Lead Opinion
A fоurteen year old juvenile was charged with offenses which brought her under the Youth Rehabilitation Act. The child and her mother separately requested counsel. After finding them indigent the court appointed the Public Defender to represent the daughter. The appellants, W. Craig James and Idaho Legal Aid Servicеs, were appointed to represent the mother.
After termination of the proceedings, appellants sought compensation for services rendered-, submitting a statement of fees ($277.32) to the District Court Clerk of Gem County. The magistrate who appointed counsel and heard the matter annotated the fee statement “appearances confirmed” and forwarded it to the district’s administrative judge.
The administrative district judge entered the following order:
“W. CRAIG JAMES and Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc. having been appointed as counsel for the custodial parent in the above captioned matter; a trial determination of the case having been made; a claim for attorney fees having been timely made pursuant to Idaho Code 16— 1809A, as supported by a sworn statement of fees; ■ and the Court finding that W. CRAIG JAMES and Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc. are not entitled to attorney fees; now therefore, it is,
“ORDERED that the claim for attorney fees submitted by W. CRAIG JAMES and Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc. be and the same is hereby denied.”
Two issues are presented. Appellants claim error on the part of the court in holding them not entitled to attorney fees; respondents move to dismiss the appeal as improperly taken “from an еxtrajudicial ministerial act.” Respondents do not address the issue raised by appellants. We turn first to the motion to dismiss.
Common School District No. 58 v. Lunden,
While it is true, as pointed out by respondents, that there is no specific statutory provision for judicial review of orders passing on claims for attorney fees in connection with legal services rendered as appointed counsеl in Y.R.A. cases, the Third Judicial District apparently has adopted some procedure whereby such claims once verified by the magistrate must gain the approval of the Third District’s administrative judge. It is logical to believe that the respondent judge acted upon some agreement or understanding with the resрondent Board of County Commissioners whereby the Board desired his approval of such claims. This is in accord with I.C. § 19-856: when counsel are appointed to represent an indigent criminal defendant, “the court shall prescribe reasonable compensation for him and approve the expensеs necessarily incurred by him in the defense of the needy person.”
In Spaulding v. Children’s Home Finding and Aid Society,
What was said in Spaulding in 1965 remains true today. Y.R.A. proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, and the right of the involved indigents tо counsel cannot be seriously contested. Under the provisions of both I.C. § 1&-1809A of the Y.R.A. and I.C. §§ 19-853(c) and 19-856 of the Criminal Code, respectively the indigent youthful offender (and his parent) and the indigent adult offender are entitled to an order of the court providing legal representation; hence we see no fault оn the part of the respondent judge and respondent county in utilizing in both instances the attorney fees claim approval procedure years ago set forth in the Criminal Code and, as amended, still in effect today.
Concomitant with the contention just disposed of, respondents argue that appellants were not parties in the court below in the juvenile proceeding. This is true, but appellants were very much parties in the ensuing compensation proceeding and certainly they were aggrieved by the order holding them not sо entitled. Renfro v. Nixon,
Turning to the issue which appеllants present, and assuming as do appellants that the denial of entitlement to fees was predicated upon appellants’ status as paid legal aid attorneys, we hold that appellants are entitled to compensation. In doing so we acknowledge the benefit of the brief of amicus curiae, Legal Services Corp.
In the Unitеd States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to attorney fees in the absence of a statutory provision or enforceable contract. But where Con
In the present case, I.C. § 16 — 1809A provides a statutory basis for the mandatоry award of reasonable attorney fees by the county to court-appointed counsel in Youth Rehabilitation Act proceedings. This intent of the legislature is clearly indicated by similar mandatory language found in other statutes pertaining to juveniles, e. g., Idaho Juvenile Rule 4(b), which states: “Counsel appоinted for a child in a Y.R.A. proceeding shall initially receive reasonable compensation from the county . . . .” See Child Protective Act, I.C. § 16-1618 and Idaho Juvenile Rule 4(a). The statute does not distinguish between legal aid and court-appointed private attorneys. If the county is required to pay reasonable fees to court-appointed private counsel, it is also required to pay reasonable fees to legal aid attorneys who are appointed by the court in these proceedings. See Avan v. Municipal Court for Los Angeles Jud. Dist.,
“The Act utilizes mandatory language. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) states: ‘The Court shall . . allow a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .’ Thus the court would appear to have no discretion to deny such fees. See Wright v. Carrigg,275 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1960). Likewise, it is of no moment that the plaintiff himself may not owe or otherwise be obligated to pay counsel an attorney’s fee, because the statute provides the attorney with a direct interest. .
“There is no logical reason to lessen defendant’s burden simply because an indigent plaintiff obtains representation by an entity such as CLS. The extent of defendant’s liability should not depend upon the ability of plaintiff to hire private counsel. Because CLS is publicly financed, reimbursement to it for the time and effort its attorneys and staff expended in vindicating the rights of plaintiff individually and the plaintiff class is all the more compelling. By awarding reasonable fees to CLS, its limited resources will be increased to expand its present services, or conversely, the same services may be rendered with less expenditure of publiс funds. In either event the public benefits, and at no greater expense to defendants than if plaintiffs had privately retained an attorney.”
Accord, Townsend v. Edelman,
The order of the district court is reversed with directions that the claim for compensation be reconsidered in light of the views herein expressed.
Costs to appellants.
Notes
. The forerunner to I.C. § 19-856 was I.C.A. 19-1413, as amended in 1937, providing that where counsel were appointed for indigents being tried for felonies, services rendered “must be paid for out of the county treasury, upon order of the judge of the court, such sum as the court may deem reasonable for the services rendered.” From 1864 until 1937, district court representations were statutorily set at ten dollars for misdemeanors, fifty dollars for murder cases, and all other felonies twenty-five dollars.
. We see little distinction between a procedure where the court sets the fee and directs payment, and one where the court approves the claim as а prerequisite to approval by the county commissioners. If the legislature in passing I.C. § 16-1809A had in mind something different from the procedure here adopted by the county and district judge, it can be easily rectified by the legislature.
. The district judge undoubtedly would rather be thought of as having acted judicially rather than ministerially. For definition of that which is ministerial in nature, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) at p. 899 states:
“That which is done under the authority of a superior; opposed to judicial. That which involves obedience to instructions, but demands no special discretion, judgment, or skill.”
. For other cases which acknowledge standing of attorneys to aрpeal denial of fees, see Maddrix v. Dize,
In Taylor v. Taylor,
This Court entertained the appeal and reversed the dismissal and the denial of the continuance. The opinion of the Court does not reflect any specific challenge raised as to the right of the attorneys to appeal. The statute at that time spoke in terms of “aggrieved parties” having the right of appeal.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
In the instant case the minuscule, almost nonexistent, “record” demonstrates only that a fourteen year old girl shoplifted somе soft drinks and a package of doughnuts. Alleging that the child was within the purview of the Youth Rehabilitation
We are not told whether any hearing on that claim was held nor whether the district judge denied the claim on the basis that it was excessive, that the claimed services had not been rendered, or that the judge thought that since the attorney was a member of a lеgal aid service, such service should be rendered without compensation. Of these matters, the record is completely lacking.
Thereafter, as reflected by the record, the attorney filed a purported notice of appeal giving notice to the administrative judge and to the Board of County Commissioners of Gem County that he was taking an appeal from an order of the magistrate’s division to the Supreme Court. I am unable to discern how such an appeal could be taken directly from the magistrate’s division to this Court and am further confused as to how an attorney (or any other class of person who rеndered a service or furnished material to a county) can prosecute a creditor’s claim under the guise of appealing a matter to which he is a non-party.
The attorney here may or may not have a cause of action against the county upon the denial of his creditor’s claim. If he brings such an action, he may recover or, depending upon the facts and circumstances revealed, his claim may be determined by a court to be unfounded in part or in whole.
In my judgment, the majority opinion becomes needlessly involved in the technical niceties of whether or not the judge who denied the claim for legal fees was acting in a “judicial proceeding” or whether legal aid attorneys, because they are salaried employees of a public body, are or are not entitled to fees. With all deference, in my judgment, those issues should be resolved in a proper proceeding brought by the person claiming to be the creditor against the person or body who it is claimed is the debtor.
Again, with all deference, I cannot agree that the authorities cited in the majority opinion are in point or material to the case at bar. Both Townsend and Hairston are cases wherein parties took an appeal from deniаl of attorney’s fees and the discussion of those cases relates to the allowance of such attorney’s fees. Rodriguez was the decision of a federal trial court allowing attorney’s fees to community legal services. As indicated above, it is my opinion that the question of whether public service attorneys are entitled to be awarded fees should be reserved following a proper action to collect those fees. My point is perhaps best exemplified by the Avan case cited by the majority opinion, wherein a direct action by way of writ of mandate was brought by the attorney against the court which denied the attorney’s fees.
It is enough to state at this point that an attorney has no authority to institute or maintain an appeal separate and apart from his client. Annot.
I would dismiss the attempted appeal and leave the attorney to pursue his creditor’s claim through the regular channels of litigation, wherein an adequate record may be developed.