magistrate's decision.
{¶ 4} On appeal, Puterbaugh contends the trial court lacked authority to grant the Chases visitation with C.C. He claims the trial court's decision is "contrary to R.C. § 3[1]09.051 and/or contrary to a dependency action." In support of his argument, Puterbaugh relies exclusively on In re E.H., Lorain App. No. 04CA008585,
{¶ 5} On appeal, the Ninth District agreed, observing that the Revised Code contained three subsections governing non-parent visitation with minor children. The first, R.C. §
{¶ 6} Upon review, we find Puterbaugh's reliance on In re E.H. to be unpersuasive. Although the Chases do not meet the criteria for non-parent visitation found in R.C. Chapter 3109 and discussed in In reE.H., our analysis does not end there. As the trial court recognized, the present case began as a dependency action. Granting the Chases visitation rights is not, as Puterbaugh argues, "contrary to * * * a dependency action." Revised Code §
{¶ 7} "(A) Any court that issues a dispositional order pursuant to section
{¶ 8} In the present case, the trial court determined, after a hearing with proper notice, that it was in the best interest of C.C. to modify the custody arrangement by granting Puterbaugh legal custody and granting the Chases visitation every other weekend. Based on the foregoing statutory authority, the trial court had jurisdiction to modify the existing custody arrangement. As set forth above, R.C. §
{¶ 9} Finally, the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in In re Gibson is distinguishable. In that case, Paul Gilbert, the grandfather of juvenile Mark Gibson, filed a complaint seeking visitation with the boy. Gibson was not a dependent, abused, or neglected child, and he lived with both of his parents. Upon review, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the request for visitation. Consistent with our analysis herein, the Gibson court noted that R.C. Chapter 3109 authorizes non-parent visitation following some "disruptive precipitating event" such as the death or divorce of a parent. Gibson,
{¶ 10} The Gibson court next rejected Gilbert's attempt to characterize his motion as one for "custody" brought under, inter alia, R.C. §
{¶ 11} Unlike Gibson, the present case did not originate as a complaint for visitation brought by a non-parent. Instead, it originated as a dependency action. The *6
trial court possessed original jurisdiction over the dependency action pursuant to R.C. §
{¶ 12} Based on the reasoning set forth above, we overrule Puterbaugh's sole assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division.
GRADY and WALTERS, JJ., concur.
(Hon. Sumner E. Walters, retired from the Third District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio).